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Abstract 
 
Emotions are ubiquitous in everyday life, and can often be re-experienced accurately 
after long periods. Emotions also have a strong mutual influence on other memory 
systems (most notably episodic memory), but rely on different neuroanatomical 
structures, and can function independently – often reported in amnesic patients. 
However, unlike episodic memory, many fundamental questions about the structure of 
emotions remain unresolved. The two most influential accounts of the organisation of 
affect (the dimensional and categorical theories) are surprisingly divergent, an issue not 
addressed by the fact that emotion memory studies tend to be based on two rather than 
many emotion categories. Moreover, the field lacks sophisticated empirical tools for 
analysing discrete emotions, and calculating their specificity. Using a novel set of 
controlled emotional stories, the present thesis investigated the re-experience of four 
discrete classes of emotion (anger, fear, sadness, and happiness) in three samples: 
neurologically-normal participants (N=32), Korsakoff’s syndrome patients (N=20), and 
age-matched controls (N=20). The results suggest that: (1) The most durable form of 
emotional memory encodes affective valence. Discrete emotions can be reliably re-
experienced, but require stronger forms of emotion elicitation than valence. (2) 
Remarkably, severely amnesic Korsakoff’s syndrome patients show a preserved ability 
to re-experience discrete emotions, at similar levels of intensity to neurologically-
normal age-matched controls. Furthermore, the intensity of discrete emotions, in 
patients and controls, appears to be related to core executive functions; (3) Using a 
novel methodological approach, it is clear that the brief experience of certain discrete 
emotions (e.g., happiness) also increases the specificity of other emotions (e.g., anger 
and fear). Thus, the present thesis provides a unique attempt to reconcile the 
dimensional and categorical theories of emotions, and allows the investigation of 
specific basic emotions, while accounting for the experience of other basic emotions. 
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Thesis Summary 
 
The present thesis investigates the relationship between the re-experience of 
discrete basic emotions and episodic memory. The first topic of investigation addresses 
the fundamental structure of affect. The view that affective experience is best described 
by a distinct set of basic emotions is supported by a generous and increasing body of 
behavioural, physiological, and neuroanatomical evidence. However, frequent accounts 
that certain basic emotions are also highly inter-related (especially on the negative 
spectrum) are yet unreconciled with the categorical view of affect. A range of 
experimental work addresses this issue, by investigating the stability of emotion valence 
and discrete emotions. A second issue is the re-experience of basic discrete emotions, 
following normal or impaired episodic recall. For example, amnesic patients have long 
been shown to retain and re-experience emotions, despite their episodic memory 
impairment, but it is yet unknown whether emotional memory can encode and re-
activate a full range of specific discrete emotions. Several studies investigate the re-
experience of basic emotions in neurologically normal and amnesic participants. 
The first study (presented in Chapter 2) investigated the hierarchical 
organisation of emotions in an affective conditioning paradigm involving four basic 
emotions (anger, fear, sadness, and happiness). A group of neurologically normal 
participants listened to and recalled four sets of stories consisting of a neutral beginning 
and a different emotional ending for each target basic emotion. The results showed that 
basic emotions were successfully associated with the neutral beginnings after 30 
minutes. However, after one week they appeared to lose their affective specificity, while 
still retaining the correct positive or negative valence. This is the first experimental 
report that the most durable form of emotional memory encodes affective valence – and 
is in line with neuroscientific accounts arguing that phylogenetically older neural 
systems produce the most stable affect. The data is re-analysed, focusing on the 
emotional re-experience of the initially neutral and emotional material after one week. 
While the beginnings of the stories failed to elicit the corresponding target basic 
emotions, the detailed recollection of the passage that had initially generated the 
specific basic emotion triggered the selective re-experience of that emotion. These 
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findings suggest that the process of detailed recollection of emotional events is central 
for a full affective re-experience. This psychological process has a range of practical 
and therapeutic applications, such as maximising happiness, improving elite sport 
performance, and managing emotional disorders. 
In the second study (Chapter 3), the emotional memory for a set of four discrete 
emotions (anger, fear, sadness, and happiness) is for the first time tested in a sample of 
20 Korsakoff amnesic patients. Despite a significant episodic memory impairment, the 
amnesic patients were able to experience the four basic emotions at similar levels of 
intensity and with a similar specificity to that of neurologically normal controls. 
Notably, even those patients who failed to remember any parts of the emotional stories, 
still reported intense emotions with moderate levels of emotional accuracy. Previous 
reports that negative emotions (e.g., sadness) are experienced for longer by amnesic 
patients, in the absence of episodic recall, were not confirmed. The findings suggest that 
even in the absence of most episodic details, the attempt to recall a past event is capable 
of re-eliciting its original emotional specificity, and this applies equally to all of the four 
basic emotions. The relationship between a range of neuropsychological variables and 
emotional memory was also investigated. Importantly, the magnitude of episodic 
memory impairment was not associated with emotional intensity or accuracy. However, 
executive functions such as flexibility/rule shifting and problem solving were strongly 
associated with both emotional accuracy and specificity. Thus, the emotional memory 
seems to be dependent on the ability to process, monitor, and update information 
relevant to an emotional event, rather than remember the relevant information over time. 
Notably, this finding was observed independently for each of the four basic emotions. 
Chapter 4 addresses the presently unanswered challenge of analysing 
simultaneously a full set of discrete emotions. Every emotion induction procedure is 
likely to elicit, alongside the target basic emotion, a range of other (non-target) 
emotions, at various levels of intensity. Thus, it becomes essential to establish the 
degree to which the target emotion has been discretely experienced. A novel 
computational solution is proposed to establish the emotional intensity (i.e., the overall 
intensity of an emotional experience described by the ratings of several distinct basic 
emotions), specificity (i.e., the discrete experience of any basic emotion) and emotional 
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accuracy (i.e., the discrete experience of the intended, target basic emotion). The 
proposed technique provides a novel parsimonious analysis for three key aspects of 
emotional experience (intensity, specificity, and accuracy), replacing a succession of 
individual statistical comparisons with a single data transformation, reducing the risk of 
loss of statistical power and an increased Type II error. Data from the previous studies 
are re-analysed and reinterpreted using an exploratory approach, presenting the new set 
of indices for affective intensity, specificity, and accuracy side-by-side with the 
traditional method of analysis involving the common ratings of discrete emotions. A 
summary of the main findings suggests that the specific re-experience of happiness is 
substantially reduced after the brief interference of a negative emotion experience. 
Conversely, in certain cases, the specific re-experience of certain classes of negative 
emotions (e.g., anger and fear) is enhanced by the brief interference of a positive 
emotion (happiness). The limitations and possible implications of these findings are 
discussed at the end of the chapter. 
In summary, the present thesis reported a range of novel findings, most notably 
the first evidence that valence is likely to be encoded in the most stable form of 
emotional memory (compared to discrete emotions), and that the process of active 
recollection is central for the re-experience of basic emotions. Moreover, attempting to 
actively recall an event appears to trigger specifically any of the basic emotions that 
were initially elicited by the event, regardless how much of the event is recalled – and 
indeed, even when almost nothing of the event is recalled episodically. This surprising 
phenomenon seems to be explained by the finding that the intensity and accuracy of 
emotional memory appears to be associated with key executive function abilities and 
not episodic memory. 
 
1. General Introduction 
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Chapter 1. General Introduction 
 
 The present thesis draws from two bodies of affective sciences literature. The 
first relates to the structure of affect, and specifically to the evidence supporting the 
existence of discrete classes of emotions. The second relates to the ability to re-
experience emotions over time (emotional memory) both in the presence and more 
interestingly in the absence of the episodic recall of the stimuli which elicited the 
emotions in the first place. Both these research areas on their own (despite some largely 
historic and to a lesser extent ongoing disagreement) stand on a significant amount of 
empirical evidence. On the one hand, the neural substrates of discrete emotions show 
large overlaps, but few, and unequivocally unique areas are significantly associated with 
each of the four basic emotions commonly investigated in the literature (i.e., anger, fear, 
sadness, and happiness). On the other hand, both neurologically unimpaired and 
amnesic patients show an ability to re-experience past emotions following a brief or 
complete re-encounter of the original stimulus. The big questions of the present thesis 
are: how do discrete classes of emotions fit in the overall structure of affect, what are 
the differences (if any) between discrete emotions in terms of how they are re-
experienced over time, and how much of the affective experience can be encoded in 
emotional memory and re-experienced over time in the absence of episodic recall. More 
broadly, are discrete emotions able to be re-experienced accurately, in the absence of 
episodic recall? 
 
1.1 Towards a unified theory of emotions 
 
Intellectual efforts to explore, understand, explain, and as much as possible 
manage the processes that underpin what are currently called emotional or affective 
experiences have had a long presence in human history. The earliest recorded attempts 
to explain emotions, although distinctly different from the present requirements of the 
scientific method, are commonly attributed to the influential ancient Greek philosophers 
of Plato (c. 423 – c. 348 BCE) and his student Aristotle (384–322 BCE). The study of 
emotions in a philosophical context has continued since Antiquity, with contributions 
1. General Introduction 
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from major Western philosophers such as Lucius Annaeus Seneca (4 BCE – 65 CE), 
Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274), René Descartes (1596-1650), Baruch Spinoza (1632-
1677), John Locke (1632-1704), David Hume (1711-1776), to name just a few, and 
leading up to William James (1884) and the dawn of scientific enquiry in Psychology. 
The long-running endeavour to understand the experience of emotions is a strong 
testimony to their significance to human identity, and their ubiquity in everyday life. 
As a further reflection of the importance of emotions for understanding the 
internal mental experience of being human and its outward manifestation, all major 
schools of thought that followed the scientific enquiry in Psychology have formulated 
influential if often at times irreconcilable theories of emotions. The breadth of 
differences between the various approaches is testament to the complexity of emotional 
experiences and their interaction with other mental and biological functions (currently 
called cognitive and physiological). Competent reviews of both historical and current 
theories of emotions have been undertaken previously by other scholars (Power & 
Dalgleish, 2008; Scherer, 2000). The most important conclusion of such reviews is that 
for the most part of its long history, the enquiry into the nature of emotions has been 
marked by a considerable lack of consensus within the community, even regarding 
fundamental questions such as what emotions are, and how we can define them. Even 
presently, the vast debate and wealth of approaches to the study of emotions are major 
obstacles to a unifying theory of emotions. 
 Relatively recent advances in the field of neuroscience have contributed 
significantly to the understanding of emotions. The investigation of subcortical brain 
structures and cortical regions associated with the experience of emotions has provided 
insights about the experience (and thus existence) of different emotions, and has 
provided the necessary empirical rigour for understanding the interaction between 
emotions and other cognitive functions. The field of “affective neuroscience” (a term 
coined by the Estonian-born, American psychologist Jaak Panksepp, 1992) is attracting 
an increasing interest from psychologists and non-psychologists alike. For example, 
cross-species studies have confirmed that basic processes of emotional experience are 
organised within primitive subcortical regions of the brain that are similarly found in 
other mammals. Moreover, neuroscientific advances in our understanding of the nature 
1. General Introduction 
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of the primary affective processes and their neuroanatomical underpinnings can help 
inform better clinical models of psychiatric disorders and advance psychiatric practice. 
 Nonetheless, presently, agreement on the structure and manifestations of 
emotions is still lacking. Two dominant views on the structure of affect have stood 
prominent in the literature: the discrete and dimensional approaches. Discrete emotion 
theorists, famously tracing the origins of their ideas to Darwin’s work, have suggested 
the existence of a varying number of basic emotions (e.g., anger, fear, sadness, 
happiness, etc.), which are universally displayed and recognised (Darwin, 1872/1998; 
Ekman, 1992; Ekman, 1999). The dimensional approach assumes the existence of two 
or more continuous dimensions (valence and arousal being the most frequently 
employed being), that describe and distinguish between different emotion states (Barrett 
& Russell, 1999; Russell, 1994; Russell & Mehrabian, 1977). 
 
1.1.1 Emotions as discrete classes of affect 
The evidence for the existence of discrete basic emotions is vast. A brief 
summary of the main supportive findings include: common cross-cultural facial 
expressions and eliciting events, and presence of these emotions in other primates 
(Ekman & Friesen, 1975) and in infants (Izard, Huerber, Risser, McGinnes, Dougherty; 
1980); individual autonomic nervous system response patterns (Stephens, Christie, & 
Friedman, 2010), cardiorespiratory activity (Rainville, Bechara, Naqvi, & Damasio, 
2006); different but partly overlapping neural structures (Hamann, 2012; Murphy, 
Nimmo-Smith, & Lawrence, 2003; Tettamanti, Rognoni, Cafiero, Costa, Galati, & 
Perani, 2012; Vytal & Hamann, 2010); specific changes in cognition, judgment, and 
behaviour (Lench, Flores, & Bench, 2011, but see for a dissenting view Lindquist, 
Siegel, Quigley & Barrett, 2013).  
Originally, these various sources of evidence proposed different combinations of 
basic emotions. However, recent powerful and comprehensive meta-analysis (Murphy 
et al., 2003; Tettamanti et al., 2012; Vytal & Hamman, 2010) of the neuroscientific 
evidence seems to consolidate agreement in favour of four (i.e., anger, fear, sadness, 
and happiness), or possibly five (i.e., the above and disgust) primary classes of affect, 
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which have also, historically, been most consistently reported in the literature (Damasio 
et al., 2000). As the conceptual representation of emotion states is relatively broad 
across cultures, with overlapping but not identical linguistic inventories, other emotions 
are often seen as combinations of these basic emotions or as socially learned variants of 
these emotions. For example, grief, guilt and loneliness are all variants of basic sadness, 
(Bower, 1992). 
Despite the increasing evidence supporting the theory of discrete emotions, its 
fundamental assumptions have continued to be scrutinised and challenged, in the search 
for alternative formulations of the structure of affect. At least four such assumptions 
seem to conflict with the most common empirical evidence. 
Firstly, the central idea that the affective experience is underpinned by a small 
number of distinct and supposedly independent emotions neither predicts nor explains 
the common finding that basic emotions are often co-activated. Thus affective 
experience seems to be almost always described by a blend of basic emotions, best 
predicted by the distinction between positive and negative affect. 
Secondly, although basic emotions are supposed to transcend cultural and social 
divides, there appears to be a lack of one-to-one mapping of emotion terms between 
languages (often even within families of languages). Moreover, despite a scientifically 
driven attempt to assign specific emotion labels to each discrete emotion, the common 
language of most people use an assortment of terms to refer to different instances of 
supposedly the same discrete emotion. 
Thirdly, there continues to be a notorious failure to identify a unique pattern of 
activation of the autonomous nervous system. Subjective experiences of discrete 
emotions are not readily associated with unique visceral manifestations. 
Fourthly, if universal, but also specific emotion classes have evolved as distinct 
evolutionary adaptations, then the range (in number) and scope (in definition and 
function) should be equally unambiguous and definitive. Unfortunately, the exact 
number of discrete emotions has continued to be an infamous shortcoming of the theory 
of discrete emotions, whose only resolution has been the circumstantial and changing 
1. General Introduction 
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consensus between scientists. Equally, the definition of each discrete emotion, and their 
exact adaptive function seem to vary with the circumstances in which they are elicited.  
Opposing views to the categorical theory of discrete emotions have built around 
the argument that affective experiences correlate strongly with a small number of 
orthogonal dimensions. Valence and arousal have been most frequently and reliably 
reported (Mayer & Gaschke, 1988; Meyer & Shack, 1989; Russell & Feldman Barrett, 
1999; Watson, Wiese, Vaidya, & Tellegen, 1999), with various other dimensions also 
proposed, such as dominance (Mehrabian, 1996; Russell, 1977), anticipated effort, 
attentional activity, and situational control (Smith, & Ellsworth, 1985). Most recently, 
Lövheim (2012), proposed a novel account of the organisation of affect, suggesting that 
the combinations of the levels of three monoamine neurotransmitters (i.e., dopamine, 
noradrenaline, serotonin) involved in the affective experience, might explain the 
experience of a distinct set of eight discrete emotions. 
 The arguments in favour of dimensional emotion theories have received support 
from physiological correlates of emotional stimuli, such as heart rate and skin 
conductance levels, though the breadth and depth of evidence appears more modest than 
that supporting the categorical accounts. Wundt (1904) developed the first dimensional 
model, which was later supported by Scherer’s (2002) research showing that people 
tend to perceive the meaning of stimuli as either positive or negative (the valence 
dimension) and tend to respond to them either passively or actively (the activation 
dimension). Others proposed the use of independent bipolar dimensions of pleasure–
displeasure, arousal, and dominance–submissiveness (Russell; 1994), dominance 
(Mehrabian, 1996; Russell, 1977), anticipated effort, attentional activity, and situational 
control (Smith, & Ellsworth, 1985), rather than a small number of discrete emotion 
categories. In general, valence and arousal have been most frequently and reliably 
reported dimensions (Mayer & Gaschke, 1988; Russell & Barrett, 1999). In a 
dimensional taxonomy, all emotion categories vary quantitatively (Russell & Steiger, 
1982) and are mapped within a bipolar dimensional space. However, the dimensional 
approaches (and their mostly correlational empirical support) have received heavy 
criticism from every new piece of evidence in favour of basic emotions – especially 
since, at least conceptually, the two accounts seem mutually incompatible. For example, 
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one of the most important dimensions (arousal) appears to be confounded with the 
intensity of emotions (Reisenzein, 1994; Wintre & Vallance, 1994). 
 
1.1.2 Core affect and the psychological construction of emotional experiences 
The view of emotions as various manifestations of core affect evolved from the 
family of dimensional theories of emotions (i.e., the circumplex model; Russell, 1980, 
2005) and comes to answer the fundamental issues raised above. At a structural level, 
the core affect is defined by two dimensions (or axes): pleasure-displeasure, and 
activation-deactivation (Yik, Russell, & Steiger, 2008). Both these dimensions are 
supposed to be expressed simultaneously, in a singular experience, which bridges the 
previous concepts of emotion and mood - thus at times being a continuous experience, 
not necessarily directed at an eliciting agent (much like mood), but at other times, can 
become very intense and overtly linked to an eliciting stimulus (much like pain, or the 
classical concept of emotions). 
The core affect is defined as having two fundamental characteristics. Firstly, it is 
unique to each individual, and greatly variable from situation to situation (Kuppens et 
al., 2007). Secondly, it changes in response to many internal and external influences, but 
most notably only in relation to cognitively processed information (Russell, 2009). 
When information is not consciously attended, its influence on core affect is said to 
diminish. Of course, this account fails to acknowledge the experience of emotions in the 
absence of conscious processing of the stimuli, such as either through masked 
presentation beyond the perception threshold (Morris, Öhman, & Dolan, 1998; Pessoa, 
2005; Whalen, et al., 1998), in clinical cases of amnesia (Feinstein, Duff, & Tranel, 
2010; Hamann, Cahill, McGaugh, & Squire, 1997), or the more common everyday 
occurrence of the "petit madeleine" effect (Proust, 1982/1921). The concept of core 
affect is not equivalent to the full spectrum of emotional experiences, but it is an 
intermediary concept between emotion and mood, whose manifestation is highly 
individual and situation specific. 
The role of core affect in the emotional experience is through a series of 
processes known as psychological construction (Russell, 2009), which define (1) the 
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behavioural and experiential components of the emotional episode (e.g., facial 
movement, vocal tone, peripheral nervous change, attribution of causation, conscious 
subjective experience, etc.), (2) the associations between the different components, and 
(3) the categorisation of the pattern of components as a specific emotion. Thus, 
psychological construction is responsible for the subjective experience (i.e., individual 
token events), which may or may not be perceived and classed as discrete (or not so 
discrete) emotional experiences. The process of psychological construction is not meant 
to provide a deterministic account of the emotional experience, by acknowledging that 
this is individual to each person, and specific for each situation. It rather contrasts the 
biological construction assumed by the theory of discrete emotions, and provides a 
framework which accommodates the notorious variation of emotional experiences 
between different cultures, people, and situations. 
The psychological constructivist model provides a novel explanation for the 
origin and role of discrete emotion classes. In managing everyday situations, people 
often have to be able to describe and identify the emotions they are feeling, and also be 
able to communicate this to other people. Thus, emotion words (such as fear, anger, 
sadness) are seen as answering a social need to communicate, rather than an empirical 
need to classify uniform processes. In everyday situations, the components of 
psychological construction (detailed above) are occurring in various forms. And while 
each emotional experience is different, some similarities will emerge, as a matter of 
degree (some situations more similar than others). In an attempt to organise, compare, 
understand and communicate, people assign certain experiences to certain classes, 
without all situations being equal. For example, one situation might feel like a perfect 
example of what the experience of fear would be, while other situations might be only 
mediocre or borderline examples. However, although the subjective experience of 
emotion is organised, understood, and communicated using the familiar mental 
categories of anger, fear, sadness, shame, etc. the processes by which they were 
experienced are fundamentally unique. They are only reported as fear, or anger, or 
happiness, because people need to refer to their emotional experiences (either for own 
reflection or for communication) using a system which is efficient, useable and which is 
also recognised by other people. 
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In conclusion, instead of relying on a series of distinct processes specifically 
developed for the experience of a limited set of basic emotions (anger, fear, sadness, 
etc.), the psychological constructivist view argues that all emotional experience 
originate from core affect, and a multitude of other processes (e.g., behavioural, 
cognitive, experiential, somatic, neural, etc.) unique to each individual and to each 
situation. And the fundamental dimension of core affect are valence (positive or 
negative) and activation (or arousal). 
Although the dimensional and categorical classifications of emotions appear to 
be mutually exclusive, it has been proposed that the two theories can coexist 
successfully. This would be made possible by viewing the two theories as describing 
different and complementary aspects of emotional experience. This argument was 
recognised by the hierarchical model of emotions (Tellegen, Watson, & Clark, 1999), 
which proposed that valence is a fundamental dimension of affect, superimposed on a 
series of discrete classes of affect. However, to this date it remains largely under-
investigated, and will be experimentally addressed in Chapter 2.  
 In summary, the affective science literature is markedly fragmented, notably in 
respect to fundamental questions about the structure of affect. Any comprehensive 
theory of emotions should seek to bring together its most systematically validated 
arguments. To this end, understanding the structure and manifestation of emotional 
experiences seems to best be served by harmonising the presently opposing dimensional 
and categorical theories of emotions.  Encouragingly, experimental techniques allow the 
measure of discrete emotions and valence. The present thesis will employ the measure 
of discrete emotions, while also retaining and analysing the underlying dimension of 
valence. Chapter 2 is dedicated to further exploring the relationship, and also the 
difference between basic classes of affect and their positive or negative valence. 
 
1.2 Emotions, consciousness and the concept of self 
 The experience of emotions is an intimate aspect of human existence, frequently 
associated with, and described as a part of the concept of self (Panksepp, 2004). The 
neural seat of consciousness (and possibly of the “self”) has been suggested as lying 
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deep in the subcortical regions of the brain. Neuroscientific evidence suggests that the 
midbrain, one of the phylogenetically oldest brain regions is responsible for the most 
basic forms of consciousness, the generation of the representation of “self”, and the 
initiation of basic affective states (Davidson & Hugspeth, 1995; Ross, Homan, & Buck, 
1994). 
Recently, the evidence of neuroscientific basis of consciousness of the concept 
of self has been discussed by others (Gennaro, 2012; Merker, 2007; Morin, 2006). The 
concept of consciousness and self in humans has been described across at least two 
levels – a basic system originating in the brainstem (Parvizi & Damasio, 2001) and a 
superior form of consciousness involving the prefrontal cortex (PFC; Mantyh, 1982; 
Sesack, Deutsch, Roth, & Bunney, 1989). A similar hierarchical organisation of 
emotions seems to reflect the organisation of the self/consciousness. It is well 
recognised that basic discrete emotions essentially involve more phylogenetically recent 
cortical structures (Hamman, 2012). Thus, discrete emotions may play a role in higher 
forms of consciousness (also involving cortical structures), while affective valence may 
help define experiences associated with lower level of consciousness and self.  
The distinction between the two levels of the affective experience: a low level 
(valence) and a higher level (discrete classes of emotion) has also been linked to 
agency. Positive and negative emotions (sometimes referred to as “basic emotional 
energies”; Panksepp, 2004, pp. 315) can exist in the absence of a causing agent. In this 
sense, happiness is not the same as positive affect, but a higher, more complex form of 
positive emotional energy. Notably, in most cases, discrete emotions such as anger, fear, 
sadness (in the sense of loss, or separation, rather than a general sense of dejection or 
“un-happiness” – an umbrella term for negative affect), and happiness (with the 
meaning of excitement, or joy, rather than a general sense of elation – more readily 
associated with the overarching concept of positive affect), unmistakably require an 
agent. The integration of agent-related judgements presumably requires to various 
extents more complex cognitive functions like episodic memory, judgement, planning, 
and foresight. However, the most common forms of everyday emotion derive their rich 
cognitive ramifications from interactions with higher brain functions, and can also be 
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triggered at various levels of the neuroaxis by minimal stimuli as a form of classical 
affective conditioning. 
 
1.3 Memory for emotions and emotional memory 
 
Memory for past emotions has been argued to be generally accurate (Levine, 
Lench, & Safer, 2009), and emotional stimuli and events are usually remembered more 
vividly than emotionally neutral information (Todd, Talmi, Schmitz, Susskind, & 
Anderson, 2012). However, studies investigating explicit memory for emotions have 
reported consistent biases in remembering the emotional experience triggered by past 
events. In a review of studies on the accessibility of emotional self-report, Robinson and 
Clore (2002) argue that retrospective emotion reports can potentially be subject to 
general semantic memory biases (when episodic details are relatively inaccessible) and 
to episodic memory biases (e.g., peak and recency effects). Reports of biases in the 
implicit memory for emotions have been far fewer than in the case of explicit memory 
(Levine, Lench, & Safer, 2009). 
 Memory for negative arousing stimuli was reported to be less prone to distortion 
than the memory for neutral stimuli. Kensinger and Schacter (2006) used a reality 
monitoring paradigm (Johnson, 1988; Johnson & Raye, 1981) in which they presented 
aurally (via headphones) a series of words, half of which were also presented visually 
(on a screen) and asked participants to perform a letter height decision task (i.e., 
indicate whether the first letter of the word they were presented was taller than the last 
letter of the word; e.g., in the word “toes” the letter “t” is taller than the letter “s”). They 
later asked participants to identify which words had been presented visually. The results 
indicated that the emotional stimuli showed lower misattribution rates than the 
emotional stimuli both in an incidental and intentional encoding scenario. The findings 
remained robust even within the same presentation modality, that is, when names of 
objects were presented on a screen followed or not by the picture of the object, and 
participants were asked to judge the physical dimensions of the objects (i.e., whether or 
not they could fit in a show box). Because the orienting tasks required participants in 
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both experiments to build a mental representation of the target stimuli (i.e., imagine the 
written word or the image of the object), the authors concluded that negative emotional 
items can increase the ability to discern between the internal generation and external 
presentation of a stimulus, and that in this respect the memory for negative emotional 
items can be less prone to distortion than the memory for neutral material. 
Moreover, a number of biases have been revealed to affect the experience of 
emotions and their recall, such as, moments of peak intensity increase recalled emotion; 
changes in appraisals of past situations influence memory for emotions; false memories 
for emotions can be assimilated with real memories; recent experiences and current 
goals alter the emotional response). More recently, the study of emotional memory in 
amnesia has received an increasing attention, especially in the last two decades. For 
example, the preserved ability to encode and retrieve emotional information has been 
reported in patients with both unilateral (LaBar, LeDoux, Spencer, & Phelps, 1995) and 
bilateral hippocampal damage (Bechara et al., 1995). Remarkably, the ‘after-effects’ of 
certain discrete emotions (sadness) seem to be better preserved in amnesics than in non-
neurological controls, while other emotions (happiness) show no significant differences 
(Feinstein, Duff, & Tranel, 2010).  
 
1.3.1 Differences between implicit and explicit emotions 
 
Research investigating emotional memory has followed the distinction between 
explicit and implicit memory (Levine & Safer, 2002; Levine, Lench, & Safer, 2009). 
Studies examining the explicit memory for emotions focused on people’s ability to 
encode and store emotional experiences in memory and deliberately retrieve them at a 
later time (e.g., Morewedge, Gilbert, & Wilson, 2005; Wirtz, Kruger, Scollon, & 
Diener, 2003). By contrast, studies investigating the implicit memory for emotions 
tested associative learning, using, for example, fear conditioned visual stimuli (Öhman 
& Soares, 1998; Kuriyama, Soshi, Fujii, & Kim, 2010) and the Iowa Gambling Task 
(IGT; Bechara, Damasio, Damasio, & Anderson, 1994). Furthermore, studies involving 
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amnesic patients offered a new avenue of research into implicit emotional memory 
(Claparède, 1911/1951; Feinstein, Duff, & Tranel, 2010; Turnbull & Evans, 2006). 
 
1.3.2 Biases Affecting Explicit Memory for Emotion 
 
In agreement with studies of explicit memory for emotions, Robinson and Clore 
(2002) proposed an “accessibility model” of emotional self-report. According to this 
theory, affect was assumed not to be stored directly in memory and thus, emotional 
experiences could only be reported and studied as they are being felt (see for previous 
formulations of this view, Christianson & Safer, 1996; Kahneman, 1999; Ross, 1989; 
Wyer, Clore, & Isbell, 1999). Later emotional reports were thought to be only 
representations of the original emotion, based on available information at the time of 
recall. These information sources were identified as the episodic memory for the context 
that had triggered it and situation-specific and identity-related beliefs about what type of 
emotion could have been felt in those circumstances. The accessibility model states that 
when people attempt to recall a past emotion, they first access episodic memory for the 
event, as being the most specific source of information. If this is not available, they next 
turn to their beliefs about what a typical emotion would be for the particular type of 
situation. And if those beliefs do not suffice, or are not formed yet, people would then 
retrieve their beliefs about what their emotions are in general. Robinson and Clore 
argued that, for this reason, that any attempt to recall an emotional experience 
automatically involves a loss of information. Therefore, any report of past emotions 
would be susceptible to biases affecting episodic memory and situation-and identity-
specific beliefs. This view on emotional self-report was supported by a growing body of 
research documenting the factors influencing people’s recollections of emotions, among 
which the most documented are the peak-and-end effect (Fredrickson, 2000), the current 
appraisals of past events (Levine, 1997), and individual differences, such as personality 
traits (Feldman Barrett, 1997; Safer & Keuler, 2002) and motivation and emotion 
regulation strategies (Cutler, Larsen, & Bunce, 1996; Lench & Levine, 2010). 
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1.3.2.1 Peak-and-end effect.  
 
Fredrickson and Kahneman (1993) reported recency and peak intensity effects of 
explicit memory for emotions. They asked participants to rate the intensity of their 
emotions after a series of emotional video clips. Peak intensity and final emotional 
reaction were the main factors affecting the subsequent recall of the overall intensity of 
their emotions (see also for a review of the peak-and-end rule Fredrickson, 2000). The 
current emotional state is another predictor of the intensity of recalled emotions. Safer, 
Bonanno, and Field (2001) found in a longitudinal study that after five years from the 
death of their spouses, when widows and widowers were asked to remember the grief 
they felt earlier, reported intensity of emotions was more highly correlated with current 
grief than with actual past emotion. 
 
1.3.2.2 Current appraisals of past events.  
 
Levine (1997) argued that current appraisals of past events influence the explicit 
memory for emotions evoked by those events. People’s memories for the intensity of 
emotions elicited by the 1992 withdrawal of Ross Perot from United States presidential 
campaign varied accordingly with their later attitudes towards the candidate. 
Furthermore, certain beliefs were found to influence the memory for some discrete 
emotions, but not for others (Levine, Prohaska, Burgess, Rice, & Laulhere, 2001). After 
the verdict of a famous criminal trial held in Los Angeles (People vs. O.J. Simpson), 
participants’ later appraisals about the desirability of the outcome affected their memory 
for happiness and anger, but not surprise at the announcement of the decision. 
Conversely, participants who later reported they were expecting the verdict, 
underestimated their initial surprise, but recalled correctly how happy or angry they 
were at hearing the result of the trial. A very similar pattern was found at two months 
and more than a year after the verdict, which suggest the biases remain stable over time. 
The effect of appraisals on emotional memory was supported not just by correlational 
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findings, but experimental studies as well. Safer, Levine, and Drapalski (2002) 
manipulated participants’ post-event knowledge and found that when informed about 
the outcome of an event (results of university examinations), participants distorted their 
recollections of emotions (intensity of test anxiety, positive emotions and negative 
emotions) at the time of the event (before and during the exam) in accordance with the 
grades they obtained. No such distortion was found when participants were asked to 
recall their emotions before they found out their grades. 
 
1.3.2.3 Individual differences.  
 
Individual differences, such as personality traits, motivation and emotion 
regulation strategies were reported to influence explicit memory for emotions. High 
ratings on negative personality traits (e.g., neuroticism, depression, anxiety) tended to 
be associated with overestimation of past negative emotions (pre-psychotherapy 
distress, and momentary negative emotions), while high score on positive personality 
traits (e.g., extroversion, ego-strength) with underestimation of initial distress and with 
the recall of more positive emotions (Feldman Barrett, 1997; Safer & Keuler, 2002). 
People’s motivation and goals were also found to predict distortions in memory for 
emotions. Lench and Levine (2010) reported that participants who were generally 
motivated by positive outcomes, responding to information signalling potential reward 
via a behavioural activation system (approach motivation) and showed an approach goal 
to a challenging task (wanted to successfully complete the task) later overstated the 
intensity of happiness experienced during the task. However, participants who tended to 
be motivated by negative outcomes, employing a behavioural inhibition system 
(avoidance motivation) and showed avoidance goals (wanted to avoid failure on the 
task) later recalled higher levels of anxiety than they declared during the task. Emotion 
regulation strategies seemed also to affect people’s memories for past emotions. Cutler, 
Larsen, and Bunce (1996) asked university undergraduates to complete a daily mood 
report over four weeks and then, at the end of the study, to recall the mood they 
experienced during the reporting period. Biases in memory for emotions were analysed 
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from the perspective of the emotion regulation strategies employed by the students. 
Participants who showed a repressive coping style underestimated negative emotions, 
while highly anxious participants overstated the intensity of negative emotions. 
 
1.3.2.4 “Foreign” emotions.  
 
Studies following a line of research originating in the area of eyewitness 
testimony have reported that memories for emotions can be just as easily implanted as 
memories for events (Laney & Loftus, 2008; see also Porter, Yuille, & Lehman, 1999, 
for an earlier account using a more laborious design). Hundreds of studies going back to 
the 1970’s, revealed the malleability of our memory for events. When people are 
presented new and misleading information about an event they had previously 
experienced, their recollections become distorted (misinformation effect; Loftus 1979, 
1995; Loftus & Palmer, 1974; see also Wright & Loftus, 1998 for a review). More 
recently, this memory bias has also been replicated in other fields that could potentially 
attempt to deliberately change people’s memories, such as advertising (Braun, & Loftus, 
1998; Braun-LaTour, LaTour, Pickrell, & Loftus, 2004) and media (Sacchi, Agnoli, & 
Loftus, 2007). The area was further expanded when an emotional dimension was 
introduced and the misinformation effect was successfully replicated. Laney and Loftus 
used a simple false feedback paradigm to create false memories of emotional childhood 
events, and then asked participants to remember the intensity of the emotions 
experienced at the time. Participants with true memories for the events reported the 
same levels of fear, sadness, confusion, disgust, and responsibility as those who never 
experienced the events, but only thought they did as a result of the false feedback. 
However, a framework such as the accessibility model cannot account for 
situations in which people do not consciously retrieve a past emotional experience, but 
do show signs of employing past emotions when dealing with current situations. For 
example, in a recent study Kuriyama et al. (2010) reported that after a fear conditioning 
paradigm, event recognition decayed, but emotional recognition increased. Moreover, 
this effect was obtained despite the stimuli being very similar (pictures of a car driving 
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along a typical city street, shot from the driver’s viewpoint, controlled for image 
complexity and recall cues). These findings suggest that despite a loss in episodic 
memory and undifferentiated situational and identity factors, people’s recognition of 
past emotions associated with neutral stimuli remains unaltered, and possibly improves, 
over certain periods of time. Therefore, despite being a useful tool for understanding 
emotional memories which require a deliberate recall of the encoding experience (i.e., 
explicit emotional memory, see Levine et al., 2009), access to past emotions is also 
obtained through a different system (i.e., implicit memory for emotions, see Levine et 
al., 2009), which does not involve the conscious recollection of the emotional event, and 
which remains unexplained by the accessibility model. 
 
1.3.3 Biases Affecting Implicit Memory for Emotion 
 
The implicit memory for emotions is often linked with an influential account of 
the relationship between emotions and cognition, given by the Somatic Marker 
Hypothesis (SMH; Damasio, 1994, 1996). According to the SMH, emotions originate 
from the subjective perception of the complex range of homeostatic changes that occur 
in given situations, or from their representation in the brain. For example, in the case of 
decision-making, for every option that is being contemplated, a somatic state is 
generated, which acts as an indicator (somatic marker) of the value attached to the 
option that is considered. These somatic representations in the brain are continuously 
updated. In addition, the SMH claims that somatic memories may be associated with the 
stimuli that caused the somatic change. These learned somatic reactions may be 
activated when re-experiencing similar stimuli, causing an anticipated perception of 
these emotions (see, for a critical review of SMH, Dunn, Dalgleish, & Lawrence, 2006). 
 
 
1. General Introduction 
21 
 
1.3.3.1 Current goals.  
 
Current goals were reported to influence implicit memory for emotions. 
Ferguson and Bargh (2004) presented participants with stimuli useful for successfully 
performing a task that they were induced to either care about or not. When participants 
were motivated to perform well, they later showed a more positive implicit attitude 
towards the stimuli than participants who were presented with the task but were 
instructed that their performance would not be important for the experiment. 
 
1.3.3.2 Implicit evaluative procedure.  
 
Olson and Fazio (2006) assessed the influence of an implicit evaluative 
conditioning procedure on automatic racial prejudice. Participants in the control 
condition showed an implicit prejudice by responding faster to positive words after 
white faces than after black faces. This effect was reversed after participants were 
exposed to a conditioning phase in which black face were paired with positive words. 
Therefore, further experiences and current emotions were shown to distort implicit 
memory for emotions. 
 
1.3.3.3 Variable associative patterns.  
 
Changes in activation of associative patterns were argued to represent another 
bias in implicit memory for emotions (Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006). When a 
stimulus is associated with different attitudes and affective responses, subtle cues can 
determine which associative pattern is activated and this directs the emotional response. 
For example, Foroni and Mayr (2005) found that different contexts distort the emotional 
preference for flowers over insects measured using the Implicit Association Test (IAT). 
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Participants were asked to read a fictional post-nuclear war scenario in which either 
flowers or insects were contaminated and thus should be avoided by any means in order 
to ensure survival. At the same time, the other target category (i.e., insects and flowers 
respectively) represented the only indirect food resource for humans, and accordingly 
acquired a positive valence. In a separate condition, participants were instructed to try 
and think of flowers/insects as negative or positive and to perform the IAT with the 
appropriate association in mind. The results showed that the fictional scenario was able 
to reduce the implicit emotional preference for flowers over insects, but not the direct 
instruction to imagine that flowers are good and insects are bad. The findings suggest 
that a single reading of fictional scenarios can successfully activate different associative 
patterns leading to changes in implicit emotional responses. 
In conclusion, the memory for emotions elicited by affective stimuli and events 
is often influenced by a range of internal (cognitive) and environmental factors 
(described above). However, despite the many reports that valence and affective 
category also have a distinctive influence on memory for emotions, its direction and 
mechanisms remain disputed. A distinct opportunity to study emotional memory 
consists in investigating the implicit affective associations that form between eliciting 
stimuli and emotional experiences. 
 
1.4 Emotional memory and affective re-experience in amnesia 
 
The subjective sense of remembering emotional events has been shown to be 
driven by different neural systems than the recollection of non-emotional memories 
(Ulrike, Lile, & Phelps, 2012). Nonetheless, as discussed in the previous section, 
episodic memory systems can influence the assessment of the emotional value of a 
stimulus over time. The context and details surrounding the initial emotion elicitation 
can be accessed and their retrieval and re-processing influence the present affective 
value of the stimulus. Moreover, emotions can also be re-experienced prior to the 
conscious episodic recall of the eliciting situation (using affective conditioning 
paradigm; Dawson, Rissling, Schell, & Wilcox, 2007; De-Houwer, Thomas, & 
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Baeyens, 2001; St-Laurent, Moscovitch, Levine, & McAndrews, 2009) and indeed even 
when neurological deficits cause episodic memory systems to be permanently and 
severely disrupted – such as in the case of densely amnesic patients (see Buchanan, 
2007; Haman, 2001).  
The ability to access (or more precisely re-experience) past emotions directly, 
prior to or in the absence of other forms of memory (most notably episodic memory) 
has led to the conclusion that affect benefits from a dedicated neural system for 
encoding, storage and retrieval of subjective emotional experiences, called emotional 
memory (Squire, 2004). Although preferentially processing and encoding affective 
experiences, the system is highly interconnected and strongly influences other memory 
systems, such as episodic and semantic memory (Dunsmoor, Murty, Davachi, & Phelps, 
2015; LaBar, 2004; Phelps, 2004; Phelps, LaBar, & Spencer, 1997).  
An extensive body of literature investigating the memory for emotionally 
arousing material has identified the amygdala as a key brain region for emotional 
memory (Brierly, Medford, Shaw, & David, 2004; Canli, Zhao, Desmond, Glover, & 
Gabrieli, 1999; Canli, Zhao, Brewer, Gabrieli, & Cahill, 2000; Hamann, 2001; LaBar & 
Cabeza, 2006; LaBar, LeDoux, Spencer, & Phelps, 1995; Phelps, 2006; Phelps & 
LeDoux, 2005). As a bilateral subcortical structure shared with other mammalian 
species, the role of the amygdalae in the memory for aversive or appetitive stimuli was 
first identified in animal studies (see for a review McGaugh, 2000). Extensive human 
research has confirmed the role of the amygdala in emotional memory and its 
modulating influence on other forms of memory when encoding emotional material. 
Non-declarative (e.g., conditioned responses) and declarative form of memory (episodic 
and semantic) for emotionally enhancing stimuli has been shown to be modulated by the 
amygdala (Adolphs, 1999; Adolphs, Cahill, Schil, & Babinsky, 1997; Buchanan, 
Tranel, & Adolpsh, 2005; Denburg, Buchanan, Tranel, & Adolphs, 2003; LeDoux & 
Muller, 1997). Through its interactions with a wide range of neural structures (e.g., 
anterior hippocampus, anterior and posterior parahippocampal gyrus, the left lateral 
prefrontal cortex, and right ventral parietal cortex), the amygdala can influence 
perceptual processing, semantic elaboration, and attention in the formation of emotional 
memories (Murty, Ritchey, Adcock, & LaBar, 2010). Lesion studies have shown that 
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the amygdala preferentially processes gist and emotional memories, while surrounding 
medial temporal structures are involved in the memory for general episodic material 
(Adolphs, Tranel, Buchanan, 2005). The neuromodulatory effect of arousal on memory 
(rather than valence) seems to be the most important contribution of the amygdala to 
emotional memory (Phelps, LaBar, Anderson, O’Connor, Fulbright, & Spencer, 1998). 
The amygdala’s contribution to emotional memory appears to be lateralised, with the 
right (and not left) amygdala involved in the retrieval of aversive, high-intensity 
emotions (Buchanan, Tranel, & Adolphs, 2006). The left amygdala appears to have a 
specific role in the enhanced perception of negative arousing stimuli (Anderson & 
Phelps, 2001). 
In the last decade, the amygdala’s role as the central structure in processing the 
retrieval of emotional memories has come under increased scrutiny. Recent studies have 
confirmed amygdala’s role in processing negative, high-intensity emotions (i.e., fear, 
and ager), but also showed that other basic emotions can be experienced even following 
extensive amygdala lesions (Feinstein, Adolphs, Damasio, & Tranel, 2011; see also an 
earlier reports Anderson & Phelps, 2000; Phelps, O’Connor, Gatenby, Gore, Grillon, & 
Davies, 2001). Amygdala-lesioned patients were shown to be able to experience 
positive and negative emotions, and displayed a typical arousal to positive stimuli, but a 
severely impaired response to negative arousing stimuli. Other structures (i.e., the 
insular cortex) may play a greater role than the amygdala in modulating the arousal of 
both positive and negative stimuli, as well as integrating both cognitive and affective 
processes, while the amygdala may have a selective role in the arousal of negative 
stimuli (Berntson, Norman, Bechara, Bruss, Tranel, & Cacioppo, 2011).  
 
1.4.1 The experience and re-experience of emotions  
 
The investigation of emotional experience prior to or in the absence of episodic 
recall presents a unique opportunity to study emotional memory systems. The emotional 
experience following the recollection of past events is thought to activate the original 
emotion (emotional memory), as well as potentially elicit new emotions (Levine & 
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Safer, 2002). It is widely recognised that the actual (physical) or imagined (metal) 
experience of an emotional situation can elicit an affective response (Destun & Kuiper, 
1999; Turner, Simons, Gilbert, Frith & Burgess, 2007). Thus, when re-living a past 
event through conscious recollection it is impossible to discern between the re-
experienced emotions (triggered by the affective associations created initially and stored 
in emotional memory systems), and the potential experience of new emotions, as a 
response to the mental (imagined) encounter of the affectively potent stimuli. In order to 
isolate the re-experience of emotions from the possible experience of “new emotions”, 
the contribution of episodic memory systems needs to be suppressed.  
Affective conditioning paradigms offer an accessible solution to this problem. 
Presenting an emotionally neutral stimulus in the context of an emotional situation, 
allows to later assess the emotional response to the affectively conditioned stimulus in 
the absence of the recollection of the actual emotional event. An alternative opportunity 
to study affective re-experience is offered by neurological patients with selective lesions 
to episodic memory systems (amnesic patients). This is particularly relevant as 
Pavlovian conditioning to emotionally stimuli can take place both through direct or 
indirect experience such as following observation or verbal instruction (Olsson & 
Phelps, 2004, 2007), the latter proving to be more ethically appropriate experimental 
paradigms for this patient group. 
 
1.4.2 Emotional memory in amnesia 
 
Amnesic patients have long been reported to show intact emotion-based 
learning. Possibly the earliest account is the classic case study of an elderly woman 
suffering from the Korsakoff’s syndrome (Claparède, 1911/1951). The Swiss 
neuropsychiatrist Eduard Claparède introduced himself with a handshake every time he 
came to see her. However, when he started hiding a sharp pin in his hand, which would 
surprise the patient and inflict a small amount of pain during the handshake, she would 
later adamantly refuse to shake his hand, despite her inability to recall any previous 
handshakes or their displeasing outcome.  
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Since this early report, emotional memory was shown to be in amnesic patients. 
The enhancing effect of emotion on perception and memory are intact in amnesia. For 
example, Hamann, Cahill, and Squire (1997) showed that emotional arousal of either 
positive or negative valence enhances the recall and recognition of visual emotional 
stimuli (pictures) to the same extent as for non-amnesics. Similar effects were reported 
when amnesics and neurologically normal controls listened to emotionally arousing 
stories. Recognition memory for the emotional elements of the stories was similarly 
enhanced for amnesics and controls (Hamann, Cahill, McGaugh, & Squire, 1997). 
However, the flexibility of the emotional memory seems to be limited in amnesia. 
Following a successful acquisition and extinction of an affectively conditioned fear 
response, hippocampal amnesic patients showed an inability to reinstate the fear 
response in the same context, unlike neurologically normal controls (LaBar & Phelps, 
2005). Thus, environmental contexts and hippocampal activity seem to regulate the 
expression of latent affective conditioning. 
The recall of both positive and negative emotional autobiographical memories 
appears to be intact for purely amnesic patients, with brain lesions confined to 
hippocampus (Buchanan, Tranel & Adolphs, 2005). However, more extensive lesions 
including the hippocampus, amygdala and the parahippocampal cortices lead to a 
selectively reduced memory for negative and highly emotional events from one’s own 
past. Amygdala’s role of integrating emotion, perception and cognition was reported to 
be crucial in cueing the emotional significance of mnemonic events and re-activate the 
neural connections required for the affective re-experience – as seen in rare cases of 
Urbach-Wiethe patients with a selective calcification of the amygdala and 
periamygdaloid gyri (Markowitsch & Staniloiu, 2011). 
Emotional memory is preserved in amnesic patients when more complex 
contingency patterns of emotional experience are used. Turnbull and Evans (2006) 
presented the case of SL, an 85-year-old man with a dense anterograde amnesia 
following a left posterior artery infarction. In spite of his inability to form new episodic 
memories, SL showed unimpaired learning of the Iowa Gambling Task (Bechara et al., 
1994; Damasio, 1994), at levels comparable or even better than age-matched controls on 
three separate sessions, spanning across three weeks, even when the reward-contingency 
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pattern was shifted between sessions. The findings, thus, show that amnesic patients can 
preserve an intact ability to encode and utilise emotional memories even when presented 
with complex patterns of valence learning (see also, Evans-Roberts & Turnbull, 2011). 
The emotional experience of patients with severe amnesia (following 
circumscribed bilateral damage to the hippocampus) endures after the explicit memory 
for the eliciting event has faded (Feinstein, Duff, & Tranel, 2010). Notably, the effects 
were found for both sadness and happiness. A series of film clips induced either sadness 
or happiness. A post-induction memory test revealed that the amnesic patients retained 
little or no information about the clips, but they continued to experience more elevated 
levels of sadness and similar levels of happiness when compared to the non-
neurological controls (whose memory for the film clips was intact). The results indicate 
that the emotional experience of amnesic patients surpasses their limited memory for 
episodic events. The two basic emotions (happiness and sadness) seemed to indicate a 
different pattern of stability across time (with sadness being more enduring than 
happiness), although the lack of information about the patients psychiatric history (e.g., 
depression) poses a significant limitation on the validity of this later conclusion. 
In summary, affective systems are able to function independently of episodic 
memory. However, the literature has not yet integrated the structure and forms of affect 
supported by the strongest empirical base, namely the discrete classes of emotions. As 
presented in the earlier sections of this chapter, the affective experience can be reliably 
described by a distinct set of basic emotions, but it remains unknown how such discrete 
classes of affect relate to episodic memory, and how they are re-experienced in amnesia. 
 
1.5 Korsakoff syndrome aetiology, neuropathology and cognitive performance 
 
In 1887 Sergei Sergeievich Korsakoff (Victor & Yakovlev, 1955) described a 
neurological syndrome characterised by general confusion, ataxia (loss of muscle 
coordination), and nystagmus (abnormal saccadic back and forth eye movements when 
looking at moving visual stimuli). Korsakoff also described the associated chronic 
changes in mental functioning, most notable of which were the temporally graded loss 
1. General Introduction 
28 
 
of memory for past events (retrograde amnesia), and the inability to form new memories 
(anterograde amnesia). Years later (Gudden, 1896), Korsakoff's observations were 
linked to the previous reports of three patients made by Karl Wernicke in 1881. 
Wernicke described symptoms of fatigue, vomiting, headaches, ocular impairment, and 
a staggered gait (Thomson, Cook, Guerrini, Sheedy, Harper, & Marshall, 2008). Over 
the last century a considerable amount of knowledge was gained about the two 
disorders, which have become synonymously known as Wernicke-Korsakoff syndrome. 
It is generally agreed that the syndrome has an acute and chronic form of presentation, 
which are referred to as Wernicke's encephalopathy and Korsakoff's syndrome, 
respectively. 
The onset of Wernicke's encephalopathy is sudden and is usually marked by 
disorientation, confusion, and apathy. The patient is often unable to maintain a coherent 
conversation and the state of confusion is accompanied by ataxia and oculomotor 
symptoms, although considerable variability exists between patients (Reuler, Girard, & 
Cooney, 1985). If patients are diagnosed early and treated promptly the symptoms of 
Wernickes' encephalopathy can be reversed. However, failure to diagnose and treat the 
disorder, may result in the permanent brain damage known as Korsakoff syndrome. 
In Korsakoff syndrome the confusion from the acute phase clears and the patient 
is typically left with a profound memory impairment. The defining feature of the 
Korsakoff syndrome is the inability to retrieve recent memories and remember new 
events, in the context of otherwise preserved cognitive functioning. Other common 
symptoms include confabulation (Falsification of memory in clear consciousness – 
making up stories or events) and hallucinations (sensory perception of stimuli that are 
not actually present), apathy, lack of initiation, as well as signs of gait and ocular 
disorders. Symptoms can range from relatively mild to severe. 
The acute phase of the Wernicke's encephalopathy can sometimes be mute, and 
patients appear to present directly with the Korsakoff syndrome symptoms (Blansjaar & 
Van Dijk, 1992). Many have argued that based on the common neuropathology of the 
two syndromes, they should be considered as a single syndrome, with an early (acute) 
and late (chronic) stage. 
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1.5.1 Aetiology  
It is now fully recognised that the Wernicke-Korsakoff syndrome is a condition 
that occurs as a result of a severe avitaminosis (nutritional deficiency), especially a lack 
of thiamine (vitamin B1). Thiamine is not synthesised in the body, and internal stores 
usually last for a few weeks. Thus, if the intake or the absorption of thiamine are 
reduced for an extended period, the patient is at risk of developing Wernicke's 
encephalopathy. 
Currently, most cases of thiamine deficiency are associated with chronic alcohol 
abuse. Long-term over-consumption of alcohol can lead to thiamine deficiency in three 
ways: (1) by decreasing absorption of thiamine from the gastrointestinal tract following 
stomach and liver damage, (2) by impairing thiamine utilisation in the cells, and (3) by 
causing inadequate nutritional thiamine intake through an imbalanced diet (Thomson & 
Marshall, 2006). However, non-alcohol related cases have been reported in cases of 
prisoners of war (De Wardener & Lennox, 1947), severe pregnancy sickness 
(hyperemesis gravidaru, Yoon, Chang, & Lee, 2005), gastrointestinal disorders 
(Shimomura, Mori, Hirono, Imamura, & Yamashita, 1998),  anorexia (Handler & 
Perkin, 1982), and following certain surgical procedures, such as laparotomy for small 
bowel obstruction or bariatric surgery (Aasheim, 2008; Deb, Law-Min, & Fearnley, 
2002). Other chronic conditions may cause a thiamine deficiency including AIDS, 
thyrotoxicosis, metastatic cancers, long-term dialysis and congestive heart failure (when 
treated with long-term diuretic therapy). 
Emergency clinical practice has also been responsible for a number of 
Wernicke-Korsakoff cases, when severely malnourished patients were administered 
intravenous glucose. For such patients with depleted levels of thiamine a glucose 
supplement can precipitate or worsen Wernicke's encephalopathy by driving thiamine 
intracellularly. Current good clinical practice demands administration of thiamine prior 
to or simultaneously with glucose infusion in patients at high risk for Wernicke-
Korsakoff syndrome. This is usually done using a multivitamin intravenous fluid 
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(banana bag) containing thiamine, magnesium, folate, and other vitamins (Krishel et al., 
1998; Li et al., 2008). 
Wernicke's encephalopathy is considered a medical emergency. Untreated, it 
leads to death in up to 20% of cases, or to the Korsakoff's syndrome in 85% of survivors 
(Kopelman Thomson, Guerrini, & Marshall, 2009). The recommended treatment 
involves intravenous administration of thiamine, usually for over 30 minutes. The long-
term rehabilitation involves thiamine supplementation and a correction of the triggering 
factors. Where a history of alcohol misuse or dependency is suspected, abstinence is 
paramount to recovery. 
 
1.5.2 Neuropathology 
 The pathology of Korsakoff patients involves primarily lesions to the 
dorsomedial nucleus of the thalamus and to the mammillary bodies (Victor, Adams, & 
Collins, 1989). Neuronal loss, micro-haemorrhages and gliosis have also been identified 
in the paraventricular and periaqueductal grey matter, the mammillo-thalamic tract, the 
anterior thalamus, as well as secondary lesions in the medulla, pons, and cerebellum. 
The diencephalic lesions are thought to play a major role in amnesia. 
Neocortical atrophy, especially in the frontal and parietal lobes has also been 
reported for Korsakoff patients (Jernigan, Schafer, Butters, Cermak, 1991; Oscar-
Berman & Marinkovic, 2007; Shimamura, Jernigan, & Squire, 1988). This was 
associated with the enlargement of the lateral ventricles, and the widening of the sylvian 
and interhemispheric fissures, particularly between the frontal lobes. However, frontal 
atrophy is a common characteristic of alcoholics independent of thiamine deficiency.   
 
1.5.3 Cognitive performance 
The cardinal cognitive impairment of Korsakoff syndrome patients is the 
episodic memory deficit (amnesia), affecting both the memory for past events 
(retrograde amnesia), and new memories (anterograde amnesia). Immediate registration 
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of information is usually at normal levels, as patients are able to repeat information in 
the absence of any delay (Joyce & Robbins, 1991; Wiegersma, De Jong, Dieren, 1991). 
However, after a distracting activity, memory performance is severely impaired (Butters 
& Cermak, 1980; Kopelman, 1985). Some information may be learned during an initial 
learning trial, but following interference from distracting information, memory 
performance decays significantly. This marked sensitivity to interference is the most 
prominent feature of anterograde amnesia. 
Although similar in most respects to the anterograde amnesia of other 
aetiologies, Korsakoff patients often present unique features leading from their frontal 
executive deficits. Most notable are the motivational and arousal deficits, which could 
contribute to their severe memory problems. Korsakoff patients usually display apathy, 
passivity and lack initiation. These deficits may interfere with the encoding and retrieval 
of information (Oscar-Berman, 1980). However, Korsakoff patients show better 
learning when information is emotionally relevant, or arousing (Kopelman, 1986; 
Markowitsch, Kessler, & Denzler, 1986), although benefits are usually not preserved in 
the long-term (Davidoff, Butters, Gerstman, Zurif, Paul, & Mattis, 1984; Grandholm, 
Wolfe, & Butters, 1985). The ability to acquire new motor and perceptual skills and 
performance on implicit memory tasks is usually preserved (Cohen & Squire, 1980; 
Martone, Butters, Payne, Becker, & Sax, 1984). 
Retrograde amnesia is also commonly found in Korsakoff patients, and usually 
presents with a marked temporal gradient: the more recent the event, the poorer the 
memory or the lower the likelihood of it being remembered at all. The retrograde 
amnesia often covers a relatively limited period prior to the onset of Wernicke's 
encephalitis (Seltzer & Benson, 1974), although cases have been reported when the 
retrograde amnesia was extensive (Kopelman, 1989; Zola-Morgan, Cohen, & Squire, 
1981, 1983). Originally, two concurrent explanations were proposed for the retrograde 
memory deficit: a gradually developing anterograde amnesia (meaning that patients fail 
to remember in the first place these remote periods of their lives), and a general retrieval 
deficit, which sets in during the acute phases of the disease (Albert, Butters, & Levin, 
1979; Butters & Albert, 1982). However, cases have been reported were prior to the 
onset of Korsakoff's syndrome, patients were able to provide detailed accounts of their 
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earlier life, which after the acute phase of the disease were completely forgotten 
(Butters & Cemark, 1986). Since then, alternative explanations have been suggested for 
the temporal gradient of the retrograde amnesia, according to which information from 
different time periods might be accessed using different forms of memory. Recent 
events are anchored in a spatial and temporal context, held in episodic memory systems 
which are deficient in Korsakoff patients. Events from the distant past are thought to 
lose their contextual qualities, but can still be retained through continued rehearsing and 
retelling in semantic memory systems – thought to be generally intact in Korsakoff 
patients with limited neural lesions. However, the majority of Korsakoff patients have a 
long history of alcohol abuse and the extent and severity of their brain lesions is widely 
variable. Semantic memory deficits have also been reported in Korsakoff syndrome 
patients, for information acquired prior to the onset of the disease (Verfaellie, Reiss, & 
Roth, 1995), and this was also more pronounced for recent information than for older 
material. This suggests that recent memories of Korsakoff patients, whether episodic or 
semantic, are more vulnerable than information acquired earlier in their lives. Notably, 
the extent of retrograde amnesia seems to be related to frontal lobe functioning 
(Kopelman, 1989; Verfaellie et al., 1995), which could play a role in planning and 
initiating memory retrieval (Dall'Ora, Della Sala, & Spinnler, 1989; Stuss & Benson, 
1986). 
Korsakoff syndrome patients normally lack awareness into their memory deficit. 
Early neurological reports documented that Korsakoff patients display both amnesia and 
confabulation (Bonhoeffer, 1901, 1904). Indeed the first report of confabulation as a 
neurological symptom describing the false recollections of amnesic patients made 
without conscious knowledge of their falsehood belongs to Korsakoff (1889/1996). The 
term used by Korsakoff can be directly translated into English as 
“pseudoreminiscences”, and was later replaced by confabulation. Since then, 
confabulation was reported for many other aetiologies of amnesia (Johnson, Hayes, 
D’Esposito, & Raye, 2000). Bonhoeffer (1904) was the first to distinguish between 
“momentary” and fantastic/florid confabulations. Momentary confabulations were 
commonly assigned to the patient's attempt to fill gaps in memory, when provoked with 
questions from an examiner. Fantastic confabulations are usually spontaneous, appear to 
exceed the need to account for memory lapses and their content is usually grandiose and 
1. General Introduction 
33 
 
wish-fulfilling (Berlyne, 1972; Fotopoulou, Conway, Tyrer, Birchall, Griffiths, & 
Solms, 2008). More recent evidence suggested that that spontaneous confabulations are 
aetiologically different from the provoked memory distortions or intrusions (Kopelman 
1987; Schnider, 2003). However, currently some disagreement persists regarding the 
exact taxonomy of and possible subtypes of confabulation (for discussions see DeLuca, 
2000; Metcalf, Langdon, & Coltheart, 2007). 
 Despite amnesia (which can be severe), general intelligence is usually preserved 
in Korsakoff patients (Butters & Cermak, 1980). IQ scores as measured by the Wechsler 
Adult Intelligence Scale – Revised (WAIS-R) are usually in the average range, with the 
exception of the Digit Symbol subtest – a measure of visuomotor performance, where 
Korsakoff patients are taxed by their neurological oculomotor impairment (Parkin & 
Leng, 1993). Performance on the Wechsler Memory Scale – Revised is markedly 
impaired. The discrepancy between IQ and Delayed Memory Quotient can be as high as 
three standard deviations (Butters, Salmon, Cullum, 1988).   
Korsakoff patients often show deficits in a number of domains other than 
memory. Visuospatial and visuoperceptual functioning impairment was documented in 
a number of tasks, such as digit-symbol and symbol-digit substitution, and embedded 
figures tests (Jacobson, Acker, & Lishman, 1990). Some patients can show deficits in 
problem solving and concept formation, deficits linked with impaired frontal executive 
control (Becker, Butters, Rivoira, & Milliotis, 1986).   Performance on other clinical 
tests of frontal lobe functioning such as the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test, Verbal 
Fluency and Trail-Making B is sometimes impaired (Jacobson et al., 1990; Squire, 
1982). 
In conclusion, Korsakoff patients are characterised by anterograde amnesia, 
which can range from mild to severe and may be associated with diencephalic damage. 
Temporally graded retrograde amnesia is also present and it may be associated with 
frontal lobe damage. Procedural and semantic learning are often (although not always) 
preserved. Additionally to the memory impairment, Korsakoff patients can present 
impaired executive functioning especially on tasks requiring spatiotemporal processing. 
However, despite the memory and executive function deficits, intellect and working 
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memory are relatively intact. This might suggest that certain frontal dysfunctions might 
be specific to Korsakoff patients and necessarily a result of chronic alcohol abuse. 
 
1.6 Aim and objectives of the thesis 
 
 The aim of the current thesis is to bridge the significant gap in the literature 
between discrete emotions and emotional memory in the absence of episodic recall. The 
study of discrete emotions is an active area of enquiry, focused on exploring the 
fundamental differences between basic emotions, mostly in terms of expression and 
influence on cognition. The study of the powerful affective processes that exist even in 
the absence of the episodic memory support have mostly been studied in emotional 
versus neutral situations or for positive and negative emotions. Affective scientists 
investigating emotional memory have not addressed discrete emotions systematically, 
and it is becoming increasingly recognised that discrete classes of emotion (and not just 
positive and negative affect) can best reveal the richness of people’s emotion 
experiences. More specifically, the re-experience of a full set of discrete basic emotions 
has never been systematically compared in the presence and absence of the recall of 
episodic material. Isolating the emotional experience from the episodic memory can be 
done firstly by eliciting and measuring old emotions before and after the conscious and 
detailed recollection of the emotional material. Secondly, the separation of the 
emotional and episodic memory processes can be observed by comparing the emotional 
re-experience of a sample of neurologically normal individuals and amnesic patients in 
a similarly controlled emotion elicitation paradigm. The present thesis will conduct 
both. The simultaneous study of four discrete emotions is the paramount dimension of 
the thesis, the tradition distinction between positive and negative affect cannot be 
discounted by empirical evidence, and will be integrated in the design. 
 The first objective of the thesis is to investigate the hierarchical position of 
valence in relation to the four discrete classes of emotions (anger, fear, sadness, and 
happiness). The empirical question addressed is whether the valence of an affectively 
conditioned stimulus can be re-experienced for longer than its discrete category.  
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The second objective is to investigate which aspects of an emotional event need 
to be recalled in order to elicit the original discrete emotions. The emotional re-
experience of both neutral and emotional material, over one week following the 
presentation and episodic recall of four sets of stories generating discrete basic emotions 
will be compared between anger, fear, happiness, and sadness. This will be the first 
direct investigation comparing the stability of affective valence and discrete emotions 
over time. The first two objectives are addressed in Chapter 2. 
 The third objective of the thesis (see Chapter 3) is to examine the differences in 
the re-experience of the four discrete classes of emotions (anger, fear, sadness and 
happiness) between amnesic (Korsakoff’s syndrome) patients and neurologically normal 
controls. This study allows to investigate the relationship between episodic recall and 
the experience of each of the four discrete emotion classes, and also, the relationship 
between core executive functions and the intensity of the emotional re-experience of the 
four distinct basic emotions. 
 Finally, the fourth objective of the present thesis is to introduce the concepts of 
affective intensity, specificity and accuracy, and develop a computational method for 
calculating the respective indices for negative and overall affect from the individual 
intensities of the most common four basic emotions (anger, fear, sadness, and 
happiness). The conceptual and procedural definitions of the indices and a first 
application of the indices on the datasets collected during the previous two studies are 
presented in Chapter 4.  
 
1.7 Ethical considerations and governance 
 
 The studies undertaken as part of this PhD project have been reviewed and 
approved by the Ethics Committee of the School of Psychology, Bangor University, the 
NHS Wales, North Wales Research Committee – West , and Betsi Cadwaladr 
University Health Board R&D Internal Review Panel – West. Chapter 2 presents data 
collected during a first experiment involving undergraduate students in the School of 
Psychology of Bangor University, and has been approved by the Ethics Committee of 
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the School of Psychology, Bangor University. Chapter 3 presents data collected during a 
second experiment, involving amnesic patients and age-matched controls, and was 
reviewed and approved by both the Bangor University and the local NHS research 
ethics and R&D review panels of the Betsi Cadwaladr University Health Board 
(BCUHB). A further substantial amendment was submitted for the second experiment to 
allow the recruitment of Korsakoff’s syndrome patients from a single location in 
England (The Victoria Care Home, Worksopp, Nottinghamshire, run by Dukeries 
Healthcare Ltd.) The detailed application and approval documents are included in 
Appendices A, B, and C. 
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Chapter 2. Emotional memory in neurologically intact individuals: 
affective valence is more enduring than discrete emotion classes and 
active recollection is essential for re-experience 
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2.1 Abstract 
 
Discrete classes of emotions (anger, fear, etc.) have been associated with distinct 
patterns of behaviour, physiology and neuroanatomy. However, a substantial overlap 
exists between negative emotions, suggesting a hierarchical grouping into two basic 
categories of positive or negative affect, with subordinate classes for discrete emotions. 
This organisation is consistent with the evolutionary development and the 
neuroanatomy of emotion systems, but has been little investigated. Firstly, the present 
study investigated for the first time the hierarchical organisation of affect in the context 
of emotional memory. Secondly, the emotional re-experience of both neutral and 
emotionally discrete material is studied over one week. A novel set of emotional stimuli 
(narrative vignettes) was developed, consisting of a neutral beginning and four 
emotional endings, eliciting anger, fear, sadness, and happiness. A group of 32 
university students listened to four different stories (one for each emotion), recalling 
them after 30 minutes and again seven days later, while providing self-report measures 
of discrete emotions during each session. Firstly, as expected, after 30 minutes, the 
presentation of the initially neutral story beginnings reliably elicited the discrete 
emotion associated with the content of each story. Notably, after seven days, the story 
beginnings no longer elicited the earlier emotional specificity, but evoked the correct 
affective valence. Moreover, the participants reported experiencing the correct discrete 
target emotion only after a detailed recall of the passage that had initially generated the 
emotion. The results suggest, firstly, that experiences of discrete emotions lose their 
affective specificity with time, but still retain the correct valence. Secondly, the findings 
show that a detailed recollection of emotional events is central for a full affective re-
experience. This is the first experimental report that the most durable form of emotional 
memory encodes affective valence – and is in line with neuroscientific accounts arguing 
that the phylogenetically older neural systems produce the most stable affect. 
Furthermore, the findings suggest that a detailed recollection of emotional events is 
central for a full affective re-experience. This psychological process has a range of 
practical and therapeutic applications, such as maximising happiness, improving elite 
sport performance, and managing emotional disorders. 
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2.2 Introduction 
 
Some of the earliest systematic descriptions of emotions have been notably 
categorical (Aristotle, trans. 1975; Darwin, 1872/1998; James, 1884), and this is 
presently the view dominating empirical research. The landmark findings that specific 
emotional states reliably produce similar patterns of facial expressions across distant 
cultures (Ekman & Friesen, 1971; Izard, 1971) and in infants (Izard, Huerber, Risser, 
McGinnes, Dougherty; 1980) formed the basis of the current theory of discrete 
emotions. This argues for the existence of an innate set of distinct, universal, and basic 
emotions, with a specific physiology and an automatic appraisal mechanism which 
requires minimal cognitive processing (although an extended appraisal system can 
coexist, see Ekman, 1999). A generous body of empirical evidence has reported that 
discrete basic emotions show individual autonomic nervous system response patterns 
(Cacioppo, Berntson, Klein, & Poehlmann, 1997; Collet, Vernet-Maurym, Delhomme, 
& Dittmar, 1997; Stephens, Christie, & Friedman, 2010), cardiorespiratory activity 
(Bloch, Lemeignan, & Aguilera, 1991; Rainville, Bechara, Naqvi, & Damasio, 2006), 
involve different, but partly overlapping neural structures (Tettamanti, Rognoni, 
Cafiero, Costa, Galati, & Perani, 2012; Vytal & Hamann, 2010), and elicit specific 
changes in cognition, judgment, and behaviour (Lench, Flores, & Bench, 2011, but see 
for a dissenting view Lindquist, Siegel, Quigley & Barrett, 2013). However, despite the 
overwhelming evidence in favour of a distinct set of basic emotions, there is still 
ongoing disagreement on the number and range of discrete emotions, with four primary 
classes of affect (anger, fear, sadness, and happiness) being most consistently reported 
in the literature (see Damasio et al., 2000).  
Opposing views to the categorical theory of discrete emotions have built around 
the argument that affective experiences correlate strongly with a small number of 
orthogonal dimensions. Valence and arousal have been most frequently and reliably 
reported (Mayer & Gaschke, 1988; Meyer & Shack, 1989; Russell & Feldman Barrett, 
1999; Watson, Wiese, Vaidya, & Tellegen, 1999), with various other dimensions also 
proposed, such as dominance (Mehrabian, 1996; Russell, 1977), anticipated effort, 
attentional activity, and situational control (Smith, & Ellsworth, 1985). Most recently, 
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Lövheim (2012), proposed a novel account of the organisation of affect, suggesting that 
the combinations of the levels of three monoamine neurotransmitters (i.e., dopamine, 
noradrenaline, serotonin) involved in the affective experience, might explain the 
experience of a distinct set of eight discrete emotions. 
 
2.2.1 The hierarchical model of emotions 
The discrete and categorical accounts are currently the most actively 
investigated theories of emotions, but both suffer from significant limitations, and 
appear to be mutually exclusive. Arousal (one of the two fundamental dimensions of 
core affect) has long been dismissed as a reliable affective dimension, on the argument 
that it seems confounded with the intensity of emotions (Reisenzein, 1994; Wintre & 
Vallance, 1994), and the empirical evidence supporting the other dimensions remains 
currently modest. However, valence (positive or negative) has continued to pose a direct 
challenge to the categorical account. Proposed discrete emotions (especially on the 
negative spectrum) show a significant concurrent validity (Watson & Clark, 1992), 
suggesting that they are all underpinned by a common latent construct, perhaps best 
labelled ‘negative affect’. Thus, the similarities of negative emotions on one hand and 
the contrast between positive and negative affect on the other remain difficult to 
reconcile with the purist interpretation of the theory of discrete emotions. 
These findings have been used to advance a compromise between the categorical 
and dimensional theories, in the form of a hierarchical system of emotions (Watson & 
Clark, 1992; Watson & Tellegen, 1985). Positive and negative affect has, thus, been 
argued to be a more fundamental dimension of emotion, with emotion category as a 
secondary level with various discrete classes (Tellegen, Watson, & Clark, 1999). Thus, 
the long established findings regarding basic emotions could be fitted in a parsimonious 
model that recognises valence as a fundamental dimension of affect. 
The affective neuroscience literature seems to offer convergent and influential 
support for the hierarchical account. Findings derived initially from work in non-human 
animals suggest that a basic valence system is located in the primitive areas of the upper 
brain stem, specifically in the periaqueductal grey (PAG; Bailey & Davies, 1942; 1943; 
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Bandler & Shipley, 1994). In more recent evolutionary history these have become 
differentiated into discrete emotion systems distributed across a range of structures such 
as the hypothalamus, amygdala, anterior cingulate, nucleus accumbens, and others 
(Vytal & Hamann, 2010). Panksepp (2004) recognised that “basic emotional energies” 
(p. 315) of either a positive or negative nature can be triggered in the PAG by minimal 
stimuli, possibly as a result of affective conditioning, and can be transmitted upwards in 
the neuroaxis, to interact with a variety of higher brain structures, sometimes resulting 
in the experience of discrete or more complex classes of emotions. Therefore, the 
hierarchical organisation of affect seems to be benefit from a direct neuroanatomical 
mapping. 
However, thus far this theory remained largely untested. Empirical momentum 
behind the study of discrete emotions appears to have eclipsed the arguments favouring 
this integrative approach, while proponents of dimensional theories have preferred to 
avoid discrete emotions altogether (Russell & Feldman Barrett, 1999). As a result, to 
date, the hierarchical theory, that valence is the fundamental ingredient of any emotional 
experience, upon which distinct classes of emotions are constructed, rests solely on 
correlational evidence from self-report measures (Tellegen, Watson, & Clark, 1999). 
The hierarchical account is eminently testable. An important consequence of this 
model is that discrete emotion categories should be the most transient and disruptable 
forms of emotional experience, while emotional valence should remain accessible over 
time, even after the specificity of emotion category has faded. This assumption can be 
readily tested in the framework of emotional memory. A stimulus encountered in an 
emotional situation can cause the re-experience of that emotion over time – in an 
affective conditioning paradigm (Tranel & Damasio, 1993). The question of interest is 
whether the re-experienced emotion elicited by the affectively conditioned stimulus 
indeed retains its emotional valence (positive or negative), even after losing its 
emotional specificity, or if once the emotional specificity is lost, the emotional valence 
of the stimulus is lost as well. A critical aspect of the question is demonstrating the 
selective affective conditioning of discrete classes of emotions. Although the range of 
emotional stimuli for eliciting discrete emotions is vast (Coan & Allen, 2007), affective 
conditioning studies have either employed generic positive and negative emotions (see 
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Hofmann, De Houwer, Perugini, Baeyens, & Crombez, 2010 for a meta-analysis of 
evaluative conditioning studies), or selective discrete emotions – most commonly fear 
and anger (Kuriyama, Soshi, Fujii, & Kim, 2010), but never a full set of discrete 
emotions.  
 
2.2.2 Episodic recall and the re-experience of past emotions 
Retrieved emotional experiences play an important role in everyday decision 
making (Bechara, 2004; Bechara, Damasio, & Damasio, 2003; Levine, 1997; Pfister & 
Böhm, 2008), influencing performance in various fields of activity (Cohen, Tenenbaum, 
& English, 2006; Hanin & Syrjä, 1995; Straw & Cummings, 1996; Sun & Wu, 2011), 
affecting our subjective feeling of well-being (Diener, Suh, Lucas, & Smith, 1999), and 
featuring as a critical factor in a range of clinical disorders (LaBar & Cabeza, 2006; see 
for a review, Leppänen, 2006). It is generally agreed that emotions and episodic 
memory are characterised by a bidirectional interaction: episodic recall can precede and 
trigger the re-experience of emotions, and in turn emotions can also precede and trigger 
episodic recall. For example, past emotions are frequently re-experienced following the 
recollection of the eliciting event (see for a review Holland & Kensinger, 2010). 
Conversely, a memory can be elicited by the presentation of a stimulus or situation 
associated with the relevant emotions, without the intentional episodic recollection of 
the event (Berntsen & Rubin 2002) – particularly in the case of patients with post-
traumatic stress disorder (PTSD; Rubin, Boals, & Berntsen, 2008).   
The subjective sense of remembering is largely believed to involve the 
emotional re-experiencing of the original context (see for a review, Buchanan, 2007) 
and the degree to which affect is influenced by the recall of past events is regularly 
measured in experimental psychology to assess emotional reactivity (e.g., Damasio et 
al., 2000; Rainville, Bechara, Naqvi, & Damasio, 2006; Salas, Radovic, & Turnbull, 
2011). Furthermore, the affective re-experience of critical past events is an important 
therapeutic factor in a number of clinical settings, especially in Post-Traumatic Stress 
Disorder (PTSD; see for a review Ehlers, Hackmann, & Michael, 2004), depression 
(Reynolds, & Brewin, 1999), and the resolution of problematic experiences (Watson & 
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Rennie, 1994). It also serves as the basis for emotion focused therapy, and in particular 
process-experiential interventions, which aims to increase the awareness of moment-by-
moment emotional experiences and associate them with new meaning (see Greenberg, 
Rice, & Elliott, 1993, and also Angus & McLeod, 2004). Conversely, applied work in 
the domain of elite sports performance recommends the avoidance of complete re-
experiencing – which risks the recollection of previous failure (Hardy & Ringland, 
1984; Sun & Wu, 2011).  
Despite the growing recognition of the importance of re-experienced emotions, 
and their impact on successful therapeutic interventions, general wellbeing and 
behavioural performance in applied settings, the factors affecting the reliving of 
emotions remain under-investigated. The greatest insight gained thus far relates to the 
form and context in which emotions are re-experienced, as opposed to the content. For 
example, the clinical psychology literature has long recognised the role of the vividness 
of mental imagery (see for a review Hackman & Holmes, 2004, and also Karatzias, 
Power, Brown, and McGoldrick, 2009; Wheatley et al., 2007). Qualitative analyses 
have also revealed that the use of vivid and concrete language during recall enhances 
the emotional re-experience (Watson, 1996). Surprisingly, however, there appears to 
have been no previous investigations of the way in which discrete emotions elicited by 
recollections of episodic material relate to the original emotions. Perhaps the most 
significant question is ‘which aspects of an event need to be recalled for the original 
emotion to be re-evoked?’ Does the affective experience begin as soon as a memory is 
recounted, being automatically trigged by the range of associations, or is only the 
complete re-experiencing of the episode sufficient to adequately elicit the original 
emotion?  
Recent neuroanatomical evidence directed the selection of the range of basic 
emotions whose re-experience should be investigated separately. Two of the latest 
neuroanatomical meta-analyses (Lench, Flores, & Bench, 2011; Vytal & Hamann, 
2010) concluded that anger, fear, happiness, sadness, and perhaps disgust activate 
unique and consistent neural pathways in the brain, with specific changes in cognition, 
judgment, behaviour, experience, and physiology (see for a dissenting view Lindquist, 
Siegel, Quigley & Barrett, 2013). These findings expand an already growing body of 
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empirical evidence reporting that discrete basic emotions show individual autonomic 
nervous system response patterns (Collet, Vernet-Maurym, Delhomme, & Dittmar, 
1997; Stephens, Christie, & Friedman, 2010), cardiorespiratory activity (Bloch, 
Lemeignan, & Aguilera-T, 1991; Rainville et al., 2006; Schwartz, Weinberger, & 
Singer, 1981), and involve different neural circuits (Tettamanti, Rognoni, Cafiero, 
Costa, Galati, & Perani, 2012). Therefore, an insightful study of the relationship 
between emotions and memory should differentiate between the four primary emotions 
(anger, fear, happiness, and sadness) which have been consistently reported in the 
literature (Damasio et al., 2000). 
Firstly, the present study investigated the stability of valence and discrete 
emotions (i.e., anger, fear, sadness, and happiness) over time. The empirical question 
addressed is whether the valence of an affectively conditioned stimulus can be re-
experienced for longer than its discrete category. A preliminary objective was to 
establish that the vignettes would elicit the target emotion (anger, fear, sadness, and 
happiness) selectively. Then, we sought to confirm that the emotional content of the 
stories retained its original emotional specificity over time (i.e., the content of the 
fearful stories was continuing to elicit more fear than any other emotion, etc.). Finally, 
the changes in emotion intensity after the presentation of the affectively conditioned 
story contexts over time were compared. To support the hierarchical organisation of 
affect, the contexts of the stories should continue to retain their emotional valence 
(positive or negative), even when the selective experience of discrete emotions has been 
lost. 
Secondly, the episodic recall and associated affective re-experience, for the four 
sets of stories (anger, fear, happiness, and sadness) was investigated. The aim was to 
investigate the degree to which the neutral story stems succeeded in producing the re-
experience of the original emotion elicited by the story endings. The expected finding 
was that if participants remembered the emotional ending and re-experienced the 
appropriate emotion after recollection, the detailed presentation of the beginning of the 
story alone would change their affective state, causing them to report increased levels of 
the target emotion. 
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2.3 Method 
 
2.3.1 Participants 
Thirty-two Bangor University students (11 male), with ages between 18 and 31 
(M=20.78, SD=3.35), screened for neurological and psychiatric history took part in the 
study in return for the usual amount of course credits or University’s standard 
participant payment rate (up to a maximum of £12). Recruitment was made on an 
opportunity sample basis. 
 
2.3.2 Stimuli and Measures 
 
Four novel sets of emotional vignettes were used in the present study. Each set 
consisted of four stories, written in the second person, and targeting a different emotion 
(anger, fear, happiness, and sadness). An equally controlled set of such stories has never 
been developed before (cf., Kuriyama, Soshi, Fujii, & Kim, 2010). Each story differed 
in narrative content, but employed an identical plot design, number of recall units, and 
number of characters eliciting the target emotion. All stories in a set shared an identical 
and emotionally neutral beginning (also referred to as context, or stem), which defined 
the time, place and introduced the main agent of the story (i.e., the character 
subsequently responsible for eliciting the target emotion). Each of the four stories in a 
set continued with a different plot (also referred to as content, or ending) presenting a 
series of events aimed at eliciting a specific discrete emotion. Pilot data demonstrated 
that the stories show emotional specificity (i.e., selective elicitation of the target 
emotion at a significantly higher intensity than any non-target emotions), and 
comparable levels of intensity between target emotions. With stimuli producing this 
level of experimental control, it is possible to investigate the extent to which episodic 
recall triggers the re-experience of emotions, and to study the temporal effects of 
memory on emotion.  
The four sets of stories are included in Appendix D. Following the classical 
protocol of Turner and Greene (1977), a propositional analysis (Kintsch & van Dijk, 
1978) confirmed that each story consisted of 60 propositional units, each corresponding 
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to an individual recall unit (Kintsch, 1994) – see Appendix E. Recall was measured by 
comparing the transcripts of the audio recordings of participants’ recollections of the 
stories to the original scripts and counting the number of propositional units correctly 
reproduced. 
Momentary ratings of emotional experience were collected using the anger, fear, 
happiness, and sadness questionnaires, extracted from the Visual Analogue Mood 
Scales (VAMS; Stern, 1997). Participants were asked to indicate the momentary 
intensity of each of the four discrete emotions by answering the question “How 
angry/afraid/sad/happy do feel right now?” Responses were self-recorded on a 100mm 
vertical visual analogue scale, anchored at the two ends by schematic faces representing 
a neutral expression and the target emotion and matching verbal labels (i.e., Neutral, 
Angry, Afraid, Happy, and Sad). The VAMS have been reported to have high validity 
and test-retest reliability (see Stern, 1997), and were also validated for use with various 
clinical populations (Arruda, Stern, Somerville; 1999). 
 
2.3.3 Design 
 
The study employed an overall 3x4x3 repeated-measures design, consisting of 
three phases (Presentation, Recall after 30 minutes, and Recall after 7 days), four 
stories, one for each discrete emotion (anger, fear, sadness, and happiness), and three 
time points when emotion intensity ratings were collected: at the start of the session 
(Baseline), after the presentation of the story contexts and after the presentation or recall 
of the story content. The vignettes were presented via the auditory modality, and order 
was counterbalanced across participants. 
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2.3.4 Procedure 
 
The study was advertised as investigating the effect of experiential stories on the 
ability to perform mental calculations (which acted as a filler task). The mental 
calculation task consisted of 120 seconds of basic single digit additions and subtractions 
and was administered after each emotional story. The task was chosen for its emotion 
regulation function (see Kanske, Heissler, Schönfelder, Bongers, & Wessa, 2010), and 
was used to prevent emotional carry-over effects from one story to another. As part of 
the study’s cover story, the number of correct equations solved in the two minute 
interval was argued to be the measure of interest. 
The first two of three phases (Presentation and Recall after 30 minute) took part 
in a single session, and all the participants returned for a second session, seven days 
later, when the last phase of the study took place (Recall after 7 days). At the beginning 
of the first phase (Presentation), participants provided baseline measures of momentary 
emotional experience. Next, they listened to four emotional stories (one from each set, 
and targeting a different emotion) and, each time, were asked to imagine that they were 
experiencing what is happening in the story. Emotional measures were taken after the 
beginning (context) and ending (content) of each story, and were then followed by the 
mental calculation task. In the second phase (Recall after 30 minutes), participants were 
presented again with the story contexts as memory cues for the vignettes they were 
requested to recall. Next, they were asked to reproduce from memory the remaining part 
of the story (Content), with as much detail as possible. As before, emotional measures 
were taken after story contexts and contents. In the last phase of the study (Recall after 7 
days), participants provided a baseline measures of momentary emotional experience, 
and followed the same procedure as in the second phase (Recall after 30 minutes). 
The presentation order of the four sets of stories was counterbalanced using a 
composite latin-square, balanced for story set (Set 1 – 4) and target emotion (anger, 
fear, sadness, happiness), as shown in Table 1. 
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Table 1. The composite balanced latin-square used to determine the presentation order 
The composite balanced latin-square used to determine the presentation order for the 
story stems and endings. Both the story stem (Set 1 – 4) and target emotion (anger, fear, 
sadness, happiness) were counterbalanced. 
Participant First story Second story Third story Fourth story 
1 Stem 1 - anger Stem 2 - fear 
Stem 4 - 
sadness 
Stem 3 - 
happiness 
2 Stem 1 - fear 
Stem 2 - 
happiness 
Stem 4 - anger 
Stem 3 - 
sadness 
3 
Stem 1 - 
happiness 
Stem 2 - 
sadness 
Stem 4 - fear Stem 3 - anger 
4 
Stem 1 - 
sadness 
Stem 2 - anger 
Stem 4 - 
happiness 
Stem 3 - fear 
5 Stem 2 - anger Stem 3 - fear 
Stem 1 - 
sadness 
Stem 4 - 
happiness 
6 Stem 2 - fear 
Stem 3 - 
happiness 
Stem 1 - anger 
Stem 4 - 
sadness 
7 
Stem 2 - 
happiness 
Stem 3 - 
sadness 
Stem 1 - fear Stem 4 - anger 
8 
Stem 2 - 
sadness 
Stem 3 - anger 
Stem 1 - 
happiness 
Stem 4 - fear 
9 Stem 3 - anger Stem 4 - fear 
Stem 2 - 
sadness 
Stem 1 - 
happiness 
10 Stem 3 - fear 
Stem 4 - 
happiness 
Stem 2 - anger 
Stem 1 - 
sadness 
11 
Stem 3 - 
happiness 
Stem 4 - 
sadness 
Stem 2 - fear Stem 1 - anger 
12 
Stem 3 - 
sadness 
Stem 4 - anger 
Stem 2 - 
happiness 
Stem 1 - fear 
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13 Stem 4 - anger Stem 1 - fear 
Stem 3 - 
sadness 
Stem 2 - 
happiness 
14 Stem 4 - fear 
Stem 1 - 
happiness 
Stem 3 - anger 
Stem 2 - 
sadness 
15 
Stem 4 - 
happiness 
Stem 1 - 
sadness 
Stem 3 - fear Stem 2 - anger 
16 
Stem 4 - 
sadness 
Stem 1 - anger 
Stem 3 - 
happiness 
Stem 2 - fear 
 
 
2.3.5 Data Analysis 
 
Emotional experience ratings from the visual analogue scales were converted 
into numeric values ranging from 0-100 (Stern, 1997). The emotion ratings after the 
context of all four stories during the first phase were not collected for 10 participants. 
Missing data was excluded on a pairwise basis. Their data were excluded pair-wise from 
all subsequent analyses. The ratings of the negative target emotions were split into 
target emotions (e.g., anger for anger stories) and non-target emotions (e.g., fear and 
sadness for anger stories). Repeated-measures ANOVAs followed-up by planned 
contrasts were used to compare the intensity and recall accuracy scores of the four sets 
of emotional stories. Simple Bonferroni corrections were applied to the family-wise 
alpha rate (α=.05) for planned contrasts, and the Holm–Bonferroni method was used for 
all other multiple tests (Holm, 1979). The relevant α value is reported separately for 
each test, where it was different from the standard value. 
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2.4 Results 
 
2.4.1 The stability of discrete emotions and affective valence 
 
The stability of valence and affective category following the affective 
conditioning of discrete emotions was investigated over time. Firstly, two preliminary 
analyses were performed to establish the emotional experience at Baseline (before the 
affective conditioning task) and to confirm that the verbal emotional stimuli elicited the 
four target emotions (anger, fear, sadness, and happiness) selectively, that is, at higher 
levels than any non-target emotion. Secondly, it was shown that the recall of the 
vignettes retained their emotional specificity over time. Finally, the main study question 
was addressed by comparing the changes of emotion intensities from Baseline after the 
presentation of the story contexts 30 minutes after the affective conditioning and seven 
days later. 
 
2.4.1.1 Emotion Ratings at Baseline and after the Presentation of Story Endings 
 
At Baseline (see Figure 1), happiness (M=45.42, SD=28.44) was dominant 
compared to all other (negative) emotions: anger (M=4.39, SD=8.07), fear (M=7.18, 
SD=9.91), and sadness (M=5.21, SD=10.91). This was confirmed by a significant 
ANOVA (F(1,30)=53.15, p<.001, ηp2=.624), and follow-up t-tests (happiness vs. anger, 
t(30)=8.10, p<.001, d=1.96, α=.017; happiness vs. fear, t(30)=7.61, p<.001, d=1.80, 
α=.017; happiness vs. sadness, t(30)=7.57, p<.001, d=1.87, α=.017). 
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Figure 1. The mean ratings of discrete emotions at Baseline and after Presentation. 
The emotion ratings at the start of the study and after the presentation of the emotional 
content of all stories (x-axis) are grouped by target emotion. Happiness was the 
dominant emotion at Baseline. The intensity of the target emotion was significantly 
higher than the intensity of any non-target emotions, for all stories. The intensity of 
happiness after the happy stories was higher than at Baseline. The error bars represent 
±1 SE of the mean. 
 
The presentation of the emotional stories, as expected, elicited the discrete target 
emotions at significantly higher levels of the than any of the non-target classes (see 
Table 2). Furthermore, even though happiness was the dominant emotion at the start of 
the session, after the happy stories, participants reported even higher levels of happiness 
(M=71.95, SD=27.07) than at Baseline (t(30)=4.29, p<.001, d=.96, α=.013).
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Table 2. The specificity of emotion elicitation after Presentation and Recall. 
The specificity of emotion elicitation after Presentation and Recall. The content of emotional vignettes elicited the target emotion 
selectively both when they were presented to participants (Presentation) and also when they were later recalled (Recall after 30 minutes, 
and Recall after 7 days). Differences between the target emotions and the other discrete emotions reached significance, at all-time points. 
The only exception was that anger stories, after 7 days, elicited only marginally more anger than sadness (p=.044) which did not meet the 
Bonferroni corrected statistical significance level (α=.017). 
Target Emotion Non-target Emotion 
Presentation  Recall after 30 minutes  Recall after 7 days 
F p α ηp2  F p α ηp2  F p α ηp2 
Anger Happiness 226.06 <.001 * .017 .863  101.13 <.001 * .017 .737  16.12 <.001 * .017 .309 
 Fear 43.35 <.001 * .017 .573  50.53 <.001 * .017 .584  16.68 <.001 * .017 .317 
 Sadness 21.12 <.001 * .017 .370  21.93 <.001 * .017 .379  4.37 .044 .017 .108 
Fear Happiness 147.73 <.001 * .017 .804  104.93 <.001 * .017 .745  31.3 <.001 * .017 .465 
 Anger 29.17 <.001 * .017 .448  30.13 <.001 * .017 .465  19.14 <.001 * .017 .347 
 Sadness 8.91 <.001 * .017 .198  11.67 <.001 * .017 .245  9.81 <.001 * .017 .214 
Sadness Happiness 191.72 <.001 * .017 .842  105.89 <.001 * .017 .752  34.3 <.001 * .017 .488 
 Anger 61.91 <.001 * .017 .632  53.59 <.001 * .017 .605  34.09 <.001 * .017 .486 
 Fear 56.75 <.001 * .017 .612  50.35 <.001 * .017 .590  34.96 <.001 * .017 .493 
Happiness Anger 242.79 <.001 * .017 .871  151.4 <.001 * .017 .808  105.8 <.001 * .017 .746 
 Sadness 232.12 <.001 * .017 .866  170.44 <.001 * .017 .826  103.8 <.001 * .017 .742 
 Fear 176.06 <.001 * .017 .828  170.54 <.001 * .017 .826  105.29 <.001 * .017 .745 
 
2. Emotional memory in neurologically intact individuals 
54 
 
2.4.1.2 Emotional Stability of Story Contents over Time 
 
 It was essential to establish that the recall of stories continued to elicit the 
discrete target emotion selectively, after 30 minutes and one week. To test this 
assumption, emotion changes from Baseline were calculated for the ratings of anger, 
fear, sadness and happiness, after 30 minutes and seven days. Positive (happiness) and 
negative (anger, fear, sadness) stories were analysed separately (see Figure 2). For the 
negative stories, the changes from Baseline of the target emotions were averaged 
together for each participant and labelled “Target Emotions (A/F/S)”. The changes of 
the most intense non-target negative emotions (e.g., the higher value between the 
intensities of fear and sadness for the angry story) were labelled “Non-Target Emotions 
(A/F/S)”. For the happy stories, the higher of the ratings of anger, fear, and sadness 
(which were close to zero after Presentation) were retained for analyses and labelled 
“Non-Target Emotions (A/F/S)”. 
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Figure 2. The average changes in the intensity of emotions from Baseline. 
after the presentation of the semantically neutral context and the presentation and 
subsequent recall of the emotional content of all stories. A. The content of negative 
stories produced a selective activation of target emotions, and to a lesser extent negative 
non-target emotions, while reducing the Baseline level of happiness. The context of the 
negative stories did not change the Baseline affect at Presentation (before the emotional 
content of the stories was revealed), but after 30 minutes elicited selectively the target 
emotion, and reduced the Baseline levels of happiness. Surprisingly, after seven days, 
the context of emotional stories had lost the ability to selectively elicit the target (or 
even non-target) negative emotions, but continued to significantly reduce the Baseline 
level of happiness. All changes remaining significant over time. B. The content of 
happy stories increased the Baseline level of happiness, but, after correcting the α level, 
only the increase at Presentation reached significance. The context of the happy stories 
failed to change the Baseline affect. All error bars represent ±1 SE of the mean. 
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The emotional content of negative stories reduced the Baseline levels of 
happiness at Presentation (M=-41.30, SD=27.51), and increased the intensities of target 
emotions (M=63.91, SD=20.20), and the other negative non-target emotions (M=44.15, 
SD=21.54). After 30 minutes, the emotion changes from Baseline showed a similar 
pattern (happiness, M=-39.97, SD=29.11; negative target emotions, M=56.67, 
SD=25.62; and non-target emotions, M=38.00, SD=26.25), and again seven days later 
(happiness, M=-34.22, SD=26.44; target emotions, M=41.54, SD=31.14; and non-target 
emotions, M=30.19, SD=25.75). T-tests confirmed that all emotion changes from 
Baseline were significant even after correcting the α level for multiple comparisons (see 
Table 3). Notably, increases of the target emotions were significantly higher than those 
of non-target negative emotions, at Presentation (t(30)=5.38, p<.001, d=.94, α=.025), 
after 30 minutes (t(30)=5.25, p<.001, d=.72, α=.025), and one week (t(30)=3.88, 
p<.001, d=.39, α=.025), confirming the preserved emotional specificity of the stories. 
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Table 3. Emotion changes from Baseline after the presentation and recall of the stories. 
Emotion changes from Baseline after the presentation and recall of the stories. The contexts of the negative stories significantly 
increased the negative emotions compared to Baseline levels, and decreased the happiness ratings after 30 minutes. One week later, the 
contexts of negative stories significantly decreased the levels of happiness, but without activating the target negative emotions, and only 
modestly increasing the non-target negative emotions (change which failed to reach significance when α level was corrected for multiple 
comparisons). The content of negative stories reliably reduced the level of happiness and increased the target and non-target negative 
emotions. 
Stories Affect Emotions Comparison 
Story Context  Story Content 
df t p α d  df t p α d 
Happiness 
Positive Happiness 
Presentation vs Baseline 20 -0.35 .73 .008 .07  30 4.28 <.001* .008 .75 
Recall 30 min vs Baseline 20 -0.72 .479 .013 .17  30 2.44 .020 .01 .43 
Recall 7 days vs Baseline 30 -0.44 .664 .025 .08  30 2.20 .034 .013 .36 
Negative Anger, Fear, Sadness 
Presentation vs Baseline 20 1.63 .118 .01 .35  30 -1.08 0.287 .05 .19 
Recall 30 min vs Baseline 20 0.20 .841 .05 .04  30 -1.50 0.142 .017 .26 
Recall 7 days vs Baseline 30 -0.59 .563 .017 .10  30 -1.33 0.193 .025 .22 
Anger, 
Fear, 
Sadness 
Positive Happiness 
Presentation vs Baseline 20 -0.68 .503 .05 .15  30 -8.62 <.001* .05 1.50 
Recall 30 min vs Baseline 20 -3.80 <.001* .007 .83  30 -7.89 <.001* .025 1.37 
Recall 7 days vs Baseline 30 -5.21 <.001* .005 .89  30 -7.87 <.001* .017 1.29 
Negative 
Target Emotions 
Presentation vs Baseline 20 1.47 .158 .016 .32  30 18.17 <.001* .013 3.16 
Recall 30 min vs Baseline 20 4.42 <.001* .006 .96  30 12.70 <.001* .01 2.21 
Recall 7 days vs Baseline 30 0.72 .477 .025 .12  30 8.12 <.001* .008 1.33 
Non-target Emotions 
Presentation vs Baseline 20 2.13 0.46 .012 .46  30 11.78 <.001* .007 2.05 
Recall 30 min vs Baseline 20 3.82 <.001* .008 .83  30 8.32 <.001* .006 1.45 
Recall 7 days vs Baseline 30 2.51 .017 .010 .43  30 7.13 <.001* .006 1.17 
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The happy stories increased the already dominant Baseline level of happiness at 
Presentation (M=24.55, SD=32.96), after 30 minutes (M=15.85, SD=37.27), and seven 
days (M=8.65, SD=23.85), without affecting the minimal levels of the negative 
emotions (Presentation, M=-1.64, SD=8.69; after 30 minute, M=-1.94, SD=7.41; after 
seven days, M=-2.00, SD=9.17). However, when correcting for multiple comparisons, 
only the change in happiness at Presentation reached significance, with a moderate 
effect size (see Table 3). 
In conclusion, the emotional contents of stories retained their discrete emotion 
specificity both after 30 minutes and seven days. The negative stories reduced 
vigorously the levels happiness from Baseline, and substantially increased the intensity 
of negative emotions, suggesting that the stories elicited emotions of a negative valence. 
Notably, the increases in negative target emotions were significantly greater than for 
non-target negative emotions, confirming that the stories also retained their intended 
emotional specificity throughout the seven days. At the same time, the happy stories 
consistently increased the already high levels of happiness reported at Baseline. Thus, 
the affective valence and discrete emotion category were accurately re-experienced after 
the presentation and recall of the story contents. This allowed the investigation of the 
valence and emotion specificity of the affectively conditioned story contexts. 
 
2.4.1.3 Affective Valence and Emotional Specificity of Story Contexts over Time 
 
The semantically neutral story contexts were expected to preserve the Baseline 
emotional experience at Presentation, but produce an emotional change of a similar 
valence and discrete emotion class as the story endings after 30 minutes. Over time, it 
was hypothesised that the specificity of the emotion class might be lost, but that the 
story contexts would continue to retain the correct emotional valence – thus supporting 
the argument that valence is a more stable form of affect than discrete emotions. 
 The contexts of the negative stories (see Figure 2, A.) were, as expected, 
emotionally neutral when they were first read to participants, at Presentation. The 
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emotion changes from Baseline for happiness (M=-4.62, SD=31.05), the negative target 
emotions (M=3.14, SD=9.83), and non-target emotions (M=2.05, SD=4.41) were non-
significant (see Table 3). After 30 minutes, the story contexts retained the valence and 
emotion specificity of their associated stories. The levels of happiness decreased from 
Baseline (M=-29.43, SD=35.49), while the target emotions increased strongly 
(M=19.67, SD=20.41), and to a lesser extend so did the intensities of the non-target 
negative emotions (M=6.86, SD=8.24). All emotion changes were significant (Table 3), 
with large effect sizes (Cohen’s d between .83 and .96). A follow-up t-test revealed that 
the increase in target emotions was significantly higher than in non-target emotions 
(t(20)=3.48, p=.002, d=.82, α=.025), confirming the successful conditioning of the story 
contexts. Thus, after 30 minutes, the initially neutral story contexts acquired both the 
valence and emotion category of the negative story endings, specifically for anger, fear, 
and sadness. 
As expected, a week later, the story contexts of the negative stories failed to 
elicit their respective target emotions (M=1.21, SD=9.77), or any other negative (non-
target) emotions (M=1.06, SD=2.46). All changes of negative emotion from Baseline 
levels were non-significant (see Table 3). However, the story contexts continued to 
significantly decrease the Baseline levels of happiness (M=-20.06, SD=22.47), showing 
that participants accurately retained the valence of the negative stories (Table 3), even in 
the absence of a specific experience of a discrete negative emotion. This suggests that 
valence was a more stable form of affect than emotion category.  
The contexts of the happy stories (Figure 2, B.) were neutral at Presentation just 
as in the case of the negative stories. Emotion changes from their Baseline were modest 
for both happiness (M=-2.67, SD=34.87) and negative emotions (M=2.71, SD=7.61), 
and they were not significant (see Table 3). Unlike the negative stories, emotion 
changes from Baseline remained non-significant after 30 minutes (happiness, M=-5.41, 
SD=32.69; negative emotions, M=0.33, SD=7.51) and seven days (happiness, M=-
2.03,SD=26.97; negative emotions, M=-0.79, SD=7.92). However, as seen previously, 
even after the detailed recall of the stories’ emotional content the intensity of happiness 
was not significantly different from the already high levels at Baseline (see Table 3). 
Thus, range effects could have been responsible for the non-significant changes of 
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emotion intensities, as the Baseline levels of happiness were already very high and 
could have proven difficult to increase further, while the levels of negative emotions 
were already close to the minimum levels, and could not have decreased further.  
  In conclusion, the story contexts showed a successful affective conditioning 
after 30 minutes. Both the emotional valence and specific discrete affect classes of the 
stories were experienced accurately after the presentation of the initially neutral story 
contexts, and before the recall of the anger, fear, sadness, and happiness stories. 
However, after seven days, the story contexts lost their discrete emotion class 
specificity, but still retained accurately the corresponding emotional valence. Thus, the 
results suggest that affectively conditioned stimuli can remain emotionally salient, by 
retaining a positive or negative valence, even after they have lost the ability to elicit 
discrete classes of emotions. 
 
2.4.2 The re-experience of discrete emotions after seven days 
 
The second aim of the study was to investigate the differences between the re-
experience of the original emotion after the delayed re-presentation of the story stems 
and the recollection of the story endings. Two sets of preliminary analyses were 
performed. Firstly, the intensity and specificity of target emotions after the first 
presentation of the stories was examined (i.e., initially, each story elicited the target 
emotion significantly more than any other discrete emotion, and there were no 
significant differences between the intensities of target emotions). Secondly, the 
memorability of each emotional story was investigated at Recall 1 and Recall 2 (i.e., the 
differences in the proportion of details reported at the recollection of each emotional 
story, after 30 minutes and seven days). Then, finally, the main analysis was carried out 
to investigate the differences in emotional re-experience between the presentation of 
story stems and the recall of the story endings, seven days after the initial presentation. 
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2.4.2.1 Emotional Intensity and Specificity of Story Endings, at Presentation 
 
 Ideally, the emotional stories should each strongly elicit the target emotion, and 
the intensity of each of the four target emotions should be similar across stories. As 
shown in Figure 3, at Presentation, the target emotions of anger (M=68.1, SD=4.4), fear 
(M=69.6, SD=5.4), sadness (M=73.5, SD=4.5), and happiness (M=72.0, SD=4.6) were 
similar. A paired-samples ANOVA failed to reveal a main effect of Emotion. 
 
 
Figure 3. Discrete emotion elicitation after presentation of story endings. 
The mean ratings of discrete emotions (legend) for all story endings (x-axis) at 
Presentation are grouped by target emotion. The intensity of the target emotion was 
significantly higher than the intensity of any non-target emotions, for all groups of 
stories. Differences in the intensity of the target emotions were non-significant. The 
error bars represent ±1 SE of the mean. 
Emotional specificity was analysed, for each story, by comparing the intensity of 
the target emotion (see above) with all non-target emotions (means ranging from 2.9-
48.7, and standard deviations from 1.1-5.8). A separate repeated-measures ANOVA 
found a main effect of Emotion for the anger stories (F(2.48, 74.4)=53.13, p<.001; 
degrees of freedom corrected using the Greenhouse-Geisser estimate of sphericity, 
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ε=.83), fearful stories (F(3, 90)=47.01, p<.001), sadness stories (F(1, 30)=53.15, 
p<.001), and happiness stories (F(1, 30)=151.67, p<.001; lower-bound estimate of 
sphericity was used to correct the degrees of freedom, ε=.33). 
In conclusion, the emotional stimuli elicited the target emotion selectively (i.e., 
at higher levels of intensity than the non-target emotions), thus showing emotional 
specificity for each of the four sets of stories. This finding supports the validity of the 
novel emotional stimuli, and that the targeted discrete emotion was adequately elicited. 
Notably, as an added dimension of experimental control, all target emotions were also 
comparable in intensity. 
 
2.4.2.2 Recall Accuracy of Story Endings across Time 
 
 This set of investigations sought to reveal a stable and comparable proportion of 
story details remembered across time from Recall 1 (30 minutes after Presentation) to 
Recall 2 (seven days later) for the four sets of emotional stories. Every story had the 
same number of recall units (i.e., propositional units), and, thus, the memory scores are 
reported as percentages (see Figure 4). 
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Figure 4. Recall accuracy of story endings after 30 minutes and seven days. 
The recall accuracy for all story endings at 30 min and seven days after the initial 
presentation decayed slightly over time. Anger stories were significantly better 
remembered than all other stories. The error bars represent ±1 SE of the mean. 
 
Differences in recall accuracy after 30 minutes (Recall 1; means and standard 
deviations ranging from 51.5-64.4%, and 3.0-4.3%, respectively) and seven days 
(Recall 2; means ranging from 44.0-59.2%, and standard deviations from 3.0-3.5%) 
were analysed (see Figure 4). The recall accuracy scores of all stories decreased over 
time. A 2x4 repeated-measures ANOVA reported a main effect of Emotion (F(3, 
90)=9.05, p<.001), a main effect of Time (F(1, 30)=25.84, p<.001, r=.67), and a non-
significant Time*Emotion interaction (F(2.50, 75)=2.88, p=.050; degrees of freedom 
corrected using the Greenhouse-Geisser estimates of sphericity, ε=.83). Simple contrasts 
of the main effect of Emotion, revealed that the recall of angry stories was higher than 
for fearful stories (F(1, 30)=22.23, p<.001, r=.65), sad stories (F(1, 30)=9.55, p=.004, 
r=.49), and happy stories (F(1, 30)=16.57, p<.001, r=.59). 
 In conclusion, the stories were remembered well seven days after the initial 
presentation, with a modest decay in accuracy over time and only one notable difference 
between the target emotions. Anger stories were significantly better recalled than the 
other classes of emotional stories, but all memory scores at Recall 2 fall within a close 
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range around the 50% mark (44.0-59.1%), which suggests that at the beginnings of all 
the stories participants are already aware of how the stories end. 
 
2.4.2.3 Differences between the Re-experience of Emotions after Story Stems and 
Endings 
 
 The preliminary analyses have established, firstly, that the initial presentations 
elicited the target emotions discretely and at comparable levels, and, secondly, that the 
four sets of stories were remembered well seven days after the initial presentation. The 
above findings allowed the investigation of the degree to which the detailed presentation 
of the beginning of the well-known stories, and the recollection of the ending would 
influence emotional experience at Recall 2 (seven days after Presentation). The Baseline 
measure of emotions refers to the reports at the start of the session. The stem and ending 
time points refer to emotional reports after the presentation of the stems and recall of 
endings. A likely result was that memories of an emotional event would affect 
participants’ emotional experience when reminded of the story by its initially neutral 
beginning. Three analyses were performed to investigate this issue.  
 
2.4.2.3.1 Emotional experience at Baseline. 
 
 When participants’ ratings of discrete emotions at the beginning of Recall 2 
were analysed, happiness (M=44.4, SD=5.1) was dominant over all other emotions: 
anger (M=3.3, SD=1.6), fear (M=3.9, SD=2.1), and sadness (M=6.5, SD=2.5), as shown 
in Figure 5. 
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Figure 5. Emotional re-experience at seven days after the initial presentation. 
The negative target emotions (i.e., in sad, angry and fearful stories) remained unchanged 
after the presentation of the story stems, but dramatically increased after the recollection 
of the story endings, particularly for the target emotions. Solid lines show the target 
emotion. The error bars represent ±1 SE of the mean. 
 
A repeated measures ANOVA revealed that this finding was significant (F(1, 
29)=36.12, p<.001; degrees of freedom reported using the lower-bound estimate of 
sphericity, ε=.33). Simple contrasts confirmed that the intensity of happiness was 
significantly higher than sadness (F(1, 29)=32.61, p<.001, r=.73), fear (F(1, 29)=49.20, 
p<.001, r=.79), and anger (F(1, 29)=51.76, p<.001, r=.80). These findings confirmed 
the expectation, commonly found in ‘neutral’ affective states – that happiness was the 
dominant emotion at Baseline. 
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2.4.2.3.2 Happiness following story stems. 
 
 A key issue was whether the presentation of the neutral stem, known to have 
preceded an emotional event in the past, was sufficient to produce a re-experience of the 
original emotions. An initial analysis targeted the changes in happiness, as it was the 
dominant emotion at the start of Recall 2. However, the intensity of happiness was not 
significantly different after Baseline (see above) and after any of the four story stems 
(anger, M=35.8, SD=25.3; fear, M=34.2, SD=32.1; sadness M=30.2, SD=30.7; and 
happiness, M=40.6, SD=28.7) – as confirmed by a non-significant paired-samples 
ANOVA. Thus, surprisingly, the presentation of the story stems did not affect 
participants’ happiness, despite unimpaired recall of the endings and a later elicitation 
of a clear emotional response after each story ending was formally recalled. 
 
2.4.2.3.3 Re-experiencing the target emotion after story stems and endings.  
 
 Although the story stems did not affect the intensity of happiness, a further 
analysis investigated if the stems succeeded in cueing the target emotion of the story 
ending (i.e., the intensity of fear elicited by fearful stories, etc.). This analysis was only 
relevant for the negative emotions (anger, fear and sadness), given that participants 
reported a high level of happiness at Baseline (M=41.3, SD=28.5), which changed little 
after the presentation of the stem (M=40.6, SD=28.7) and the recall of the ending of the 
happy stories (M=50.6, SD=30.3). A repeated-measures ANOVA showed that the 
difference between the ratings of happiness did not reach significance. 
Anger. The levels of anger were negligible at the beginning of Recall 2 
(Baseline; M=3.6, SD=9.2), continued to be low after the stem (M=3.6, SD=7.9), but 
were dramatically increased after the recall of the ending (M=42.2, SD=33.9).  A one-
way repeated-measure ANOVA was significant (F(1, 29)=35.80, p<.001; degrees of 
freedom corrected using the lower bound estimate of sphericity, ε=.50) and paired 
samples t-tests revealed that the intensity of the target emotion after the recall of the 
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ending was greater than at Baseline (t(29)=5.98, p<.001, r=.74) and after the Stem 
(t(29)=6.07, p<.001, r=.75), but there was no difference between Baseline and Stem. 
 Fear. The ratings of Fear were low at Baseline (M=4.2, SD=12.2), and after the 
Stem (M=6.3, SD=15.7), but increased dramatically after the recall of the story ending 
(M=52.2, SD=35.8). A significant one-way repeated-measures ANOVA (F(1, 
29)=45.34, p<.001; degrees of freedom corrected using the lower bound estimate of 
sphericity, ε=.50) was followed up by paired samples t-tests, which revealed that the 
intensity of fear after the Ending was greater than both at Baseline (t(29)=7.34, p<.001, 
r=.81) and after the Stem (t(29)=6.57, p<.001, r=.77), but there was no difference 
between Baseline and Stem. 
 Sadness. Finally, the intensity of sadness at Baseline (M=8.5, SD=15.9) was at a 
low level, increased slightly after the Stem (M=10.4, SD=14.0), and raised substantially 
after the Ending (M=48.5, SD=32.1). A one-way repeated-measures ANOVA reported a 
significant result (F(1, 29)=40.38, p<.001; degrees of freedom corrected using the lower 
bound estimate of sphericity, ε=.50). Similarly with the other negative emotions, paired 
samples t-tests revealed that fear was more intense after the recall of the endings than 
both at Baseline (t(29)=6.83, p<.001, r=.79) and Stem (t(29)=6.43, p<.001, r=.77), but 
the difference between Baseline and Stem was not significant.  
 In sum, the intensities of negative target emotions were unchanged after the 
presentation of the story stems, seven days after the initial encoding – although the 
detailed recollection of the story endings immediately afterwards produced a selective 
elicitation of the appropriate target emotions. 
 
2.4.2.4 The emotional re-experience after story contexts and the recall of story 
endings 
 
 An intriguing possibility is that the emotional re-experience after the 
presentation of the story stems (both after 30 minutes and 7 days) was related to the 
subsequent explicit recall of the story endings. It is at least theoretically possible that 
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participants may have automatically (and silently) recalled the story endings, while 
listening to the story stems, or while they considered providing the self-report ratings of 
emotions after the story stems. To test this hypothesis a set of correlations were 
performed between the re-experience of the target emotion after the presentation of the 
story stem and the subsequent recall accuracy. The analyses were carried out for each 
negative emotion (anger, fear, sadness) after 30 minutes and 7 days from the first 
presentation (see Figure 6). 
  
 
Figure 6. The correlations between the re-experience of the target emotion after the 
presentation of the story stems and the subsequent recall of the story endings. 
 
 As shown in Figure 6 A., after 30 minutes, the correlations between the 
emotional experience ratings after the presentation of the story stems and the recall 
accuracy were non-significant for the anger stories (r(19)=0.11, p=.642), fear stories 
(r(19)=-0.03, p=.903), and sadness stories (r(19)=0.12, p=.617). Similarly, after seven 
days, all correlations remained non-significant (see Figure 6 B.): anger stories 
(r(32)=0.18, p=.334), fear stories (r(32)=0.17, p=.358), and sadness stories (r(32)=-
0.27, p=.130). These results are in line with the previously reported findings that the 
recall of the story endings was not correlated with the recall accuracy. The lack of any 
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correlation suggest an absence of empirical support for the idea that participants may 
have recalled the story endings automatically, and silently, during or immediately after 
the presentation of the story.  
 
2.5 Discussion 
 
The present study reports a newly developed set of stories, designed to 
investigate a range of four basic emotions: three of which have been traditionally 
labelled as ‘negative’ (i.e., anger, fear, sadness), and one ‘positive’ (happiness). The 
stimuli elicited the target emotion discretely, at similar levels of intensity.  
This is the first direct investigation comparing the stability of affective valence 
and discrete emotions over time. As first proposed by the hierarchical theory of 
emotions (Tellegen et al., 1999), and supported by evidence from affective neuroscience 
(Panksepp, 2004), emotion valence was expected to outlast the experience of discrete 
emotions. A series of self-referential vignettes elicited selectively four commonly 
investigated discrete emotions (anger, fear, sadness, and happiness). After the 
presentation of semantically neutral contexts preceding the emotional events in the 
stories, participants were able to experience selectively the discrete emotions elicited by 
the associated episode after a short period of time (i.e., 30 minutes).  However, over the 
course of a week, the story contexts lost their affective specificity, carrying only a 
flavour of the associated emotions, in the form of either positive or negative affect. The 
loss of the emotional specificity of the story contexts could not be explained by an 
affective reappraisal of the stories, since the detailed episodic recall elicited the target 
emotions discretely and accurately every time. 
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2.5.1 Valence, discrete emotions and the hierarchical organisation of affect 
 
The sustained stability of valence in the absence of the specific experience of the 
target discrete emotion, reported in the present study, supports the hierarchical 
organisation of affect, which proposes that valence is a more fundamental property of 
emotional expression, underlying all distinct classes of emotions (Tellegen et al., 1999). 
Thus, despite the universal, automatic and differentiable character of discrete emotions, 
they seem to require, over time, more intense forms of emotion elicitation (e.g., detailed 
episodic recall) than are needed for the re-experience of affective valence. Furthermore, 
the results also confirmed previous reports (Watson & Clark, 1992) that discrete classes 
of emotions have in common an either positive or negative valence when they are being 
experienced (as shown by story contexts after 30 minutes), but also that the affective 
valence is what ultimately is retained and re-experienced from emotional memory when 
the specificity of discrete emotions has faded (as seen after seven days).  
 Future research could expand present findings in at least four ways. Firstly, the 
results of the affective conditioning paradigm employed in the present study could be 
replicated by participants showing a selective episodic memory impairment (i.e., the 
amnesic syndrome).  Such patients have long been shown to possess a normal ability to 
retain and re-experience past emotions (Bechara et al., 1995; Feinstein, Duff, & Tranel, 
2010; LaBar, LeDoux, Spencer, & Phelps, 1995; Turnbull & Evans, 2006), for 
considerable periods of time (Damasio, 1994). Thus, it would be possible to examine if 
specific discrete emotions can even be experienced in the absence of explicit episodic 
recall, and also, if in such cases emotional memory can retain and retrieve distinct 
classes of affect.  
Secondly, the present study employed momentary self-reports of emotional 
experiences, as an established way of measuring specific emotions. However, relatively 
recent neroimaging evidence (Tettamati et al., 2012; Vytal & Hamann, 2010) has 
invited the possibility of investigating specific cerebral blood-flow patterns as correlates 
for discrete emotions (anger, fear, sadness, disgust, and happiness). The superior 
temporal resolution of fMRI techniques over the end-of-story self-reports would allow a 
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live measurement of affective change, which in turn could help identify emotional 
trigger points during the presentation and recall of narratives, as well as peak and ebb 
points for the intensity of each discrete emotion.  
Thirdly, a further dimension that could be added to the present design refers to 
the amount of seemingly neutral and emotional details and their association with 
emotional re-experience; these are sometimes called “peripheral” and “central”, 
respectively (Loftus, 1996). Situations when neutral versus emotional details influence 
the accuracy and consistency of episodic recall are abundant in the eye-witness 
literature (see for a review Loftus, Doyle, & Dysert, 2008), but the simultaneous direct 
investigation of these differences between a wide range of discrete emotions is notably 
absent. This is surprising since different classes of discrete emotions have long been 
reported to have a specific effect on other cognitive functions (Lench, Flores, & Bench, 
2011).  
Fourthly, many studies investigating the difference between positive and 
negative emotions, in different methodological contexts, seemed to reach contradictory 
findings, especially in relation to the interaction between episodic memory and 
emotional experience (see for a review Levine & Lench, 2010). Thus, a simultaneous 
and methodologically controlled investigation of a broader range of discrete classes of 
emotions could provide more conclusive evidence regarding the effect of distinct 
emotional experiences on episodic memory.  
 
2.5.2 Implications for core affect and the psychological constructivist view of 
emotions 
The present finding that valence is more stable than the experience of discrete 
emotions seemingly supports the core affect and psychological constructivist view of 
emotions. Indeed, the stable re-experience of the correct positive or negative valence of 
the story stems both after 30 minutes and seven days seems to suggest that core affect is 
a basic process in the experience of emotions. Due to the nature of the self-report 
measures, only one of the two dimension of core affect were captured in the present 
study, namely valence (pleasure-displeasure), and not arousal. Nonetheless, the reliable 
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re-experience of the same emotion (viewed as core affect) after the presentation of the 
story stems seems to suggest that intrinsic reaction to the known stories was either one 
of pleasure or displeasure and, as expected, this remained the same over time. 
Notably, one of the fundamental aspects of core affect (Russell, 1999, 2009) is 
that it changes only in response to consciously processed information. It is without 
doubt that the participants' core affect changed after the presentation of each of the four 
stories stems, regardless of the order in which they were presented. However, it remains 
open to speculation if (or when) participants actually recalled the emotional endings of 
the stories, namely because the only information we have about what the participants 
were thinking coms from what they told us.  One possibility is that, indeed, as 
instructed, participants listened to the story stems and paid attention to them exclusively, 
after which they reported their momentary emotional experience. A second possibility 
(less likely for the reason presented below) could be that while listening to the story 
stems, or immediately afterwards, the participants consciously but silently anticipated 
(and recounted) the known emotional ending. Therefore the emotional ratings given 
after the listening to the story stems were in fact referring to the quickly but internally 
remembered story endings. Of course, this artefact would have defeated the purpose of 
the experimental design. However, such an explanation would not be easily fit the 
pattern of the results. After 30 minutes from the initial presentation, participants 
reported specific discrete emotions of reduced intensity after story stems, while after the 
full (and aloud) recollection of the story endings they reported the same discrete 
emotions with a high specificity and intensity. If the change in core affect was due to 
conscious processes, then a similar process should have been observed after 7 days. 
This was not the case. Seven days later, participants' emotional reaction after the story 
stems was non-specific regarding discrete emotions, but consistent with the positive or 
negative valence of the story endings. It seems unlikely that all participants would have 
recollected the story endings rapidly and silently while listening to the story stems, or 
shortly afterwards on one occasion, but then a second time nobody or hardly anybody 
would have done the same thing again. 
The present results suggest two novel hypotheses for core affect and 
psychological construction of emotions. Firstly, the findings seem to indicate that, 
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perhaps, core affect does change in response to unconscious processes. Secondly, the 
processes broadly defined as psychological construction seem to be recruited differently 
(1) over time, and (2) in the presence and absence of conscious recollection. It is beyond 
the purpose of this study to investigate or explain the mechanisms through which this 
might happen, but indeed, in the absence of detailed recall, over short periods of time 
processes leading to a very specific categorisation of emotions manifested, while over 
seven days only those processes that differentiate between pleasure and displeasure 
were took place. Markedly, after detailed recall, all processes leading to specific 
emotional experiences were activated both over the short (30 minutes) and longer time 
frames (seven days).  
 
2.5.3. Active recollection is essential for re-experience 
The second aim of the study was to examine the degree to which the 
presentation of the circumstances surrounding an emotional event (i.e., main character, 
time and location), would produce the re-experience of emotion evoked during the 
original event. The most surprising finding was the magnitude of the emotional 
response to the initially neutral stem, when it was known to participants that it would 
have an emotional ending. At the start of the recall phase, participants’ baseline level of 
happiness was high. After complete recall, as expected, participants re-experienced 
emotional states which were both powerful, and retained the specificity of the original 
target stories delivered a week earlier. However, surprisingly, emotions were not 
elicited after cueing, when recall was prompted by the emotionally neutral stem. 
Notably, the participants subsequently reproduced the story rather well, and in doing so 
powerfully re-experienced the appropriate emotion. This result suggests that the process 
of formal detailed recall is central for full affective re-experience.  
This finding can be linked with the positive psychology literature, which favours 
an approach usually labelled as “savouring”. Here, an individual actively takes time to 
revisit and systematically re-experience previous events which had been positive 
(Bryant, 1989; Bryant & Veroff, 2007). This literature suggests several ways in which 
such positive re-experiencing may benefit happiness and overall mental health (Hurley 
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& Kwon, 2011; Jose, Lim, & Bryant, 2012; Quoidbach, Berry, Hansenne, & 
Mikolajczak, 2010). The present study offers a clear example of the way in which 
detailed re-experiencing can map directly onto positive emotional states. 
There are further lines of evidence of the obverse aspect of the argument, 
suggesting that reducing re-experience decreases the magnitude of negative affect, not 
only in the encoding stage, but also in later memory. It has long been recognised that re-
experiencing a memory directly after a traumatic event disrupts affective control, and 
leads to an enhancement of disorders such as PTSD (Bisson, Jenkins, Alexander, & 
Bannister, 1997; Conlon, Fahy, & Conroy, 1999; Mayou, Ehlers, & Hobbs, 2000). 
There have been various approaches which attempt to regulate the emotional 
consequences of such re-experiencing, which are relevant to therapy. For example, the 
work of Emily Holmes suggests that avoiding episodic recall of an event, through visuo-
spatial distraction, reduces traumatic re-experience (Krans, Näring, Holmes, Becker, 
2010; Stuart, Holmes, & Brewin, 2006). Similar approaches have been adopted in the 
sport psychology domain where elite athletes are encouraged to actively avoid the 
recollection of aversive negative experiences in order to maintain adequate levels of 
concentration (Mahoney, Gabriel, & Perkins, 1987; Thomas & Over, 1994) and 
improve performance (Jackson, Thomas, Marsh, & Smethurst, 2001). In a different 
class of therapeutic intervention, attempts are often made to allow the patient to re-
experience traumatic events, but to manage the emotional consequences of these 
traumatic recollections through reappraisal or reframing (Bryant, 2011; Litz, Gray, 
Bryant, & Adler, 2002; Nickerson, Bryant, Silove, & Steel, 2010; Williams, Joseph, & 
Yule, 1994). 
Emotional self-report measures remain the most widely used means of 
investigating the intensity of discrete emotions in experimental psychology. However, 
as with any subjective ratings they introduce the risk of demand characteristics – an 
experimental artefact where participants direct their responses away from the intended 
purpose of the experiment, and towards fulfilling self-serving goals, such as, appearing 
that the experiment has worked in their case (and thus they fit the expected norm), or on 
the contrary assuming a negative-participant role, and derail the experimental procedure 
(see for a detailed discussion Weber & Cook, 1972). To reduce the risk of demand 
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characteristics, the present study dissimulated the true nature of the experimental 
manipulation until the final debriefing at the end of the last session of the study. 
Participants were told that this was a pilot study aim to investigate the effect of listening 
to a set of stories on the ability to perform mental calculations. Emotional measures 
were also collected in this case to assess the participants’ affect. As per usual practice, 
the memory task was only revealed before participants were asked to recall the stories, 
so knowledge of the task could not have affected the encoding of the material. However, 
participants were repeatedly asked to provide self-report measures of their emotional 
experience. Demand characteristics could have affected the present study if participants 
had identified and labelled the stories as being specific to each discrete emotion (the 
nasty/angry story, the scary story, the sad story and the nice/happy story). In turn, this 
could have affected the experimental results in two ways: (1) after listening to the story 
stems/contexts, participants may have identified the story by the affective label they 
assigned to it (angry, scary, sad, happy) and provide emotion reports consistent with 
their labelling (irrespective of their true affective experience), and/or (2) when 
providing the affective experience ratings after recalling the story endings/contents, 
participants may have remembered that they reported once feeling specifically very 
“angry” after the angry story and provided emotional ratings consistent with their initial 
reports. However, the instructions for providing emotional experience ratings 
specifically mentioned, each time, that participants were expected to report momentary 
ratings of the four emotions (i.e., how they felt in that moment), rather than emotions 
associated with the presented/recall story (i.e., how the story made them feel). This is a 
significant aspect of the orienting task, which directs the focus away from a cognitive 
assessment of the story and towards an introspective assessment of own affect. 
Moreover, as argued below, the participant data itself argues against the previous two 
confounding effects. 
Firstly, there are strong reasons to believe that participants followed the 
instructions faithfully after the presentation of the story stems. This is because initially, 
the story stems were rated as neutral, but 30 minutes after the presentation of the 
associated story endings, they reported the specific re-experience of the target emotion, 
(just as they did after the story endings) but at a substantially reduced intensity. Thus, 
their emotional reports following the story stems after 30 minutes are neither consistent 
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with their initial ratings of the story stems (which were neutral), nor with their ratings of 
the emotional endings (which were of a considerably higher intensity). Thus, the 
emotion ratings are not consistent compatible with an attempt to remain consistent with 
an earlier set of ratings – whichever they may be: after the story stems or story endings. 
Moreover, the emotion ratings after 7 days were no longer specifically identifying the 
target emotion, but all negative stories reported a significant reduction in the baseline 
levels of happiness. Again, such ratings are further removed from any of the previous 
ratings after the presentation of 30 minute recall phases, either after stems or endings. In 
conclusion, it seems that indeed, the emotion ratings showed a successful and specific 
affective conditioning of the stem to the target emotion after 30 minutes and a loss of 
the specific re-experience and retention only of the correct affective valence (positive or 
negative). 
Secondly, the emotion self-report ratings after the presentation and 30-minutes 
and 7-day recall phases respectively was markedly consistent over time, with a high 
degree of specificity and high intensity. This may present the risk of participants 
potentially having recalled their previous emotional report and choose to provide similar 
ratings on subsequent occasions. However, the recall accuracy of the story endings 
showed an identical pattern with the emotion ratings, being markedly similar between 
the 30-minutes and 7-days phases, containing almost the same emotional material every 
time. If demand characteristics were responsible for this high consistency in emotion 
ratings over time (instead of the constantly high recall accuracy), it is difficult to explain 
the different ratings of participants after the story stems. The only explanation could be 
that participants were naive about the story stems and thus provided true (and changing 
over time) ratings of their emotions after them, but treated the story endings differently, 
by always referring to and repeating their initial ratings, time after time and for each of 
the four discrete emotions. This convoluted possibility is made even more unlikely by 
the fact that the standard deviations of the emotional ratings after stems and endings 
were low and constant over time. This means that all the participants with no noticeable 
exception should have adopted the same approach in providing emotion ratings 
differently after story stem and ending, thus allowing for individual differences in 
putting into practice this approach. While it is not possible to entirely exclude this 
possibility for a limited minority of cases, it seems very unlikely that such a highly 
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complex rationale which goes against the direct instructions of the task and its face 
validity, would have applied to a majority of participants, thus driving the effects 
reported in the study.  
In conclusion, this is the first investigation of the hierarchical classification of 
basic discrete emotions, using emotional memory. Results showed that stimuli 
encountered in emotional situations, reflect the discrete emotional specificity of these 
situations. However, ultimately, over time, they elicit only the core affect, characterised 
by either a positive or negative valence. These changes over time appear to represent a 
fundamental structure of affect, suggesting that valence is a more basic level at which 
emotional experiences seem to be encoded and re-experienced. Discrete classes of affect 
appear to be subordinated to the positive or negative dimension, to be more volatile over 
time, or to require superior forms of cognitive and emotional processing. Such an 
organisation of affect invites a dynamic and simultaneous investigation of both discrete 
emotions and valence, especially to understand the influence of emotions on cognition 
and vice-versa. 
Secondly, the present study provided an important empirical foundation for a 
psychological process with substantial practical and therapeutic implications. To 
promote and maximise happiness and good mental health we might seek to encourage a 
complete recollection of positive experiences, whereas the re-experience of negative 
emotional experiences is best delayed until managed appropriately. More specifically, it 
seems that emotions elicited by past events do not appear to transfer to temporally 
adjacent memories (i.e., story endings to story stems), even after repeated recollections. 
Arguably, one possibility is that episodic memory may have helped to strengthen the 
dissociation between the neutral stem and emotional ending. Further studies could 
investigate this claim by attempting to replicate the present findings in cases of 
diminished recall of episodic information (e.g., in elderly memory impaired, or amnesic 
participants). 
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3.1 Abstract 
 
Amnesic patients have long been shown to re-experience emotions elicited by events 
they no longer remember. The neural structures fundamentally associated with the 
processing of emotionally arousing stimuli (i.e., the amygdala), although strongly 
connected to episodic memory structures (e.g., mammillary bodies, fornix, the 
hippocampal complex, etc.) have been shown to preserve their function in amnesic 
patients. However, this preserved ability of amnesic patients to re-experience past 
emotions has only been tested in the context of generic emotions (e.g., positive and 
negative; or arousing vs neutral), and never for a full set of specific classes of basic 
emotions. Also, recent empirical reports have argued that executive functions play a 
significant role in the re-experience of emotions. However, evidence of which basic 
emotions are associated with which executive functions are still missing. The present 
study reports the first separate and simultaneous investigation of the differences in the 
intensity of the emotional re-experience of anger, fear, sadness, and happiness, between 
a group of amnesic patients and controls. The relationship between the intensity of the 
re-experience of four basic emotions (anger, fear, sadness, and happiness), and well-
established measures of executive function is also assessed. Twenty Korsakoff’s 
syndrome patients and 20 neurologically normal age matched controls listened to four 
emotional vignettes eliciting discretely one of the four basic emotions, and recalled 
them later, while providing self-report measures for each of the four emotions. The 
results showed that after 30 minutes, the recall of each of the four stories was severely 
impaired for Korsakoff’s patients, but the emotional re-experience was not different 
from that of controls. A separate analysis for both groups revealed that there was no 
relation between the number of episodic details recalled by participants and the reported 
intensity of each of the four emotions. Moreover, even those patients who could not 
remember anything at all from the stories after 30 minutes, reported moderate levels of 
the correct target emotion – and this finding was consistent for all four emotion classes. 
The intensities of fear, sadness, and happiness were consistently associated with 
executive functions, such as, cognitive flexibility, response inhibition and non-verbal 
fluency, and Processing Speed, and Performance IQ from WAIS. Conversely, the 
intensity of anger was only associated with the Verbal Comprehension task from 
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WAIS, and not with any significant executive function tests. The findings suggest that 
discrete classes of emotions can be re-experienced independently of episodic memory. 
This is also a first attempt to map the relationship between the re-experience of the four 
discrete emotions and the ability to perform specific executive functions and superior 
abstract cognitive tasks. Although the statistically significant results are encouraging, 
the findings are limited by the small sample size and the inability to separate the data 
from the neurologically impaired and unimpaired participants. Future studies could seek 
to replicate the findings and possibly to pool the data together for a joint analysis. 
 
Keywords: basic emotions, emotional memory, episodic memory, amnesia, Korsakoff’s 
syndrome.  
3. The re-experience of discrete emotions in amnesia 
81 
 
3.2 Introduction 
 
3.2.1 Emotional re-experience in amnesia 
 
Past emotions have long been shown to be encoded and accurately retrieved in 
the absence of an episodic memory trace of the eliciting event. Perhaps the earliest 
report consistently cited in the literature is that of Swiss neurologist Édouard Claparède 
about an amnesic Korsakoff’s syndrome patient intuitively avoiding his handshake after 
being pricked with a hidden pin (Claparède, 1911/1951). More recent studies have 
reported that even densely amnesic patients show an improved recognition of emotional 
stimuli as much as controls (Hamann, Cahill, McGaugh, & Squire, 1997; Phelps, LaBar, 
& Spencer, 1997) and possess the same ability to access past emotional experiences and 
to employ them in guiding present decisions (Turnbull & Evans, 2006). The neural 
mechanisms behind the preserved ability of amnesic patients to accurately re-experience 
past emotions have been revealed in neurological studies which confirmed the 
dissociation between the roles of the amygdala and hippocampus (Bechara, Tranel, 
Damasio, Adolphs, Rockland, & Damasio, 1995; see also Phelps, 2004). 
Past emotions are not only equally relevant to amnesic patients as they are to 
controls, but it has been suggested that certain negative emotions (e.g., sadness) could 
be more enduring for amnesic patients than controls, while other emotions (e.g., 
happiness) might not be any different (Feinstein, Duff, & Tranel, 2010). The small 
sample size prevented Feinstein and colleagues from drawing any generalising 
conclusions about affective processes, but invited the question of whether negative 
emotions have a special property of being more stable than happiness, in the absence of 
episodic memory. Such a dissociation would not be surprising, since positive and 
negative emotions appear to be affected by different biases (Levine, Lench, & Safer, 
2009) and emotion regulation processes (Kim & Hamann, 2007). More than general 
positive and negative emotions, discrete basic emotions (e.g., anger, fear, sadness, 
happiness) may differ in the way they are experienced by amnesic patients and controls, 
since such emotions have already been shown to uniquely activate different neural 
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structures (Tettamanti, Rognoni, Cafiero, Costa, Galati, & Perani, 2012; Vytal & 
Hamann, 2010), have been linked with individual autonomic nervous system response 
patterns (Rainville, Bechara, Naqvi, & Damasio, 2006; Stephens, Christie, & Friedman, 
2010), and to elicit specific changes in cognition, judgment, and behaviour (Lench, 
Flores, & Bench, 2011).  
 
3.2.2. Emotional experience and the executive function 
 
A large body of psychological evidence has traditionally proposed that cognition 
can influence and be influenced by emotions (Bower, 1981, Isen, Shalke, Clark, & 
Karp, 1978; Johnson & Tversky, 1983; Ortony, Turner, & Antos, 1983; Schwarz & 
Clore, 1983). More recent accounts have argued that emotion–cognition interactions are 
largely agreed to be a major factor influencing the processes that sustain, amplify, or 
attenuate emotion experience – collectively labelled emotion regulation (Izard, 
Woodburn, Finlon, Krauthamer-Ewing, Grossman, & Seidenfeld, 2011). Moreover, 
emotion–cognition interactions are also viewed as a fundamental part of our ability to 
engage attentional, emotional-cognitive, and behavioural capacities in order to solve 
everyday challenges – generically referred to as executive function. (cf., Nelson, 
Thomas, & deHaan, 2006; Zelazo, Carter, Reznick, & Frye, 1997).  
The neural pathways most strongly argued to underpin the emotion–cognition 
interactions point in the direction of the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) due to its 
strong connections with other brain regions in the limbic system and neocortex. For 
example, the ACC was found to play a significant role in processing emotional arousal, 
and in the interaction between emotions and attention (Lane, Reiman, Axelrod, Yun, 
Holmes, & Schwartz, 1998; Rudrauf et al., 2009) and is strongly involved in the 
experience of intense emotions (Phan, Wager, Taylor, & Liberzon, 2002), and 
interpersonal relations and social engagement (Rudebeck, Bannerman, & Rushworth, 
2008). At the same time, the ACC is engaged in decision making processes that require 
executive functioning (Rudrauf et al., 2009), and neuroimaging evidence also suggests 
that it is associated with the resolution of emotional conflicts (Etkin, Egner, Peraza, 
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Kandel, & Hirsch, 2006). These functions of the ACC are supported by its 
interconnectivity with discrete areas of the temporal lobe and subcortical circuits that 
are involved in controlling activity of the autonomic nervous system (Pessoa, 2009). 
The anterior cingulate cortex interacts with the amygdala and nucleus accumbens, in 
integrating affectively significant signals with control signals in the prefrontal cortex 
(Pessoa, 2009). 
Generically, the executive function is a collection of interrelated cognitive 
processes, predominantly located within the frontal lobes, which are responsible for 
controlling and directing other brain processes, emotional responses, and behaviour 
(Gioia, Isquith, & Guy, 2001). Although there is presently no definitive and universally 
accepted list of executive functions, the most widely mentioned processes include the 
capacity for response inhibition, switching back and forth between tasks, resisting 
interference from distractors, forming and carrying out an efficient problem-solving 
strategy, and integration of feedback. 
A growing body of literature has recognised the role of executive function in 
moderating emotional responses and behavioural actions (Garcia-Andres, Huertas-
Martinez, Ardura, & Fernandez-Alcaraz, 2010; Gioia, Isquith, Guy, & Kenworthy, 
2000Gyurak, Goodkind, Kramer, Miller, & Levenson, 2012). Executive control is often 
reported to influence the processing and experience of emotions (Cohen, Henik, & 
Moyal, 2012; Etkin, Egner, Peraza, Kandel, & Hirsch, 2006; Etkin, Prater, Hoeft, 
Menon, & Schatzberg, 2010). Furthermore, neuroimaging studies have reported that 
emotion regulation and re-experience are strictly linked with brain regions involved in 
executive function (Cohen, Henik, & Mor, 2011; Goldin, McRae, Ramel, & Gross, 
2008; Kim & Hamman, 2007; Levesque et al., 2003; Ochsner et al., 2004). 
Significantly, impaired executive functioning (executive dysfunction) is often 
associated with maladaptive emotional responses and social behaviour (Anderson, 
Bechara, Damasio, Tranel, & Damasio, 1999; Eslinger, Grattan, Damasio, & Damasio, 
1992; Grattan & Eslinger, 1991). 
However, the explicit influence of cognitive processes on the re-experience of 
discrete emotions has not been explained by previous studies. The question of interest is 
what, if not episodic memory, can predict the intensity of the re-experience of discrete 
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basic emotions. More specifically, are differences in executive functions associated with 
a stronger or less intense re-experience of discrete emotions?  
The present study firstly investigates the differences between the experience of 
four basic discrete emotions (i.e., anger, fear, sadness, and happiness) of amnesic 
patients (Korsakoff’s syndrome) and control participants with unimpaired episodic 
memory. Secondly, the relationship between the episodic recall and the experience of 
each discrete emotion is also assessed. Thirdly, the relationship between the intensity of 
the emotional re-experience of anger, fear, sadness, and happiness, and executive 
function abilities is investigated.  
 
3.3 Method 
 
3.3.1 Participants 
 
Twenty Korsakoff’s patients (16 recruited from four residential care units, four 
patients recruited from home care), and twenty control participants recruited from the 
local community (see Table 4 for basic demographics) took part in the study in return 
for the usual amount of participant payment (£10/hour). Recruitment was completed on 
an opportunity sample basis, and all participants completed all four sessions of the 
study. 
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Table 4. The basic demographics of the Korsakoff patients and control participants. 
The basic demographics of the Korsakoff patients and control participants. 
Group Female Male 
Age  Years of Education 
M SD  M SD 
Korsakoff Patients 6 14 53.5 7.8  11.0 1.3 
Control Participants 10 10 64.0 7.8  13.1 3.1 
 
 
3.3.2 Stimuli and Measures 
 
Four emotional vignettes (developed and piloted previously) were used to elicit 
discretely anger, fear, sadness, and happiness respectively (see Appendix F). A 
propositional analysis (Kintsch, 1994; Kintsch & van Dijk, 1978) was performed on all 
Endings and each propositional unit was treated as a discrete recall unit – a detailed 
description of the protocol is presented elsewhere (Turner & Greene, 1977). Each story 
had 60 recall units, whose exact recollection was used to calculate the recall accuracy 
(see Appendix G). 
Momentary ratings of emotional experience were collected using the anger, fear, 
happiness, and sadness questionnaires extracted from the Visual Analogue Mood Scales 
(VAMS; Stern, 1997). The VAMS questionnaires (see Appendix I) required participants 
to indicate the momentary intensity of each of the four discrete emotions on a 100mm 
vertical visual analogue scale. Schematic faces representing a neutral expression and the 
target emotion anchor the analogue scale. The schematic faces at both ends of the scale 
are accompanied by a word label describing the neutral state and the four target 
emotions (i.e., Neutral, Angry, Afraid, Happy, and Sad). The VAMS have been reported 
to have high validity and test-retest reliability (see Stern, 1997), and were also validated 
for use with various clinical populations (Arruda, Stern, Somerville; 1999). Recall was 
measured by comparing the transcripts of the audio recordings of participants’ 
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recollections of the stories to the original scripts and counting the number of 
propositional units correctly reproduced. 
 
3.3.3 Design 
 
The study employed a mixed-factorial design, and included two groups: 
Korsakoff patients and control participants, and four emotions (anger, fear, sadness, 
and happiness). The presentation order of the four sets of stories was counterbalanced 
using a balanced latin-square. 
 
3.3.4 Procedure 
 
The emotion elicitation paradigm will be adapted for amnesic patients (see 
Schmidt, 1996), to include successive repetitions of the verbal stimuli in order to help 
fixate the episodic details of the emotional stories. This will allow the Korsakoff 
patients to process the meaning of the story as a whole, and create associations between 
the character and context of each story and the emotion eliciting actions presented. In 
line with classical findings of amnesic patients (Butters et al., 1988; Dean, Massman, 
Butters, Salmon, Vermak, & Kramer, 1991; Janowski, Shimamura, & Squire, 1989; 
Squire, Haist, & Shimamura, 1989), episodic memory is expected to be disrupted by an 
interference story. The recall accuracy scores immediately after interference and 
following a longer delay of 20-30 minutes are expected to illustrate the Korsakoff 
patients’ level of memory impairment (Squire & Shimamura, 1986), and allow the 
investigation of the emotional re-experience in the absence of episodic memory. 
Participants completed the study over four separate sessions, scheduled one 
week apart. Each session targeted a specific basic emotion, using a different emotional 
vignette, and following a similar procedure between sessions. Participants listened to 
the target emotional story in three successive repetitions, after each presentation 
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recalling everything that they could remember, and immediately providing momentary 
ratings of the four basic emotions, after each recollection. A novel, distracting story was 
read at the end of the three repetitions, followed by a similar recall task and emotion 
rating. Next, participants were asked to recall the target story once again, but notably 
without listening to it first. After a 30 minute delay interval, occupied with various pen-
and-paper tasks, participants were asked again to recall from memory the target story 
and to provide emotion ratings for each of the four basic emotions. 
 
3.3.5 Neuropsychological assessments 
 
 The neuropsychological assessment of participants (Korsakoff patients and 
neurological controls) included two batteries of executive function tests (i.e., the Delis-
Kaplan Executive Function Scale, and the Behavioural Assessments of Dysexecutive 
Function), the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale, the Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of 
Intelligence, and the Wechsler Memory Scale IIIR. Table 5 shows a list of the tests 
included from each battery and the number of participants who were administered each 
test. Appendix H shows a detailed list of all the composite scores computed for each 
test.  
 
Table 5. List of neuropsychological assessment tests and the number of participants 
List of neuropsychological assessment tests and the number of participants who were 
administered each test. (DKEFS – Delis-Kaplan Executive Function Scale) 
Battery / Name of test 
Korsakoff 
patients 
Control 
participants 
Total 
DKEFS - Trail Making 19 19 38 
DKEFS - Verbal Fluency 19 16 35 
DKEFS - Design Fluency 14 5 19 
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DKEFS - Colour-Word Interference 14 5 19 
DKEFS - Sorting Test 14 5 19 
DKEFS - Twenty Questions Test 14 4 18 
DKEFS - Word Context Test 14 4 18 
DKEFS - Tower Test 14 4 18 
DKEFS - Proverb Test 14 4 18 
    
Battery / Name of test (continued) 
Korsakoff 
patients 
Control 
participants 
Total 
Behavioural Assessment of the Dysexecutive Syndrome 14 5 19 
    
Wechsler Memory Scale III-R – Auditory Immediate 20 16 36 
Wechsler Memory Scale III-R – Auditory Delayed 20 16 36 
Wechsler Memory Scale III-R – Auditory Recognition 
Delayed 
19 5 24 
Wechsler Memory Scale III-R – Working Memory 14 5 19 
    
Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence – Verbal IQ 14 5 19 
Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence – 
Performance IQ 
14 5 19 
Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence – Full Scale 
IQ 
14 5 19 
    
Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale – Verbal IQ 13 4 17 
Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale – Performance IQ 13 4 17 
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Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale – Full Scale IQ 13 4 17 
Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale – Verbal 
Comprehension 
13 4 17 
Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale – Perceptual 
Organisation 
13 4 17 
Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale – Working Memory 13 4 17 
Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale – Processing Speed 13 4 17 
 
 
3.3.6 Data analysis 
 
All participants completed all four sessions of the study. Participant’s recall 
transcripts were scored independently by two blind raters against the initially identified 
recall units to produce the recall accuracy score with an almost perfect inter-rater 
agreement (Kappa=0.93, p<.001, 95% CI [0.928, 0.932]). The final recall score was 
computed as the average of the two ratings. Emotional experience ratings from the 
visual analogue scales were converted into numeric values ranging from 0-10 (using one 
decimal place). Mixed-factorial ANOVAs followed-up by planned contrasts were used 
to compare the intensity and recall accuracy scores of the four sets of emotional stories. 
Simple Bonferroni corrections were applied to the family-wise alpha rate (α=.05) for 
planned contrasts. A series of independent-samples one-way ANOVAs confirmed that 
there were no order effects for the recall accuracy scores (anger, F(3,36)=.04, p=.988., 
ηp2=.004.; fear, F(3,36)=.04, p=.991, ηp2=.003; sadness, F(3,36)=.15, p=.927, ηp2=.013; 
happiness, F(3,36)=.07, p=.975, ηp2=.006), the overall intensity of emotion ratings 
(anger, F(3,36)=1.32, p=.284, ηp2=.099; fear, F(3,36)=2.02, p=.129, ηp2=.144; sadness, 
F(3,36)=.84, p=.480, ηp2=.066; happiness, F(3,36)=2.06, p=.123, ηp2=.146), or the 
intensity of target emotions (anger, F(3,36)=.97, p=.417, ηp2=.075; fear, F(3,36)=2.0, 
p=.132, ηp2=.142; sadness, F(3,36)=1.02, p=.394, ηp2=.078; happiness, F(3,36)=1.88, 
p=.151, ηp2=.135). 
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3.4 Results 
 
3.4.1 Neuropsychological assessments of amnesic Korsakoff’s syndrome patients 
 
3.4.1.1 Mini Mental State Examination (MMSE) 
 
 All 20 Korsakoff’s syndrome patients were administered the Mini Mental State 
Examinations. The results are shown in Figure 7. 
 
 
Figure 7. The Mini Mental State Examination (MMSE) score (Korsakoff patients). 
The Korsakoff’s syndrome patients scored in the normal range of the MMSE, with a 
minimal variation in scores. Error bars represent +/– 1 SE. 
 
3.4.1.2 The Beck’s Depression Inventory 
 
 The Beck Depression Inventory (BDI) is a questionnaire developed to measure 
the intensity, severity, and depth of depression in patients with psychiatric diagnoses. It 
is also used to detect depressive symptoms in a primary care setting as part of a 
psychological or medical examination. Fourteen Korsakoff’s syndrome patients were 
administered the Beck Depression Inventory (see Figure 8). 
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Figure 8. Beck Depression Inventory (Korsakoff’s syndrome patients). 
The Korsakoff’s syndrome patients scored in the mild-moderate depression range of the 
BDI test. Error bars represent +/– 1 SE. 
 
3.4.1.3 Emotion Regulation Questionnaire (ERQ) 
 
 The Emotion Regulation Questionnaire (ERQ) is designed to measure 
respondents’ tendency to regulate their emotions in two ways: (1) Cognitive Reappraisal 
and (2) Expressive Suppression. Cognitive reappraisal is a form of cognitive change that 
involves construing a potentially emotion-eliciting situation in a way that changes its 
emotional impact. Expressive suppression is a form of response modulation that 
involves inhibiting on-going emotion-expressive behaviour. Reappraisal is an 
antecedent-focused strategy: it occurs early, and intervenes before the emotion response 
tendencies have been fully generated. This means that reappraisal can efficiently alter 
the entire subsequent emotion trajectory. More specifically, when used to down-regulate 
negative emotion, reappraisal should successfully reduce the experiential and 
behavioural components of negative emotion. By contrast, suppression is a response-
focused strategy: it comes relatively late in the emotion-generative process, and 
primarily modifies the behavioural aspect of the emotion response tendencies. 
Suppression should thus be effective in decreasing the behavioural expression of 
negative emotion, but might have the unintended side effect of also clamping down on 
the expression of positive emotion. At the same time, suppression will not be helpful in 
reducing the experience of negative emotion, which is not directly targeted by 
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suppression and may thus continue to linger and accumulate unresolved. In addition, 
because suppression comes late in the emotion-generative process, it requires the 
individual to wilfully manage emotion response tendencies as they continually arise. All 
scores range from zero to seven. Fourteen Korsakoff’s syndrome patients were 
administered the test (see Figure 9). 
 
 
Figure 9. Emotion Regulation Questionnaire (Korsakoff’s syndrome patients). 
The Korsakoff’s syndrome patients scored marginally but significantly higher on the 
cognitive reappraisal scale than on the expressive suppression scale, showing an 
adaptive/positive emotion regulation functioning. Error bars represent +/– 1 SE. 
 
3.4.1.4 D-KEFS Trail Making Test 
 
 Nineteen Korsakoff’s syndrome patients were administered the D-KEFS Trail 
Making Test. The results are illustrated in Figure 10. 
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Figure 100. D-KEFS Trail Making Test (Korsakoff’s syndrome patients). 
The Korsakoff’s syndrome patients recorded a below-average score on the Trail Making 
Test, most importantly on Condition 4 (task switching). Error bars represent +/– 1 SE. 
 
3.4.1.5 D-KEFS Verbal Fluency Test 
 
 Nineteen Korsakoff’s syndrome patients were tested with the D-KEFS Verbal 
Fluency Test. The results are shown in Figure 11. 
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Figure 111. D-KEFS Verbal Fluency Test (Korsakoff’s syndrome patients). 
The Korsakoff’s syndrome patients scored significantly lower the age corrected mean 
(scaled mean) on the D-KEFS Verbal Fluency Test, especially on the two primary 
measures (task switching) during Condition 3. Error bars represent +/– 1 SE. 
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 The D-KEFS Design Fluency Test assesses motor planning, cognitive flexibility, 
and fluency in generation of visual patterns, above and beyond contributions from 
motor speed. Condition 1 provides a basic test of design fluency, Condition 2 measures 
both design fluency and response inhibition, and Condition 3 measures both design 
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fluency and cognitive flexibility. Fourteen Korsakoff’s syndrome patients were 
administered the D-KEFS Design Fluency Test. The results are illustrated in Figure 12. 
 
Figure 12. D-KEFS Design Fluency Test (Korsakoff’s syndrome patients). 
The Korsakoff’s syndrome patients scored below the age corrected average of the 
Design Fluency Test on all measures, most importantly, on Condition 3 (task 
switching). The error bars represent +/– 1 SE. 
 
3.4.1.7 D-KEFS Colour-Word Interference Test 
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and cognitive flexibility. Condition 3: Inhibition is the traditional Stroop task which 
measures verbal inhibition. Condition 4: Inhibition/Switching is a means of evaluating 
both inhibition and cognitive flexibility. Fourteen Korsakoff’s syndrome participants 
took the D-KEFS Colour-Word Interference Test. The results are shown in Figure 13. 
 
 
Figure 13. D-KEFS Colour-Word Interference Test (Korsakoff’s syndrome patients). 
The Korsakoff’s syndrome patients performed marginally but significantly below the 
age corrected average for the Condition 3 (inhibition) and lower still on Condition 4 
(inhibition/switching) of the D-KEFS Colour-Word Interference Test. The error bars 
represent +/– 1 SE. 
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3.4.1.8 D-KEFS Sorting Test 
 
 The D-KEFS Sorting Test evaluates primarily the examinee's abilities of 
problem solving and concept formation. Secondly, the test also involves the executive 
functions of initiation of problem-solving behaviour concept formation skills, modality-
specific problem-solving skills (verbal versus nonverbal), creativity in forming 
responses, transfer of conceptual knowledge into goal-directed behaviour, and the 
ability to inhibit previous responses in order to allow behavioural and cognitive 
flexibility. Fourteen Korsakoff’s syndrome patients were administered the D-KEFS 
Sorting Test. The results are depicted in Figure 14. 
 
 
Figure 14. D-KEFS Sorting Test (Korsakoff’s syndrome patients). 
The Korsakoff’s syndrome patients performed below the age corrected average on all 
the measures of the D-KEFS Sorting Test. The error bars represent +/– 1 SE. 
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3.4.1.9 D-KEFS Twenty Questions Test 
 
 The D-KEFS Twenty Questions Test measures the examinee's logical thinking, 
hypothesis testing, and deduction. The test assesses the ability to organise visual 
elements into categories and subcategories, formulate abstract questions, and 
incorporate the examiner's feedback. Fourteen Korsakoff’s syndrome patients were 
administered the D-KEFS Twenty Questions Test. The results are shown in Figure 15. 
 
 
Figure 15. D-KEFS Twenty Questions Test (Korsakoff’s syndrome patients). 
The Korsakoff’s syndrome patients scored marginally but significantly below average 
on the D-KEFS Twenty Questions Test. The error bars represent +/– 1 SE. 
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3.4.1.10 D-KEFS Word Context Test 
 
 The D-KEFS Word Context Test is a means of evaluating executive functioning 
in the verbal modality and assessing skills such as deductive reasoning, integration of 
multiple bits of information, hypothesis testing, and flexibility of thinking. Fourteen 
Korsakoff’s syndrome patients were administered the D-KEFS Word Context Test. The 
results are shown in Figure 16. 
 
 
Figure 16. D-KEFS Word Context Test (Korsakoff’s syndrome patients). 
The Korsakoff’s syndrome patients performed below the average age corrected level of 
the D-KEFS Word Context Test. The error bars represent +/– 1 SE. 
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3.4.1.11 D-KEFS Tower Test 
 
 The D-KEFS Tower Test is a measure of visual attention, spatial planning, rule 
learning, inhibition of impulsive and perseverative responding, and the ability to 
establish and maintain a cognitive (instructional) set. Fourteen Korsakoff’s syndrome 
patients were administered the D-KEFS Tower Test. The results are illustrated in Figure 
17. 
 
 
Figure 17. D-KEFS Tower Test (Korsakoff’s syndrome patients). 
Unlike all previous D-KEFS tests, the Korsakoff’s syndrome patients showed a normal 
(age corrected average) performance on the D-KEFS Tower Test. The error bars 
represent +/– 1 SE. 
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3.4.1.12 D-KEFS Proverb Test 
 
 The D-KEFS Proverb Test assesses the examinee's ability to interpret brief, 
concrete phrases that convey deeper, abstract meaning. The test requires high level 
executive functions of verbal abstract thinking, semantic integration of the individual 
words into coherent, abstract principles or concepts, and generalisation to many 
situations beyond the concrete, literal interpretation. Fourteen Korsakoff’s syndrome 
patients were administered the D-KEFS Proverb Test. The results are shown in Figure 
18. 
 
 
Figure 1818. D-KEFS Proverb Test (Korsakoff’s syndrome patients). 
The Korsakoff’s syndrome patients performed below the age corrected average on the 
D-KEFS Proverb Test. The error bars represent +/– 1 SE. 
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3.4.1.13 Behavioural Assessment of the Dysexecutive Syndrome 
 
 The Behavioural Assessment of the Dysexecutive Syndrome (BADS) is a 
battery of six tests which require participants to plan, initiate, monitor and adjust 
behaviour in response to the explicit and implicit demands of a series of tasks.  (1) Rule 
Shift Cards (RS) – This test purports to identify perseverative tendencies and its 
obverse, mental flexibility (perseveration refers to a difficulty in adjusting behaviour to 
meet the demands of a changing situation). (2) Action Programme (AP) – This test 
assesses the ability to devise and implement a solution to a practical problem (getting a 
cork out of a narrow plastic tube) while not contravening a set of rules. (3) Key Search 
(KS) – was influenced by one of the task in the Stanford-Binet Intelligence Scale, and it 
assesses ability to plan a strategy to solve a problem (finding a key lost in a field). (4) 
Temporal Judgement (TJ) –  This test involves judgement and abstract thinking based 
on common knowledge, as the respondent is required to estimate times for everyday 
events. (5) Zoo Map (ZM) – This is a test to assess the ability to formulate and 
implement a plan while following an instructional set (spontaneous planning ability) 
and to follow a pre-formulated plan while observing the original set of instructions. (6) 
Modified Six Elements (6E) – This test assesses the ability to time-manage, while 
making demands on the examinee's ability to plan, organise and monitor behaviour, and 
also to remember to carry out an intention at a future time (prospective memory). It 
involves dividing the available time between a number of simple tasks (picture naming, 
arithmetic and dictation) while not contravening a set of rules. The results of the six 
tests are reported as an aggregate score, standardised and age corrected. Fourteen 
Korsakoff’s syndrome patients took the BADS. The results are shown in Figure 19. 
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Figure 19. Behavioural Assessment of the Dysexecutive Syndrome (Korsakoff 
patients). 
The Korsakoff’s syndrome patients performed in the borderline-low average range of 
the BADS. The error bars represent +/– 1 SE. 
 
3.4.1.14 Wechsler Memory Scale III-R 
 
 All 20 Korsakoff’s syndrome patients were administered the Wechsler Memory 
Scale (III-R). As for the neurologically normal participants, only the Auditory 
Immediate, Auditory Delayed, Auditory Recognition Delayed and Working Memory 
indices are reported. The results are shown in Figure 20. 
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Figure 20. Wechsler Memory Scale III-R (Korsakoff’s syndrome patients). 
The Korsakoff’s syndrome patients scored in the borderline-extremely low range of the 
WMS III-R for the three memory indices (Auditory Immediate, Delayed and Auditory 
Recognition Delayed). The Working Memory scores were close to the normal age 
corrected range, between the average and low average intervals. The error bars represent 
+/– 1 SE. 
 
3.4.1.15 Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale 
 
 The primary composite measures of the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale 
(WAIS) are the Verbal IQ, the Performance IQ, and the overall Full Scale IQ indices. 
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Scores for the secondary Verbal Comprehension, Perceptual Organisation, Working 
Memory, and Processing Speed indices are also presented. 
 The Verbal IQ is derived from scores on seven of the subtests: information, digit 
span, vocabulary, arithmetic, comprehension, similarities, and letter-number 
sequencing. The information subtest is a test of general knowledge, including questions 
about geography and literature. The digit span subtest requires test takers to repeat 
strings of digits. The vocabulary and arithmetic subtests are general measures of a 
person's vocabulary and arithmetic skills. The comprehension subtest requires test 
takers to solve practical problems and explain the meaning of proverbs. The similarities 
subtest requires test takers to indicate the similarities between pairs of things. The letter-
number sequencing subtest involves ordering numbers and letters presented in an 
unordered sequence. Scores on the verbal subtests are based primarily on correct 
answers. 
 The Performance IQ is derived from scores on the picture completion, picture 
arrangement, block design, digit symbol, matrix reasoning, and symbol search. In the 
picture completion subtest, the test taker is required to complete pictures with missing 
elements. The picture arrangement subtest entails arranging pictures in order to tell a 
story. The block design subtest requires test takers to use blocks to make specific 
designs. In the digit symbol subtest, digits and symbols are presented as pairs and test 
takers then must pair additional digits and symbols. The matrix reasoning subtest 
requires test takers to identify geometric shapes. The symbol search subtest requires 
examinees to match symbols appearing in different groups. Scores on the performance 
subtests are based on both response speed and correct answers. 
 Thirteen Korsakoff’s syndrome patients were administered the WAIS. The 
results are shown in Figure 21. 
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Figure 21. Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale (Korsakoff’s syndrome patients). 
The Korsakoff’s syndrome patients scored between the low average and borderline low 
ranges of the WAIS, most importantly for the Full Scale IQ. The error bars represent 
+/– 1 SE. 
 
3.4.1.16 Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence 
 
The Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence (WASI) is a shortened version 
of the Wechsler Adults Intelligence Scale, which produces three primary composite 
scores: the Verbal IQ, the Performance IQ, and the overall Full Scale IQ indices. 
Although the scores on the WASI and WAIS are shown to be highly correlated, the fact 
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potentially perform better. Fourteen Korsakoff’s syndrome patients were administered 
the WASI. The results are shown in Figure 22. 
 
 
Figure 22. Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence (Korsakoff’s syndrome patients). 
The Korsakoff’s syndrome patients performed close to the normal age corrected range 
of the WASI, between the average and low average intervals. The error bars represent 
+/– 1 SE. 
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3.4.2 Neuropsychological assessments of neurologically intact elderly controls 
 
3.4.2.1 Mini Mental State Examination (MMSE) 
 
The Mini Mental State Examination (MMSE) is the most commonly used test to 
screen for cognitive impairment. It can be used by clinicians to help diagnose dementia 
and to help assess its progression and severity. All 20 participants in the sample were 
administered this test, and the results are presented in Figure 23. 
 
 
Figure 23. The Mini Mental State Examination (MMSE) score (elderly controls). 
Neurologically normal participants scored in the upper part of the normal range, with a 
minimal variation in scores. Error bars represent +/– 1 SE.  
 
3.4.2.2 D-KEFS Trail Making Test 
 
 The primary executive function task is Condition 4: Number-Letter Switching, 
which assesses cognitive flexibility on a visual-motor sequencing task. The other four 
conditions allow the examiner to determine if a deficient score on the switching 
condition is related to a deficit in cognitive flexibility and/or to an impairment in one or 
more underlying skills. Nineteen participants were administered the Trail Making Test 
(see Figure 24). 
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Figure 24. D-KEFS Trail Making Test (neurologically normal elderly controls) 
The age corrected scores (scaled scores) showed participants performed above average 
on the key measures of the test, especially Condition 4 (task switching). Error bars 
represent +/– 1 SE. 
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(Category Switching). The key measures of the test are Condition 3: total correct 
responses and the second measure during Condition 3: total switching accuracy. Sixteen 
participants were administered the Verbal Fluency Test (see Figure 25). 
 
 
Figure 25. D-KEFS Verbal Fluency Test (neurologically normal elderly controls). 
Participants performed above average (age corrected performance), especially on the 
two primary measures of the test in Condition 3 (category switching). Error bars 
represent +/– 1 SE. 
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3.4.2.4 Wechsler Memory Scale IIIR 
 
 The Wechsler Memory Scale involves a number of classical memory tests 
whose scores are used to compute aggregate index scores. For the purposes of the 
present study four such index scores were computed: Auditory Immediate, Auditory 
Delayed, Auditory Recognition Delayed, and Working Memory.  
The Auditory Immediate index reflects the examinee's ability to remember 
information immediately after it is orally presented. Scores from Logical Memory I and 
verbal Paired Associates I contribute to this index. 
The Auditory Delayed index reflects the examinee's ability to remember orally 
presented information after a 25-30 minute delay. Scores from Logical Memory II and 
Verbal Paired Associates II are used to calculate this index. 
The Auditory Recognition Delayed index reports the examinee's ability to 
remember (via recognition, not free recall) auditory information after a delay of 25-30 
minutes. Recognition scores from Logical Memory II and Verbal Paired Associates II 
contribute to this index. 
The Working Memory index reflects the examinee's capacity to remember and 
manipulate both visually and orally presented information in the short-term (working) 
memory. Scores from Spatial Span and Letter-Number Sequencing are used to compute 
this index. 
 For the purposes of the present study, the key measure from the Wechsler 
Memory Scale IIIR is the Auditory Delayed Index. Sixteen participants completed this 
assessment, and the results are shown in Figure 26. 
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Figure 26. Wechsler Memory Scale IIIR (neurologically normal elderly controls). 
Participants scored in the high-average range of the WMS test, especially for the key 
measure (Auditory Delayed Index). Error bars represent +/– 1 SE. 
 
3.4.3 The specific re-experience of discrete emotions is unimpaired for amnesic 
Korsakoff’s syndrome patients 
 
The present study investigated the differences in the emotional experience of 
four basic discrete emotions (anger, fear, sadness, and happiness) between a group of 20 
Korsakoff patients and 20 control participants, following the recollection of four 
emotional vignettes aimed at eliciting the target emotion discretely. Firstly, we sought to 
establish the difference in the recall accuracy between the two groups. Secondly, we 
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compared the emotional experience for each discrete emotion after the story recall. 
Finally, a set of correlational analyses was carried out between the intensity of the target 
emotion and the amount of episodic details recalled from each story. 
 
3.4.3.1 Differences in recall accuracy 
 
The Korsakoff patients were expected to show a substantial level of memory 
impairment compared to controls, across all four emotions. As shown in Figure 27, the 
patients’ lowest recall accuracy was recorded for the sadness stories (M=9.65%, 
SD=1.41%), followed by fear (M=14.62%, SD=2.51%), and happiness (M=14.71%, 
SD=2.40%), while the recall of anger stories was highest (M=20.92%, SD=2.24%). The 
control participants scored the lowest recall accuracy for the fear stories (M=57.99%, 
SD=2.58%), followed by anger (M=68.84%, SD=2.53%), happiness (M=70.33%, 
SD=1.95%), and sadness (M=71.22%, SD=2.15%). A sample of the free recall 
transcripts of a Control participant and Korsakoff’s syndrome patient are included in 
Appendices J and K, respectively.  
 
 
Figure 27. Episodic recall of emotion stories for Korsakoff patients and controls. 
Korsakoff patients recalled substantially fewer story details compared to healthy 
controls. Error bars show +/– 1 SE. 
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Paired sample t-tests confirmed the predicted differences for the anger stories 
(t(38)=14.20, p<.001, d=4.49), fear (t(38)=12.06, p<.001, d=3.81), sadness 
(t(38)=23.96, p<.001, d=7.58), and happiness stories (t(38)=17.98, p<.001, d=5.69). 
Thus, the Korsakoff patients presented a substantial episodic memory impairment 
compared to control participants. This result allowed the investigation of the differences 
in the re-experience of discrete emotions, in the presence and absence of episodic 
information about the original events. 
 
3.4.3.2 Emotional experiences after the recall of emotional stories 
 
The average ratings for each discrete emotion after each of the four stories (see 
Figure 28) showed a specific elicitation of the target emotion. However, despite the 
large difference between the amount of episodic information recalled by the two groups, 
emotional experience was surprisingly similar for Korsakoff patients and controls. 
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Figure 28. Ratings of discrete emotions for Korsakoff patients and control participants. 
Each story showed a specific elicitation of the target emotion, and Korsakoff patients 
showed a similar emotional experience to healthy controls. Error bars show +/– 1 SE. 
 
The results were confirmed by four mixed factorial ANOVAs and planned 
contrasts, analysing the emotion ratings after each story (see Table 6). Ratings of target 
emotions were significantly higher than all non-target emotions, with no significant 
differences between control participants and patients. This seems to suggest that a 
substantially impaired episodic recall of an emotional event can still produce a similarly 
distinct experience of each of the four basic emotions as a normal detailed recollection. 
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Table 6. The difference between the ratings of discrete emotions after story recall 
The difference between the ratings of discrete emotions after story recall showed a 
specific elicitation of the target emotions (compared to non-target emotions), with no 
significant differences between the two groups (Korsakoff patients and control 
participants). Effect sizes are expressed as partial eta-squared. 
 
 
3.4.3.3 The relationship between recall accuracy and intensity of target emotions 
 
To confirm the previous surprising finding that despite the sizable difference in 
the amount of information recalled, both groups of participants experienced the target 
emotion of each story at significantly higher levels than any of the non-target emotions, 
the relationship between the intensity of the target emotion and the amount of 
information remembered from each story was investigated directly. As shown in Figure 
29, the data failed to indicate a relationship between recall accuracy and intensity of 
target emotion. 
 
 
 
F p η2 F p η2
Overall ANOVA - 16.09 * <.001 .298 1.89 .816 .006
Fear 29.55 * <.001 .437 0.49 .490 .013
Sadness 10.26 * .003 .213 0.05 .828 .001
Happiness 25.99 * <.001 .406 0.31 .577 .008
Overall ANOVA - 37.66 * <.001 .498 1.40 .246 .036
Anger 29.91 * <.001 .440 0.01 .933 <.001
Sadness 5.95 * .019 .135 0.65 .425 .017
Happiness 83.1 * <.001 .686 1.59 .215 .040
Overall ANOVA - 17.05 * <.001 .310 0.35 .720 .009
Anger 42.67 * <.001 .529 0.39 .536 .010
Fear 34.49 * <.001 .476 0.99 .325 .025
Happiness 15.36 * <.001 .288 0.13 .722 .003
Overall ANOVA - 139.06 * <.001 .785 1.10 .728 .011
Anger 167.51 * <.001 .815 0.35 .559 .009
Fear 149.61 * <.001 .797 0.49 .487 .013
Sadness 136.21 * <.001 .782 0.52 .476 .013
Happiness
Planned contrasts
Main Effect of Emotion Emotion*Group Interaction
Non-Target EmotionAnalysisTarget Emotion
Planned contrasts
Planned contrasts
Anger
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Sadness
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Figure 29. The relation between recall accuracy and the intensity of the target emotion.  
The correlations between the recall accuracy and the ratings of each of the four discrete 
emotions were not significant. Korsakoff patients’ and control participants’ scores are 
analysed together. 
 
A Spearman correlation failed to reach significance for any of the target 
emotions (anger stories, r(40)=0.10, p=.522; fear stories, r(40)=0.06, p=.698; sadness 
stories, r(40)=0.07, p=.651; happiness stories, r(40)=-0.04, p=.788). Surprisingly, the 
data showed that even those patients whose recall accuracy was close to zero (4-5%) 
specifically reported high levels of the basic target emotions (80-90%). The nil 
correlations between emotional intensity and recall accuracy seemed to be explained by 
equal spread in emotion intensity scores for participants with massively different recall 
scores. Specifically, some of amnesic patients with floor levels of recall accuracy scores 
reported moderate-to-high levels of the target emotions for all classes of emotions (e.g., 
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anger, 7.2; fear, 9.9; sadness, 6.5; happiness, 4.7). The results suggest that the amount 
of episodic information retained and actively recalled is not related to the intensity of 
basic emotions re-experience.  
 
3.4.4 The re-experience of discrete emotions is positively correlated with the 
executive functions of cognitive flexibility and response inhibition 
 
The second aim of the present study was to investigate the relationship between 
the four discrete classes of emotions, basic demographics, executive function, memory, 
and intelligence. At first, an analysis of the relationship between the intensity of each 
discrete emotion and basic demographics (age and years of education) was carried out 
to rule out these variables as possible covariates. Secondly, the relationship between the 
intensity of the re-experience of the four basic emotions and measures of the executive 
function is carried out controlling for the difference in recall accuracy of the appropriate 
stimulus/story corresponding to each emotion. Thirdly, the relationship between the 
performance on more complex abstract reasoning tasks, part of popular IQ tests are 
compared against emotion intensity ratings. Lastly, the relationship between the 
emotion intensities and overall measures of episodic memory are analysed and 
presented. On each occasion, the relationships are presented first cumulatively 
(Korsakoff patients and neurologically normal controls together), and the separately for 
patients and controls. The cumulative analysis benefits from the larger sample size 
(patients + controls), which carries a great weight in identifying a relationship using 
Pearson’s r. However, given the marked cognitive (specifically declarative memory) 
and neurological differences between the two groups, correlational analysis were also 
carried out separately for the separate samples of Korsakoff patients and control 
participants. The Korsakoff patients were administered distinctly more 
neuropsychological tests (see Table 6 above, in section 3.3.5). When fewer than 12 
participants contributed with scores for an analysis, results were not reported. 
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3.4.4.1 The relationship between the intensity of discrete emotions and basic 
demographic variables 
 
A Pearson correlation analysis was conducted for each of the four discrete 
emotions to investigate the relationship between the intensity of basic emotions and two 
basic demographics variables (age, and years of education). A second analysis was 
performed separately (but reported together in Table 7), in which the same variables were 
partially correlated, controlling for the recall accuracy scores for the stories of each 
discrete emotion. 
 
Table 7. The relationship between the intensity of discrete emotions and age. 
Age of participants showed a moderate negative relation with the intensity of fear. The 
relationship between age and the intensities of all other discrete emotions (anger, 
sadness and happiness) was not significant. The numbers of years of education showed 
no relationship with the intensity of any basic emotions. 
Discrete 
emotions 
Demographic 
variables 
Pearson Correlation 
Partial Pearson 
Correlation (Covariate: 
Free Recall) 
r p N r p df 
Anger Age -0.23 .151 40 -0.27 .094 37 
Anger Education -0.01 .971 40 -0.04 .820 37 
Fear Age -0.33 .036 * 40 -0.38 .016 * 37 
Fear Education -0.24 .143 40 -0.27 .097 37 
Sadness Age -0.08 .619 40 -0.08 .631 37 
Sadness Education -0.03 .858 40 -0.02 .900 37 
Happiness Age -0.24 .135 40 -0.25 .131 37 
Happiness Education -0.06 .731 40 -0.04 .797 37 
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As shown in Table 7, the age of participants had a moderate negative 
relationship only with the intensity of fear, and not with any other discrete emotions. 
The number of years of education was not related with the intensity of any of the four 
basic emotions. 
 
3.4.4.1a The relationship between the intensity of discrete emotions and the age of the 
Korsakoff patients 
 
 The relationship between the intensity of the discrete target emotions and the 
Korsakoff patients’ age was tested using the Pearson’s correlation test, and the data are 
shown in a scatterplot in Figure 30. The correlations failed to reach significance for any 
of target emotions: anger (r(20)=-0.36, p=.122), fear (r(20)=-0.36, p=.114), sadness 
(r(20)=0.69, p=.773), and happiness (r(20)=-0.375, p=.103). 
 
 
Figure 30. The relation between Korsakoff patients’ age and emotion ratings. 
The correlations between the intensity of the target emotions and the age of the 
Korsakoff patients were non-significant. 
0
2
4
6
8
10
30 40 50 60 70 80 90
Years of age
A
ve
ra
ge
 R
at
in
g 
o
f 
H
ap
p
in
es
s
D.
0
2
4
6
8
10
30 40 50 60 70 80 90
Years of age
A
ve
ra
ge
 R
at
in
g 
o
f 
A
n
ge
r
A.
0
2
4
6
8
10
30 40 50 60 70 80 90
Years of age
A
ve
ra
ge
 R
at
in
g 
o
f 
Fe
ar
B.
0
2
4
6
8
10
30 40 50 60 70 80 90
Years of age
A
ve
ra
ge
 R
at
in
g 
o
f 
Sa
d
n
es
s
C.
3. The re-experience of discrete emotions in amnesia 
121 
 
 Thus, despite the wide range of ages of the Korsakoff patients group (40-69 y.o.) 
differences in the intensity of emotional experience were not related to their age. A 
similar analysis was carried out for the control participants (see below). 
 
3.4.4.1b The relationship between the intensity of discrete emotions and the age of the 
control participants 
 
A similar Pearson correlation test as above was carried out between the intensity 
of the discrete target emotions of the control participants and their age (see Figure 31 
below). Notably, the intensity of anger (r(20)=-0.55, p=.012) and fear (r(20)=-0.50, 
p=.026) were negatively correlated with age, indicating that the more elderly control 
participants reported lower levels of the two emotions. Although both effects sizes are 
large (Cohen, 1992, 2013), when a Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons is 
applied, only the anger correlation remains significant. The relationships for sadness 
(r(20)=-0.29, p=.773) and happiness (r(20)=-0.35, p=.129) failed to reach significance. 
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Figure 31. The relation between control participants’ age and emotion ratings. 
The correlations between the intensity of the target emotions and the age of the control 
participants show that the re-experience of anger (A.) and fear (B.) were significantly 
and negatively correlated with age. 
 
 Despite the small sample size, the two significant correlations were not affected 
by moderate or extreme outliers. Results suggest that the two high arousal negative 
emotions (anger and fear) were experienced at a lower intensity by the more elderly 
control participants. 
 
3.4.4.2 The relationship between the intensity of discrete emotions and measures of 
the executive function 
 
 The second research question addressed the possible relationship between the 
intensity of the re-experience of basic emotions and the executive function. The scores 
on two commonly used batteries of executive functions tests: the Delis Kaplan 
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Executive Function Scale (DKEFS) and the Behavioural Assessment of the 
Dysexecutive Syndrome (BADS) were compared to the intensity of basic emotions.  
As presented in Table 8 below, only the DKEFS tests reached significance, 
especially for the re-experience of happiness and after controlling for recall accuracy. 
Key measures from the Design Fluency test, joining the empty dots only (DKEFS DF 2) 
and switching between joining filled and empty dots (DKEFS DF 3) showed a moderate 
positive relationship with the intensity of happiness, when controlling for recall 
accuracy. Both tests require participants to ignore the previously learned rule of joining 
the filled dots, practiced in the first part of the test. This relationship has further 
transferred into the combined scores for both parts of the test (DKEFS DF Comb) and 
the total score for the Design Fluency test (DKEFS DF Total). The intensity of 
happiness also showed a moderate positive relationship with the initial abstraction score 
of the Twenty Question Test (DKEFS TQT Abs), which examines logical thinking, 
hypothesis testing, and deduction. 
The intensity of sadness showed a moderate positive correlation with the first 
task of the Design Fluency test (filled dots; DKEFS DF 1), while the intensity of fear 
was moderately correlated with the set-shifting task of the same test (DKEFS DF 3). 
The intensity of anger reported a small negative correlation with the motor speed task of 
the Trail Making Test (DKEFS TMT 5). 
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Table 8. The relationship between the intensity of discrete emotions and measures of the executive function 
The relationship between the intensity of discrete emotions and measures of executive 
function. Only the significant values are shown, for either the simple or partial 
correlation, beginning with the negative emotions in alphabetical order, and followed 
by happiness. 
Discrete 
emotions 
Measures of 
executive function 
Pearson Correlation 
Partial Pearson 
Correlation (Covariate: 
Free Recall) 
r p N r p df 
Anger DKEFS TM 5 -0.36 .046 32 -0.39 .029 * 29 
Fear DKEFS DF 3 0.45 .054 19 0.50 .034 * 16 
Sadness DKEFS DF 1 0.46 .047 19 0.51 .029 * 16 
Happiness DKEFS DF 2 0.56 .013 * 19 0.64 .004 * 16 
Happiness DKEFS DF 3 0.45 .055 19 0.62 .006 * 16 
Happiness DKEFS DF Comb 0.54 .017 * 19 0.68 .002 * 16 
Happiness DKEFS DF Total 0.51 .024 * 19 0.68 .002 * 16 
Happiness DKEFS TQT Abs 0.59 .009 * 18 0.67 .003 * 15 
 
 
3.4.4.2a The relationship between the intensity of discrete emotions and measures of 
the executive function for the Korsakoff patients 
 
The relationship between the intensity of the discrete target emotions and the 
Korsakoff patients’ performance on the DKEFS battery of executive function tests was 
examined individually, for each test, using a series of Pearson’s correlations. The data 
for the Trail-Making test are shown in a scatterplot in Figure 32. The correlations failed 
to reach significance for any of target emotions: anger (r(19)=-0.21, p=.382), fear 
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(r(19)=0.07, p=.786), sadness (r(19)=0.04, p=.876), and happiness (r(19)=0.13, 
p=.606). 
 
 
Figure 32. The relation between Korsakoff patients' DKEFS-TM scores and emotion 
ratings. 
The correlations between the intensity of the target emotions and the standardised scores 
on the DKEFS – Trail-Making Test for the Korsakoff patients were non-significant. 
 
A similar Pearson correlation test was carried using the scores on the DKEFS 
Verbal Fluency test (see Figure 33). Similarly with before, no relationship was 
identified for any of target emotions: anger (r(19)=-0.09, p=.706), fear (r(19)=0.08, 
p=.749), sadness (r(19)=-0.28, p=.245), and happiness (r(19)=-0.26, p=.275). 
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Figure 33. The relation between Korsakoff patients' DKEFS-VF Total Switching 
Accuracy scores and emotion ratings.  
The correlations between the intensity of the target emotions and the standardised scores 
on the DKEFS – Verbal Fluency Test for the Korsakoff patients were non-significant. 
 
Two separate sets of correlation analyses were carried out for the DKEFS 
Design Fluency Test, one for the Condition 2 – response inhibition scores (see Figure 
34) and the second for Condition 3 - cognitive flexibility (see Figure 35). The 
correlations with the response inhibition measure failed to reach significance for any of 
target emotions: anger (r(14)=0.12, p=.689), fear (r(14)=0.29, p=.307), sadness 
(r(14)=0.07, p=.825), and happiness (r(14)=0.51, p=.062). 
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Figure 34. The relation between Korsakoff patients' DKEFS-DF Response Inhibition 
scores and emotion ratings. 
The correlations between the intensity of the target emotions and the standardised scores 
on the DKEFS – Design Fluency Test (response inhibition) for the Korsakoff patients 
were not significant. 
 
Similarly with above, the correlations with the cognitive flexibility measure of 
the DKEFS – Design Fluency Test (see Figure 35) failed to reach significance for any 
of target emotions: anger (r(14)=-0.36, p=.209), fear (r(14)=0.49, p=.075), sadness 
(r(14)=-0.13, p=.667), and happiness (r(14)=0.44, p=.113). Results of the correlations 
with both primary measures of the Design Fluency Test may have been substantially 
affected by the small sample size (N=14). In particular for fear and happiness the data 
show a trend towards a large positive correlation, but that cannot be interpreted in the 
context of the limited data available. 
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Figure 35. The relation between Korsakoff patients' DKEFS-DF Cognitive Flexibility 
scores and emotion ratings. 
The correlations between the intensity of the target emotions and the standardised scores 
on the DKEFS – Design Fluency Test (cognitive flexibility) for the Korsakoff patients 
were not significant. 
 
Two separate sets of correlation analyses were also carried out for the DKEFS 
Colour-Word Interference Test (a variant of the common Stroop task). The first set of 
analyses was done for the measure of inhibition during Condition 3 (see Figure 36). 
None of the correlations reached significance: anger (r(14)=-0.46, p=.095), fear 
(r(14)=0.06, p=.840), sadness (r(14)=-0.29, p=.313), and happiness (r(14)=0.09, 
p=.768). 
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Figure 36. The relation between Korsakoff patients' DKEFS-CWI Inhibition scores and 
emotion ratings. 
The correlations between the intensity of the target emotions and the standardised scores 
on the DKEFS – Colour-Word Interference Test (inhibition) for the Korsakoff patients 
were not significant. 
 
The second set of correlations involved the measures on Condition 4 
(inhibition/switching) of the DKEFS – Colour-Word Interference Test (see Figure 37). 
Again, none of the correlations reached significance: anger (r(14)=-0.11, p=.714), fear 
(r(14)=0.03, p=.929), sadness (r(14)=-0.49, p=.075), and happiness (r(14)=-0.20, 
p=.492).  
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Figure 37. The relation between Korsakoff patients' DKEFS-CWI Inhibition/Switching 
scores and emotion ratings. 
The correlations between the intensity of the target emotions and the standardised scores 
on the DKEFS – Colour-Word Interference Test (inhibition/switching) for the 
Korsakoff patients were not significant. 
 
Next, the relationship between the intensity of the discrete target emotions and 
the Korsakoff patients’ performance on the DKEFS Sorting Test was investigated. As 
shown in Figure 38, the correlations failed to reach significance for any of target 
emotions: anger (r(14)=-0.46, p=.098), fear (r(14)=0.26, p=.366), sadness (r(14)=0.01, 
p=.978), and happiness (r(14)=0.17, p=.568). 
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Figure 38. The relation between Korsakoff patients' DKEFS-S scores and emotion 
ratings. 
The correlations between the intensity of the target emotions and the standardised scores 
on the DKEFS – Sorting Test for the Korsakoff patients were not significant. 
 
The relationship between the intensity of the discrete target emotions and the 
performance on the DKEFS – Twenty Questions Test and the intensity of the discrete 
target emotions for the Korsakoff patients’ was analysed next (see Figure 39). The 
Pearson’s correlations failed to reach significance for any of target emotions: anger 
(r(14)=-0.29, p=.311), fear (r(14)=0.36, p=.205), sadness (r(14)=0.10, p=.727), and 
happiness (r(14)=0.34, p=.242). 
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Figure 39. The relation between Korsakoff patients' DKEFS-TQ scores and emotion 
ratings. 
The correlations between the intensity of the target emotions and the standardised scores 
on the DKEFS – Twenty Questions Test for the Korsakoff patients were not significant. 
 
The relationship between the intensity of the discrete target emotions and the 
Korsakoff patients’ performance on the DKEFS – Word Context Test was analysed 
using a series of Pearson’s correlations (see Figure 40). All correlations failed to reach 
significance: anger (r(14)=-0.10, p=.739), fear (r(14)=-0.15, p=.612), sadness (r(14)=-
0.38, p=.185), and happiness (r(14)=-0.38, p=.897). 
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Figure 40. The relation between Korsakoff patients' DKEFS-WC scores and emotion 
ratings. 
The correlations between the intensity of the target emotions and the standardised scores 
on the DKEFS – Word Context Test for the Korsakoff patients were not significant. 
 
The relationship between the intensity of the discrete target emotions and the 
Korsakoff patients’ performance on the DKEFS – Tower Test was examined using a 
series of Pearson’s correlations. The data are shown in a scatterplot in Figure 41. The 
correlations failed to reach significance for any of target emotions: anger (r(14)=-0.21, 
p=.483), fear (r(14)=0.28, p=.328), sadness (r(14)=0.01, p=.992), and happiness 
(r(14)=0.39, p=.173). 
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Figure 41. The relation between Korsakoff patients' DKEFS-T scores and emotion 
ratings. 
The correlation between the intensity of the target emotions and the standardised scores 
on the DKEFS – Tower Test for the Korsakoff patients were not significant. 
 
The relationship between the Korsakoff patients’ performance on the DKEFS – 
Proverb Test and the intensity of the discrete target emotions was analysed next, using a 
series of Pearson’s correlations. The correlations (see Figure 42) failed to reach 
significance for any of target emotions: anger (r(14)=-0.14, p=.641), fear (r(14)=0.06, 
p=.828), sadness (r(14)=-0.03, p=.910), and happiness (r(14)=0.17, p=.556). 
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Figure 42. The relation between Korsakoff patients' DKEFS-P scores and emotion 
ratings. 
The correlations between the intensity of the target emotions and the standardised scores 
on the DKEFS – Proverb Test for the Korsakoff patients were not significant. 
 
Finally, the relationship between the intensity of the discrete target emotions and 
the Korsakoff patients’ performance on the Behavioural Assessment of the 
Dysexecutive Syndrome test was investigated using a series of Pearson’s correlations. 
The data are shown in a scatterplot in Figure 43. The correlations failed to reach 
significance for any of target emotions: anger (r(14)=-0.19, p=.518), fear (r(14)=-0.28, 
p=.341), sadness (r(14)=-0.31, p=.277), and happiness (r(14)=0.17, p=.565). 
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Figure 43. The relation between Korsakoff patients' BADS scores and emotion ratings. 
The correlations between the intensity of the target emotions and the standardised scores 
on the Behavioural Assessment of the Dysexecutive Syndrome for the Korsakoff 
patients were not significant. 
 
In conclusion, the executive function measures were largely not correlated with 
the intensity of the discrete target emotions reported by the Korsakoff patients. 
Although on occasions, the data seemed to indicate an either positive of negative trend, 
it failed to reach the significance level. The small sample size, usually unsuitable for 
correlational analyses may have been a major cause for the lack of significance. 
However, in a current study design (involving four separate discrete emotions) a 
sufficiently large sample size would have been of a different order of magnitude 
(N>100), considering necessary corrections of the significance level to allow for 
multiple simultaneous comparisons. 
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3.4.4.2b The relationship between the intensity of discrete emotions and measures of 
the executive function for the control participants 
 
Similarly with the analyses for the Korsakoff patients, the relationship between 
the intensity of the discrete target emotions and the control participants’ performance on 
key tests from the DKEFS battery were performed using a series of Pearson’s 
correlations. The data for the Trail-Making test are shown in a scatterplot in Figure 44. 
The correlations failed to reach significance for any of target emotions: anger (r(19)=-
0.06, p=.797), fear (r(19)=-0.04, p=.888), sadness (r(19)=-0.10, p=.689), and happiness 
(r(19)=-0.14, p=.560). 
 
 
Figure 44. The relation between control participants' DKEFS-TM scores and emotion 
ratings. 
The correlations between the intensity of the target emotions and the standardised scores 
on the DKEFS – Trail-Making Test for the control participants were non-significant. 
 
0
2
4
6
8
10
5 7 9 11 13 15
DKEFS - Trail Making Test (Condition 4 - set shifting)
A
ve
ra
ge
 R
at
in
g 
o
f 
H
ap
p
in
es
s
D.
0
2
4
6
8
10
5 7 9 11 13 15
DKEFS - Trail Making Test (Condition 4 - set shifting)
A
ve
ra
ge
 R
at
in
g 
o
f 
A
n
ge
r
A.
0
2
4
6
8
10
5 7 9 11 13 15
DKEFS - Trail Making Test (Condition 4 - set shifting)
A
ve
ra
ge
 R
at
in
g 
o
f 
Fe
ar
B.
0
2
4
6
8
10
5 7 9 11 13 15
DKEFS - Trail Making Test (Condition 4 - set shifting)
A
ve
ra
ge
 R
at
in
g 
o
f 
Sa
d
n
es
s
C.
3. The re-experience of discrete emotions in amnesia 
138 
 
Next, the relationship between the intensity of the discrete target emotions and 
the control participants’ performance on the DKEFS – Verbal Fluency Test was 
investigated. The data are shown in Figure 45. The correlations failed to reach 
significance for any of target emotions: anger (r(16)=-0.01, p=.990), fear (r(16)=-0.23, 
p=.389), sadness (r(16)=0.03, p=.905), and happiness (r(16)=0.16, p=.545). 
 
 
Figure 45. The relation between control participants' DKEFS-VF scores and emotion 
ratings. 
The correlations between the intensity of the target emotions and the standardised scores 
on the DKEFS – Verbal Fluency Test for the control participants were not significant. 
 
 In conclusion, the executive function measures failed to show a significant 
correlation with any of the four discrete target emotions (anger, fear, sadness, and 
happiness) for the control participants. The results are in line with those of the 
Korsakoff syndrome patients, and could largely be attributed to the small sample size of 
both groups. 
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3.4.4.3 The relationship between the intensity of discrete emotions and the scores on 
the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale 
 
The third research questioned examined the relationship between more complex 
forms of abstract thinking, tested by the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale (WAIS) and 
the intensity of the re-experience of basic emotions. Similarly with before, the emotion 
intensities were correlated with the WAIS scores both with and without controlling for 
recall accuracy (see Table 9). 
 
Table 9. The relationship between the intensity of discrete emotions and the scoes on the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale 
The relationship between the intensity of discrete emotions and the scores on the 
Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale. Only the significant values are shown, for either the 
simple or partial correlation. Negative emotions are shown at the top in alphabetical 
order, and happiness, as above, is shown last. 
Discrete 
emotions 
Wechsler Adult 
Intelligence Scale 
Pearson Correlation 
Partial Pearson Correlation 
(Covariate: Free Recall) 
r p N r p df 
Anger WAIS Ver Comp Perc. -0.56 .020 * 17 -0.58 .018 * 14 
Fear WAIS P Speed Index .47 .059 17 .70 .002 * 14 
Sadness WAIS P Speed Index .45 .070 17 .78 < .001 * 14 
Sadness WAIS PIQ Index  .36 .150 17 .50 .049 * 14 
Happiness WAIS P Speed Index .54 .024 * 17 1.00 < .001 * 14 
Happiness WAIS PIQ Index  .38 .137 17 .60 .014 * 14 
Happiness WASI FSIQ Index .43 .064 19 .51 .031 * 16 
 
 The intensity of fear, sadness, and happiness showed a small to moderate 
positive correlation with the Processing Speed Index, which in the case of happiness 
and sadness translated into a relationship with the Performance IQ index, and further for 
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happiness only, into a relationship with the Full Scale IQ index. The intensity of anger 
showed a moderate but negative correlation with Verbal Comprehension. 
 
3.4.4.3a The relationship between the intensity of discrete emotions and the scores on 
the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale for the Korsakoff patients 
 
The relationships between key indices of the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale 
and the intensity of the discrete target emotions for the Korsakoff patients were 
analysed using Pearson’s correlation. The data are shown in Figure 46. The correlations 
failed to reach significance for any of target emotions: anger (r(13)=-0.12, p=.697), fear 
(r(13)=0.19, p=.534), sadness (r(13)=0.16, p=.605), and happiness (r(13)=0.37, 
p=.208). 
 
Figure 46. The relation between Korsakoff patients' WAIS Verbal IQ scores and 
emotion ratings. 
The correlations between the intensity of the target emotions and the WAIS – Verbal IQ 
for the Korsakoff patients were not significant. 
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Next, the relationship between the intensity of the discrete target emotions and 
the Korsakoff patients’ WAIS – Verbal IQ was investigated. As shown in Figure 47, the 
correlations were all non-significant for all the target emotions: anger (r(13)=-0.12, 
p=.709), fear (r(13)=0.05, p=.876), sadness (r(13)=0.24, p=.436), and happiness 
(r(13)=0.29, p=.335). 
 
 
Figure 47. The relation between Korsakoff patients' WAIS Performance IQ scores and 
emotion ratings. 
The correlations between the intensity of the target emotions and the WAIS – 
Performance IQ for the Korsakoff patients were not significant. 
 
The correlations between the intensity of the discrete target emotions and the 
Korsakoff patients’ WAIS Full Scale IQ are shown in Figure 48. All relationships are 
non-significant: anger (r(13)=-0.39, p=.189), fear (r(13)=-0.15, p=.620), sadness 
(r(13)=-0.04, p=.896), and happiness (r(13)=0.16, p=.608). 
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Figure 48. The relation between Korsakoff patients' WAIS Full Scale IQ scores and 
emotion ratings. 
The correlations between the intensity of the target emotions and the WAIS – Full Scale 
IQ for the Korsakoff patients were not significant. 
 
 The composite scores of the WAIS battery were also analysed in relation to the 
intensity of the discrete target emotions. The data for the WAIS – Verbal 
Comprehension indices for the Korsakoff patients are shown in Figure 49. All the 
correlations failed to reach significance for any of target emotions: anger (r(13)=-0.16, 
p=.602), fear (r(13)=0.17, p=.571), sadness (r(13)=0.17, p=.573), and happiness 
(r(13)=0.35, p=.238). 
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Figure 49. The relation between Korsakoff patients' WAIS Verbal Comprehension 
Index scores and emotion ratings. 
The correlations between the intensity of the target emotions and the WAIS – Verbal 
Comprehension Index for the Korsakoff patients were not significant. 
 
Next, the relationships between the intensity of the discrete target emotions and 
the Korsakoff patients’ WAIS – Perceptual Organisation indices were investigated. The 
data are shown in Figure 50. The analyses reported non-significant relationships with 
any of target emotions: anger (r(13)=-0.08, p=.786), fear (r(13)=0.07, p=.821), sadness 
(r(13)=0.28, p=.357), and happiness (r(13)=0.26, p=.397). 
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Figure 50. The relation between Korsakoff patients' WAIS Perceptual Organisation 
Index scores and emotion ratings. 
The correlations between the intensity of the target emotions and the WAIS – 
Perceptual Organisation Index for the Korsakoff patients were not significant. 
 
The relationships between the intensity of the discrete target emotions and the 
Korsakoff patients’ WAIS – Working Memory indices were investigated next. The data 
are shown in Figure 51. All correlations failed to reach significance: anger (r(13)=0.07, 
p=.814), fear (r(13)=0.30, p=.312), sadness (r(13)=0.22, p=.469), and happiness 
(r(13)=0.37, p=.212). 
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Figure 51. The relation between Korsakoff patients' WAIS Working Memory Index 
scores and emotion ratings. 
The correlations between the intensity of the target emotions and the WAIS – Working 
Memory Index for the Korsakoff patients were not significant. 
 
Finally, the relationship between the intensity of the discrete target emotions and 
the Korsakoff patients’ WAIS – Processing Speed indices were analysed using a series 
of Pearson’s correlations. As shown in Figure 52, only the correlations correlation with 
the intensity of happiness (following the recall of happy stories) was significant 
(r(13)=0.56, p=.049), and all other emotions failed to reach significance: anger 
(r(13)=0.08, p=.799), fear (r(13)=0.44, p=.128), sadness (r(13)=0.29, p=.336). 
However, when correcting the α (Type I error) level to account for multiple corrections 
(Bonferroni corrected α=.0125), none of the correlations reach significance. Notably, 
the analysis was substantially underpowered (due to the small sample size), hence a 
definitive answer cannot be extracted from the data. 
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Figure 52. The relation between Korsakoff patients' WAIS Processing Speed Index 
scores and emotion ratings. 
The correlations between the intensity of the target emotions and the WAIS – 
Processing Speed Index for the Korsakoff patients were not significant. 
 
In conclusion, the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale indices failed to show a 
significant correlation with the intensity of the discrete target emotions for the 
Korsakoff syndrome patients.  The only notable exception was the intensity of 
happiness and the WAIS – Perceptual Speed index, which showed a significant 
correlation initially, but failed to retain significance when accounting for the number of 
simultaneous comparisons being done. 
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3.4.4.4 The relationship between the intensity of discrete emotions and the scores on 
the Wechsler Memory Scale – IIIR 
 
 The last research question sought to establish if there was any relationship 
between the intensity of discrete emotions and general episodic memory ability, 
measured using the Wechsler Memory Scale – IIIR (WMS3). As before, the correlation 
between emotion intensity and WMS scores was analysed both before and after 
controlling for the recall accuracy of the emotional stories. As shown in Table 10 anger 
and happiness showed a moderate positive relationship with the Auditory Recognition 
Delayed percentile score (WMS3 ARD Perc), while the intensity of sadness showed a 
moderate negative relationship with the retrieval composite score, which contrasts 
memory retrieval for recall versus recognition memory. 
 
Table 10. The relationship between the intensity of discrete emotions and the scoes on the Wechsler Memory Scale – IIIR 
The relationship between the intensity of discrete emotions and the scores on the 
Wechsler Memory Scale – IIIR. Only the significant values are shown, for either the 
simple or partial correlation. At the top of the table, the negative emotions are listed in 
alphabetical order, followed by happiness. 
Discrete 
emotions 
Wechsler Adult 
Memory Scale IIIR 
Pearson Correlation 
Partial Pearson 
Correlation (Covariate: 
Free Recall) 
r p N r p df 
Anger WMS3 ARD Perc 0.37 .074 24 0.44 .037 * 21 
Sadness WMS3 Retrieval Perc -0.51 .011 * 24 -0.51 .013 * 21 
Happiness WMS3 ARD Perc 0.32 .126 24 0.44 .037 * 21 
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In conclusion, the intensity of the target discrete emotions was only partly 
negatively associated with age (i.e., anger), but showed a more consistent moderate 
positive relation with the flexibility and set-shifting tasks of the executive function 
battery tests for all basic emotions with the exception of anger. From the battery of 
intelligence scale tests, only processing speed showed a consistent moderate positive 
relationship with the intensity of fear, sadness, and happiness. 
 
3.4.4.4a The relationship between the intensity of discrete emotions and measures of 
episodic memory (Wechsler Memory Scale III-R) for the Korsakoff patients 
 
The relationship between the intensity of the discrete target emotions and the 
Korsakoff patients’ performance on the Wechsler Memory Scale III-R was investigated. 
The data for the Auditory Immediate index are shown in Figure 53. The correlations 
failed to reach significance for any of target emotions: anger (r(20)=0.01, p=.8), fear 
(r(20)=-0.16, p=.499), sadness (r(20)=-0.25, p=.286), and happiness (r(20)=-0.01, 
p=.986). 
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Figure 53. The relation between Korsakoff patients' WMS-III R Auditory Immediate 
Index scores and emotion ratings. 
The correlations between the intensity of the target emotions and the Wechsler memory 
Scale III-R – Auditory Immediate Index for the Korsakoff patients were not significant. 
 
Next, the relationship between the intensity of the discrete target emotions and 
the Korsakoff patients’ WMS III-R Auditory Delayed index was examined. As shown 
in Figure 54, all correlations failed to reach significance for any of target emotions: 
anger (r(20)=0.23, p=.323), fear (r(20)=0.01, p=.962), sadness (r(20)=0.20, p=.393), 
and happiness (r(20)=0.21, p=.381). 
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Figure 54. The relation between Korsakoff patients' WMS-III R Auditory Delayed 
Index scores and emotion ratings. 
The correlations between the intensity of the target emotions and the Wechsler memory 
Scale III-R – Auditory Delayed Index for the Korsakoff patients were not significant. 
 
The correlation between the intensity of sadness and the Korsakoff patients’ 
WMS III-R Auditory Delayed Recognition (see Figure 55) revealed a statistically 
significant strong negative relationship (r(19)=-0.63, p=.004). The higher the delayed 
recognition scores on the WMS III-R scale, the lower the intensity of target emotion 
after the sad story. The correlation remained significant even after applying the 
Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons (α=.0125) between the four target 
emotions. However, the Korsakoff patients’ intensity of sadness was correlated in total 
with 24 measures of neuropsychological assessment, and the correlation fails to reach 
the significance level (α=.002) Bonferroni corrected for the larger number of 
comparisons. All other correlations were non-significant: anger (r(19)=0.02, p=.938), 
fear (r(19)=-0.31, p=.200), and happiness (r(19)=-0.03, p=.907). 
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Figure 55. The relation between Korsakoff patients' WMS-III R Auditory Delayed 
Recognition scores and emotion ratings. 
There was a strong negative correlation between the intensity of sadness and the 
Wechsler memory Scale III-R – Auditory Recognition Delayed Index for the Korsakoff 
patients, but it failed to reach significance when the α level was corrected for multiple 
comparisons using the traditional Bonferroni method (α=.002). All other correlations 
were not significant. 
 
Finally, the relationship between the intensity of the discrete target emotions and 
the Korsakoff patients’ Working Memory indices on the WMS III-R were also analysed 
(see Figure 56). Similarly with the WAIS Working Memory scores, all correlations 
failed to reach significance for any of target emotions: anger (r(14)=-0.27, p=.348), fear 
(r(14)=-0.09, p=.754), sadness (r(14)=-0.41, p=.151), and happiness (r(14)=0.03, 
p=.927). 
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Figure 56. The relation between Korsakoff patients' WMS-III R Working Memory 
Index scores and emotion ratings. 
The correlations between the intensity of the target emotions and the Wechsler memory 
Scale III-R – Working Memory Index for the Korsakoff patients were not significant. 
 
 In conclusion, only the intensity was sadness was significantly (and negatively) 
correlated with a measure of episodic memory (WMS III-R Auditory Recognition 
Delayed index). The findings indicate a rich avenue for further empirical study, but the 
present data come short of providing definitive support of this relationship. Although 
any generalisations of the current findings are limited by the small sample size of the 
patient group, the strong trend in the data and highly significant correlation, with a large 
effect size, merit further enquiry. 
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3.4.4.4b The relationship between the intensity of discrete emotions and measures of 
episodic memory (Wechsler Memory Scale III-R) for the control participants 
 
The relationship between episodic memory and the intensity of the discrete 
target emotions was carried out for the control participants as well. The Wechsler 
Memory Scale III-R Auditory Immediate indices (see Figure 57 below) showed not to 
be significantly correlated with any of the target discrete emotions: anger (r(16)=-0.09, 
p=.735), fear (r(16)=-0.14, p=.597), sadness (r(16)=0.08, p=.770), or happiness 
(r(16)=-0.21, p=.445). 
 
 
Figure 57. The relation between control participants' WMS-III R Auditory Immediate 
Index scores and emotion ratings. 
The correlations between the intensity of the target emotions and the Wechsler memory 
Scale III-R – Auditory Immediate Index for the control participants were not significant. 
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Moreover, the analysis of the relationship between the intensity of sadness and 
the control participants’ WMS III-R Auditory Delayed scores produced similar results 
(see Figure 58). None of the emotions intensities were correlated with the episodic 
memory index, as reported by the four non-significant Pearson’s correlations: anger 
(r(16)=-0.37, p=.163), fear (r(16)=-0.35, p=.185), sadness (r(16)=-0.10, p=.707), and 
happiness (r(16)=-0.38, p=.148). 
 
 
Figure 58. The relation between control participants' WMS-III R Auditory Delayed 
Index scores and emotion ratings. 
The correlations between the intensity of the target emotions and the Wechsler memory 
Scale III-R – Auditory Delayed Index for the control participants were not significant. 
 
In conclusion, main episodic memory measures of the WMS III-R (Auditory 
Immediate and Auditory Delayed indices) were not related to the intensity of the four 
discrete emotions reported by the control participants. The control participants were 
administered only a reduced version of the WMS III-R battery and the computation of 
the Auditory Delayed Recognition was not possible. This would have allowed a direct 
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comparison with the Korsakoff patients’ group who reported a significant correlation 
between delayed recognition and the experience of sadness. Future studies can address 
this question by extending the neurological assessment of control participants beyond 
that reported presently. 
 
3.5 Discussion 
 
The present study firstly investigated the differences in the re-experience of four 
discrete classes of emotions (anger, fear, sadness and happiness) between Korsakoff 
patients and neurologically normal controls. Secondly, the study sought to identify the 
relationship between episodic memory and the specific experience of the four discrete 
emotions. The emotion elicitation paradigm was a classic free recall procedure 
(involving four distinct stories which elicited discretely one of the four basic emotions). 
Participants were asked to recall a previously presented story and report separately the 
intensity of the four basic emotions. As expected, the Korsakoff patients recalled 
significantly less (between 3.5 to 5 times less) material from each of the four stories 
than did neurologically normal controls. However, despite the substantial difference in 
recall, the emotional experience of each discrete emotion was undifferentiated between 
the two groups of participants. Moreover, the separate investigation of the relationship 
between the amount of episodic recall and the intensity of each discrete emotion failed 
to report a significant value. Most notably, the Korsakoff’s syndrome patients who 
recalled almost nothing (0-5%) of the original story, reported similarly high levels of 
emotional experience as neurologically normal controls who recalled the story almost 
entirely, and this finding was confirmed for all four classes of emotions. 
Although the ability of amnesic patients to reliably re-experience past emotions 
without being able to reproduce the events that initially triggered these emotions has 
been well documented in the past (Chapelle, Philippot, & van der Linden, 2007), this is 
the first report that this phenomenon takes place for individual basic emotions (anger, 
fear, sadness, and happiness), and not just for generic positive or negative emotions. 
Furthermore, amnesic patients have shown the ability to re-experience each discrete 
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emotion at levels similar to controls, failing to support previous suggestions (Feinstein, 
et al., 2010; Guzman-Velez et al., 2014) that, perhaps, certain classes of emotions (e.g., 
sadness) could show a more sustained stability in the case of amnesic patients than 
controls.  
The findings of Feinstein and colleagues (2010), later reproduced for a different 
group of amnesic patients (Guzman-Velez et al., 2014), provide an interesting parallel 
with the present study. In 2010, a small group of five hippocampal amnesic patients 
continued to experience sustained levels of happiness and sadness long after the 
memory for the episodic details of the eliciting film clips were forgotten. Similarly, in 
2014, a larger group of 17 patients with a probable Alzheimer’s Disease (AD) pathology 
and clear memory deficits reported similar findings on an identical experimental 
paradigm. On both occasions, the prolonged experience of one emotion (sadness) was 
particularly elevated for more than 30 minutes after being unable to recall the emotional 
stimuli. Both findings draw two significant comparisons with the present study of 
Korsakoff patients.  
Firstly, both groups of the hippocampal and AD patients showed a substantially 
impaired recall of the emotional stimuli (film clips), as did the Korsakoff patients 
(verbal stories). However, all three groups of patients presented a broad range of 
memory scores, ranging from complete amnesia to levels overlapping with those of the 
control participants. Thus, in many cases, much like in the present study episodic 
memory, albeit for only a part of the emotional stimuli, was preserved. Notably, the 
paradigm employed by Feinstein and Guzman-Velez did not re-examine episodic 
memory beyond the initial post-induction time-point, although emotional experience 
was re-assessed 30 minutes later. Therefore, it is unknown if the episodic details 
retained by substantial segment of the hippocampal and AD patients were retained or 
not after 30 minutes. Time intervals of 15-30 minutes are particularly relevant for 
amnesic patients, and commonly feature as a prominent dimension in established 
neuropsychological assessments of episodic memory, such as the Wechsler Memory 
Scale III (1997), Ray Auditory Verbal Learning Test (Schmidt, 1996), and others. In the 
present study, both the episodic recall and emotional re-experience of the Korsakoff 
patients were assessed after presentation, post-interference recall and after a 30 minutes 
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delay. Recall accuracy was remarkably stable, albeit significantly impaired when 
compared to controls’. Thus, surviving fragments of episodic memory may indeed have 
contributed to the continued affective experience of the hippocampal and AD patients, 
and the emotional re-experience of the Korsakoff patients. 
Secondly, the paradigm used for the hippocampal and AD patients employed 
self-report measures of emotions (sadness and happiness), as did the present paradigm 
employed for Korsakoff patients. However, the results diverge in terms of the 
differentiation between the experience of positive and negative emotions. Feinstein and 
Guzman-Velez report a particularly sustained experience of sadness compared to 
controls, which was not found in the present study. The Korsakoff patients re-
experienced all four emotions at similar levels with controls, and moreover at similar 
levels between the four emotions. This finding is important because it reveals a greater 
ability of affective systems to accurately encode and reactivate specific classes of 
emotions with limited input from episodic memory systems, and in some cases 
apparently with no input at all. The current theory accepted that this may be the case for 
generic positive and negative affect, which originates in phylogenetically older 
structures of the brain, in particular, the periaqueductal grey (Panksepp, 2009), but 
questioned whether the same could happen for emotions usually involving more 
complex neural regions of the cortex (Vytal & Hamman, 2010). The possibility that 
discrete classes of basic emotions can be re-experienced completely independently of an 
accurate episodic recall suggests that a larger set of basic emotions should be 
investigated concomitantly in the case of amnesic patients than has been done in the 
past. 
A key question regarding the current findings refers to the quality as opposed to 
the quantity of amnesic patients’ episodic recall. Although the number of episodic 
details reproduced by the Korsakoff patients was substantially reduced by comparison 
with controls’, the question remains whether, perhaps, the amnesic patients managed to 
remember the key emotional events of the stories, or the gist, without the details 
surrounding these events.  
Indeed, the retrieval of past experiences from episodic memory seems to 
integrate information from a number of distinct but interconnected basic systems, such 
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as multiple senses, language, narrative, and emotion (Rubin, 2006). According to this 
basic-systems model, episodic memory becomes highly constructive, with recollections 
being guided by the specific organisation (schema) of information in the systems 
involved. Thus episodic memory errors (or lapses) can be seen as occurring within 
particular systems or interactions between systems, rather than affecting the entire 
episodic material encoded in memory (Rubin & Kontis, 1983). For example, surface 
information or the gist of a memory seems to be encoded in a distinct schema from 
other episodic details (Rubin, Stoltzfus, & Wall, 1991). In agreement with this view, 
neurological studies have shown that gist-based conceptual processing is preserved in 
amnesic patients (Deason, Hussey, Budson, & Ally, 2012). Clinical observations also 
routinely find that amnesic patients typically hold meaningful conversations and make 
relevant remarks regarding events beyond the extent of their episodic and working 
memory stores (Gooding, Isaac, & Mayes, 2005; Rosenbaum, Gilboa, Levine, Winocur, 
& Moscovitch, 2009), which suggests that amnesic patients appear to retain elements of 
gist. Experimental evidence has also shown that amnesic patients’ gist memory 
performance was no different to that of healthy controls (Baddeley & Wilson, 2002; 
Nissan, Abrahams, & Della Sala, 2013). To explain such findings Winocur and 
Moscovitch (2011) proposed that hippocampally dependent, episodic, or context-
specific memories transform into semantic or gist-like versions that are represented in 
extra-hippocampal structures (the transformation hypothesis). 
Therefore, in the context of the present findings, despite the substantially 
impaired episodic recall of the Korsakoff patients, the gist of the emotional stories may 
have been retained. Moreover, amnesic patients have been reported to show a reduced 
confidence in their recollections (Meudell & Mayes, 1984). Thus, retrieval of episodic 
information may have been possible beyond the amount reported during the free recall 
procedure, and which nonetheless could have contributed to the emotional re-
experience. However, the semantic gist of emotional memories relies on neural 
structures central to affective experience, such as the amygdalae (Adolphs, Denburg, & 
Tranel, 2001), making gist information a central part of emotional memory.  
Moreover, it is possible for short descriptions of episodic events to produce a 
relatively complete and specific emotional experience (Mouilso, Glenberg, Havas & 
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Lindeman, 2007). Addressing this issue would have involved a separate classification 
(or rating) of each episodic detail (recall unit) according to their emotional value, in the 
context of each story. The relation (if there is one) between the emotional value (or 
intensity) of each recall unit correctly reproduced and the overall emotional experience 
after recalling the entire story is a distinct empirical question, which exceeded the aim 
of the current study. However, the present study found that some of those few patients 
who failed to recall anything at all from the stories (i.e., whose recall accuracy was 
indeed nil), reported moderate-to-very high levels of the correct discrete emotions. This 
is a clear indication that the specific emotional re-experience of each basic emotion, 
admittedly only for these select few patients, was completely independent of any 
episodic memory influence. 
Although the present study is conceptually and methodologically grounded in 
the theory of discrete emotions, the present findings can also be interpreted in the 
context of strongest competing theory of emotional experience, namely the 
constructivist model (Barrett et al., 2007). As presented in Chapter 1 (see subsection 
1.1.2, p. 10), the constructivist view argues that the subjective sense of emotional 
experience is the result of a series of mental processes (i.e., psychological construction). 
The mental representation of affect is seen to originate from the pleasure/displeasure 
(positive/negative) dichotomy (known as core affect) and integrate contextual sensory 
and somatosensory information, prior knowledge about relevant objects and situations, 
and conceptual knowledge about emotions. This complex constructivist process is 
beyond conscious control or awareness and relies on the interaction between a series of 
distributed neural networks (Oosterwijk, Lindquist, Anderson, Dautoff, Moriguchi, & 
Barrett, 2012). Although episodic information about the past often influences and 
contributes to the final subjective experience of emotions (Spreng & Grady, 2010), the 
constructivist model points towards semantic and conceptual knowledge, as well as key 
executive function processes (Yeo et al., 20110) as being fundamental in the generation 
and maintenance of the subjective experience of affect. In particular three neural 
networks were identified to support the emotional experience: (1) the limbic network 
(Yeo et al., 2011), including the bilateral anterior and medial temporal lobe, subgenual 
anterior cingulate cortex, medial and lateral orbitofrontal cortex; (2) the “salience 
network” (Seeley et al., 2007), notably involved in cognitive control and set 
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maintenance, and involving the bilateral anterior mid-cingulate cortex, anterior insula, 
mid-insula, frontal opercularis, parts of the pars opercularis, and the temporoparietal 
junction; (3) the “frontoparietal network” (Dosenbach et al., 2008; Vincent, Kahn, 
Snyder, Raichle, & Buckner, 2008), responsible for executive functions such as task-
switching, planning, rule-specific processing, and working memory, and involving the 
bilateral dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, inferior parietal lobe, inferior parietal sulcus, and 
parts of the middle cingulate cortex. 
 The neuropsychological assessments of the Korsakoff patients confirmed 
that they appeared normal on most of the above executive functions, and only borderline 
impaired on abstract reasoning (DKEFS Proverb Test), among the tasks that did not 
require time limited processing of visual stimuli (a known deficit for Korsakoff 
patients). Thus, the ability to re-experience discrete emotions even in the absence or 
with significantly impaired recall of the stories may have been facilitated by 
constructivist processes supported by intact executive and semantic memory neural 
networks. 
The contribution of semantic memory to emotional self-reports has also been 
recognised in previous models of emotion experience (e.g., the accessibility model, 
Robinson & Clore, 2002). This account argues that emotional reports are 
representations of the original emotion, based on available information at the time of 
recall. Three types of information primarily contribute to the re-experience of past 
emotions in a cascading order (i.e., when the first type of information is not available or 
is incomplete, the following category of information is accessed). These are: (1) specific 
information about the details of the original event (episodic memory); (2) general 
beliefs about what a typical emotion would be for the similar type of situation; and (3) 
lastly identity beliefs about what own emotions are in general. Thus, Korsakoff patients’ 
lapses in episodic memory may have been supplemented by their conceptual, 
decontextualised (i.e., sematic) beliefs about the emotional experiences associated with 
the stories. This may have particularly been the case for the emotional self-report 
measures used in the present study, where ratings on the same four scales of discrete 
emotions were repeatedly provided by patients. On each of the four sessions, the 
successive presentation, and recall of the same emotional story, targeting the same 
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discrete emotion, may have allowed patients to learn and reproduce the same ratings of 
emotional self-report (using their intact semantic memory processes), rather than their 
true momentary subjective experience.  
Such an experimental artefact is arguably difficult to discount entirely, when 
using self-report measures of emotions, but key aspects of the experimental design, and 
the patients’ reports seem to indicate that this may have been only the exception rather 
than the rule. Firstly, the orienting task required participants to report their momentary 
emotional experience, rather than the emotional experience associated with the story. In 
many cases the episodic recall was so impaired that participants barely reproduced any 
details of the stories. In these situations the emotional report task took the form of an 
exit strategy commonly used to allow participants to escape the pressure of a task they 
cannot perform, and move on to a seemingly unrelated activity. Often participants 
seemed relieved to abandon the story recall and focus on something they could control 
more, such as the assessment of their own momentary affective state. Secondly, there 
was no relationship (i.e., correlation) between the recall accuracy of the emotional 
stories and the self-reported intensity of the target emotions. This was because the range 
of the self-reported intensity of the target emotions was equally broad (from hardly no 
emotion at all, to very intense emotional re-experience) for both patients who barely 
recalled anything from the stories (poor episodic recall) and those who recalled a few 
more episodic details. Thus, the data doesn’t seem to support the argument that the 
poorer the episodic recall, the more participants wilfully digressed from the task of 
reporting their momentary emotional experience when facing difficulties recalling the 
stories. Implicit influences of the semantic memory on emotional re-experience and 
indeed emotional self-reports are difficult to discount completely, but semantic memory 
is more likely to influence the explicit emotional memory, than the implicit forms of 
affective re-experience (Levine, Lench, & Safer, 2009). Thus, on balance, it appears that 
the argument that an experimental artefact may have contributed to the consistently 
specific ratings of the Korsakoff patients is rather unlikely. However, future 
investigations could seek to clarify this possibility by also employing implicit 
(physiological or neuroimaging) measures of affective experience. Possible 
discrepancies between explicit and implicit measures of affect may be explained by 
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experimental artefacts, or different psychological processes leading to the self-reports of 
the subjective experience of emotions.  
The findings of the current study are limited by the very few such cases of 
profoundly amnesic patients, which overall varied in the extent to which they re-
experienced the target emotion. However, managing to capture this phenomenon in a 
relatively small sample of amnesic patients, and doing this separately for all classes of 
basic emotions investigated, is encouraging for future studies. An obvious challenge in 
establishing the necessary scientific rigour required to confirm the independence of 
emotional re-experience from episodic memory is represented by the relative scarcity of 
completely amnesic patients, with a selective episodic memory impairment rather than a 
generalised cognitive decline. As a first report of a specific re-experience of discrete 
classes of emotions in the absence of any episodic memory of the eliciting events, these 
findings should encourage further enquiries into the ability of profoundly amnesic 
patients to accurately relive specific basic emotions elicited by forgotten past events. 
The relationship between executive function and emotion regulation has been 
reported in numerous studies, but never in relation with the self-reported intensity of a 
full set of distinct basic emotions. The present study reported a summary analysis of the 
relationship between measures of executive function and the self-reported intensity of 
re-experience of four basic emotions (anger, fear, sadness, and happiness) for a group 
of memory impaired participants and partially age matched controls. To account for the 
substantial difference in episodic memory function, the analysis between executive 
function measures and emotion intensities was carried out both simple and partial 
correlations controlling for the recall accuracy of the stimuli responsible for the emotion 
elicitation. 
The results showed a mixed picture, with marked differences and unexpected 
similarities between basic emotions. Executive functions were correlated with all 
discrete emotions, and more complex cognitive tasks correlated with most, but not all 
basic emotions. 
The Design Fluency test (from the Delis-Kaplan Executive Function Scale) 
showed a consistent moderate positive correlation with the intensities of fear, sadness, 
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and happiness, but surprisingly not with anger. The test assesses, cognitive flexibility, 
response inhibition and fluency in generation of visual patterns, above and beyond 
contributions from motor speed. The present findings are consistent with previous 
reports that verbal fluency, trail making, and the Stroop task correlate with the ability to 
down-regulate negative emotions, and up-regulate positive emotions (Gyurak et al., 
2012). However, the homologous tests from the DKEFS battery failed to report a 
significant relation with the intensity of re-experienced emotions, despite the larger 
dataset available for the analyses. Surprisingly, the intensity of anger did not correlate 
with any of these functions, but instead showed only a small negative correlation with a 
secondary measure of the Trail Making test concerning motor speed. 
More complex cognitive tasks from the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale  (i.e., 
Processing Speed, and Performance IQ) showed a moderate positive correlation with the 
intensity of fear, sadness, and happiness, but, again, not with anger. Moreover, the 
correlation was increasingly stronger for happiness compared with sadness and 
compared with fear. Anger showed only a moderate negative relationship with a 
singular test from the WAIS battery (Verbal Comprehension), which is from a different 
family than Performance IQ, but is used to compute the Verbal IQ score. This is the first 
account to date of a relationship between the intensity of the re-experience of basic 
emotions and standard measures of adult intelligence, and shows that anger is possibly 
differently interrelated with executive function compared to all the other discrete 
emotions. 
The current study benefited from a sample of patients and controls with a varied 
memory ability which presents a unique opportunity to investigate the re-experience of 
basic emotions in the presence of impaired and normal episodic recall. This is the first 
direct and concomitant investigation of the re-experience of four discrete classes of 
emotion and the relationship with executive function and other superior cognitive 
functions. The results expand previous reports about the relationship between cognition 
and emotion, and in particular between executive function and emotion regulation and 
re-experience. Furthermore, the present findings suggest that the experience of basic 
emotions may exert and receive an influence from different cognitive functions and 
specifically executive control functions. 
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Nonetheless, this first investigation of the relationship between the re-experience 
of basic emotions and the executive function should be considered in the context of two 
obvious and significant limitations. The first related to the unusually small sample size 
(for correlational studies), and large amount of missing neuropsychological assessment 
data. The second major limitation derives from the first, and refers to the mixed sample 
of neurologically impaired and neurological normal participants. Ideally, the analyses 
reported here would have been carried out separately on the two groups of participants, 
but practical considerations regarding sample size prevented this approach presently. 
Given the relative paucity of patients with a selective memory impairment, future 
studies could seek to replicate the present findings in a comparable population, and pool 
the data collected for a joint analysis. 
In conclusion, the present study reports the first investigation of the specific 
emotional re-experience of four basic emotions (anger, fear, sadness, and happiness), 
after the normal and impaired recall of the eliciting events. Results showed that the 
intensity and accuracy of emotional re-experience were not related to the amount of 
episodic information recalled from the eliciting events, and indeed, in the few cases 
when nothing was remembered from the original events, participants were able to re-
experience the correct basic emotions at substantial levels of intensity. This is the first 
empirical indication that emotional memory systems are capable of encoding and 
reactivating a broad range of discrete classes of basic emotions, rather than just generic 
positive and negative emotions, even in the complete absence of episodic memory 
support. If indeed, the emotional re-experience of basic emotions can operate 
independently of episodic memory, future investigations of affective processes are 
encouraged to pursue the study of discrete classes of emotions in profoundly amnesic 
patients to further assess the differences between basic emotions and which other 
specific cognitive functions, perhaps, influence the intensity and accuracy of emotional 
re-experience. 
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Chapter 4. The theoretical and computational basis of the intensity, 
specificity and accuracy of affective experiences is based on individual 
ratings of basic emotions 
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4.1 Abstract 
 
The study of discrete emotions is a dynamic and growing area of research, supported by 
a large body of empirical evidence and which usually involves the elicitation and 
individual measurement of a distinct set of basic emotions – most commonly: anger, 
fear, sadness, and happiness. The concomitant measurement of four discrete emotions 
raises yet answered challenges of summarising the affective experience. The present 
paper introduces the concepts of affective specificity and accuracy, and presents a 
computational method for calculating the intensity, specificity and accuracy of negative 
and overall affect from the individual intensities of the most common four basic 
emotions (mentioned earlier). Emotional specificity is defined as the degree to which 
the affective experience is described by a single basic emotion. Emotional accuracy is 
the degree to which the intended (or expected) basic target emotion is experienced in 
relation to the other (non-target) basic emotions. Intensity adjusted indices for 
specificity and accuracy are also presented. Notably, the computational formulae can be 
adapted to include a larger number of basic emotions, should future studies reveal 
compelling evidence that other emotions (e.g., disgust) represent a basic manifestation 
of affect. Future studies should investigate the possible differences between the four 
basic emotions and establish the factors that influence and correlate with the intensity, 
specificity and accuracy of the affective experience. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Keywords: discrete emotions; affective intensity, specificity and accuracy; negative 
affect; emotional experience. 
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4.2 Introduction 
 
The study of discrete, basic emotions (e.g., anger, fear, sadness, and happiness) 
has long attracted a special interest from affective scientists, and is currently an active 
area of enquiry in a wide range of other domains. Discrete emotions have been 
traditionally the focus of affective and cognitive research, for example, addressing the 
expression and regulation of emotions (Barrett, Gross, Christensen, & Benvenuto, 2001; 
Gross, 1999; Izard, 1990), and the interaction between affective and cognitive functions, 
such as memory (Levine & Pizzaro, 2006), information processing (Connolly & Butler, 
2006), decision making (Lerner & Tiedens, 2006; Nabi, 2003), and many others. More 
recently, the range of investigations has extended to applied psychology fields, as 
discrete emotions are considered to play a significant and distinctive role in influencing 
treatment adherence and health outcomes (Chipperfield, Perry, & Weiner, 2003; 
Consedine & Moskowitz, 2007), enhancing professional athletes’ performance (Cerin, 
2003; Lane & Terry, 2000; Lazarus, 1999), improving work relations and organisational 
life (Khan, Quratulain, & Crawshow, 2013; Lazarus & Cohen-Charash, 2001; Spector, 
Fox, & Domagalski, 2006), and understanding spirituality and religious beliefs (Fuller, 
2007). The overwhelming support in favour of a distinct set of basic emotions, has been 
further enhanced in recent years (Tettamanti, Rognoni, Cafiero, Costa, Galati, & Perani, 
2012; Vytal & Hamann, 2010) by meta-analyses of broad sets of neuroimaging studies, 
which have decisively concluded that a specific set of discrete, basic emotions (e.g., 
anger, fear, sadness, and happiness) are processed in dedicated neural systems. Thus, in 
future, the investigation of discrete emotions is likely to take an even more prominent 
position. 
One of the most consistent findings across an extensive literature is that although 
distinctive, discrete basic emotions are almost invariably experienced together – 
admittedly at different levels of intensity. Usually this is commonly the case for 
negative emotions (Barrett, 1998), but sometimes, complex events cause the experience 
of both positive and negative emotions (Larsen, McGraw, & Cacioppo, 2001). This 
finding is commonly reproduced in studies using self-report measures of emotions, 
when participants are asked to assess independently the intensity of each basic. 
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Moreover, neuroimaging studies reliably confirmed that discrete emotions share a vast 
array of neuroanatomic structures, with only few areas being specific to each basic 
emotion. Thus, the accurate assessment of the affective experience in general, and 
specifically the study of discrete emotions, requires information not only about the 
emotion of interest, but the concomitant measurement of the full spectrum of basic 
emotions. 
Intensity and discreteness are two fundamental metrics that define the efficacy 
of emotional stimuli (Rottenberg, Ray, & Gross, 2007). Intensity refers to the degree to 
which a discrete emotion is experienced or not (i.e., the higher the intensity, the stronger 
the emotion elicitation). Discreteness is commonly defined as the degree to which 
participants report feeling the target emotion more intensely than the non-target 
emotions. Although emotional intensity has been widely employed in assessing the 
affective state, the use of the discreteness metric has been relatively limited, especially 
by comparison to the wealth of affective stimuli reported in the literature and targeting 
discrete emotions. Moreover, a number of different interpretations have been given to 
methodological application and calculation of the metric.  
There are two fundamental approaches to formalising the discreteness metric: 
one which is stimulus-centric and seeks to establish the degree to which a stimulus is 
able to elicit the discrete target emotion in most situations, for most participants (Gross 
& Levenson, 1995); and a second, participant-centred, and which seeks to establish the 
discreteness of the emotional experience of each participant. After a brief inspection, it 
is easily obvious that the second approach has a higher resolution, because it is able to 
provide the same amount of information about the discreteness of the stimulus as the 
first approach, while at the same time, describing the discreteness of the subjective 
affective experience of each participant.  
An example of the first approach to calculating discreteness, was provided by 
studies seeking to validate new sets of emotional stimuli (e.g., film clips). In these cases 
discreteness was calculated as the proportion of participants who reported feeling the 
target emotion at least one point more intensely than all other non-target emotions 
(Gross & Levenson, 1995). The minimum discriminant value referred to one point on 
whichever scale would be used for emotion self-report. This early metric was dependent 
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on large numbers of participants and made the comparison of stimuli assessed by 
unequal samples of participants statistically problematic. Later approaches to 
calculating discreteness have abandoned this first approach and considered calculating 
the discreteness of each participant’s emotional experience, which could then be 
aggregated for individual stimuli. Alternative attempts to evaluate the specificity (or 
discreteness) or the emotional elicitation have assessed whether the target emotion was 
elicited at significantly higher level than other emotions, among the ratings provided by 
a group of participants (Jurásová & Špajdel, 2013; Salas, Radovic, & Turnbull, 2011). 
Although the inferential significance test provide statistical robustness to the method, 
this too misses the within subjects variability, because a single participants cannot be 
attributed a “discreteness rating”. 
 The second approach to quantifying the discreteness of the emotional experience 
most commonly involves a similar process of identifying instances when the target 
emotion was at least one point greater than the non-target emotions. However, instead 
of comparing the number of participants who satisfied this condition with the total 
number of participants (including those for whom the target emotion was not higher 
than all non-target emotions), the second approach attempts to assign a discreteness 
rating to each participant, for each instance of emotion self-report involving more than 
two discrete emotions. The advantage of this approach is that it leverages the power of 
parametric statistical tests for comparing different groups of participants, and emotional 
stimuli. At least two fundamentally different methods of calculating the discreteness of 
the emotional elicitation have been proposed previously. 
The method formulated by Rottenberg, Ray, and Gross (2007) factors in the 
number of non-target emotions measured at the same time as the target emotion. The 
discreteness is then calculated as the number of non-target emotions whose intensity is 
lower than the target emotion, divided by the total number of non-target emotions. For 
example, Gabert-Quillen, Bartolini, Abravanel and Sanislow (2014) reported a 
paradigm involving nine discrete emotions (one of which is the target emotion, and 
eight non-target). A participant who rated the target emotion at least 1-point greater than 
seven (out of the eight) non-target emotions would produce a discreteness score of .875 
(7 divided by 8). Thus, the discreteness score would range from .00 (i.e., the target 
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emotion was not 1 point greater than any non-target emotions) to 1.00 (i.e., the target 
emotion was at least 1 point greater than all non-target emotions). The computational 
system provides a fundamental advantage over the stimuli-centric methods, by 
assigning a single discreteness index to each participant, on each occasion emotion self-
reports are provided. Also, the indicator takes values from the unit interval ([0-1]), 
which is commonly used in mathematical calculations (0-1). This makes it intuitively 
simple to illustrate and interpret its value. However, the unit interval is limited in the 
number of operations and transformations in which it can be used (for example, the 
power function has a negative momentum on the unit interval). Although, simple data 
transformations can be applied to the discreteness index to extend the interval, another 
limitation is perhaps of a greater concern. The method of calculation losses an important 
part of the richness of the emotion self-report ratings, by using only an ordinal count of 
the non-target emotions whose ratings were 1-point less than the target emotion. To 
illustrate this, let’s assume for the sake of simplicity that the ratings of four discrete 
emotions (anger, fear, sadness, and happiness) are provided on a scale from 1-10, and 
that the target emotion is anger. Two participants would provide the following emotion 
ratings: 
Participant 1: - anger: 10   Participant 2:  - anger: 10 
- fear: 0     - fear: 9 
- sadness: 0     - sadness: 9 
- happiness: 0     - happiness: 9 
Since both participants rated the target emotion (anger) at least 1-point higher 
than all of the non-target emotions, they would both receive a discreteness index of 1. 
However, the difference between the discreteness of the emotional experience of 
participant 1 is clearly superior to that of participant 2. This dimension is unable to be 
captured following the proposed calculation, and represents a fundamental limitation of 
the information provided by the index in common experimental situations. The method 
also suffers from a computational limitation, which affects the ability to use and 
interpret the absolute values of the index. The resolution of the index (the actual values 
it can take) depends on the number of non-target emotions which are measured at the 
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same time, and not on the resolution of the initial emotion self-report scores that formed 
the basis of its calculation. For example, in the system employed by Gabert-Quillen and 
colleagues (2014), the possible values of the affective discreteness were: 0; 0.125; 0.25; 
0.375; 0.5; 0.675; 0.75; 0.875; and 1. From a computational perspective this is 
fortunate, because the number of non-target emotions (eight) approaches the resolution 
of the original measure of the intensity of discrete emotions (ten). However, there is 
limited empirical evidence to support the concomitant measurement and comparison of 
such a high number of discrete emotions. Recent empirical evidence (Hamann, 2012; 
Murphy et al., 2003; Tettamanti et al., 2012; Vytal & Hamann, 2010), suggests that 
perhaps four or five emotions can be classed as basic (anger, fear, sadness, happiness, 
and possibly disgust). Therefore, in most conservative cases, only three non-target 
emotions would contribute to the calculation of the discreteness index, giving it a 
considerably fewer possible values: 0; 0.333; 0.666; 1. Thus, using a high resolution 10- 
or perhaps 100-points visual analogue scale (or other emotion self-report) to produce a 
discreteness index that can take any of only four possible values, represents a large loss 
in primary information collected. Fortunately, both of these limitations can be avoided 
by the computational method presented later in this chapter. 
An alternative approach to this model proposed an improved calculation of 
affective the discreteness by subtracting from the intensity ratings of the target emotion, 
the averaged intensities of the non-target emotions (Schaefer, Nils, Sanchez, & 
Phillipot, 2010). This model retains the resolution of the original self-report measures, 
which is an improvement over the model proposed by Rottenberg et al., 2007. Such 
discreteness coefficients were calculated for all discrete emotions, alongside a mixed 
feelings (MF) coefficient, which estimates how mixed/blended were the feelings elicited 
by each film. The formula was previously reported by Hemenover and Schimmack 
(2007) and Schimmack (2001), and assigns the MF score the minimum intensity of two 
discrete emotions. For example, a participant reporting a score of 5 for anger and 2 for 
fear, would produce a MF score of 2. Thus, the discreteness measure summarises how 
much a specific state is activated relative to an average of all other states, while the 
mixed feelings index measures how much two specific states are mixed/differentiated on 
a pairwise basis. Although the discreteness measure retains the resolution of the original 
emotion self-reports, it presents a possibly greater limitation regarding the accuracy and 
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validity of the indicator, because it reduces the intensities of the non-target emotions to 
their common average. This way, two problems may arise: (1) although the average of 
the non-target emotions may be lower than the intensity of the target emotion 
(indicating some degree of discreteness), the intensity of one (or more of the non-target 
emotions) may actually higher than the target emotion (meaning that the target emotion 
was not the dominant affective category) – both of these interpretations being mutually 
exclusive; (2) by averaging the non-target emotion, a lot of information is lost regarding 
between-discrete emotions variability. Admittedly, such a loss in information would be 
less than in the Rottenberg model, but both these limitations can be avoided by the 
improved model presented next in this chapter. 
  
4.2.1 Affective experience described by multiple basic emotions 
 
The study of discrete emotions as independent, but concomitant descriptors of 
affect raises significant methodological challenges regarding the analysis, interpretation, 
and application of these measures. It is increasingly accepted that valence is a 
fundamental dimension of all basic emotion experiences and negative basic emotions 
(anger, fear, sadness) share a common underlying neuroanatomy, and are often 
experienced and co-elicited together. By contrast, positive affect seems to have fewer 
basic manifestations and it is most often captured by the generic term of happiness (or 
joy). Various other affective states, such as pride, satisfaction, enthusiasm, etc. have 
usually been attributed a positive valence, but are generally considered as complex 
emotion states and are seen to be the result of a mix of basic emotions and superior 
cognitions. Thus, positive affect has usually one, but almost always far fewer classes 
than negative affect. Attempts to summarise the individual scores of discrete emotion 
classes using a simple arithmetic mean result in reducing the natural variance of scores 
for negative affect compared to the single rating of positive affect. The degree to which 
the target emotion is elicited needs to be considered now alongside the experience of at 
least three other non-target emotions, and the differences in the experience of non-target 
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emotions can potentially represent key elements of the affective experience and reveal 
previously confounded effects. 
 
4.2.2 The intensity of emotional experience: positive and negative affect. 
 
The elementary assessment of affective experience is its intensity. The intensity 
of basic emotions can be readily measured through self-reports or other behavioural, 
neuroimaging, and more rarely physiological techniques. However, calculating the 
overall intensity of an emotional experience from separate ratings of discrete emotions 
presents at least two challenges: basic emotions have either a positive or negative 
valence; and, at least presently, there appears to be a different number of positive and 
negative emotions. 
It is increasingly accepted that valence is a fundamental dimension of all basic 
affective experiences, and negative emotions (anger, fear, sadness), which share a 
common underlying neuroanatomy are often experienced together. In contrast, positive 
affect seems to have fewer distinct basic manifestations and it is most often captured by 
the generic term of happiness (or joy). Various other affective states, such as pride, 
satisfaction, and others have been generally labelled as complex emotion states, and 
seem to be the result of a mix of basic emotions and superior cognitions. Attempts have 
been made to formalise the study of positive and negative affect by proposing a similar 
number of positive and negative basic emotions (e.g., PANAS-X) and calculating a 
simple arithmetic mean of negative or positive emotions. However, such attempts lack 
the evidence base to support that there are indeed as many positive as there are negative 
basic emotions. The comprehensive neuroanatomical and neuro-physiological literature 
at the moment seems to suggest that most likely there are more basic negative emotions 
than are positive (happiness possibly being the only one). Thus, computational solutions 
should be prepared to reflect this imbalance in the number of basic emotions either side 
of the valence spectrum. The simple arithmetic mean cannot represent a solution, 
because the average of all negative emotions at any one time, will consistently and 
significantly underestimate the range and variance of negative affect by comparison 
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with the single rating of happiness for positive affect. For example, a highly fearful 
event that elicits little anger or sadness (fear=10, anger=1, sadness=1), would be 
described by the same average negative valence as an event eliciting a considerably 
more moderate but indistinctive emotional experience (fear=4, anger=4, sadness=4). 
Thus, a valid computational technique should distinguish between positive and negative 
emotions and should be flexible enough to allow a growing and yet unknown number of 
discrete emotion ratings, on either side of the valence spectrum. 
 
4.2.3 The specificity of emotional experience. 
 
Basic emotions are most often experienced together, at various levels of 
intensity. On occasions, certain basic emotions dominate the affective experience. The 
degree to which the dominant emotion is superior to all other basic emotions describes 
the specific of an emotional experience and has so far been overlooked by the affective 
literature. Information about the specificity of an emotional experience can distinguish 
between situations when a certain emotion is only marginally more intense than the 
others, or when it is virtually the only emotion experienced. 
 
4.2.4 The accuracy of emotional experience.  
 
A further improvement on the specificity of the emotional experience can be 
made by referring to the accurate experience of a certain a-priori established basic 
emotion. An attempt to elicit a certain basic emotion is likely to elicit other basic 
emotions as well. A fundamental question is how distinct (or pure) was the elicitation of 
the target discrete emotion. 
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4.2.5 Consideration about Model Metrics 
 
The present model assumes that the individual intensities of discrete emotions 
are measured on a ratio scale. This offers more opportunities to apply transformations 
and more power for inferential analysis. For simplicity, it is assumed that the measures 
of discrete emotions are on a scale from 0-10, but the model can be easily translated to 
any other scalar ranges. The model uses direct (e.g., self-report) measures of four 
discrete emotions intensities (i.e., anger, fear, sadness, and happiness) and calculates the 
overall emotional intensity, specificity, and accuracy of the affective experience. The 
positive-negative dimension of basic emotions is retained by the present model as a key 
distinction. Thus, a set of indexes (intensity, specificity and accuracy) is calculated for 
the negative emotions from the ratings of anger, fear, and sadness (i.e., within negative 
emotions, further denoted by the subscript “w”). Separately, the model incorporates the 
ratings of happiness to calculate the intensity, specificity and accuracy of the complete 
affective experience (i.e., between positive and negative emotions, further denoted by 
the subscript “b”). 
 
4.3 Intensity, Specificity, and Accuracy of Discrete Emotions 
 
Let A, F, S, H be the emotional intensity ratings for the discrete emotions anger, 
fear, sadness, and happiness, and 𝐴, 𝐹, 𝑆, 𝐻 ∈ [0,10]. 
 
4.3.1 Intensity and specificity within discrete negative emotions. 
 
Let Δw1 and Δw2 be defined as the following differences (as shown in Figure 59): 
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 𝛥𝑤1: [0,10] × [0,10] × [0,10] → [0,10] 
𝛥𝑤1 = 𝑀𝑎𝑥(𝐴, 𝐹, 𝑆) −  𝑀𝑖𝑛(𝐴, 𝐹, 𝑆) 
 
(1) 
 
 
 𝛥𝑤2: [0,10] × [0,10] × [0,10] → [0,10] 
𝛥𝑤2 = 𝑀𝑎𝑥(𝐴, 𝐹, 𝑆) −  [𝐴 + 𝐹 + 𝑆 − 𝑀𝑎𝑥(𝐴, 𝐹, 𝑆) −  𝑀𝑖𝑛(𝐴, 𝐹, 𝑆)] 
 
(2) 
 
 
 
 
Figure 59. Defining the intensity and specificity of negative emotions. 
The individual intensity ratings of basic negative emotions 1, 2, 3 correspond to anger, 
fear, sadness, in any order. The overall intensity of negative affect is represented by the 
intensity of the strongest basic emotion (here emotion 1). The specificity of negative 
affect is calculated from the differences between the intensity of the dominant emotion 
(1) and the remaining two basic negative emotions (i.e., 2 and 3). 
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Then, Intens(w) and Spec(w) represent the intensity and specificity within discrete 
negative emotions, respectively, where: 
 
 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑠(𝑤): [0,10] × [0,10] × [0,10] → [0,10] 
𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑠(𝑤) = 𝑀𝑎𝑥 (𝐴, 𝐹, 𝑆) 
 
(3) 
 
 𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑐(𝑤): [0,10] × [0,10] → [0,10] 
𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑐(𝑤) =  √(𝛥𝑤1 + .125) ∗ (𝛥𝑤2 + .125)  − .125 
 
(4) 
 
The following statements result from the above definition: 
 
Observation 1: For any A, F and S, 𝛥𝑤1  ≥   𝛥𝑤2, and  𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑐(𝑤)  ≤ 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑠(𝑤) 
 
Observation 2: For any 𝛥𝑤1 = 𝛥𝑤2, then 𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑐(𝑤) =  𝛥𝑤1 = 𝛥𝑤2. In particular, it needs 
noting that if 𝛥𝑤1 = 𝛥𝑤2 = 0, then 𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑐(𝑤) = 0, and if 𝛥𝑤1 = 𝛥𝑤2 =
10, then 𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑐(𝑤) = 10 
 
Observation 3: If 𝛥𝑤1 = 10 and 𝛥𝑤2 = 0, then 𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑐(𝑤) = 1 
 
 As illustrated in Figure 60, the specificity within negative emotions is a 
monotonic function, with a positive Gaussian curvature (except when Δw1=Δw2=Spec(w), 
when the graph is a straight line). In the notable case when 𝛥𝑤1 = 10 and 𝛥𝑤2 = 0 
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(e.g., A=10, F=10, and S=0), the specificity within negative emotions was given the 
unitary value (𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑐(𝑤) = 1). 
 
 
Figure 60. Simulation of the specificity of negative affect (anger, fear and sadness). 
The simulation of the specificity within discrete negative emotions shows a surface with 
a positive Gaussian curvature with the exception when the three coordinates are equal 
(Δw1=Δw2=Spec(w)), and the value of the specificity within negative emotions rests on 
the diagonal of the cube (zero Gaussian curvature). A. view from azimuth (az=– 35) and 
elevation (el=15); B. azimuth (az=235) and elevation (el=15); C. azimuth (az=– 10) and 
elevation (el=10); D. azimuth (az=275) and elevation (el=10). 
 
Importantly, although the specificity is always lower than the intensity (see 
Observation 1, above), there is no other relation between the magnitude of the two 
indices. For example: 
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(1) If A=1, F=0, S=0, then Intens(w)=1, and Spec(w)=1, and 
 
(2) If A=10, F=9, S=9, then Intens(w)=10, and Spec(w)=1. 
 
NB: Here F=S, and Spec(w)=1 were chosen for the benefit of the simplicity of 
calculations. 
 
As can be seen above, Spec(w) provides the same information about examples (1) 
and (2), because the difference between the discrete emotions is the same. However, the 
intensity of the emotional experience is dramatically different in the two examples. In 
example (1), the specificity within negative emotions (although low in absolute value) 
describes the entire intensity of the emotional experience (i.e., there is no noise from 
other discrete emotions). In contrast, example (2) shows a similarly low specificity 
within negative emotions, but for a dramatically higher affective intensity. However, the 
added intensity of example (2) is provided by the noise from other discrete negative 
emotions, and thus the specificity within negative emotions remains the same. 
Therefore, since the specificity index alone cannot differentiate between any situations 
where the intensity of negative emotions is different (including such extreme examples 
as above), a secondary index can be computed to take into account the intensity within 
negative emotions. 
 
4.3.1.1 Intensity adjusted specificity within discrete negative emotions. 
 
Let SpecInt(w) be the intensity adjusted specificity within discrete negative 
emotions, where: 
 
 𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑐𝐼𝑛𝑡(𝑤): [0,10] × [0,10] → [0,10]  
4. Intensity, specificity, and accuracy of discrete emotions in amnesia 
180 
 
𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑐𝐼𝑛𝑡(𝑤) =  
𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑐(𝑤)
𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑠(𝑤)
∗ 10 
(5) 
 SpecInt(w) is the proportion from the intensity of negative emotions which is 
represented by the specificity of the emotional experience. In example (1), above, the 
specificity within negative emotions Spec(w)=1, but the intensity adjusted (or weighted) 
specificity within negative emotions SpecInt(w)=1. In stark contrast, example (2) has a 
similar specificity Spec(w)=1, but a dramatically lower intensity adjusted specificity 
within negative emotions SpecInt(w)=1. In conclusion, the specificity within negative 
emotions for similar emotion intensities is best described by Spec(w). In situations when 
the intensity within negative emotions is significantly different, both Spec(w) and 
SpecInt(w) are needed to describe the differences in the specific experience of a discrete 
negative emotion. 
 However, the specificity within negative emotions refers to the degree to which 
the dominant discrete emotion (whichever it may be) is higher than all other discrete 
emotions. This index does not describe the difference in intensity between a target 
discrete negative emotion and other non-target negative emotions. For this purpose a 
separate index (called accuracy) is describe below. 
 
4.3.2 Accuracy within discrete negative emotions. 
 
Let anger be the target emotion and A, F and S the individual intensities of 
anger, fear, and sadness respectively. Acc(w)A is the accuracy of anger within discrete 
negative emotions, defined as: 
 
 
 𝐴𝑐𝑐(𝑤)𝐴: [0,10] × [0,10] × [0,10] → [−10,10]  
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𝐴𝑐𝑐(𝑤)𝐴 = (√(
10 + 𝐴 − 𝐹
2
) ∗ (
10 + 𝐴 − 𝑆
2
) − 5) ∗ 2 
(6) 
 
Unlike the specificity index, the accuracy within negative emotions can take 
negative values. This happens when the intensity of the target emotion (here anger), is 
lower than the intensities of either of the non-target emotions (fear or sadness), as 
presented in Observation 4 below: 
 
Observation 4: If A<F, or A<S, then Acc(w)A<0 
 
Furthermore: 
 
Observation 5: For any A, F and S, 𝐴𝑐𝑐(𝑤)𝐴  ≤ 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑠(𝑤) 
 
Observation 6: If 𝐴 − 𝐹 = −10, then for any A − S ∈ [−10,10], 𝐴𝑐𝑐(𝑤)𝐴 = −10, and 
alternatively, if 𝐴 − 𝑆 = −10, then for any A − F ∈ [−10,10], 𝐴𝑐𝑐(𝑤)𝐴 = −10 
 
Observation 7: If 𝐴 − 𝐹 =  A − S = 0, then 𝐴𝑐𝑐(𝑤)𝐴 = 0 
 
Observation 8: If 𝐴 − 𝐹 = 10, and A − S = 10, then 𝐴𝑐𝑐(𝑤)𝐴 = 10 
 
Observation 9: For 𝐴 − 𝐹 = 0 and A − S = 10, or 𝐴 − 𝐹 = 10, and A − S = 0, then 
𝐴𝑐𝑐(𝑤)𝐴 = 4.14213562373095 ≅ 4 
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 The accuracy of fear and sadness within negative emotions is calculated 
similarly, replacing the target emotion (anger) accordingly. As shown in Figure 61, the 
accuracy (in this case of anger) within negative emotions is a monotonic function, with 
a positive Gaussian curvature. 
 
 
Figure 61. The simulation of the accuracy of negative affect (anger, fear and sadness). 
The simulation of the accuracy within discrete negative emotions shows a surface with a 
positive Gaussian curvature throughout. The dark blue lines indicate cases when anger 
and sadness ratings are equal (A – S=0) and anger and fear, respectively (A – F=0). A. 
view from azimuth (az=– 35) and elevation (el=15); B. azimuth (az=235) and elevation 
(el=15); C. azimuth (az=– 10) and elevation (el=10); D. azimuth (az=275) and elevation 
(el=10). 
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The accuracy index is always lower than the intensity within negative emotions 
(see Observation 5, above), but there is no other relation between the magnitude of the 
two indices. Thus, in order to account for the intensity of negative emotions, (for 
reasons similar with the ones described in the examples above, for specificity within 
negative emotions) an intensity adjusted accuracy within negative emotions can be 
calculated. 
 
4.3.2.1 Intensity adjusted accuracy within discrete negative emotions. 
 
Let AccInt(w)A be the intensity adjusted accuracy of anger within discrete 
negative emotions, where: 
 
 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝐼𝑛𝑡(𝑤)𝐴: [−10,10] × [0,10] → [−10,10] 
𝐴𝑐𝑐𝐼𝑛𝑡(𝑤)𝐴 =  
𝐴𝑐𝑐(𝑤)𝐴
𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑠(𝑤)
∗ 10 
 
(7) 
 
 The intensity adjusted accuracy of anger within negative emotions is the 
proportion from the intensity of negative emotions which is represented by the accurate 
experience of anger, as the target emotion. Moreover, the intensity adjusted accuracy 
within negative emotions can be calculated similarly for any other discrete negative 
emotions. 
 The intensity, specificity and accuracy indices introduced above describe the 
experience of discrete negative emotions. The same concepts (i.e., variables) can 
extended to the full range of basic emotions (including happiness). The added 
complexity posed by the introduction of a new discrete emotion (i.e., happiness) is 
accommodated in the modified functions, and visual representation of indices. 
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4.3.3 Intensity and specificity between discrete positive and negative emotions 
 
Let Δb1, Δb2, and Δb3, be the differences between the intensity ratings of the four 
discrete emotions (anger, fear, sadness and happiness), shown in Figure 62, and defined 
as follows:  
 
 𝛥𝑏1: [0,10] × [0,10] × [0,10]  × [0,10] → [0,10] 
𝛥𝑏1 = 𝑀𝑎𝑥(𝐴, 𝐹, 𝑆, 𝐻) −  𝑀𝑖𝑛(𝐴, 𝐹, 𝑆, 𝐻) 
 
(8) 
 
 𝛥𝑏2: [0,10] × [0,10] × [0,10]  × [0,10] → [0,10] 
𝛥𝑏2 = 𝑀𝑎𝑥(𝐴, 𝐹, 𝑆, 𝐻) −  [𝐴 + 𝐹 + 𝑆 + 𝐻 − 𝑀𝑖𝑛(𝐴, 𝐹, 𝑆, 𝐻)
−  𝑀𝑎𝑥(𝐴 + 𝐹, 𝐴 + 𝑆, 𝐴 + 𝐻, 𝐹 + 𝑆, 𝐹 + 𝐻, 𝑆 + 𝐻)] 
 
 
(9) 
 
 𝛥𝑏3: [0,10] × [0,10] × [0,10]  × [0,10] → [0,10] 
𝛥𝑏3 = 𝑀𝑎𝑥(𝐴, 𝐹, 𝑆, 𝐻) − [𝐴 + 𝐹 + 𝑆 + 𝐻 − 𝑀𝑎𝑥(𝐴, 𝐹, 𝑆, 𝐻)
− 𝑀𝑖𝑛(𝐴 + 𝐹, 𝐴 + 𝑆, 𝐴 + 𝐻, 𝐹 + 𝑆, 𝐹 + 𝐻, 𝑆 + 𝐻)] 
 
(10) 
 
 
4. Intensity, specificity, and accuracy of discrete emotions in amnesia 
185 
 
 
Figure 62. Defining the intensity and specificity of positive and negative emotions. 
The individual intensity ratings of basic emotions 1, 2, 3, 4 correspond to anger, fear, 
sadness, and happiness in any order. The overall intensity of affect is represented by the 
intensity of the strongest basic emotion (here emotion 1). The specificity of negative 
affect is calculated from the differences between the intensity of the dominant emotion 
(1) and the remaining two basic negative emotions (i.e., 2, 3, and 4). 
 
Then, Intens(b) and Spec(b) represent the intensity and specificity between 
discrete positive and negative emotions, where: 
 
 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑠(𝑏): [0,10] × [0,10] × [0,10]  × [0,10] → [0,10] 
𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑠(𝑏) = 𝑀𝑎𝑥 (𝐴, 𝐹, 𝑆, 𝐻) 
 
(11) 
 
 𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑐(𝑏): [0,10] × [0,10] × [0,10] → [0,10] 
𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑐(𝑏) = √(𝛥𝑏1 +  .0102907) ∗ (𝛥𝑏2 + .0102907) ∗ (𝛥𝑏3 + .0102907)
3
 
− .0102907 
 
(12) 
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The formulae for the intensity and specificity between positive and negative are 
extensions of formulae for the corresponding indices within negative emotions. Both 
indices take values on the same interval as their within negative emotions counterparts 
(i.e., [0,10]). Similarly with the case within negative emotions, the following 
consequences need noting: 
 
Observation 10: For any A, F, S and H, Δb1 ≥ Δb2 ≥ Δb3 and 𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑐(𝑏)  ≤ 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑠(𝑏) 
 
Observation 11: For any 𝛥𝑏1 = 𝛥𝑏2 =  𝛥𝑏3, then 𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑐(𝑏) =  𝛥𝑏1 = 𝛥𝑏2 =  𝛥𝑏3. In 
particular, this is relevant for the limits of the [0,10] interval when, if 𝛥𝑏1 = 𝛥𝑏2 =
 𝛥𝑏3 = 0, then 𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑐(𝑏) = 0 and if 𝛥𝑏1 = 𝛥𝑏2 =  𝛥𝑏3 = 10, then 𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑐(𝑏) = 10 
 
Observation 12: If 𝛥𝑏1 = 𝛥𝑏2 = 10 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝛥𝑏3 = 0, 𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑛 𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑐(𝑏) =
 1.00000000792215 ≅ 1  
 
 The specificity between positive and negative emotions is a 4-D object defined 
by Spec(b), Δb1, Δb2, and Δb3, where always Δb1 ≥ Δb2 ≥ Δb3. Thus, the visual 
representation of Spec(b) is done using a 3-D level set, for five key values of Δb2 (see 
Figure 63): values approaching the upper and lower limits and three evenly distributed 
intermediary values. The middle difference between discrete basic emotions (Δb2) was 
chosen for visual clarity. 
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Figure 63. Simulation of affective specificity between positive and negative emotions. 
The simulation of the specificity between positive and negative emotions is shown for 
five key values of Δb2 shown in red (Δb2=0.1), green (Δb2=2.5), yellow (Δb2=5.0), cyan 
(Δb2=7.5) and blue (Δb2=9.9). All level surfaces have a positive Gaussian curvature 
throughout. A. view from azimuth (az=– 35) and elevation (el=15); B. azimuth (az=235) 
and elevation (el=15); C. azimuth (az=– 10) and elevation (el=10); D. azimuth (az=275) 
and elevation (el=10). 
 
Similarly with the specificity within negative emotions, the specificity between 
positive and negative emotions provides no information about the overall intensity of 
the affective experience (i.e., intensity between positive and negative emotions), other 
than the intensity being larger than specificity (see Observation 9, above). Thus, for the 
same reasons as described earlier, an intensity adjusted specificity between positive and 
negative emotions can be calculated. 
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4.3.3.1 Intensity adjusted specificity between discrete positive and negative emotions. 
 
Let SpecInt(b) be the intensity adjusted specificity between discrete positive and 
negative emotions, where: 
 
 𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑐𝐼𝑛𝑡(𝑏): [0,10] × [0,10] → [0,10] 
𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑐𝐼𝑛𝑡(𝑏) =  
𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑐(𝑏)
𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑠(𝑏)
∗ 10 
 
(13) 
 
SpecInt(b) is the proportion from the intensity of positive and negative emotions 
which is represented by the specific experience of the single dominant discrete emotion. 
As earlier, for similar levels of intensity the specificity between positive and negative 
emotions is best described by Spec(b). However, when the intensity between positive and 
negative emotions is significantly different, Spec(b) and SpecInt(b) best describe together 
the differences in the specific experience of a discrete positive or negative emotion. 
 Similarly with the case within negative emotions, the specificity index presented 
above only refers to the dominant emotion as it is experienced, rather than the intended 
target emotion. Thus, in order to describe the difference in intensity between a target 
discrete positive or negative emotion and other non-target emotions a similar accuracy 
index is described below. 
 
4.3.4 Accuracy between discrete positive and negative emotions 
 
Let anger be the target emotion and A, F, S and H the individual intensities of 
anger, fear, sadness, and happiness respectively. Acc(b)A is the accuracy of anger 
between discrete positive and negative emotions, defined as: 
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 𝐴𝑐𝑐(𝑏)𝐴: [0,10] × [0,10] × [0,10] × [0,10] → [−10,10] 
𝐴𝑐𝑐(𝑏)𝐴 = (√(
10 + 𝐴 − 𝐹
2
) ∗ (
10 + 𝐴 − 𝑆
2
) ∗ (
10 + 𝐴 − 𝐻
2
)
3
− 5) ∗ 2 
 
(14) 
 
 Similarly with the previous accuracy index, and unlike the specificity indices, 
the accuracy between positive and negative emotions takes negative values for cases 
when the intensity of the target emotion (here anger), is lower than the intensities of any 
of the non-target emotions (fear, sadness, or happiness).  
 
Observation 13: If A<F, or A<S, or A<H, then Acc(b)A<0 
 
In addition to this: 
 
Observation 14: For any A, F, S, H,  𝐴𝑐𝑐(𝑏)𝐴  ≤ 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑠(𝑏),  
 
Observation 15: If 𝐴 − 𝐹 = −10, then for any A − S and A − H ∈ [−10,10],
𝐴𝑐𝑐(𝑏)𝐴 = −10 Symmetrically, if 𝐴 − 𝑆 = −10, then for any A − F and A − H ∈
[−10,10], 𝐴𝑐𝑐(𝑏)𝐴 = −10, and if 𝐴 − 𝐻 = −10, then for any A − F and A − S ∈
[−10,10], 𝐴𝑐𝑐(𝑏)𝐴 = −10 
 
Observation 16: If 𝐴 − 𝐹 = A − S = A − H, then 𝐴𝑐𝑐(𝑏)𝐴 =  𝐴 − 𝐹 = A − S = A − H. 
In particular, if 𝐴 − 𝐹 = A − S = A − H = 0, then 𝐴𝑐𝑐(𝑏)𝐴 = 10, and if 𝐴 − 𝐹 = A −
S = A − H = 10, then 𝐴𝑐𝑐(𝑏)𝐴 = 10 
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Observation 17: If 𝐴 − 𝐹 = 0, 𝑎𝑛𝑑 A − S = A − H = 10, then 𝐴𝑐𝑐(𝑏)𝐴 =
5.87401051968199 ≅ 6 
 
The accuracy between positive and negative emotions is a 4-D object defined (in 
the case of anger) by Acc(b)A, A – F, A – S and A – H. Thus, the visual representation of 
Acc(b)A  is done using a 3-D level set, for five key values of A – F (see Figure 64) 
approaching the two limits and three evenly distributed intermediary values. The 
difference A – F is chosen arbitrarily, as there is no necessary relationship between the 
three differences (i.e., A – F, A – S and A – H). 
 
 
Figure 64. Simulation of affective accuracy between positive and negative emotions. 
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The simulation of the accuracy between positive and negative emotions is shown for 
five key values of A – F shown in red (A – F =–9.9), green (A – F =–5.0), yellow (A – F 
=0), cyan (A – F =5.0) and blue (A – F =9.9). All level surfaces have a positive 
Gaussian curvature throughout. A. view from azimuth (az=– 35) and elevation (el=15); 
B. azimuth (az=235) and elevation (el=15); C. azimuth (az=– 10) and elevation (el=10); 
D. azimuth (az=275) and elevation (el=10). 
 
As presented earlier, the accuracy between positive and negative emotions offers 
no information about the overall intensity of the positive and negative emotions, except 
that the intensity is always larger than accuracy (see Observation 12, above). Thus, for 
similar reasons with the ones described earlier, an intensity adjusted accuracy between 
positive and negative emotions can be calculated. 
 
4.3.4.1 Intensity adjusted accuracy between discrete positive and negative emotions. 
 
Let AccInt(b)A be the intensity adjusted accuracy of anger between discrete 
positive and negative emotions, where: 
 
 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝐼𝑛𝑡(𝑏)𝐴: [0,10] × [0,10] → [−10,10] 
𝐴𝑐𝑐2(𝑏)𝐴 =  
𝐴𝑐𝑐(𝑏)𝐴
𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑠(𝑏)
∗ 10 
 
(15) 
 
The intensity adjusted accuracy between positive and negative emotions is the 
proportion from the intensity of positive and negative emotions which is represented by 
the accurate experience of the previously established target discrete emotion. As earlier, 
for similar levels of intensity the accuracy, for example of anger, between positive and 
negative emotions is best described by Acc(b)A. However, when the intensity between 
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positive and negative emotions is significantly different, Acc(b)A and AccInt(b)A best 
describe together the differences in the accurate experience of anger among all the other 
discrete positive or negative emotions. 
 
4.4 A first application of the affective intensity, specificity and accuracy indices: 
The discrete re-experience of negative emotions is improved after the interference 
of positive emotions, while the discrete re-experience of happiness is reduced after 
the interference of negative emotions  
 
The present section presents the detailed analysis of the three datasets included 
in previous chapters. The analysis of the intensity ratings of the fours discrete emotions 
included in Chapters 2 and 3 are presented side-by-side with the novel indices of overall 
affective intensity, specificity and accuracy for negative and positive emotions, 
introduced previously in the present chapter. 
 The main aim of the present section is to illustrate the practical application of the 
novel indices. As a first application of the intensity, specificity and accuracy indices on 
real datasets, the analyses will follow an exploratory approach, rather than hypothesis-
driven. This is in order to a present a broader perspective of the applicability and 
opportunities offered by each of the new indices, to assess assumptions on which 
statistical inferences could be based, to support the selection of appropriate statistical 
tools and techniques, and to provide a basis for further data collection and 
implementation in future experimental designs. Furthermore, this chapters allows the 
further detailed exploration of the emotion ratings, at each time point when they were 
collected, whereas in earlier chapters the data was often summarised across time points 
and iterations. 
 A summary of findings is presented at the end of this section (4.4.4), which 
suggest a different experience of positive and negative emotions after a brief affective 
interference of the opposite valence. The results are further discussed in section 4.5. 
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4.4.1 Sample 1: Neurologically normal undergraduate students 
 
The data included in this section also underpins Chapter 2. The full details 
regarding sample characteristics, measures and stimuli used, and the design and 
procedure of the data collection have already been presented in Chapter 2, and will not 
be repeated below. 
 
4.4.1.1 Data Analysis 
 
 The ratings of anger, fear, sadness, and happiness are analysed in a global 4x4 
repeated-measures ANOVA, with the two factors being Emotion and Time (Baseline, 
Presentation, Recall after 30 minutes and Recall after 7 days). The significant 
interactions and main effects are explored further using planned contrasts and pair-wise 
comparisons. 
 The affective intensity, specificity and accuracy scores are presented together, 
but analysed separately. Firstly, the intensity between positive and negative emotions 
and the intensity within negative emotions are subjected to a repeated-measures 2x4 
ANOVA, with the significant interaction and main effects being followed-up with 
planned contrasts. Secondly, the indices of specificity between positive and negative 
emotions and the specificity within negative emotions are analysed together in a similar 
2x4 repeated-measures ANOVA. And thirdly, the accuracy between positive and 
negative emotions and the accuracy within negative emotions are analysed using a 
similar 2x3 repeated-measures ANOVA. The analysis of the accuracy indices omits the 
Baseline time point, because the target emotion only refers to the emotion induction 
tasks of presentation and recall. 
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4.4.1.2 Results 
 
 The Results section is structured to mirror the traditional analysis of the emotion 
ratings (presented on the left side of the page) and the analysis of the novel summary 
indices of affective intensity, specificity and accuracy (shown on the right). Although 
the emotion ratings data represent a repeated measures design, the figures (shown on the 
left side of the page throughout this section) use a bar chart for the benefit of visual 
clarity. The expected/target emotion at Baseline was happiness. Thus the accuracy 
within negative emotions is not calculated at Baseline in any of the section below, and 
also for any of the time points in the case of the happiness stories (see section 4.4.1.2.4 
below, figures on the right side).  
The novel intensity, specificity, and accuracy indices are shown in figures on the right 
side using the following abbreviations: 
Intens(b) – the intensity between positive and negative emotions;  
Intens(w) – the intensity within negative emotions;  
Spec(b) – the specificity between positive and negative emotions;  
Spec(w) – the specificity within positive and negative emotions; 
Acc(b) – the accuracy between positive and negative emotions; 
Acc(w)A – the accuracy within negative emotions, when anger is the target/expected 
emotion; 
Acc(w)F – the accuracy within negative emotions, when fear is the target/expected 
emotion; 
Acc(w)S – the accuracy within negative emotions, when sadness is the target/expected 
emotion; 
Acc(w)H – the accuracy within negative emotions, when happiness is the 
target/expected emotion. 
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4.4.1.2.1 The affective experience after the presentation and recall of the endings of the anger stories 
 
 
Figure 65.Emotion ratings after the endings of the anger stories 
 
An overall repeated-measures 4x4 ANOVA reported a 
significant main effect of Time (F(2.42,74.86)=27.27, p<.001, 
ηp2=.468), Emotion (F(2.46,76.20)=25.45, p<.001, ηp2=.451),  
 
(sub-section continued on the left half of the next page) 
 
Figure 66. Affective intensity, specificity and accuracy after the 
presentation and recall of the endings of the anger stories. 
 The 2x4 repeated-measures ANOVA for the affective 
intensity scores produced a main effect of Time 
(F(2.27,70.47)=45.12, p<.001, ηp2=.593; degrees of freedom 
correction:  
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and a significant Time*Emotion interaction (F(1,31)=39.95, 
p<.001, ηp2=.563). Degrees of freedom were applied the 
Greenhouse-Geisser, Greenhouse-Geisser, and lower bound 
corrections respectively.  
The planned-contrasts follow-up analysis indicated that the 
interaction best fitted (F(1,31)=132.04, p<.001, ηp2=.810) the 
quadratic contrast of Time (F(1,31)=57.91, p<.001, ηp2=.651) when 
emotion ratings increased from Baseline to Presentation and Recall 
30 minutes, and receded after seven days, and the linear contrast of 
Emotion (F(1,31)=71.46, p<.001, ηp2=.697). The main effect of 
Emotion indicated that the target emotion anger and was 
significantly more intensely experienced than fear, sadness, and 
happiness. 
 
 
 
 
Greenhouse-Geisser), a main effect of Intensity (F(1,31)=36.26, 
p<.001, ηp2=.539), and a significant Time*Intensity interaction 
(F(1,31)=25.88, p<.001, ηp2=.455; degrees of freedom correction: 
lower-bound). The main effect of Time best fitted a quadratic 
contrast (F(1,31)=136.23, p<.001, ηp2=.815), explained by an 
increase in the intensity of emotions from Baseline to Presentation, 
and Recall after 30 minutes, followed by a decrease for the Recall 
after 7 days. The intensity between negative and positive emotions 
was significantly higher than the intensity within negative 
emotions, effect mainly driven by the difference between the two 
indices at Baseline. 
 The analysis of the specificity indices (2x4 repeated-
measures ANOVA) produced a main effect of Time (F(3,93)=6.02, 
p<.001, ηp2=.163), a main effect of Specificity (F(1,31)=52.68, 
p<.001, ηp2=.630), and a significant Time*Specificity interaction 
(F(1,31)=12.59, p<.001, ηp2=.289). The effect of Time best fitted a 
quadratic contrast (F(1,31)=14.06, p=.001, ηp2=.312) and together 
with the interaction were mostly driven by the  
(sub-section continued on the right half of the next page) 
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reduced specificity within negative emotions at Baseline. The 
specificity between positive and negative emotions was 
consistently higher than the specificity within negative emotions 
(F(1,31)=52.68, p<.001, ηp2=.630). 
 Lastly, the analysis of the accuracy indices (2x3 repeated-
measures ANOVA) found a main effect of Time (F(2,62)=9.12, 
p<.001, ηp2=.227), a main effect of Accuracy (F(1,31)=27.68, 
p<.001, ηp2=.472), and a significant Time*Accuracy interaction 
(F(1,31)=5.03, p=.032, ηp2=.139; degrees of freedom corrected 
using the lower-bound estimate). The interaction was driven by the 
stronger decrease of the accuracy between positive and negative 
emotions after one week, caused mostly by an unexpected increase 
of happiness ratings effect. The effect Accuracy confirmed that 
despite the stronger decrease at Recall after 7 days, the accuracy 
between positive and negative emotions remained consistently 
higher than the accuracy within negative emotions. Most 
significantly, the effect of Time fitted a linear contrast 
(F(1,31)=15.31, p<.001, ηp2=.331) and confirmed that when  
(sub-section continued on the right half of the next page) 
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calculated only among negative emotions, as the intensity of re-
experienced emotions decreased over time, the accuracy of anger 
(the target emotion) also decreased, even when compared only with 
the other negative emotions. This effect suggest that as the 
affective re-experience of the anger stories becomes less intense, it 
also loses its initial accuracy. 
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4.4.1.2.2 The affective experience after the presentation and recall of the endings of the fear stories 
 
 
Figure 67. Emotion ratings after the endings of the anger stories 
 
The overall 4x4 repeated-measures ANOVA produced a 
significant main effect of Time (F(2.53,78.31)=29.20, p<.001, 
ηp2=.484), emotion (F(3,93)=32.61, p<.001, ηp2=.513), and 
(sub-section continued on the left half of the next page) 
 
Figure 68. Affective intensity, specificity and accuracy after the 
presentation and recall of the endings of the fear stories. 
 The affective intensity 2x4 repeated-measures ANOVA 
reported a main effect of Time (F(2.32,71.86)=39.18, p<.001, 
ηp2=.558; degrees of freedom correction: Greenhouse-Geisser),  
(sub-section continued on the right half of the next page) 
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a significant interaction (F(5.92,183.41)=37.32, p<.001, 
ηp2=.546). Degrees of freedom for Time and the Time*Emotion 
interaction were corrected using the Greenhouse-Geisser estimate.  
The follow-up analysis indicated that the interaction was 
best described (F(1,31)=87.72, p<.001, ηp2=.739) by the quadratic 
contrast of Time (F(1,31)=49.37, p<.001, ηp2=.614) when emotion 
ratings increased from Baseline to Presentation and Recall 30 
minutes, only to drop back after seven days), and the quadratic 
contrast of Emotion (F(1,31)=62.27, p<.001, ηp2=.668). The main 
effect of Emotion showed that fear and to a lesser extend sadness, 
were overall more intensely experienced than anger and 
happiness. 
 
 
 
 
 
a main effect of Intensity (F(1,31)=35.19, p<.001, ηp2=.532), and 
a significant Time*Intensity interaction (F(1,31)=36.19, p<.001, 
ηp2=.539; degrees of freedom correction: lower-bound). The main 
effect of Time best fitted a quadratic contrast (F(1,31)=103.31, 
p<.001, ηp2=.769), caused by an increase in the intensity of 
emotions from Baseline to Presentation, and subsequent decrease 
at Recall after 30 minutes, and Recall after 7 days. The effect of 
Intensity as well as the Time*Intensity interaction were driven by 
the difference between the intensity between positive and 
negative emotions and the intensity within negative emotion at 
Baseline. 
 The analysis of the specificity indices (2x4 repeated-
measures ANOVA) produced a marginal main effect of Time 
(F(3,93)=3.01, p=.034, ηp2=.088), an effect of Specificity 
(F(1,31)=56.37, p<.001, ηp2=.645), and a significant 
Time*Specificity interaction (F(1,31)=15.92, p<.001, ηp2=.339; 
degrees of freedom corrected using the lower-bound estimate).  
(sub-section continued on the right half of the next page) 
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The Time*Specificity interaction and the small effect of Time was 
best described by a quadratic contrast (F(1,31)=6.10, p=.019, 
ηp2=.164), driven by the reduced specificity within negative 
emotions specificity at Baseline. Furthermore, the specificity 
between positive and negative emotions was significantly higher 
than the specificity within negative emotions (F(1,31)=56.37, 
p<.001, ηp2=.645). 
 The 2x3 repeated-measures ANOVA for the affective 
accuracy indices reported a main effect of Accuracy 
(F(1,31)=61.48, p<.001, ηp2=.665) and a significant 
Time*Accuracy interaction (F(1,31)=6.45, p=.016, ηp2=.172; 
degrees of freedom corrected using the lower-bound estimate). 
The interaction was caused by the stronger decrease of the 
accuracy between positive and negative emotions at Recall after 7 
days. In turn, this was caused by the unexpected increase in 
happiness ratings after the last recall procedure. Nonetheless, the 
accuracy between positive and negative emotions was always 
higher than the accuracy within negative emotions 
(F(1,31)=61.48, p<.001, ηp2=.665).
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4.4.1.2.3 The affective experience after the presentation and recall of the endings of the sadness stories 
 
 
Figure 69. Emotion ratings after the endings of the sadness stories 
 
The global 4x4 repeated-measures ANOVA produced a 
significant main effect of Time (F(3,93)=24.95, p<.001, 
ηp2=.446), Emotion (F(3,93)=41.74, p<.001, ηp2=.574), and 
 
(sub-section continued on the left half of the next page) 
 
Figure 70. Affective intensity, specificity and accuracy after the 
presentation and recall of the endings of the sadness stories. 
The 2x4 repeated-measures ANOVA of the affective 
intensity scores reported a main effect of Time 
(F(2.54,78.58)=41.75, p<.001, ηp2=.574; degrees of freedom 
correction:  
(sub-section continued on the right half of the next page) 
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Baseline Presentation Recall 30 min Recall 7 days
Em
o
ti
o
n
 R
at
in
gs
 (
V
A
M
S)
Anger Fear Sadness Happiness
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Baseline Presentation Recall 30 min Recall 7 days
Intens(b)
Intens(w)
Spec(b)
Spec(w)
Acc(b)S
Acc(w)S
4. Intensity, specificity, and accuracy of discrete emotions in amnesia 
203 
 
a significant interaction (F(1,31)=39.58, p <.001, ηp2=.561). 
Degrees of freedom for the Time*Emotion interaction were 
corrected using the lower bound estimate to correct for violation 
of sphericity.  
The planned-contrasts follow-up analysis indicated that 
the interaction was best described (F(1,31)=91.48, p<.001, 
ηp2=.747) by the quadratic contrast of Time (F(1,31)=46.86, 
p<.001, ηp2=.602) when emotion ratings increased from Baseline 
to Presentation and Recall 30 minutes, only to drop back after 
seven days), and the quadratic contrast of Emotion 
(F(1,31)=53.18, p<.001, ηp2=.632). The main effect of Emotion 
indicated that sadness and was overall more intensely experienced 
than anger, fear and happiness. 
 
 
 
 
Greenhouse-Geisser), an effect of Intensity (F(1,31)=40.95, 
p<.001, ηp2=.596), and a significant interaction (F(1,31)=37.08, 
p<.001, ηp2=.545; degrees of freedom corrected using the lower-
bound estimate). The interaction and the effect of Intensity were 
caused by the reduced intensity within negative emotions at 
Baseline. Notably, the effect of Time best fitted a quadratic 
contrast (F(1,31)=85.67, p<.001, ηp2=.734), which indicated that, 
similarly with the emotion elicitation of anger and fear presented 
earlier, the affective intensity associated with the sadness stories 
increased from Baseline to Presentation, and then gradually 
decreased over time after 30 minutes and one week. 
The analysis of the specificity indices (2x4 repeated-
measures ANOVA) reported an effect of Time 
(F(2.57,79.53)=10.44, p<.001, ηp2=.252; degrees of freedom 
correction: Huynh-Feldt), an effect of Specificity (F(1,31)=44.17, 
p<.001, ηp2=.588), and a significant Time*Specificity interaction 
(F(1,31)=19.88, p<.001, ηp2=.391; degrees of freedom corrected 
using the lower-bound estimate). The interaction and the effect of  
(sub-section continued on the right half of the next page) 
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Specificity were caused by the reduced specificity within negative 
emotions at Baseline (when all negative emotions were at floor 
level). The main effect of Time best fitted a quadratic contrast 
(F(1,31)=16.95, p<.001, ηp2=.354), which indicated that the 
affective specificity slightly increased from Baseline to 
Presentation, and then decreased over time after 30 minutes and 
seven days. Thus, as the affective re-experience became less 
intense at Recall 30 minutes and Recall 7 days, the differentiation 
between discrete emotions (affective specificity) also decreased. 
 The analysis of the affective accuracy (2x3 repeated-
measures ANOVA) reported an effect of Time (F(2,62)=6.27, 
p=.003, ηp2=.168), an effect of Accuracy (F(1,31)=23.03, p<.001, 
ηp2=.426) and a significant Time*Accuracy interaction 
(F(1,31)=6.82, p=.016, ηp2=.180; degrees of freedom corrected 
using the lower-bound estimate). As in the case of the other two 
negative emotions, the interaction was driven by the stronger 
decrease of the accuracy between positive and negative emotions 
at Recall after 7 days, which was caused by the increase in 
happiness ratings after one week. The accuracy between positive  
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and negative emotions was higher than the accuracy within 
negative emotions (F(1,31)=23.03, p<.001, ηp2=.426). The main 
effect of Time was best fitted by a linear contrast (F(1,31)=9.38, 
p=.005, ηp2=.232), which confirmed that affective accuracy, just 
as specificity before decreased over time with the decrease in 
affective intensity. 
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4.4.1.2.4 The affective experience after the presentation and recall of the endings of the happiness stories 
 
 
Figure 71. Emotion ratings after the endings of the happiness stories 
 
An overall repeated-measures 4x4 ANOVA reported a 
significant main effect of Time (F(3,93)=9.38, p<.001, ηp2=.232), 
emotion (F(1,31)=160.44, p<.001, ηp2=.838), and  
(sub-section continued on the left half of the next page) 
 
Figure 72. Affective intensity, specificity and accuracy after the 
presentation and recall of the endings of the happiness stories. 
The analysis of the affective intensity (2x4 repeated-
measures ANOVA) reported a main effect of Time (F(3,93)=10.80, 
p<.001, ηp2=.258), an effect of Intensity (F(1,31)=166.90, p<.001,  
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a significant interaction (F(1,31)=11.80, p=.002, ηp2=.276). Degrees 
of freedom for Emotion the Time*Emotion interaction were 
corrected using the lower bound estimate.  
The planned-contrasts follow-up analysis indicated that the 
interaction was driven (F(1,31)=21.71, p<.001, ηp2=.412) by the 
quadratic contrast of Time (F(1,31)=22.82, p<.001, ηp2=.424) when 
emotion ratings increased from Baseline to Presentation and Recall 
30 minutes, only to drop back after seven days, and the cubic 
contrast of Emotion (F(1,31)=86.81, p<.001, ηp2=.737). The main 
effect of Emotion indicated that happiness and was massively 
dominant over all other negative emotions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ηp2=.843), and a significant interaction (F(3,93)=11.03, p<.001, 
ηp2=.262). The follow-up analysis indicated that the interaction was 
driven (F(1,31)=16.24, p<.001, ηp2=.344) by the increase in the 
Intensity between positive and negative emotions from Baseline to 
Presentation and receded at Recall 30 minutes and after seven days, 
and the flat evolution of the intensity within negative emotions. The 
effect of Time best fitted a quadratic contrast (F(1,31)=23.73, 
p<.001, ηp2=.434), and the intensity between positive and negative 
emotions was substantially higher than the intensity within negative 
emotions (F(1,31)=166.90, p<.001, ηp2=.843). 
 The analysis of the affective specificity produced similar 
results with the intensity and accuracy indices as the affective 
experience was mostly described by a single emotion (i.e., 
happiness), and thus, there was little variation between the three 
indices. For the benefit of consistency, the results are briefly 
presented below. The 2x4 repeated-measures ANOVA of specificity 
indices reported a main effect of Time (F(3,93)=13.83, p<.001, 
ηp2=.309), an effect of Intensity (F(1,31)=150.68, p<.001, ηp2=.829),  
(sub-section continued on the right half of the next page) 
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and a significant interaction (F(1,31)=8.72, p<.001, ηp2=.219).  
 The analysis of the affective accuracy (one-way repeated-
measures ANOVA) reported an effect of Time (F(2,62)=6.88, 
p=.002, ηp2=.182), which best fitted a linear contrast (F(1,31)=11.12, 
p=.002, ηp2=.264), indicating that the accuracy of the affective 
experience decreased over time from Presentation to Recall after 7 
days mostly as a result of the decrease in the intensity of the target 
emotion (i.e., happiness). 
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4.4.1.2.5 The affective experience after the presentation of the stems of the anger stories 
 
 
Figure 73. Emotion ratings after the stems of the anger stories 
 
An overall repeated-measures 4x4 ANOVA reported a 
single significant main effect of Emotion (F(1,16)=20.66, p<.001, 
ηp2=.564), degrees of freedom corrected using the lower  
(sub-section continued on the left half of the next page) 
 
Figure 74. Affective intensity, specificity and accuracy after the 
presentation and recall of the stems of the anger stories. 
The analysis of the affective intensity indices (2x4 
repeated-measures ANOVA) reported a main effect of Intensity 
(F(1,16)=27.24, p<.001, ηp2=.630), and a significant  
(sub-section continued on the right half of the next page) 
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Baseline Presentation Recall 30 min Recall 7 days
Em
o
ti
o
n
 R
at
in
gs
 (
V
A
M
S)
Anger Fear Sadness Happiness
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
8
10
Baseline Presentation Recall 30 min Recall 7 days
Intens(b)
Intens(w)
Spec(b)
Spec(w)
Acc(b)A
Acc(w)A
4. Intensity, specificity, and accuracy of discrete emotions in amnesia 
210 
 
bound estimate. Surprisingly, there was no main effect of Time, 
and the Time*Emotion interaction failed to reach significance 
after correcting the degrees of freedom (F(1,16)=4.22, p=.057, 
ηp2=.209). The follow-up analysis indicated that happiness was 
overall significantly more intensely experienced after the anger 
story stems than anger (F(1,16)=21.68, p<.001, ηp2=.575), fear 
(F(1,16)=21.91, p<.001, ηp2=.578), or sadness (F(1,16)=29.90, 
p<.001, ηp2=.651). Notably, 15 participants failed to provide 
emotion ratings during the Presentation and Recall 30 minutes 
phases, and two participants did not provide emotion data a week 
later (Recall after 7 days). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Time*Intensity interaction (F(3,48)=3.32, p=.028, ηp2=.172). The 
main effect of Intensity, in line with the previous analyses of 
affective intensity indices (see sections 4.4.1.2.1 to 4.4.1.2.4; also 
see Chapter 3), confirmed that the intensity between positive and 
negative emotions was higher than the intensity within negative 
emotions. Notably, the Time*Intensity interaction was caused by 
the increase of the intensity within negative emotions at Recall 30 
minutes (t(16)= 2.55, p=.021), while the intensity between 
positive and negative emotions remained largely the same, even 
showing a negative trend (t(16)=-1.98, p=.066). The finding 
should be interpreted in the context of Chapter 2 (where the same 
data are analysed after a different transformation: change from 
Baseline) and indicate that as participants listen again to the 
semantically neutral beginning of the anger stories they re-
experience the negative affect associated with the ending of the 
story (mostly represented by the anger ratings). However, as 
confirmed by the subsequent reduction of the intensity within 
negative emotions, (t(16)=-2.75, p=.014), the selective re-
experience of the discrete emotions after the presentation of the  
(sub-section continued on the right half of the next page) 
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anger story stems is no longer reproduced after seven days. 
The analysis of the affective specificity (2x4 repeated-
measures ANOVA) reported a single main effect of Specificity 
(F(1,16)=20.61, p<.001, ηp2=.563), and no overall effect of Time 
or a significant interaction. The analysis of the affective accuracy 
(2x3 repeated-measures ANOVA) reported a single main effect of 
Time (F(2,32)=5.21, p=.011, ηp2=.245), an effect of Accuracy 
(F(1,16)=17.52, p=.001, ηp2=.523), and a significant 
Time*Accuracy interaction (F(2,32)=5.55, p=.009, ηp2=.257). 
Most notably, the effect of Time was best fitted by a quadratic 
contrast (F(1,16)=6.71, p=.020, ηp2=.295), which indicated that 
both affective accuracy indices showed a slight increase at Recall 
after 30 minutes. This finding put in the context of the analysis of 
the intensity indices and of Chapter 2 confirms that when 
participants first re-listened to the story stems of the anger stories 
after 30 minutes, they re-experienced more of the target emotion 
(anger) than at any time during the study – because at  
(sub-section continued on the right half of the next page) 
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Presentation participants were not yet aware of the emotional 
ending of the story, and at Recall after 7 days, the stem was no 
longer sufficient to elicit the discrete emotion associated with the 
story ending. 
It is worth noting at this stage that the affective accuracy 
indices were significantly affected by the high ratings of 
happiness at all time-points. Since anger was chosen as the target 
emotion the high ratings of happiness meant that for the first time 
the affective accuracy indices took negative values. This is an 
expected scenario when the intended emotion (i.e., target 
emotion) is not the most intensely experienced discrete emotion. 
Although the current analysis is exploratory and not strictly 
hypothesis driven, the accuracy indices are presented from the 
perspective of Chapter 2, where these data are first presented, and 
where it was expected that the emotionally neutral story stems 
would begin to elicit the discrete emotion associated with their 
respective endings, as participants become familiar with the story 
(i.e., at Recall 30 minutes and Recall 7 days). An alternative  
(sub-section continued on the right half of the next page) 
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approach would be to consider that the semantically neutral stems 
should remain emotionally neutral over time (and hence the target 
emotion could be happiness, instead of anger), and the value and 
interpretation of the affective accuracy indices would change 
accordingly. This argument is further developed in the Discussion 
section below. 
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4.4.1.2.6 The affective experience after the presentation of the stems of the fear stories 
 
 
Figure 75. Emotion ratings after the stems of the fear stories 
 
The global 4x4 repeated-measures ANOVA reported only 
a significant main effect of Emotion (F(1,16)=13.87, p=.002, 
ηp2=.464), degrees of freedom corrected using the lower bound  
(sub-section continued on the left half of the next page) 
 
Figure 76. Affective intensity, specificity and accuracy after the 
presentation and recall of the stems of the fear stories. 
The analysis of affective intensity (2x4 repeated-measures 
ANOVA) reported a main effect of Intensity (F(1,16)=19.55, 
p<.001, ηp2=.550), and a significant Time*Intensity interaction  
(sub-section continued on the right half of the next page) 
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estimate. As for the stems of the anger stories, there was no main 
effect of Time, and the Time*Emotion interaction was not 
significant after correcting the degree of freedom (F(1,16)=3.67, 
p=.074, ηp2=.187). The follow-up planned contrasts showed that 
happiness remained significantly more intensely experienced after 
the fear story stems than any of the negative emotions: anger 
(F(1,16)=15.80, p<.001, ηp2=.497), fear (F(1,16)=12.42, p=.003, 
ηp2=.437), and sadness (F(1,16)=14.85, p<.001, ηp2=.481). As for 
the anger stories, 15 participants did not provide emotion ratings 
after the story stems during the Presentation and Recall 30 
minutes phases, and two participants a week later (Recall after 7 
days). 
 
 
 
 
 
(F(3,48)=3.27, p=.029, ηp2=.169). As in the case of the stems of 
the anger stories (see section 4.4.1.2.5) the interaction was driven 
by the increase in the intensity within negative emotions at Recall 
30 minutes (t(16)=2.09, p=.053), while the intensity between 
positive and negative emotions had an overall downward trend 
(t(16)=-1.83, p=.087), although neither contrast reached 
significance. 
 The 2x4 repeated-measures ANOVA employed to analyse 
the affective specificity indices reported a main effect of 
Specificity (F(1,16)=17.78, p=.001, ηp2=.526), and a significant 
interaction (F(3,48)=3.04, p=.038, ηp2=.160). As reflected earlier 
by the analysis of the intensity indices, the interaction was driven 
by the increase of the specificity within negative emotions at 
Recall 30 minutes and the reduction of the specificity between 
positive and negative emotions at the same time point. 
The analysis of the affective accuracy (2x3 repeated-
measures ANOVA) reported a main effect of Accuracy 
(F(1,16)=10.60, p=.005, ηp2=.399), and a Time*Accuracy  
(sub-section continued on the right half of the next page) 
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interaction (F(2,32)=3.71, p=.036, ηp2=.188). The interaction was 
driven  by an increase of the accuracy between positive and 
negative emotions from Presentation to Recall after 30 minutes 
(t(16)= 2.07, p=.055), which failed to reach significance (unlike 
in the case of the anger stories – see section 4.4.1.2.5 above). 
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4.4.1.2.7 The affective experience after the presentation of the stems of the sadness stories 
 
 
Figure 77. Emotion ratings after the stems of the sadness stories 
 
The global 4x4 repeated-measures ANOVA reported a 
single significant main effect of Emotion (F(1,16)=10.38, p=.005, 
ηp2=.394), degrees of freedom corrected using the lower  
(sub-section continued on the left half of the next page) 
 
Figure 78. Affective intensity, specificity and accuracy after the 
presentation and recall of the stems of the sadness stories. 
 The analysis of the affective intensity after the stems of 
the sadness stories (2x4 repeated-measures ANOVA) found only 
a main effect of Intensity (F(1,16)=18.68, p=.001, ηp2=.539).  
(sub-section continued on the right half of the next page) 
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bound estimate. There was no main effect of Time, and no 
Time*Emotion interaction. The follow-up planned contrasts 
showed that happiness remained significantly more intensely 
experienced after the sadness story stems than any of the negative 
emotions: anger (F(1,16)=14.84, p=.001, ηp2=.481), fear 
(F(1,16)=11.59, p=.004, ηp2=.420), and sadness (F(1,16)=9.43, 
p=.007, ηp2=.371). Fifteen participants failed to provide emotion 
ratings after the story stems during the Presentation and Recall 30 
minutes phases, and two participants a week later (Recall after 7 
days). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The intensity between positive and negative emotions was 
significantly higher than the intensity within negative emotions. 
 The analysis of the specificity indices (2x4 repeated-
measures ANOVA) revealed a single main effect of Specificity 
(F(1,16)=16.39, p=.001, ηp2=.506), indicating that the Specificity 
between positive and negative emotions (mainly driven by the 
higher ratings of happiness) was significantly higher than the 
specificity within negative emotions. 
 The analysis of the accuracy indices (2x3 repeated-
measures ANOVA) reported a main effect of Time (F(2,32)=4.77, 
p=.015, ηp2=.230), and an effect of Accuracy (F(1,16)=9.37, 
p=.007, ηp2=.369). The most notable findings is the effect of 
Time, which was best fitted by a quadratic contrast (F(1,16)=8.72, 
p=.009, ηp2=.353), and indicates that both the accuracy between 
positive and negative emotions and the accuracy within negative 
emotions increased at Recall after 30 minutes (t(16)=2.64, 
p=.018, and t(16)=2.57, p=.021 respectively). The finding 
corresponds to the substantial increase from Baseline in  
(sub-section continued on the right half of the next page) 
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the discrete target emotion (sadness) after the presentation of the 
story stems of the sadness stories, effect which was recorded only 
at the Recall after 30 minutes time-point, and not after one week 
(see Chapter 2). 
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4.4.1.2.8 The affective experience after the presentation of the stems of the happiness stories 
 
 
Figure 79. Emotion ratings after the stems of the happiness stories 
 
An overall repeated-measures 4x4 ANOVA found a single 
significant main effect of Emotion (F(1,16)=25.61, p<.001, 
ηp2=.615), degrees of freedom corrected using the lower bound  
(sub-section continued on the left half of the next page) 
 
Figure 80. Affective intensity, specificity and accuracy after the 
presentation and recall of the stems of the happiness stories. 
 The analysis of the affective intensity after the stems of the 
sadness stories (2x4 repeated-measures ANOVA) found a single 
main effect of Intensity (F(1,16)=24.84, p<.001, ηp2=.608).  
(sub-section continued on the right half of the next page) 
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estimate. There was no main effect of Time, and no Time*Emotion 
interaction. The follow-up planned contrasts revealed that 
happiness ratings were significantly higher after the happiness 
story stems than any of the ratings for the negative emotions: anger 
(F(1,16)=31.41, p<.001, ηp2=.663), fear (F(1,16)=25.40, p<.001, 
ηp2=.613), and sadness (F(1,16)=27.58, p<.001, ηp2=.633). Fifteen 
participants failed to provide emotion ratings after the story stems 
during the Presentation and Recall 30 minutes phases, and two 
participants a week later (Recall after 7 days). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The intensity between positive and negative emotions was 
significantly higher than the intensity within negative emotions, 
which is expected as happiness the target emotion. 
 Similarly with the intensity indices, the analysis of the 
specificity indices (2x4 repeated-measures ANOVA) reported a 
single main effect of Specificity (F(1,16)=20.44, p<.001, ηp2=.561), 
revealing that the Specificity between positive and negative 
emotions was significantly higher than the specificity within 
negative emotions. 
 Lastly, the analysis of the accuracy index (one-way 
repeated-measures ANOVA) reported failed to report a main effect 
of Time (F(2,32)=.31, p=.734, ηp2=.019). The accuracy between 
positive and negative emotions did not change over the course of 
one week, since the Baseline levels of happiness remained largely 
the same, and all the negative emotions were at floor levels. 
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4.4.2 Sample 2: Neurologically normal elderly participants 
 
The data presented in this section was also included in Chapter 3, as the 
neurologically normal control participants. The complete details regarding sample 
characteristics, measures and stimuli used, the design and procedure of the data 
collection, as well as the neuropsychological assessments of the neurologically 
unimpaired elderly participants have already been presented in Chapter 3, and will not 
be repeated below. 
 
4.4.2.1 Data Analysis 
 
 The ratings of anger, fear, sadness, and happiness are analysed in a global 4x4 
repeated-measures ANOVA, with the two factors being Emotion and Time (Baseline, 
Repetitions 1-3, Immediate Recall and Recall after 30 minutes). The significant 
interactions and main effects are explored further using planned contrasts and pair-wise 
comparisons. 
 Similarly with section 4.4.1.1 above, the affective intensity, specificity and 
accuracy scores are presented together, but analysed separately. Firstly, the intensity 
between positive and negative emotions and the intensity within negative emotions are 
subjected to a repeated-measures 2x6 ANOVA, with the significant interaction and 
main effects being followed-up with planned contrasts. Secondly, the indices of 
specificity between positive and negative emotions and the specificity within negative 
emotions are analysed together in a similar 2x6 repeated-measures ANOVA. And 
thirdly, the accuracy between positive and negative emotions and the accuracy within 
negative emotions are analysed using a similar 2x5 repeated-measures ANOVA. The 
analysis of the accuracy indices omits the Baseline time-point, because the target 
emotion only refers to the emotion induction tasks of presentation and recall. 
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4.4.2.2 Results 
 
 The Results section presents the traditional analysis of the emotion ratings (on 
the left side of the page) and the analysis of the novel summary indices of affective 
intensity, specificity and accuracy (on the right side). Although the emotion ratings data 
represent a repeated measures design, the figures (shown on the left side of the page 
throughout this section) use a bar chart for the benefit of visual clarity. The 
expected/target emotion at Baseline was happiness. Therefore, the accuracy within 
negative emotions is not calculated at Baseline in any of the sub-sections below. 
Furthermore, for the same reason, the accuracy within negative emotions is cannot be 
calculated for the happiness story (see section 4.4.4 below, figures on the right side).  
The time-points presented in both figures use the following abbreviations: 
Base – Baseline measure of emotions; 
Rep 1 – the first repetition of the emotional story (recalled after presentation); 
Rep 2 – the second repetition of the emotional story (recalled after presentation); 
Rep 3 – the third repetition of the emotional story (recalled after presentation); 
ImmUR – Immediate Unaided Recall (recall after the distraction story without a 
prior presentation of the emotional story); 
30mUR – 30 minutes Unaided Recall (recall after 30 minutes without a prior 
presentation of the story); 
The intensity, specificity, and accuracy indices are shown in figures on the right 
side using the same abbreviations as above: 
Intens(b) – the intensity between positive and negative emotions;  
Intens(w) – the intensity within negative emotions;  
Spec(b) – the specificity between positive and negative emotions;  
Spec(w) – the specificity within positive and negative emotions; 
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Acc(b) – the accuracy between positive and negative emotions; 
Acc(w)A – the accuracy within negative emotions, when anger is the target/expected 
emotion; 
Acc(w)F – the accuracy within negative emotions, when fear is the target/expected 
emotion; 
Acc(w)S – the accuracy within negative emotions, when sadness is the target/expected 
emotion; 
Acc(w)H – the accuracy within negative emotions, when happiness is the 
target/expected emotion. 
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4.4.2.2.1 The affective experience after the recall of the anger stories 
 
 
Figure 81. Emotion ratings after the recall of anger stories 
 
An overall repeated-measures 4x6 ANOVA reported a 
significant main effect of Emotion (F(2.42,43.55)=9.70, p<.001, 
ηp2=.352), and a significant Time*Emotion interaction 
(F(1,19)=23.26, p<.001, ηp2=.564). Degrees of freedom were 
(sub-section continued on the left half of the next page) 
 
Figure 82. Affective intensity, specificity and accuracy after the 
recall of anger stories 
The 2x6 repeated-measures ANOVA for the affective 
intensity scores produced a main effect of Time 
(F(3.90,74.17)=6.47, p<.001, ηp2=.241; degrees of freedom 
corrected using the Huynh-Feldt estimate), a main effect of 
Intensity (F(1,19)=112.06, p<.001, ηp2=.855), and a 
(sub-section continued on the right half of the next page) 
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applied the Huynh-Feldt, and lower-bound corrections 
respectively.  
The planned-contrasts revealed that the complex 
interaction was driven by the decrease in the happiness ratings 
from Baseline (F(1,19)=33.61, p<.001, ηp2=.651; lower-bound 
correction of degrees of freedom) and the corresponding 
increase in negative emotions, most strongly, anger 
(F(3.55,63.94)=16.70, p=.001, ηp2=.481). The main effect of 
Emotion indicated that the target emotion anger and was 
significantly more intensely experienced than fear, sadness, and 
happiness. 
 
 
 
 
 
significant Time*Intensity interaction (F(1,19)=55.78, p<.001, 
ηp2=.746; degrees of freedom corrected using the lower-bound 
estimate). The main effect of Time best fitted a quadratic 
contrast (F(1,19)=10.90, p=.001, η2=.365), explained by an 
increase in the intensity of emotions from Baseline to 
Repetitions 1-3 and subsequent decrease for Immediate Unaided 
Recall and the delayed unaided recall after 30 minutes. The 
interaction was driven by the substantial difference in the 
intensity between positive and negative emotions, and the 
intensity within negative emotions at Baseline (t(19)=8.57, 
p<.001) 
 The analysis of the specificity indices (2x6 repeated-
measures ANOVA) reported that overall, the specificity indices 
did not vary over time (no effect of Time), except at Baseline, as 
indicated by the significant Time*Specificity interaction, 
(F(1,19)=52.20, p<.001, ηp2=.733). The substantial difference at 
Baseline (t(19)=8.61, p<.001) also explained the effect of 
Specificity (F(1,19)=67.95, p<.001, ηp2=.781). 
(sub-section continued on the right half of the next page) 
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 The analysis of the accuracy indices (2x5 repeated-
measures ANOVA) reported a single main effect of Accuracy 
(F(1,19)=5.00, p=.038, ηp2=.208), explained by the relatively 
higher values of the accuracy between positive and negative 
emotions. Notably, the accuracy indices did not vary over time 
(no effect of Time). 
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4.4.2.2.2 The affective experience after the recall of the fear stories 
 
 
Figure 83. Emotion ratings after the recall of fear stories 
 
The general repeated-measures 4x6 ANOVA reported a 
significant main effect of Emotion (F(3,57)=8.83, p<.001, 
ηp2=.317), and a significant Time*Emotion interaction 
(F(1,19)=21.98, p<.001, ηp2=.536; degrees of freedom corrected  
(sub-section continued on the right half of the next page) 
 
Figure 84. Affective intensity, specificity and accuracy after the 
recall of fear stories 
 The 2x6 repeated-measures ANOVA for the affective 
intensity scores reported an effect of Time (F(1,19)=5.94, 
p=.025, ηp2=.238; degrees of freedom corrected using the lower-
bound estimate), a main effect of Intensity (F(1,19) = 
(sub-section continued on the right half of the next page) 
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Base Rep 1 Rep 2 Rep 3 ImmUR 30mUR
Em
o
ti
o
n
 R
at
in
gs
 (
V
A
M
S)
Anger Fear Sadness Happiness
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Base Rep 1 Rep 2 Rep 3 ImmUR 30mUR
Intens(b)
Intens(w)
Spec(b)
Spec(w)
Acc(b)F
Acc(w)F
4. Intensity, specificity, and accuracy of discrete emotions in amnesia 
229 
 
using the lower-bound estimate. 
Similarly with section 4.4.2.2.1, the planned-contrasts 
revealed a complex interaction. A significant effect was reported 
for the decrease of the happiness ratings from Baseline 
(F(1,19)=33.01, p<.001, ηp2=.635; lower-bound correction of 
degrees of freedom) and the corresponding increase in negative 
emotions, most strongly, fear (F(3.53,67.22)=20.22, p<.001, 
ηp2=.516; Huynh-Feldt correction of degrees of freedom). The 
main effect of Emotion indicated that the target emotion fear 
and was significantly more intensely experienced than anger, 
sadness, and happiness. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
95.02, p<.001, ηp2=.833), and a significant Time*Intensity 
interaction (F(5,95)=55.78, p<.001, ηp2=.685). The main effect 
of Time best fitted a quadratic contrast (F(1,19)=22.19, p<.001, 
ηp2=.539), explained by an increase in the intensity of emotions 
from Baseline to Repetitions 1-3 and subsequent decrease for 
Immediate Unaided Recall and the delayed unaided recall after 
30 minutes. The interaction was driven by the substantial 
difference in the intensity between positive and negative 
emotions, and the intensity within negative emotions at Baseline 
(t(19)=7.71, p<.001) 
 Similarly with section 4.4.2.2.1, the 2x6 repeated-
measures ANOVA used to analyse the specificity indices 
reported that overall, the specificity indices did not vary over 
time (no effect of Time), except at Baseline, as indicated by the 
significant Time*Specificity interaction, (F(1,19)=28.22, p<.001, 
ηp2=.598; degrees of freedom corrected using the lower-bound 
estimate). The interaction was cause by the difference between 
the specificity between positive and negative emotions  
(sub-section continued on the right half of the next page) 
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and the specificity within negative emotions at Baseline 
(t(19)=7.37, p<.001), which also explained the effect of 
Specificity (F(1,19)=56.77, p<.001, ηp2=.749). 
 The analysis of the accuracy indices (2x5 repeated-
measures ANOVA) failed to reach significance, confirming that 
there was no difference between the two accuracy indices, and 
also that the accuracy didn’t change over time. 
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4.4.2.2.3 The affective experience after the recall of the sadness stories 
 
 
Figure 85. Emotion ratings after the recall of sadness stories 
 
The general repeated-measures 4x6 ANOVA reported a 
significant main effect of Emotion (F(1,19)=14.45, p=.001, 
ηp2=.432), and a significant Time*Emotion interaction 
(F(1,19)=21.35, p<.001, ηp2=.529; degrees of freedom corrected 
using the lower-bound estimate.  
(sub-section continued on the left half of the next page) 
 
Figure 86. Affective intensity, specificity and accuracy after the 
recall of sadness stories 
The analysis of the affective intensity scores (2x6 
repeated-measures ANOVA) reported an effect of Intensity 
(F(1,19)=33.53, p<.001, ηp2=.638; degrees of freedom corrected 
using the lower-bound estimate), and a significant 
(sub-section continued on the right half of the next page) 
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Similarly with sections 4.4.2.2.1 and 4.4.2.2.2, the 
planned-contrasts of the complex interaction was driven to 
largest extent by the decrease of the happiness ratings from 
Baseline over time (F(1,19)=25.71, p<.001, ηp2=.575; lower-
bound correction of degrees of freedom) and the corresponding 
increase in negative emotions, most notably, sadness 
(F(1,19)=15.39 p=.001, ηp2=.447; degrees of freedom corrected 
using the lower-bound estimate). The main effect of Emotion 
indicated that the target emotion sadness and was significantly 
more intensely experienced than anger, fear, and happiness. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Time*Intensity interaction (F(1,19)=28.49, p<.001, ηp2=.600). 
The interaction was driven by the substantial difference in the 
intensity between positive and negative emotions, and the 
intensity within negative emotions at Baseline (t(19)=7.69, 
p<.001). The intensity indices did not vary over time between 
the Repetition to the Unaided Recall phases (no effect of Time). 
 The analysis of the specificity indices (2x6 repeated-
measures ANOVA) reported an effect of Specificity 
(F(1,19)=21.59, p<.001, ηp2=.532) and a significant 
Time*Specificity interaction (F(1,19)=26.96, p<.001, ηp2=.587; 
degrees of freedom corrected using the lower-bound estimate). 
As in the case of the intensity indices, the interaction was caused 
by the difference between the specificity between positive and 
negative emotions and the specificity within negative emotions 
at Baseline (t(19)=7.21, p<.001), which also explained the effect 
of Specificity. 
 
(sub-section continued on the right half of the next page) 
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Similarly with section 4.4.2.2.2, the analysis of the 
accuracy indices (2x5 repeated-measures ANOVA) failed to 
reach significance. The result confirmed that there was no 
difference between the two accuracy indices, and also that they 
remained constant between the Repetition and Unaided Recall 
phases. 
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4.4.2.2.4 The affective experience after the recall of the happiness stories 
 
 
Figure 87. Emotion ratings after the recall of happiness stories 
 
The overall repeated-measures 4x6 ANOVA reported a 
single significant main effect of Emotion (F(1,18)=80.21, 
p<.001, ηp2=.817). Degrees of freedom were corrected using the 
lower-bound estimate. The effect of Emotion was best fitted by a  
(sub-section continued on the left half of the next page) 
 
Figure 88. Affective intensity, specificity and accuracy after the 
recall of happiness stories 
The analysis of the affective intensity indices (2x6 
repeated-measures ANOVA) reported a single effect of Intensity 
(F(1,18)=83.48, p<.001, ηp2=.823), and no effect of Time or an 
interaction. The results suggest that affective intensity remained 
(sub-section continued on the right half of the next page) 
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linear contrast, showing that happiness was significantly higher 
rated than anger, fear, or sadness, throughout the six time 
points, from Baseline to Unaided  Recall after 30 minutes 
(F(1,18)=114.20, p<.001, ηp2=.864). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
unchanged from Baseline to Repetitions 1-3 and Unaided Recall 
(immediate and 30 minutes delayed). 
 The analysis of the specificity indices (2x6 repeated-
measures ANOVA) reported a similar single effect of Specificity 
(F(1,18)=70.86, p<.001, ηp2=.797), as the intensity indices. Both 
the effect of Time and the Time*Specificity interaction failed to 
reach significance. Similarly with the intensity indices, the 
findings suggest that the affective specificity both between 
positive and negative emotions and within negative emotions 
remained largely similar from Baseline throughout the different 
recall tasks. 
 The one-way repeated-measures ANOVA used to 
analyse the accuracy between positive and negative emotions 
failed to reach significance after correcting the degrees of 
freedom to account for the violation of sphericity. The results 
suggest the index remained unchanged over time, from Baseline 
to the Repetition and the Unaided Recall tasks. The findings are 
consistent with the previous analysis of the specificity indices. 
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4.4.3 Sample 3: Korsakoff’s syndrome patients 
 
The data presented in this section is part of the data analysed in Chapter 3, 
representing the Korsakoff’s syndrome patients. As for the previous sample (section 
4.4.2), the details regarding sample characteristics, measures and stimuli used, the 
design and procedure of the data collection, and the detailed results of the 
neuropsychological assessments are presented in Chapter 3, and will not be repeated 
below. 
 
4.4.3.1 Data Analysis 
 
 The ratings of anger, fear, sadness, and happiness are analysed in a global 4x6 
repeated-measures ANOVA, with the two factors being Emotion and Time (Baseline, 
Repetitions 1-3, Immediate Recall and Recall after 30 minutes). The significant 
interactions and main effects are explored further using planned contrasts and pair-wise 
comparisons. 
 Similarly with section 4.4.4.2.1 above, the affective intensity, specificity and 
accuracy scores are presented together, but analysed separately. Firstly, the intensity 
between positive and negative emotions and the intensity within negative emotions are 
subjected to a repeated-measures 2x6 ANOVA, with the significant interaction and 
main effects being followed-up with planned contrasts. Secondly, the indices of 
specificity between positive and negative emotions and the specificity within negative 
emotions are analysed together in a similar 2x6 repeated-measures ANOVA. And 
thirdly, the accuracy between positive and negative emotions and the accuracy within 
negative emotions are analysed using a similar 2x5 repeated-measures ANOVA. The 
analysis of the accuracy indices omits the Baseline time-point, because the target 
emotion only refers to the emotion induction tasks of presentation and recall. 
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4.4.3.2 Results 
 
 Similarly with section 4.4.2.2 above, the traditional analysis of the emotion 
ratings is presented on the left side of the page and the analysis of the novel summary 
indices of affective intensity, specificity and accuracy on the right side. The emotion 
ratings is illustrated using a bar chart for the benefit of visual clarity, although the data 
represent a repeated measures design. As before, the expected/target emotion at 
Baseline was happiness, thus, the accuracy within negative emotions is not calculated at 
Baseline for any of the sub-sections below. Moreover, the accuracy within negative 
emotions is cannot be calculated for the happiness story (see section 4.4.4 below, 
figures on the right side). 
The time-points presented in both figures use the same abbreviations as in the earlier 
section 4.4.2.2, as follows: 
Base – Baseline measure of emotions; 
Rep 1 – the first repetition of the emotional story (recalled after presentation); 
Rep 2 – the second repetition of the emotional story (recalled after presentation); 
Rep 3 – the third repetition of the emotional story (recalled after presentation); 
ImmUR – Immediate Unaided Recall (recall after the distraction story without a prior 
presentation of the emotional story); 
30mUR – 30 minutes Unaided Recall (recall after 30 minutes without a prior 
presentation of the story); 
 The intensity, specificity, and accuracy indices are shown in figures on the right 
side using the same abbreviations as previously: 
Intens(b) – the intensity between positive and negative emotions;  
Intens(w) – the intensity within negative emotions;  
Spec(b) – the specificity between positive and negative emotions;  
4. Intensity, specificity, and accuracy of discrete emotions in amnesia 
238 
 
Spec(w) – the specificity within positive and negative emotions; 
Acc(b) – the accuracy between positive and negative emotions; 
Acc(w)A – the accuracy within negative emotions, when anger is the target/expected 
emotion; 
Acc(w)F – the accuracy within negative emotions, when fear is the target/expected 
emotion; 
Acc(w)S – the accuracy within negative emotions, when sadness is the target/expected 
emotion; 
Acc(w)H – the accuracy within negative emotions, when happiness is the 
target/expected emotion. 
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4.4.3.2.1 The affective experience after the recall of the anger stories 
 
 
Figure 89. Emotion ratings after the recall of anger stories 
 
The overall repeated-measures 4x6 ANOVA reported a 
single significant main effect of Time (F(3.97,75.44)=4.53, p=.005, 
ηp2=.193; degrees of freedom corrected using the Greenhouse-
Geisser estimate), and a significant Time*Emotion  
(sub-section continued on the left half of the next page) 
 
Figure 90. Affective intensity, specificity and accuracy after the 
recall of anger stories 
The analysis of the affective intensity scores (2x6 repeated-
measures ANOVA) reported an effect of Time (F(1,19)=7.14, 
p=.015, ηp2=.273; degrees of freedom corrected using the lower-
bound estimate), an effect of Intensity (F(1,19)=7.58, p=.013, 
(sub-section continued on the right half of the next page) 
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interaction (F(1,19)=7.50, p=.013, ηp2=.283; degrees of freedom 
corrected using the lower-bound estimate). Notably, the effect of 
Emotion failed to reach significance after correcting the degrees of 
freedom for the violation of the sphericity assumption. 
 The complex interaction was best fitted by the quadratic 
contrast of Time and the linear contrast of Emotion (F(1,19)=23.68, 
p<.001, ηp2=.555) showing that as the overall ratings of emotions 
increased from Baseline to the Repetitions phases, they then 
decreased over time in the unaided recall phases (immediate and 30 
minutes delayed). This contrasted with the high ratings of 
happiness at Baseline which immediately subsided for the 
remaining phases (F(1,19)=8.71, p=.008, ηp2=.314), while the 
ratings of the negative emotions, especially anger increased 
(F(1,19)=13.61, p=.002, ηp2=.417) and remained dominant over 
time. 
 
 
 
ηp2=.285), and a significant Time*Intensity interaction 
(F(5,95)=10.87, p<.001, ηp2=.364). The interaction was mostly 
driven by the difference between the intensity between positive and 
negative emotions and the intensity within negative emotions at 
Baseline (t(19)=4.53, p<.001) and at the last recall phase (Unaided 
Recall after 30 minutes; t(19)=2.19, p=.041). The effect of Time 
was best fitted by a quadratic contrast (F(1,19)=13.30, p=.002, 
ηp2=.412), which indicated that overall, the intensity indices 
increased from Baseline to the Repetition phases and then 
decreased over time, in particular at the last phase (Unaided Recall 
after 30 minutes). 
 The analysis of the specificity indices (2x6 repeated-
measures ANOVA) reported an small effect of Time 
(F(4.20,79.70)=2.59, p=.041, ηp2=.120; degrees of freedom 
corrected using the Huynh-Feldt estimate), an effect of Specificity 
(F(1,19)=7.63, p=.012, ηp2=.287), and a significant 
Time*Specificity interaction, (F(1,19)=7.71, p=.012, ηp2=.289; 
degrees of freedom corrected using the lower-bound estimate). As  
(sub-section continued on the right half of the next page) 
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in the case of the intensity indices, the interaction was mostly 
caused by the difference between the specificity indices at Baseline 
(t(19)=3.95, p=.001) and at the last recall phase (Unaided Recall 
after 30 minutes; t(19)=2.17, p=.043). The effect of Time was best 
fitted by a linear contrast (F(1,19)=6.31, p=.021, ηp2=.249), which 
indicated that overall, the specificity indices decreased over time.  
 The 2x5 repeated-measures ANOVA used to analyse the 
affective accuracy indices failed to reach significance. This 
suggested that the accuracy between positive and negative 
emotions was similar with the accuracy within negative emotions, 
and both indices remained relatively stable over time. The 
downward trend observed at Unaided Recall after 30 minutes failed 
to reach significance. 
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4.4.3.2.2 The affective experience after the recall of the fear stories 
 
 
Figure 91. Emotion ratings after the recall of the fear stories 
 
The overall repeated-measures 4x6 ANOVA reported a 
significant effect of Time (F(4.22,71.69)=6.91, p<.001, ηp2=.289; 
degrees of freedom corrected using the Huynh-Feldt estimate), an 
effect of Emotion (F(3,51)=17.40, p<.001, ηp2=.506) and a  
(sub-section continued on the left half of the next page) 
 
Figure 92. Affective intensity, specificity and accuracy after the 
recall of the fear stories 
The analysis of the affective intensity scores (2x6 repeated-
measures ANOVA) reported an effect of Time 
(F(3.68,62.60)=6.29, p<.001, ηp2=.270; degrees of freedom 
corrected using the Huynh-Feldt estimate), an effect of Intensity  
(sub-section continued on the right half of the next page) 
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significant Time*Emotion interaction (F(10.51,178.81)=12.56, 
p<.001, ηp2=.425; degrees of freedom corrected using the Huynh-
Feldt estimate). 
 The complex interaction was best fitted by the quadratic 
contrast of Time and a quadratic contrast of Emotion 
(F(1,17)=33.20, p<.001, ηp2=.661) indicating that the overall 
ratings of emotions increased from Baseline to the Repetitions 
phases, and then decreased over time in the unaided recall phases 
(immediate and 30 minutes delayed), while the ratings of happiness 
dramatically subsided from Baseline (F(1,17)=15.21, p=.001, 
ηp2=.472; degrees of freedom corrected using the lower-bound 
estimate), while the ratings of the negative emotions, especially 
fear increased from Baseline (F(5,85)=16.10, p<.001, ηp2=.486) 
and remained dominant over time. 
 
 
 
 
(F(1,17)=11.75, p=.003, ηp2=.409), and a significant 
Time*Intensity interaction (F(5,85)=10.17, p<.001, ηp2=.374). The 
interaction was mostly driven by the difference between the 
intensity between positive and negative emotions and the intensity 
within negative emotions at Baseline (t(18)=3.79, p=.001). The 
effect of Time was best fitted by a linear contrast (F(1,17)=11.51, 
p=.003, ηp2=.404), which indicated that overall, the intensity 
indices increased from Baseline over time, but when discounting 
the Baseline values, intensity was stable over time. 
 The analysis of the specificity indices (2x6 repeated-
measures ANOVA) reported an small effect of Time (F(5,85)=3.52, 
p=.041, ηp2=.171), and an effect of Specificity (F(1,17)=14.91, 
p=.001, ηp2=.467). The Time*Specificity interaction failed to reach 
significance after correcting the degrees of freedom to account for 
the violation of the sphericity assumption. Similarly with the 
intensity indices, the main effect of Time best fitted a linear 
contrast, confirming that the specificity indices decreased  
(sub-section continued on the right half of the next page) 
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over time, from Baseline to the Repetition and Unaided Recall 
phases. 
The 2x5 repeated-measures ANOVA used to analyse the 
affective accuracy indices reported a single effect of Accuracy 
(F(1,17)=37.13, p<.001, ηp2=.686), confirming that the accuracy 
between positive and negative emotions was significantly higher 
than the accuracy within negative emotions, effect which remained 
constant over time, regardless of the memory task performed. 
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4.4.3.2.3 The affective experience after the recall of the sadness stories 
 
 
Figure 93. Emotion ratings after the recall of sadness stories 
 
The overall repeated-measures 4x6 ANOVA reported a 
significant effect of Emotion (F(2.12,40.21)=5.23, p=.009, 
ηp2=.216; degrees of freedom corrected using the Huynh-Feldt 
estimate), a significant Time*Emotion interaction (F(1,19)=8.45,  
(sub-section continued on the left half of the next page) 
 
Figure 94. Affective intensity, specificity and accuracy after the 
recall of sadness stories 
The analysis of the affective intensity indices (2x6 repeated-
measures ANOVA) reported an effect of Intensity (F(1,19)=22.10, 
p<.001, ηp2=.538), and a significant Time*Intensity interaction 
(F(1,19)=12.65, p=.002, ηp2=.400; degrees of freedom corrected 
(sub-section continued on the right half of the next page) 
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P=.009, ηp2=.308; degrees of freedom corrected using the lower-
bound estimate). 
 Similarly with section 4.3.2.3, the complex interaction was 
best fitted by the quadratic contrast of Time and a quadratic 
contrast of Emotion (F(1,19)=28.20, p<.001, ηp2=.597) indicating 
that the overall ratings of emotions increased from Baseline to the 
Repetitions phases, and then decreased over time in the unaided 
recall phases (immediate and 30 minutes delayed), while the ratings 
of happiness dramatically subsided from Baseline (F(1,19)=10.57, 
p=.004, ηp2=.358; degrees of freedom corrected using the lower-
bound estimate), while the ratings of the negative emotions, 
especially sadness increased from Baseline (F(1,19)=8.19, p<.010, 
ηp2=.301) and remained the highest over time. 
 
 
 
 
using the lower-bound estimate). The effect of Time failed to reach 
significance after correcting the degrees of freedom, due to the 
sphericity violation. The interaction was mostly driven by the 
difference between the intensity between positive and negative 
emotions and the intensity within negative emotions at Baseline 
(t(18)=5.79, p<.001). 
 The analysis of the specificity indices (2x6 repeated-
measures ANOVA) reported an effect of Specificity 
(F(1,19)=22.37, p<.001, ηp2=.541) and a Time*Specificity 
interaction (F(5,95)=8.34, p<.001, ηp2=.305). Similarly with the 
intensity indices, the interaction was caused by the difference 
between the specificity between positive and negative emotions and 
the specificity within negative emotions at Baseline (t(18)=4.96, 
p<.001). Notably, there was no effect of Time, suggesting the 
specificity indices remained constant over time, regardless of the 
memory task employed. 
 The 2x5 repeated-measures ANOVA used to analyse the  
(sub-section continued on the right half of the next page) 
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affective accuracy indices failed to reach significance, indicating 
that both accuracy indices were largely similar, and did not change 
over time, from Baseline, to the Repetition and Unaided Recall 
phases. 
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4.4.3.2.4 The affective experience after the recall of the happiness stories 
 
 
Figure 95. Emotion ratings after the recall of happiness stories 
 
The overall repeated-measures 4x6 ANOVA reported a 
single significant main effect of Emotion (F(1,18)=66.06, p<.001, 
ηp2=.786; degrees of freedom corrected using the lower-bound 
estimate). The Time*Emotion interaction failed to reach  
(sub-section continued on the left half of the next page) 
 
Figure 96. Affective intensity, specificity and accuracy after the 
recall of happiness stories 
The analysis of the affective intensity indices (2x6 repeated-
measures ANOVA) reported an effect of Intensity (F(1,18)=78.87, 
p<.001, ηp2=.814). The Time*Intensity interaction failed to reach 
significance after degrees of freedom were adjusted to account for 
(sub-section continued on the right half of the next page) 
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significance, after correcting the degrees of freedom to account for 
the violation of sphericity. 
 The effect of emotion best fitted a linear contrast 
(F(1,18)=74.11, p<.001, ηp2=.805) showing that the ratings of 
happiness were significantly higher than those of any negative 
emotions (anger, fear, or sadness). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
the violation of sphericity. The results suggest that the intensity 
indices remained largely stable from Baseline to Repetitions 1-3 
and Unaided Recall (immediate and 30 minutes delayed).  
 The analysis of the specificity indices (2x6 repeated-
measures ANOVA) reported a single effect of Specificity 
(F(1,18)=70.63, p<.001, ηp2=.797). Both the effect of Time and the 
Time*Specificity interaction failed to reach significance after 
correcting the degrees of freedom. Similarly with the intensity 
indices, the findings suggest that the affective specificity both 
between positive and negative emotions and within negative 
emotions remained largely similar from Baseline throughout the 
different recall tasks. 
 The one-way repeated-measures ANOVA used to analyse 
the accuracy between positive and negative emotions failed to 
reach significance, indicating that the index remained unchanged 
over time, from Baseline to Unaided Recall after 30 minutes. The 
findings are consistent with the previous analysis of the specificity 
indices. 
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4.4.4 Summary of main findings relating to the affective intensity, specificity and 
accuracy indices 
 
 A brief summary of the main findings presented in sections 4.4.1.2.1 – 4.4.1.2.8, 
4.4.2.2.1 – 4.4.2.2.4 and 4.4.3.2.1 – 4.4.3.2.4 are included in Table 11, below. The four 
discrete emotions and the stories (endings and stems) which were targeted to elicit them 
are presented in the same order as in previous chapters (i.e., anger, fear, sadness, and 
happiness) and are initialled only in the table (i.e., A – for anger stories, etc.). As in 
previous sections, the index for the accuracy within negative emotions cannot be 
calculated for the happiness stories, and this is indicated in Table 11 as “not applicable” 
(n/a). The intensity, specificity and accuracy indices and the experimental time points 
are presented using the same abbreviations as in previous chapters and sections: 
 
Intens(b) – the intensity between positive and negative emotions;  
Intens(w) – the intensity within negative emotions;  
Spec(b) – the specificity between positive and negative emotions;  
Spec(w) – the specificity within positive and negative emotions; 
Acc(b) – the accuracy between positive and negative emotions; 
Acc(w)A – the accuracy within negative emotions, when anger is the target/expected 
emotion; 
Acc(w)F – the accuracy within negative emotions, when fear is the target/expected 
emotion; 
Acc(w)S – the accuracy within negative emotions, when sadness is the target/expected 
emotion; 
Acc(w)H – the accuracy within negative emotions, when happiness is the 
target/expected emotion. 
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ImmUR – Immediate Unaided Recall (recall after the distraction story without a prior 
presentation of the emotional story); 
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Table 11. Summary of findings about the affective intensity, specificity, and accuracy indices 
Summary of findings about the affective intensity, specificity, and accuracy indices. (1) Although the results don’t fit the overall findings, a 
notable interference effect was observed during Immediate Unaided Recall. For the anger and fear stories (Sample 3 only) the Acc(b) and 
Acc(w) indices were significantly more pronounced at ImmUR, while, conversely, for the happiness story, the Acc(b) and Acc(w) indices 
were markedly lower at ImmUR, For the happiness stories (Samples 2 and 3) the Intens(b), Spec(b), and Acc(b) indices were notably lower 
after the negatively valenced interference story, and the Intens(w) and Spec(w) were notably higher than before; (2) Although the results 
did not reach significance, a distinct downward trend was noticeable, which is consistent with the findings for Sample 1 (neurologically 
normal students).  
Stimuli Indices Findings 
Sample 1 
Students 
Sample 2 
Elderly controls 
Sample 3 
Korsakoff patients 
Story 
endings 
(semantically 
emotional) 
Intensity 
Intens(b) > Intens(w) A, F, S, H A, F, S, H A, F, S, – 
Intens(b) decreases over time A, F, S, H A, F, –, (1) A, –, –, (1) 
Intens(w) decreases over time A, F, S, –  A, F, –, (1) A, –, –, (1) 
Specificity 
Spec(b) > Spec(w) A, F, S, H A, F, S, H A, F, S, – 
Spec (b) decreases over time A, F, S, H –, –, –, (1) A, F, –, (1) 
Spec(w) decreases over time A, F, S, –  –, –, –, (1) A, F, –, (1) 
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Accuracy 
Acc(b) > Acc(w) A, F, S, n/a A, –, –, n/a –, F, –, n/a 
Acc (b) decreases over time A, –, S, H –, –, –, (1) (1)(2), (1)(2), –, (1) 
Acc(w) decreases over time A, –, S, n/a  –, –, –, n/a (1)(2), (1)(2), –, n/a 
Story stems 
(semantically 
neutral) 
Intensity 
Intens(b) > Intens(w) A, F, S, –   
Intens(b) decreases at ImmUR A, F, –, – 
Intens(w) increases at ImmUR A, F, –, – 
Specificity 
Spec(b) > Spec(w) A, –, –, – 
Spec (b) decreases at ImmUR A, F, –, – 
Spec(w) increases at ImmUR A, –, –, – 
Accuracy 
Acc(b) > Acc(w) A, F, S, n/a 
Acc (b) decreases at ImmUR A, F, S, – 
Acc(w) increases at ImmUR A, –, S, n/a 
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4.4.5 Conclusions 
 
The experimental paradigm of emotion elicitation differed slightly between 
Sample 1 (the neurologically normal undergraduate students) and Samples 2 and 3 
(Korsakoff’s syndrome patients and partly age matched neurologically normal elderly 
participants). The students listened to the emotional stories once, and recalled them after 
30 minutes and seven days, while the patients and elderly controls listened to the 
emotional stories in three successive iterations, followed by a differently valenced 
interference story (i.e., happiness story for all the negative target emotions, and sadness 
story when happiness was the target emotion). Subsequently, patients and elderly 
controls immediately tried to recall the original story, and then again after 30 minutes. 
The first noticeable difference is that the Time effect refers to a seven day period in case 
of the students (Sample) and only 30 minutes for elderly controls and patients (Samples 
2 and 3 respectively). Secondly, the patients and controls allowed the observation of a 
possible emotional interference effect (corresponding to the well-established episodic 
memory interference), while this was not factored in the study design of the student 
sample. 
The emotional interference effect was clearly noticeable for both Korsakoff’s 
syndrome patients and elderly controls and differed between positive and negative 
emotions. The strongest and most consistent interference effect was noticed for 
happiness. Both groups of participants after listening to the happiness story for three 
times reported high levels of happiness, with barely any negative emotions, as expected. 
However, when recalling the happiness story immediately after listening and recalling a 
sad event, the intensity, specificity, and accuracy of the experience of happiness was 
markedly lower than before. When trying again to recall the happiness story after 30 
minutes from the interference story, the intensity, specificity and accuracy of the 
happiness experience was restored to the normal levels before the interference. Notably, 
this effect was observed irrespective of the amount of information actually being 
recalled each time (after interference and 30 minutes later). The difference between the 
amount of episodic information recalled by both groups was significant, but the effect 
was present nonetheless. These findings mirror the classical episodic memory effect, 
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where patients with a mild memory impairment are significantly affected by the 
memory interference task, but after a 30 minute delay manage to recall just as many 
episodic details as participants without a memory impairment. This is while patients 
with a severe memory impairment suffer from a substantial disruption of recall accuracy 
immediately after the interference task and fail to improve any further after the 30 
minutes delay.  
The second and different emotional interference effect was noticed for the 
negative emotions (anger and fear, but not sadness), and only for the Korsakoff’s 
syndrome patients, and not the elderly (neurologically normal) controls. After the three 
successive repetitions of the negative stories, and the interference of a novel and 
unrelated happiness story, patients had to recall the initial negative story. While the 
intensity indices showed a downward trend (or at best remained unchanged over time), 
the accuracy of the emotional experience, both between positive and negative emotions 
(but more strikingly even within negative emotions) increased only immediately after 
the interference happiness story, and after 30 minutes decreased to the normal levels 
recorder before interference. What the effect shows is that after the positively valenced 
interference story, the attempt to recall a negative story elicited the re-experience of 
“purer” (i.e., more discrete) and at the same time accurate negative emotions, but not 
more intense. The finding was consistent across two negative emotions, generally 
classed as highly arousing, and only when recall of the negative stories produced very 
few episodic details (the Korsakoff’s syndrome patients). The elderly control 
participants who managed to recall the stories accurately did not show an improvement 
in the affective accuracy following the interference story. 
This is for the first time that such an emotional interference effect is produced 
for discrete classes of emotions, in neurologically normal and amnesic patients. The 
novel indices of affective intensity, specificity, and accuracy allowed the calculation of 
such an effect. Notably, this effect was different between neurologically normal 
participants and Korsakoff’s syndrome controls. A first attempt to explain this 
difference between the two groups of participant would have to consider the starkest 
measured difference between the samples: the episodic recall of emotional stories. The 
literature on the interaction between memory and emotions has so far focused 
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predominantly on the intensity of positive and negative emotions, and only rarely on 
differences between discrete emotions. The re-experience of emotions over time, and 
most importantly the differences in the specificity and accuracy of the re-experience of 
discrete emotions in neurologically normal and memory impaired patients over time is 
most incisively approached in the present work. Far from providing definitive answers, 
the theoretical construct and application of the affective intensity, specificity and 
accuracy indices could inform future study designs and investigations of the relationship 
between emotions and memory. 
Other differences between the Korsakoff’s syndrome patients and control 
participants could also direct future research, but their magnitude was insufficient to 
allow a further investigation in the current work. For example, difference in executive 
function, and emotion regulation could have explained the difference in the emotion 
interference effect beyond any memory component. However, although the Korsakoff’s 
syndrome patients showed marginally lower executive function performance, and 
minimally raised anxiety and depression scores, these failed to reach significance and 
showed no correlation with the emotion ratings, or with the intensity, specificity, and 
accuracy ratings. Nonetheless, in other populations, larger differences on these factors 
could be linked to a different affective experience, which further and beyond the use of 
emotion ratings could be informed by the novel indices exemplified in this chapter. 
 
4.5 Comparison between the intensity, specificity and accuracy of the Korsakoff 
patients and elderly controls 
 
 The new indices of emotional intensity, specificity and accuracy of the 
Korsakoff patients and the neurologically intact elderly controls were compared for 
each of the four stories, targeting a different discrete emotion (anger, fear, sadness and 
happiness). The results are presented separately for each story and summarised at the 
end. A series of 2x6 mixed-factorial ANOVA are performed for each index, with two 
Groups (Patients and Controls) and six Time points (Baseline, Repetitions 1-3, 
Immediate Unaided Recall, and 30 minutes Delayed Unaided Recall). Differences on 
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the accuracy within negative emotions are assessed using a 2x5 mixed-factorial 
ANOVA (similar with the one before, but excluding the Baseline ratings, for which this 
accuracy index cannot be calculated). To avoid duplication with the previous sections 
(4.4.1-4.4.4), only the between-subjects effects are reported (comparing the Korsakoff 
patients and control participants) and any possible Time*Group interactions. 
 
4.5.1 The intensity, specificity and accuracy of the affective re-experience of the 
Korsakoff patients and elderly controls after the anger story 
 
Figure 97 (below) shows the index scores for the intensity between positive and 
negative emotions (A.) and within negative emotions (B.) for the two groups of 
participants. A 2x6 mixed-factorial ANOVA performed on the indices of the intensity 
between positive and negative emotions failed to confirm a significant effect of Group 
(F(1,38)=1.83, p=.184, ηp2=.046), or Time*Group interaction (F(3.62,137.78)=1.06, 
p=.375, ηp2=.027) – degrees of freedom corrected using the Greenhouse-Geisser 
estimate (GG). To confirm that the results were not compromised by the six levels of 
the Time factor and associated α level correction, a separate independent-samples t-test 
was carried out for the intensity between positive and negative emotions after Repetition 
2, where the Mean Difference between the Korsakoff patients’ and control participants’ 
scores was highest. The t-test failed to confirm a significant difference (t(38)=-1.21, 
p=.235). 
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Figure 97. The intensity between positive and negative emotions (A.) and the intensity 
within negative emotions (B.) for Korsakoff patients and elderly controls after the 
presentation and recall of the anger story. 
The intensity between positive and negative emotions and the intensity within negative 
emotions was similar for Korsakoff patients and control participants throughout the 
series of presentations and recollections of the anger story. 
 
A similar 2x6 mixed-factorial ANOVA tested the differences between the 
intensity within negative emotions for the two groups. The results showed no effect of 
Group (F(1,38)=.67, p=.420, ηp2=.017), or Time*Group interaction 
(F(3.72,141.29)=.89, p=.455, ηp2=.023) – degrees of freedom corrected using the 
Huynh-Feldt estimate (HF). 
Figure 98 (below) illustrates the specificity between positive and negative 
emotions (A.) and within negative emotions (B.) for the two groups of participants. 
Possible differences in the intensity between positive and negative emotions of 
Korsakoff patients and elderly controls were compared using a 2x6 mixed-factorial 
ANOVA. The results failed to confirm a significant effect of Group (F(1,38)=.57, 
p=.454, ηp2=.015), or Time*Group interaction (F(3.91,148.63)=1.72, p=.149, ηp2=.043, 
HF) for the specificity between positive and negative emotions. To confirm that the 
results were not compromised by the six levels of the Time factor and the associated α 
level correction, a separate independent-samples t-test was carried out for the specificity 
between positive and negative emotions after Repetition 2, where the Mean Difference 
between the Korsakoff patients’ and control participants’ scores was highest. The t-test 
failed to confirm a significant difference (t(38)=-1.71, p=.096). 
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Figure 98. The specificity between positive and negative emotions (A.) and the 
specificity within negative emotions (B.) for Korsakoff patients and elderly controls 
after the presentation and recall of the anger story. 
The specificity between positive and negative emotions and the intensity within 
negative emotions was similar for Korsakoff patients and control participants 
throughout the series of presentations and recollections of the anger story. 
 
 A 2x6 mixed-factorial ANOVA was used to assess the differences between the 
specificity within negative emotions for the two groups. The results failed to confirm an 
effect of Group (F(1,38)=.17, p=.681, ηp2=.005), or Time*Group interaction 
(F(3.77,143.14)=1.71, p=.155, ηp2=.043) – degrees of freedom corrected using the 
Huynh-Feldt estimate (HF). To confirm that the results were not compromised by the 
six levels of the Time factor and associated α level correction, a separate independent-
samples t-test was carried out for the specificity within negative emotions after the 
Delayed Unaided Recall, where the Mean Difference between the Korsakoff patients’ 
and control participants’ scores was highest. The t-test failed to find a difference 
between the two groups (t(38)=1.59, p=.120). 
Figure 99 (below) shows the index scores for the accuracy between positive and 
negative emotions (A.) and within negative emotions (B.) for the two groups of 
participants. A 2x6 mixed-factorial ANOVA applied to the indices of accuracy between 
positive and negative emotions failed to confirm a significant effect of Group 
(F(1,38)=1.55, p=.221, ηp2=.039), or Time*Group interaction (F(1,38)=.77, p=.385, 
ηp2=.020) – degrees of freedom corrected using the lower-bound estimate of sphericity 
(LB). To confirm that the results were not compromised by the six levels of the Time 
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factor and associated α level correction, a separate independent-samples t-test was 
carried out for the accuracy between positive and negative emotions after the Delayed 
Unaided Recall, where the Mean Difference between the Korsakoff patients’ and 
control participants’ scores was highest. The t-test confirmed that the Korsakoff patients 
had lower accuracy indices than the control participants (t(38)=2.29, p=.028, d=.73). 
 
 
Figure 99. The accuracy between positive and negative emotions (A.) and the accuracy 
within negative emotions (B.) for Korsakoff patients and elderly controls after the 
presentation and recall of the anger story. 
Korsakoff patients showed similar accuracy between positive and negative emotions 
and the accuracy within negative emotions were lower with the control participants 
during the Repetition and Immediate recall phases. However, both indices were 
significantly lower after the 30 minutes delayed recall. 
 
A 2x5 mixed-factorial ANOVA tested the differences between the accuracy 
within negative emotions for the two groups. The results showed no effect of Group 
(F(1,38)=.35, p=.556, ηp2=.009), or Time*Group interaction (F(4,152)=1.28, p=.282, 
ηp2=.032). To confirm that the results were not compromised by the six levels of the 
Time factor and associated α level correction, a separate independent-samples t-test was 
carried out for the intensity between positive and negative emotions after the Delayed 
Unaided Recall, where the Mean Difference between the Korsakoff patients’ and 
control participants’ scores was highest. The t-test confirmed that the Korsakoff patients 
had lower accuracy indices than the control participants (t(38)=2.24, p=.031, d=.71). 
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In conclusion, the only differences between the Korsakoff patients and the 
control participants following the repetition and recall of the anger story were for the 
accuracy indices (both between positive and negative emotions and within negative 
emotions) after the 30 minute delayed recall. As shown in Figure 100 (below) these 
results were not mirrored by the specificity indices because some of patients scored high 
on the specificity indices, but in the negative range on the accuracy indices. This 
indicates that after the 30 minute delay some of the patients re-experienced discretely a 
non-target emotion with a high level of specificity, unlike the control participants who 
largely re-experienced only the target emotion. 
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Figure 100. The average intensity, specificity and accuracy between positive and 
negative emotions (A., C., and E.) and within negative emotions (B., D., and F.) for 
Korsakoff patients and elderly controls after the presentation and recall of the anger 
story. 
Some Korsakoff patients scored in the negative range on the index of the accuracy 
between positive and negative emotions, indicating that their levels of happiness 
exceeded the intensity of anger. The Korsakoff patients who scored negatively on the 
accuracy within negative emotions experienced another negative non-target emotion at 
higher levels than the target emotion (anger). 
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 The loss of affective accuracy for the Korsakoff patients (compared to control 
participants) was even more pronounced after the 30 minutes delayed recall, and 
confirmed by the inferential statistical tests above. Figure 101 (below) shows that the 
accuracy indices of some Korsakoff patients were substantially in the negative range (as 
low as negative 10) for the accuracy between positive and negative emotions, while 
negative emotions were at reported at zero. Other Korsakoff patients scored negatively 
on the accuracy within negative emotions as they reported another negative non-target 
emotion at higher levels than the target emotion (anger). 
 
 
Figure 101. The average specificity and accuracy between positive and negative 
emotions (A.) and within negative emotions (B.) for Korsakoff patients and elderly 
controls after the 30 minutes Delayed Recall of the anger story. 
The effect seen for the average scores (Figure 100, above) appears even more 
pronounced – as certain Korsakoff patients reported much higher levels of happiness 
than anger, and other Korsakoff patients experienced different negative non-target 
emotions at higher levels than the target emotion (anger). 
 
 The emotional re-experience following the anger story suggests that the 
Korsakoff patients and elderly controls experienced similarly intense and specific 
emotions following the presentation and recall of the anger stories, with a notable 
difference after the 30 minute Delayed Recall, when a few Korsakoff patients reversed 
to Baseline levels of affect, when happiness was the dominant emotion, and the 
negative emotions (including anger) were indistinguishable. The findings suggest that 
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for a distinct minority of patients, emotion regulatory processes contributed to the 
extinction of the specific and intense affective state initially elicited by the anger story. 
 
4.5.2 The intensity, specificity and accuracy of the affective re-experience of the 
Korsakoff patients and elderly controls after the fear story 
 
Figure 102 (below) presents the index scores for the intensity between positive 
and negative emotions (A.) and within negative emotions (B.) for the two groups of 
participants following the presentation and recall of the fear story. A 2x6 mixed-
factorial ANOVA performed on the indices of the intensity between positive and 
negative emotions found a significant Time*Group interaction (F(3.31,119.12)=3.52, 
p=.0.14, ηp2=.089, HF df), but failed to confirm a significant effect of Group 
(F(1,36)=.85, p=.364, ηp2=.023) or Time (F(3.31,119.12)=.65, p=.602, ηp2=.018, HF 
df). The Time*Group interaction was caused by the changes in the intensity ratings after 
the 30 minute Delayed Recall. At Baseline (t(37)=-1.21, p=.235), Repetition 1 
(t(37)=0.51, p=.614), Repetition 2 (t(38)=0.45, p=.651), Repetition 3 (t(38)=1.16, 
p=.254), and Immediate Unaided Recall (t(37)=1.8, p=.080) there were no differences 
between the two groups. However, after the 30 minute Delayed Unaided Recall, the 
intensity between positive and negative emotions of the Korsakoff patients was 
significantly higher than the intensity of the control participants (t(38)=2.08, p=.044, 
d=.661). Thus, the overall affective intensity of the Korsakoff patients was maintained 
at significantly higher levels than that of the control participants after the 30 minutes 
delay. 
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Figure 102. The intensity between positive and negative emotions (A.) and the intensity 
within negative emotions (B.) for Korsakoff patients and elderly controls after the 
presentation and recall of the fear story. 
Korsakoff patients’ emotion self-reports had a higher intensity between positive and 
negative after the 30 minutes delay than the affect ratings of the control participants., 
with no other significant differences.  
 
A 2x6 mixed-factorial ANOVA tested the differences between the intensity 
within negative emotions for the two groups. The results showed no effect of Group 
(F(1,36)=2.65, p=.113, ηp2=.068), or Time*Group interaction (F(3.06,110.75)=.65, 
p=.587, ηp2=.018, HF df). The effect of Time was reported previously in sections 
4.4.2.2.2 and 4.4.3.2.2). 
Figure 103 (below) shows the specificity between positive and negative 
emotions (A.) and within negative emotions (B.) for the two groups of participants. A 
2x6 mixed-factorial ANOVA tested the possible differences in the specificity between 
positive and negative emotions of Korsakoff patients and elderly controls. The results 
failed to confirm a significant effect of Group (F(1,36)=2.41, p=.129, ηp2=.063), or 
Time*Group interaction (F(4.39,157.93)=1.94, p=.101, ηp2=.051, HF df) for the 
specificity between positive and negative emotions. To confirm that the results were not 
compromised by the six levels of the Time and associated α level correction, a separate 
independent-samples t-test was carried out for the specificity between positive and 
negative emotions at Baseline, where the Mean Difference between the Korsakoff 
patients’ and control participants’ scores was highest. The t-test failed to confirm that 
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the Korsakoff patients had a lower specificity between positive and negative emotions 
than control participants (t(37)=2.21, p=.034). 
 
 
Figure 103. The specificity between positive and negative emotions (A.) and the 
specificity within negative emotions (B.) for Korsakoff patients and elderly controls 
after the presentation and recall of the fear story. 
At Baseline, the Korsakoff patients’ specificity between positive and negative emotions 
was lower, and the specificity within negative emotions was higher than those of the 
control participants, respectively. No other differences between the two groups were 
found. 
 
 A 2x6 mixed-factorial ANOVA was used to assess the differences between the 
specificity within negative emotions for the two groups. The results confirmed a 
significant Time*Group interaction (F(3.80,136.66)=3.08, p=.020, ηp2=.079, HF df), but 
no effect of Group (F(1,36)=.23, p=.636, ηp2=.006). The interaction was led by the 
differences in specificity within negative emotions at Baseline, when contrary to 
expectations, Korsakoff patients’ specificity was significantly higher than that of the 
control participants (t(37)=2.06, p=.047, d=.65). There were no further differences 
between the specificity within negative emotions of the Korsakoff patients and control 
participants after Repetition 1 (t(37)=0.44, p=.661), Repetition 2 (t(38)=1.48, p=.146), 
Repetition 3 (t(38)=0.47, p=.636), Immediate Unaided Recall (t(37)=0.46, p=.652), or 
the 30 minutes Delayed Unaided Recall (t(38)=1.55, p=.129). 
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Figure 104 (below) shows the index scores for the accuracy between positive 
and negative emotions (A.) and within negative emotions (B.) for the Korsakoff patients 
and the control participants. A 2x6 mixed-factorial ANOVA applied to the indices of 
accuracy between positive and negative emotions failed to confirm a significant effect 
of Group (F(1,36)=.34, p=.563, ηp2=.009), or Time*Group interaction (F(1,36)=1.62, 
p=.211, ηp2=.043, LB df). To confirm that the results were not compromised by the six 
levels of the Time factor and associated α level correction, a separate independent-
samples t-test was carried out for the accuracy between positive and negative emotions 
at Baseline and 30 minutes Delayed Unaided Recall, where the Mean Difference 
between the Korsakoff patients’ and control participants’ scores were highest. The t-test 
was not significant for Baseline (t(37)=1.66, p=.104) and 30 minutes Unaided Recall 
(t(38)=1.12, p=.269). 
 
 
Figure 104. The accuracy between positive and negative emotions (A.) and the accuracy 
within negative emotions (B.) for Korsakoff patients and elderly controls after the 
presentation and recall of the fear story. 
There were no differences between the accuracy indices of the Korsakoff patients and 
the control participants. 
 
A 2x5 mixed-factorial ANOVA tested the differences between the accuracy 
within negative emotions for the two groups. The results failed to find an effect of 
Group (F(1,36)=.61, p=.440, ηp2=.017), or Time*Group interaction (F(4,144)=.70, 
p=.592, ηp2=.019). To confirm that the results were not compromised by the six levels 
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of the Time factor and associated α level correction, a separate independent-samples t-
test was carried out for the intensity between positive and negative emotions after the 
Delayed Unaided Recall, where the Mean Difference between the Korsakoff patients’ 
and control participants’ scores was highest. The t-test was not significant (t(38)=1.69, 
p=.099). 
 
In conclusion, following the presentation and recall of the fear story the 
Korsakoff patients showed a higher intensity between positive and negative emotions 
after the 30 minutes delayed recall, higher specificity within negative emotions and 
lower specificity between positive and negative emotions at Baseline, when compared 
to the control participants. The surprising findings from the anger story, regarding the 
decreased accuracy between positive and negative emotions, and within negative 
emotions were not strong enough to be confirmed by inferential tests. However, a 
detailed view of the data (see Figure 105 below) shows that a minority of patients 
reported negative emotional accuracy between positive and negative emotions and 
within negative emotions. As before, this indicated that the respective Korsakoff 
patients experienced significant levels of happiness and other negative emotions 
(instead of fear).  
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Figure 105. The average intensity, specificity and accuracy between positive and 
negative emotions (A., C., and E.) and within negative emotions (B., D., and F.) for 
Korsakoff patients and elderly controls after the presentation and recall of the fear story. 
Although not statistically significant for the group analysis, some Korsakoff patients 
had a negative emotional accuracy following the presentation and recall of the fear 
stories. 
 
 The emotional re-experience following the fear story suggests that the Korsakoff 
patients and elderly controls experienced similarly intense and specific emotions 
following the presentation and recall of the anger stories. Although the Korsakoff 
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patients had a more intense overall emotional experience (between positive and negative 
emotions) after the 30 minutes Delayed Unaided Recall, this was not carried over into a 
higher specificity or accuracy of the emotional experience. Previously identified 
emotion regulatory processes leading Korsakoff patients to experience more increased 
levels of happiness and other non-target negative emotions than the control participants 
after the 30 minutes delay were not statistically confirmed. However, similarly with the 
anger stories, a few patients and to a lesser extent control participants indicated this 
trend, but the effect did not reach significance. The Baseline differences between 
Korsakoff patients and control participants, indicated that the patients group had 
somewhat lower levels of happiness and more specific (although not more intense) 
negative feelings before the beginning of the experimental emotion elicitation 
procedure. 
 
4.5.3 The intensity, specificity and accuracy of the affective re-experience of the 
Korsakoff patients and elderly controls after the sadness story 
 
Figure 106 (below) shows the index scores for the intensity between positive and 
negative emotions (A.) and within negative emotions (B.) for the two groups of 
participants. A 2x6 mixed-factorial ANOVA failed to confirm a significant effect of 
Group (F(1,38)=1.55, p=.221, ηp2=.039), or Time*Group interaction (F(1,38)=2.08, 
p=.157, ηp2=.052, LB df). To confirm that the results were not compromised by the six 
levels of the Time factor and associated α level correction, a separate independent-
samples t-test was carried out for the intensity between positive and negative emotions 
after Repetition 2 and 30 minutes Delayed Unaided Recall, where the Mean Difference 
between the Korsakoff patients’ and control participants’ scores was highest. The t-test 
failed to confirm a significant difference after Repetition 2 (t(38)=-1.78, p=.084), or 30 
minutes Delayed Unaided Recall (t(38)=-1.66, p=.105). 
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Figure 106. The intensity between positive and negative emotions (A.) and the intensity 
within negative emotions (B.) for Korsakoff patients and elderly controls after the 
presentation and recall of the sadness story. 
There were no differences between the intensity of the emotional experience of 
Korsakoff patients and control participants, either between positive and negative 
emotions or within negative emotions. 
 
A 2x6 mixed-factorial ANOVA tested the differences between the intensity 
within negative emotions for the two groups. The results showed no effect of Group 
(F(1,38)=1.20, p=.280, ηp2=.031), or Time*Group interaction (F(1,38)=.23, p=.636, 
ηp2=.006, LB df). The main effect of Time is presented in sections 4.4.2.2.3 and 
4.4.3.2.3. 
Figure 107 (below) illustrates the specificity between positive and negative 
emotions (A.) and within negative emotions (B.) for the two groups of participants. 
Possible differences in the intensity between positive and negative emotions of 
Korsakoff patients and elderly controls were compared using a 2x6 mixed-factorial 
ANOVA. The results failed to confirm a significant effect of Group (F(1,38)<.01, 
p=.973, ηp2<.001), or Time*Group interaction (F(1,38)=.72, p=.401, ηp2=.019, LB df). 
The main effect of Time is presented in sections 4.4.2.2.3 and 4.4.3.2.3. 
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Figure 107. The specificity between positive and negative emotions (A.) and the 
specificity within negative emotions (B.) for Korsakoff patients and elderly controls 
after the presentation and recall of the sadness story. 
There were no differences between the specificity of the emotional experience of 
Korsakoff patients and control participants, either between positive and negative 
emotions or within negative emotions. 
 
A 2x6 mixed-factorial ANOVA was used to assess the differences between the 
specificity within negative emotions for the two groups. The results failed to confirm an 
effect of Group (F(1,38)<.01, p=.997, ηp2<.001), or Time*Group interaction 
(F(1,38)=.64, p=.427, ηp2=.017, LB df). 
Figure 108 (below) shows the index scores for the accuracy between positive 
and negative emotions (A.) and within negative emotions (B.) for the two groups of 
participants. A 2x6 mixed-factorial ANOVA failed to confirm a significant effect of 
Group (F(1,38)=.96, p=.334, ηp2=.025), or Time*Group interaction (F(1,38)=.77, 
p=.385, ηp2=.020, LB df). The effect of Time is presented in sections 4.4.2.2.3 and 
4.4.3.2.3. To confirm that the results were not compromised by the six levels of the 
Time factor and associated α level correction, a separate independent-samples t-test was 
carried out for the intensity between positive and negative emotions at Baseline and 
after the Immediate Unaided Recall, where the Mean Difference between the Korsakoff 
patients’ and control participants’ scores was highest. 
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Figure 108. The accuracy between positive and negative emotions (A.) and the accuracy 
within negative emotions (B.) for Korsakoff patients and elderly controls after the 
presentation and recall of the sadness story. 
There were no differences between the accuracy of the emotional experience of 
Korsakoff patients and control participants, either between positive and negative 
emotions or within negative emotions. 
 
A 2x5 mixed-factorial ANOVA tested the differences between the accuracy 
within negative emotions for the two groups. The results showed no effect of Group 
(F(1,38)=.75, p=.392, ηp2=.019), or Time*Group interaction (F(1,38)=1.80, p=.188, 
ηp2=.045). To confirm that the results were not compromised by the six levels of the 
Time factor and associated α level correction, a separate independent-samples t-test was 
carried out for the intensity between positive and negative emotions after Repetition 2 
and the Immediate Unaided Recall, where the Mean Difference between the Korsakoff 
patients’ and control participants’ scores was highest. The t-tests were not significant 
after Repetition 3 (t(38)=1.36, p=.182) or Immediate Unaided Recall (t(38)=1.42, 
p=.164). 
In conclusion, there were no differences between the Korsakoff patients and the 
control participants following the repetition and recall of the sadness story. Previously 
identified difference for the accuracy indices (both between positive and negative 
emotions and within negative emotions) after the 30 minute delayed recall were not 
confirmed. As shown in Figure 109 (below) fewer Korsakoff patients had negative 
accuracy indices, and their values were more modest than in the case of anger and fear 
stories. 
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Figure 109. The average intensity, specificity and accuracy between positive and 
negative emotions (A., C., and E) and within negative emotions (B., D., and F.) for 
Korsakoff patients and elderly controls after the presentation and recall of the sadness 
story. 
Although not statistically significant for the group analysis, two Korsakoff patients had 
a negative emotional accuracy following the presentation and recall of the sadness 
stories. 
 The emotional re-experience following the sadness story suggests that the 
Korsakoff patients and elderly controls experienced similarly intense, specific, and 
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accurate emotions following the presentation, immediate and delayed recall. Only two 
Korsakoff patients reported higher rating of happiness than sadness, but the magnitude 
of differences was not enough to indicate a difference between patients and control 
participants. 
 
4.5.4 The intensity, specificity and accuracy of the affective re-experience of the 
Korsakoff patients and elderly controls after the happiness story 
 
Figure 110 (below) shows the index scores for the intensity between positive and 
negative emotions (A.) and within negative emotions (B.) for the two groups of 
participants. A 2x6 mixed-factorial ANOVA performed on the indices of the intensity 
between positive and negative emotions failed to confirm a significant effect of Group 
(F(1,36)=1.03, p=.316, ηp2=.028), or Time*Group interaction (F(1,36)=.44, p=.511, 
ηp2=.012, LB df). To confirm that the results were not compromised by the six levels of 
the Time factor and associated α level correction, a separate independent-samples t-test 
was carried out for the intensity between positive and negative emotions after 30 
minutes Delayed Unaided Recall, where the Mean Difference between the Korsakoff 
patients’ and control participants’ scores was highest. The t-test failed to confirm a 
significant difference (t(37)=-1.33, p=.192). 
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Figure 110. The intensity between positive and negative emotions (A.) and the intensity 
within negative emotions (B.) for Korsakoff patients and elderly controls after the 
presentation and recall of the happiness story. 
There were no differences between the intensity of emotional experience of the 
Korsakoff patients and the control participants. 
 
A similar 2x6 mixed-factorial ANOVA tested the differences between the 
intensity within negative emotions for the two groups. The results showed no effect of 
Group (F(1,36)=.24, p=.624, ηp2=.007), or Time*Group interaction 
(F(3.79,136.48)=1.33, p=.256, ηp2=.036, HF df). To confirm that the results were not 
compromised by the six levels of the Time factor and associated α level correction, a 
separate independent-samples t-test was carried out for the intensity between positive 
and negative emotions at Baseline, where the Mean Difference between the Korsakoff 
patients’ and control participants’ scores was highest. The t-test failed to confirm a 
significant difference (t(38)=-1.69, p=.099). 
Figure 111 (below) illustrates the specificity between positive and negative 
emotions (A.) and within negative emotions (B.) for the two groups of participants. 
Possible differences in the intensity between positive and negative emotions of 
Korsakoff patients and elderly controls were compared using a 2x6 mixed-factorial 
ANOVA. The results failed to confirm a significant effect of Group (F(1,36)=.45, 
p=.506, ηp2=.012), or Time*Group interaction (F(1,36)=.79, p=.380, ηp2=.021, LB df) 
for the specificity between positive and negative emotions. 
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Figure 111. The specificity between positive and negative emotions (A.) and the 
specificity within negative emotions (B.) for Korsakoff patients and elderly controls 
after the presentation and recall of the happiness story. 
There were no differences in the specificity of the emotional experience (between 
positive and negative emotions, or within negative emotions) for the Korsakoff patients 
and control participants. 
 
 A 2x6 mixed-factorial ANOVA assessed the differences between the specificity 
within negative emotions for the two groups. The results failed to confirm an effect of 
Group (F(1,36)<.01, p=.964, ηp2<.001), or Time*Group interaction (F(1,36)=.51, 
p=.482, ηp2=.014, LB df).  
Figure 112 (below) shows the index scores for the accuracy between positive 
and negative emotions (A.) for the two groups of participants. A 2x6 mixed-factorial 
ANOVA failed to confirm a significant effect of Group (F(1,36)=.07, p=.793, 
ηp2=.002), or Time*Group interaction (F(1,36)=1.19, p=.282, ηp2=.032, LB df). To 
confirm that the results were not compromised by the six levels of the Time factor and 
associated α level correction, a separate independent-samples t-test was carried out for 
the intensity between positive and negative emotions at Baseline, where the Mean 
Difference between the Korsakoff patients’ and control participants’ scores was highest. 
The t-test failed to report a significant difference between the two groups (t(38)=1.36, 
p=.181). 
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Figure 112. The accuracy between positive and negative emotions for Korsakoff 
patients and elderly controls after the presentation and recall of the happiness story. 
There were no differences between the accuracy of the emotional experience between 
the Korsakoff patients and the control participants. 
 
 In conclusion, following the presentation and recall of the happiness story, 
Korsakoff patients and elderly control participants reported similar emotional intensity, 
specificity and accuracy. The previously reported differences in the accuracy of the 
emotional after the 30 minutes delay for the negative emotions (in particular anger) 
were not observed for happiness. Moreover, a detailed inspection of the accuracy scores 
(see Figure 113 below) showed that only one Korsakoff patient and one control 
participant recorded negative accuracy scores, indicating that the intensity of one of the 
negative emotions was marginally higher than happiness following the recall of the 
story. The magnitude of the effect was negligeable and unable to cause a group effect. 
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Figure 113. The average intensity, specificity and accuracy between positive and 
negative emotions (A., C., and D.) and within negative emotions (B.) for Korsakoff 
patients and elderly controls after the presentation and recall of the happiness story. 
Only one Korsakoff patient and one control participant had negative emotional accuracy 
scores following the presentation and recall of the happiness story. 
 
 The emotional re-experience following the happiness story suggests that the 
Korsakoff patients and elderly controls experienced similarly intense, specific, and 
accurate emotions as the control participants. Transgressions from the generally high 
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emotional accuracy were only rare exceptions, and of modest magnitudes, unable to 
influence a group effect. Thus, the Korsakoff patients were just as able to re-experience 
positive emotions following the presentation and recall of the happiness story as were 
the control participants. 
  
4.5.5 Conclusions on the intensity, specificity and accuracy of the affective re-
experience of the Korsakoff patients and elderly controls 
 
 The analysis of the intensity, specificity, and accuracy indices revealed a limited 
number of differences between the Korsakoff patients and elderly controls, summarised 
in Table 12 below. The anger story produced a unique finding, when a number of 
Korsakoff patients had a negative emotion accuracy after the 30 minute delay. This was 
due to patients reporting higher levels of happiness, when attempting to recall the anger 
after 30 minutes. The same findings, but with a lesser magnitude (fewer patients, and 
lesser negative accuracy) was found for fear and to an even lesser extent for the sadness 
story. However, the results were significant only for the anger story. 
 
Table 12. Summary of findings: emotion intensity, specificity, and accuracy of Korsakoff patients and control participants 
Summary of the comparison between the intensity, specificity and accuracy of the 
Korsakoff patients and elderly controls. (ns – not significant) 
 Anger Fear Sadness Happiness 
Intensity (b) ns 
Korsakoff > Control 
(30minUR) 
ns ns 
Intensity (w) ns ns ns ns 
Specificity (b) ns 
Control > Korsakoff 
(Baseline) 
ns ns 
Specificity (w) ns 
Korsakoff > Control 
(Baseline) 
ns ns 
Accuracy (b) 
Korsakoff<Control 
(30minUR) 
ns ns ns 
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Accuracy (w) 
Korsakoff<Control 
(30minUR) 
ns ns ns 
 
 The intensity between positive and negative emotions was higher for Korsakoff 
patients following the presentation and recall of the fear story. However, the higher 
intensity was not accompanied by a higher specificity or emotional accuracy. The 
finding that the specificity of the Korsakoff patients was different from that of the 
control participants at Baseline, during the presentation of the fear story is probably a 
sampling variation, and did not seem to relate with or influence any other effects. The 
sadness and happiness stories caused a similarly intense, specific and accurate 
emotional experience for Korsakoff patients and control participants.  
 
4.6 Discussion 
 
 The study of discrete emotions is a growing area of research with at least four 
basic emotions being elicited and studied independently. However, the targeted 
elicitation of discrete emotion produces the co-activation of other basic emotions at 
various levels of intensity. The separate measure of the intensity of discrete emotions 
creates the challenges of finding a method to summarise: (1) the overall intensity of the 
affective experience; (2) the degree to which a single basic emotion reflects the 
affective experience (specificity); and (3) the degree to which the experience of a 
certain target emotion dominates the emotional response (accuracy). The present paper 
presented a presently unique method of computing a separate index for each of the three 
constructs (intensity, specificity, and accuracy) separately for negative emotions (anger, 
fear, and sadness) – thus describing negative affect and for both positive and negative 
emotions (i.e., anger, fear, sadness, and happiness) – representing the entire spectrum of 
basic emotions, as it is currently supported by an overwhelming body of literature. 
Positive affect if currently underpinned by a single basic emotion (happiness), so a 
separate set of indices are unnecessary. 
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 The intensity index provides a summary of the overall intensity of negative 
affect and of the overall affective experience. The index reflects the maximum intensity 
of the basic emotions. Other attempts (PANAS-X, Watson & Clark, 1994; PANAS, 
Watson, Clark & Tellegen, 1988) have proposed using the average of a set of 
independent measures of a larger set of emotions to calculate the intensity of positive 
and negative affect. This approach doesn’t benefit a discrete set of basic emotions, 
whose measures are theorised to represent each emotion construct fully. For example, 
when intensity measures of rage, frustration, annoyance, resentment, fury, and others, 
are thought to represent distinct aspects of a construct (i.e., anger), the average of these 
measures can approximate the overall intensity of anger. However, extrapolating this 
method to negative affect, or to the overall affective experience would disagree with a 
fundamental finding of discrete basic emotions, that they each can fully represent the 
affective experience. If an average method would be used, then the intensity of an 
affective experience where someone feels moderately angry, afraid and sad at the same 
time, would be the same as the intensity of another affective experience when somebody 
feels extremely angry, but not at all sad, or afraid. This would clearly misrepresent the 
ability of anger to describe the affective experience entirely. The method proposed in 
the present paper argues that the overall intensity of affect should be considered as the 
maximum intensity of basic emotions. In the example above, the first affective 
experience would be of moderate intensity (although muddled between different basic 
emotions – see below for a discussion of specificity), and the second affective 
experience would be of extreme (or very high) intensity, and at the same time very 
precise in the type of emotion experienced (i.e., anger). 
 The specificity index describes the degree to which a single discrete basic 
emotion represents the affective experience. The maximum level of specificity for an 
affective experience is reached when only a single basic emotion is elicited at the 
maximum level of intensity, and thus, the intensity of all the other basic emotions is nil. 
The lowest level of specificity is achieved in situations when all basic emotions are at 
the same level intensity, regardless of the level. For example, an affective experience 
characterised by very high levels of anger, fear, and sadness would have the same 
specificity as an experience described by very low levels of the three emotions 
(provided that the absolute differences between emotions is the same). Thus, specificity 
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alone cannot fully describe the affective experience, but only the selectivity of the 
affective experience. An intensity adjusted specificity index described in the present 
paper takes into account both the specificity and intensity of the affective experience. 
 The accuracy index reflects the degree to which a certain discrete target emotion 
is being experienced at higher levels of intensity than any other (non-target) basic 
emotion. Although mostly similar, the concept of emotional accuracy differs from 
emotional specificity in one important aspect: it refers to a predefined target emotion, 
intended to be elicited by the experimental paradigm, or expected to be experienced in a 
certain situation, while emotion specificity refers to whichever basic emotion is 
dominant (i.e., most intense) at a particular time. Thus, while the specificity index 
always refers to the most intense basic emotion, without providing any information 
about which discrete emotion it is, the accuracy index refers precisely to a pre-identified 
discrete emotion, but which may not always be the most intense (see below the 
discussion for when emotional accuracy takes negative values). The accuracy index 
(similar with specificity) is always less than, or equal to emotional intensity. This means 
that an affective experience must first have intensity before it can reach a certain level 
of accuracy. However, no other information can be implied from the accuracy index 
about the emotional intensity. Similarly with the specificity index, this limitation is 
resolved by calculating the intensity adjusted accuracy index.  
This presently unique method of calculating affective intensity, specificity and 
accuracy has two key methodological features. Firstly, it summarises the affective 
experience on a scale with the same magnitude as the intensities of basic emotions – the 
commonly used range from zero to 1. The indices for intensity and specificity take 
positive values only, similarly with the intensities of basic emotions. The accuracy 
index takes values on a symmetrical interval around zero (from –10 to 10). Negative 
values are obtained in situations when a target discrete emotions was not elicited at 
higher levels of intensity than the other non-target emotions. This would amount to a 
failure in eliciting the target emotion discretely (as other emotions dominate the 
affective experience), and thus a negative value of the accuracy index seems most 
informative. Furthermore, the method can be easily adjusted to accommodate other 
scale (e.g., zero to 100), should the benefit of using other ranges be established. 
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Secondly, the present method is easily expanded from its current form to a 
potentially limitless number of discrete basic emotions. The concepts of intensity, 
specificity and accuracy prevail the exact number and choice of basic emotions. In their 
current form, the intensity, specificity and accuracy indices are computed for negative 
and overall affect from the individual intensity ratings of three (i.e., anger, fear, and 
sadness) and four basic emotions, respectively (adding happiness to the previous three). 
This was determined by the currently overwhelming empirical evidence (Bloch, 
Lemeignan, & Aguilera, 1991; Cacioppo, Berntson, Klein, & Poehlmann, 1997; Collet, 
Vernet-Maurym, Delhomme, & Dittmar, 1997; Lench, Flores, & Bench, 2011; 
Rainville, Bechara, Naqvi, & Damasio, 2006; Stephens, Christie, & Friedman, 2010; 
Tettamanti, Rognoni, Cafiero, Costa, Galati, & Perani, 2012; Vytal & Hamann, 2010) 
that the present four discrete emotions indeed meet the standard of basic affective states. 
However, future investigations may potentially reveal sufficient evidence to consider 
other emotion states as basic forms of affect, such as disgust (see Vytal & Hamman, 
2010), and also, perhaps, other discrete positive emotions alongside happiness. Such 
findings would only reinforce the importance and application of the current concepts of 
intensity, specificity, and accuracy, and would potentially extend them to positive 
affect. The computational formulae for the respective indices could be easily derived 
from the ones presented in the current model. 
A final consideration should be given to the fact that the intensity, specificity, 
and accuracy of the affective experience are potentially affected by various underlying 
traits or emotion processes unique to every individual. Thus, their index would be best 
used in repeated measures designs, in order to control for individual differences. 
Difference in emotional intensity, specificity, or accuracy between people (or groups of 
people) in response to the same stimulus (or situation), as well as different patterns 
between individual basic emotions could reflect affective and cognitive neural 
processing differences. As this paper introduces the concepts and formalises the method 
for calculating the three concepts, further studies need to establish the factors that 
influence and correlate with the intensity, specificity and accuracy of the affective 
experience. 
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 In conclusion, the present paper presented the concepts of affective intensity, 
specificity, and accuracy for negative and overall affect together with a method to 
calculate their respective values from the intensity measures of four discrete basic 
emotions (anger, fear, sadness, and happiness). A simulation of the possible values 
taken by the specificity and accuracy indices was included. The study of basic emotions 
requires the means to calculate the degree to which the emotional experience has a 
specific discrete flavour, or is made up of multiple emotions. Moreover, emotion 
elicitation paradigms targeting a certain basic emotion need to assess the degree to 
which the targeted emotion has been elicited at superior levels of intensity to other non-
target emotions. The present paper presented the only method to date which allows to 
calculate precisely these concepts. Notably, the method allows for the integration of 
other basic emotions beyond the current four with slight arithmetic adjustments. Further 
research is required to better understand the determinants and covariates of the affective 
intensity, specificity and accuracy, for each discrete emotion. 
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Final discussion and conclusions 
 
 The present thesis aimed to expand for the first time the study of emotional 
memory in amnesia to the level of four discrete classes of emotions (anger, fear, 
sadness, and happiness). The first objective was to investigate the possible hierarchical 
organisation of affect, which would bring together the long established but seemingly 
divergent findings supporting the dimensional and categorical theories of emotions. The 
stability of valence – a long established dimension of emotional experience was 
compared with the stability of emotion categories, in situations eliciting discretely each 
of the four basic classes of affect. The empirical question (addressed in Chapter 2) was 
whether the valence of an affectively conditioned stimulus can be re-experienced for 
longer than its discrete category. This was be the first direct investigation of the stability 
of affective valence and discrete emotions over time.  
A second objective of the thesis was to investigate which aspects of an 
emotional event need to be recalled in order to elicit the original discrete emotions. 
Specifically, in Chapter 2, an affective conditioning paradigm was used to test the 
emotional re-experience of both neutral and emotional material, over time, following 
the presentation and episodic recall of four sets of stories generating discretely each of 
the four basic emotions (anger, fear, happiness, and sadness). 
 Thirdly, the thesis examined for the first time the re-experience of the four 
discrete classes of emotions in amnesic (Korsakoff’s syndrome) patients and the 
differences compared to neurologically normal controls. The relationship between 
episodic recall and the experience of each of the four discrete emotion classes was also 
addressed in Chapter 3, while the relationship between core executive functions and the 
intensity of the emotional re-experience of the four distinct basic emotions was also 
explored in Chapter 3. 
 Finally, in light of the previous findings and supported by the rich data on 
emotion experience collected during the project, the thesis introduced the concepts of 
affective intensity, specificity and accuracy, and presented a computational method for 
calculating the respective indices using the individual intensities of the most common 
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four basic emotions (anger, fear, sadness, and happiness), both for negative and overall 
affect. The conceptual and procedural definitions of the indices were presented in 
Chapter 4, while a first application of the indices on the datasets collected during the 
previous two studies and the first novel findings using this set of indices were also 
presented in Chapter 4. 
 
5.1 Summary of main findings 
 
The most notable finding reported in the present thesis (see Chapter 3) refers to 
the preserved ability of amnesic (Korsakoff’s syndrome) patients to re-experience 
discretely each of four discrete classes of emotions (anger, fear, sadness and happiness) 
at similar levels of intensity as neurologically normal controls, despite a substantial 
memory impairment. Furthermore, even those patients who could not recall anything 
from the emotional stimulus, reported experiencing the target emotion discretely, at 
significantly high levels of intensity. Although the ability of amnesic patients to reliably 
re-experience past emotions without being able to reproduce the events that initially 
triggered these emotions has been well documented in the past (Chapelle, Philippot, & 
van der Linden, 2007), this was the first report that emotional memory encodes and 
reactivates individual basic emotions (anger, fear, sadness, and happiness), and not just 
for generic positive or negative affect. Moreover, previous suggestions (Feinstein, Duff, 
& Tranel, 2010) that, perhaps, certain classes of emotions (e.g., sadness) could be more 
durable in the case of amnesics than neurologically normal controls were not supported 
by the present findings. Thus, a greater ability of affective systems was revealed, to 
accurately encode and reactivate specific classes of emotions with limited or even with 
no input at all from episodic memory systems. 
 As the ability to re-experience discrete classes of emotions was preserved in 
profoundly amnesic patients, the immediate question to ask was which variables can 
predict the intensity of the emotional memory for discrete emotions. In light of the 
previous findings, it was unsurprising that there was no relationship between episodic 
memory ability and the intensity with which the four discrete classes of affect are re-
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experienced. The literature suggested that other cognitive functions could be likely 
factors to affect the re-experience of discrete emotions. Chapter 3 showed that the 
intensities of fear, sadness, and happiness were consistently associated with executive 
functions, such as, cognitive flexibility, response inhibition and non-verbal fluency, and 
Processing Speed, and Performance IQ from WAIS. In the present context, the results 
failed to find a relationship between the intensity of anger and any executive functions, 
and only showed an association with the Verbal Comprehension task from Wechsler 
Adult Intelligence Test. Although the statistically significant results are encouraging, 
the findings are a first attempt to expand the previous literature reporting that emotion 
regulatory processes rely on prefrontal cortex based executive control. 
The unimpaired re-experience of discrete emotions for Korsakoff’s syndrome 
patients is even more significant in light of the results reported in Chapter 2. Amnesic 
patients have previously been shown to re-experience the correct positive or negative 
valence of forgotten past events, but the ability to re-experience discrete emotions was 
never addressed.  
Firstly, discrete emotion categories are a more vulnerable form of emotional 
experience than affective valence, as shown in the first report of a direct comparison 
between the dimensional structure of affect (represented by valence) and the categorical 
structure (represented by the four classes of discrete emotions: anger, fear, sadness, and 
happiness). In terms of the structure of the affective experience, this finding apparently 
supports the classical dimensional theory of emotions (Russell & Barrett, 1999), at least 
for the valence dimension. However, the finding is perhaps better explained in the 
context of the hierarchical theory of emotions (Tellegen et al., 1999) and similar reports 
from the affective neuroscience (Panksepp, 2004), that emotion valence is a more 
primordial form of emotional experience than discrete emotions. Thus, despite the 
unique behavioural and neuroanatomical correlates of discrete emotions, they seem to 
require, over time, more intense forms of emotion elicitation (e.g., detailed episodic 
recall) than are needed for the re-experience of affective valence. Furthermore, this 
indicates that affective valence is the last form of affect that is retained and re-
experienced when the potency of a past emotional stimulus has faded, or in the absence 
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of further integration of more complex cognitive material (e.g., episodic recall and 
executive processing). 
 A direct implication of this finding (and of the hierarchical account) is that is 
helps bring together two large bodies of the affective science literature which 
divergently argued that the affective experience is best described either by a series of 
bipolar dimensions (e.g., valence, and others), or distinct emotion classes (e.g., anger, 
fear, sadness, happiness, etc.). The present evidence suggests that perhaps the answer to 
the question “What is the structure of affect?” is that it consists of both a dimensional 
and categorical organisation. The dimensional organisation (according to either a 
positive or negative valence) is a general, fundamental, archaic, and most durable form 
of affect. The categorical organisation is a behaviourally and neuroanatomically discrete 
organisation into at least four classes of affect (anger, fear, sadness, and happiness), that 
are more emotionally specific in the short term, but that also are more vulnerable to 
automatic emotion regulatory processes, and thus, less stable over time. 
 The second finding reported in the present thesis (Chapter 2) that makes the re-
experience of discrete emotions in amnesia even more unlikely, comes from a 
neurologically normal sample of undergraduate students. The semantically neutral 
material (story beginnings) associated with the emotional story endings (eliciting basic 
emotions discretely) is not enough to re-experience the original emotion, even when the 
event is known, but not consciously recalled and vocalised. However, the active 
recollection of the emotionally specific material, invariably elicits the correct target 
emotion, and notably, at similar levels of intensity across discrete emotions. The 
emotional experience following the active episodic recall of the eliciting event retains 
its initial affective class specificity, for each of the four basic emotions (anger, fear, 
sadness, and happiness). Thus, the process of formal detailed recall is central for a full 
and emotionally discrete affective re-experience.  
In a wider context, this finding suggests that reducing or enhancing the active 
recollection of a past emotional event affects in a similar direction the magnitude of the 
affective re-experience. The present evidence provides support to similar reports from 
the emotion disorders and the emotional well-being literature that affective processes 
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can be readily up- or down-regulated by increasing or reducing the magnitude of 
episodic recall. 
 Finally, the thesis introduced the concepts of affective intensity, specificity and 
accuracy, both for negative and overall affect, based on the experience of discrete 
classes of emotions (anger, fear, sadness, and happiness), and presented a flexible 
computational model which can be easily adapted to accommodate possible other 
classes of emotions. The importance of the model is that it allows the direct 
investigation of the degree to which a single discrete emotion is experienced and 
differentiates between situations when the discrete emotional experience corresponds 
(or not) to the affect class targeted by the emotion elicitation paradigm. A simulation of 
the domains and codomains of the equations used to calculate the indices is presented. 
A first exploratory application of the indices revealed systematically that happiness is 
less specifically (but not less intensely) re-experienced following a brief interference of 
a negative emotion. And in certain situations (for episodic memory impaired Korsakoff 
patients), certain classes of negative emotions (anger, fear, but not sadness) are more 
discretely (but not more intensely) re-experienced after a brief interference of a happy 
moment.  
This is a first report of such an emotional interference effect produced 
consistently for happiness, and in an opposite direction for certain classes of negative 
emotions, experienced by an amnesic population. The novel indices of affective 
intensity, specificity, and accuracy allowed the calculation of such an effect. These 
preliminary findings are consistent and expand previous reports (Feinstein et al., 2010; 
Guzman-Velez et al., 2014) that negative emotions have a potentially greater and more 
enduring selective relevance when episodic information is no longer available. 
 Although the present findings seem to be best explained by the hierarchical 
model of affect, they raise interesting observations and research questions in the context 
of the constructivist model of emotions (Barrett, 2012; Barrett et al., 2007). The finding 
reported in the present thesis most closely linked with the concept of core affect and the 
psychological construction of emotions is that the re-experience of discrete emotions is 
more vulnerable (over time) than the re-experience of affective valence (see Chapter 2). 
Firstly, the pleasure-displeasure dimension of the affective re-experience following the 
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presentation of the story stems, was reliably evidenced by the emotion self-report 
ratings of the student sample, after 7 days from the initial presentation. This finding can 
be associated with the concept of core affect, whose experience is viewed as the most 
fundamental conceptualisation of affect (Russell, 2003). Secondly, the discrete re-
experience of the target emotions following the presentation of the story stems after 30 
minutes, but not after 7 days, suggests that the processes of psychological construction 
can manifest in the absence of the conscious and explicit recollection of the eliciting 
stimuli, but only for relatively short periods of time. The variable nature of the re-
experience of emotions is fully acknowledged by the psychological constructivist 
model, as each emotional experience (and indeed re-experience) is unique. Thus, only 
efforts to consciously explain, classify, (possibly justify) and certainly communicate the 
emotional experience determine the use of socially acceptable and established emotion 
labels (anger, fear, sadness, happiness). Indeed, the processes that allowed participants 
to report highly specific discrete emotions, consistent with the emotional experience 
following the story endings, after 3o minutes, and not after 7 days may have been 
cognitive rather than biological. The prime candidates for the psychological processes 
accessed to recreate the specific emotional reports after 30 minutes are semantic 
memory processes, or automatic associations between stimuli (story stems) and the 
emotion measures (the ratings of emotions). In light of this account, participants may 
have either implicitly or explicitly retained and recalled their ratings of the associated 
story endings and reproduce them following the story stems after 30 minutes. However, 
a week later, their initial ratings may not have been readily and accurately remembered, 
other than the fact that they were definitely not happy stories/situations. There is a 
considerable conceptual overlap between semantic processes (e.g., Was this a anger 
story, or a fear, sadness, happiness story?), episodic processes (e.g., Which parts of this 
story would make me feel angry, or afraid, sad or happy?), and emotion memory 
processes (e.g., How does this story stem actually make me feel in the present?), and 
isolating one set of processes (e.g., emotional memory) from the others is more 
challenging using self-report measures of emotions. Experimental manipulations (e.g., 
specific orienting tasks, dissimulation of experimental goals) and analysis techniques 
(e.g., inter-participant variability) can help to some extend limit the risk of measurement 
artefacts and increase the confidence in the findings. However, the use of multiple 
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concomitant measures of affect (especially implicit measures of physiology and 
functional neuroimaging) can provide the strongest indication of which processes are 
involved in the emotional re-experience following the presentation of the contexts (i.e., 
story stems) surrounding memories that elicit highly specific and discrete emotional 
states. 
 The Korsakoff patients’ discrete re-experience of the four target emotions, 
following a severely (albeit not completely) impaired recall of the eliciting stimuli 
suggests that the psychological construction of the affective experience could be 
decoupled, at least in part, from episodic memory systems. Following their poor 
performance on the free recall task, amnesic patients integrated limited information 
about the episodic experience, associations between the different elements of the stories 
and the categorisation of the pattern of elements into discrete classes of affect. As the 
episodic material reproduced was significantly reduced (and in few, distinct cases nil), 
different processes were required to generate the emotional ratings. The surprising 
finding is that the specificity of the emotional experience remained unchanged (for all 
four discrete emotions) during the initial three presentations, as well as immediately 
after interference and after the 30 minutes delayed recall. The robustness of the 
psychological construction of each of the four discrete emotions suggests that either the 
processes of the emotional experience were very strongly and reliably inter-related, or 
perhaps other competing cognitive processes acted as a substitute. Although the 
episodic memory of the Korsakoff patients was overall severely impaired, most patients 
correctly recalled a small number of details from each story, while some were unable to 
recall anything. However, the emotional experience was not related to the number of 
episodic details recalled, and, notably, some of the patients unable to recall anything 
from the stories reported high levels of the target emotion. Thus, associations between 
limited cues from the stories led to the accurate and discrete re-experience of the target 
emotions.  
Despite their different formulation, the hierarchical theory of affect (Tellegen, 
Watson, & Clark, 1999) and the constructivist view of emotions (Barrett, 2012) share 
many conceptual elements. Firstly, both accounts acknowledge that affective valence, 
(i.e., positive and negative affect) is a fundamental dimension of the emotional 
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experience, and as shown in Chapter 2 appears to be the most stable form of affect over 
time. Secondly, both accounts recognise that discrete emotion classes are a secondary 
form of emotional experience, crucial to the conscious, subjective conceptualisation of 
the emotional experience. The processes underpinning the experience of discrete 
emotions are still debated in the literature, and the two accounts take different views in 
this respect; the hierarchical theory proposes biological factors, while the constructivist 
view suggests psychological process. Nonetheless, the ability to re-experience or at least 
to subjectively identify the re-experience of discrete classes of affect seems to be 
limited over time in comparison with the re-experience of affective valence. 
Furthermore, episodic memory processes (when impaired) can be successfully 
substituted in the attempt to instantiate the experience of discrete emotions, as was 
reported by the Korsakoff patients (Chapter 3). 
  
5.2 Limitations of findings 
 
 The present thesis provided the first direct evidence that affective valence and 
discrete emotion classes can both contribute simultaneously to defining the structure of 
affect, with valence being a more enduring and stable form of affect, while discrete 
emotions require a stronger form of emotion elicitation in order to be re-experienced 
fully. Secondly, the thesis expanded the investigation of emotional memory in amnesia 
to a specific set of four discrete emotions (anger, fear, sadness, and happiness), and 
showed that amnesic (Korsakoff’s syndrome) patients can experience discretely each of 
the four classes of affect even when they can remember very little, or indeed almost 
nothing at all from the emotion eliciting event. A possible relationship between the 
amount of episodic recall and the intensity of the emotional re-experience was shown to 
be non-existent. A possible relationship was revealed between core executive functions 
and the intensity with which certain discrete emotions were experienced. Finally, a 
series of novel indices was introduced which are able to summarise and describe the 
affective experience in ways not possible with traditional measures of emotions. 
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5.2.1 Self-reports of emotional experience 
 The self-report measures of emotions are generally regarded as the most 
efficient forms of assessing the affective experience, and are widely employed in 
experimental and clinical work. They provide great flexibility regarding the choice of 
emotions and are particularly preferred for the study of discrete classes of emotions, 
where alternative types of measures (physiological, neuroimaging, behavioural) do not 
provide (or provide only a limited) specificity. The basic premise of emotion self-
reports is that people know their own emotional states best. However, data from self-
reports are not always straightforward to interpret. Numerous socio-psychological 
factors can influence the validity of a response. These include the ability of a respondent 
to articulate his or her deeper thoughts or feelings; the motivation of the respondent to 
respond fully; the urge to respond in socially desirable ways; and biases introduced by 
the construction of the questioning sequences, etc. 
The validity of self-report measures relies on two fundamental assumptions, that 
participants are (1) able, and (2) willing to observe and report their own emotions. 
Although self-report measures provide a valuable opportunity to collect information 
about the affective experience in an integrated and standardised format, they only assess 
the explicit forms of emotional expression, accessible to conscious experience, and do 
not provide any information regarding the implicit forms of affect. Nonetheless, the 
subjective form of the emotional experience, of which people are conscious and aware, 
forms an important part of the affective life and its assessment is uniquely served by 
self-reports measures, as long as the fundamental assumptions of ability and willingness 
are met. 
Firstly, a valid use of self-report measures of emotions requires that participants 
possess the ability to monitor, assess, and integrate information about their own 
emotions. Such abilities rely heavily on intact executive and limbic system functioning. 
Thus, when used to assess the emotional experience of neurological patients, lesion 
screening and neuropsychological testing are essential.  
The second issue of willingness is an important concern for all forms of 
subjective self-report measures, namely that participants’ response might be influenced 
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by factors not contained by the variable under investigation. The most frequently 
discussed response set is that of social desirability (Diener, Smith & Fujita, 1995). 
Attempts to limit such effect often dissimulate the true goal of the study until the end of 
the study (as was the case in the current investigation). 
A different potential limitation of self-report measures of emotions concerns the 
effects of repeated assessments. The repeated use of emotion self-reports during an 
experimental paradigm raises concerns regarding measurement independence. This is a 
form of stereotypic responding (Stone, 1995), which is observed when participants 
settle into a response profile that does not change over time. The effect is usually 
reflected in the standard deviations of the self-report measures across assessment 
occasions. The stereotypic responding relies on participants remembering their previous 
ratings, and the artefact can affect neurologically normal as well as amnesic 
participants, since the semantic memory systems necessary for this response set are 
intact in both groups. Self-report measures using Liker-type scales are particularly 
vulnerable (as participants often tend to remember the phrasing of their initial rating, 
e.g., “moderate”, or “very high”, etc.). Visual analogue scales (as used in the present 
investigations) offer more protection against this artefact, as participants are not given a 
verbal anchor for their responses. Complex visual information involving proportions 
from the end of the scales are usually more difficult to encode and retrieve. Moreover, 
using a set of discrete emotions, presented in an unpredictable order, further disrupts the 
memory effects. 
 In conclusion, the use of emotion self-reports in the present studies provided an 
efficient form of collecting information about participants’ experience of discrete 
emotions, at key moments during the experimental paradigm. Methodological decisions 
regarding the orienting task of the emotion elicitation paradigm, and emotional 
assessment have helped to dissimulate the true nature of the study and reduce demand 
characteristics. The choice of visual analogue scales (instead of classical Likert scales), 
and the presentation of the measured of the four discrete emotions in a counterbalanced 
and unpredictable order helped to reduce any memory effects that participants might 
show, especially in the case of Korsakoff patients, whose reliance on semantic 
information to make sense of situations they no longer remember is well documented. 
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However, the lack of multiple methods of assessing emotional experience remains an 
important limitation of the studies. The decision not to include physiological and 
neuroimaging measures was guided by their low sensitivity for the four discrete 
emotions investigated, and practical aspects of conducting the field work (especially 
involving the Korsakoff patients). Future studies could re-examine the findings reported 
in the present studies by employing different measures of emotional experience, in 
particular assessing the physiology and neural activity associated with the affective re-
experience. 
 
5.2.2 The structure of affect 
 
The fundamental structure of affect is an essential aspect of understanding the 
emotional experience, and the on-going debate between the two most influential 
theories of emotions is still in need of a resolution, and most likely a reconciliation of 
positions. The hierarchical theory of emotions offers such a solution, and the findings 
reported in the present thesis contribute in a direct way to supporting this approach. 
However, further evidence is needed to inform the wider aspects of the theory and 
integrate the multitude of findings subscribed to each of the two original theories 
(dimensional and categorical). 
As a first investigation of its kind, the present thesis employed only behavioural, 
self-report measures of emotions. This choice was justified by the fact that a novel set of 
stimuli were needed to address the specific research questions of the thesis, and they 
required an initial validation. Moreover, the novel research questions addressed in the 
thesis were substantially distant from the established findings that they needed a first 
layer of evidence before more costly investigative techniques could be justified. The 
neuroscientific evidence is by far the most influential and informative form of evidence 
in the field of affective science. Thus, further studies using neuroimaging techniques 
can further expand present findings.  
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5.2.3 Discrete emotions in amnesia 
 
Studies of neurological patients most commonly involve neuroimaging data and 
lesion analysis. However, previous brain scans of the patients reported in this thesis 
were not available (if they were ever taken), and logistical related to the geographical 
distance of patients from Bangor University meant that dedicated neuroanatomical and 
functional MRI scanning of patients was impractical. This prevented an analysis of the 
range and severity of brain lesions/atrophy, and would have been particularly useful, 
since Korsakoff patients showed comparatively poorer executive function scores than 
neurologically normal, age-matched controls. However, it is not uncommon for early 
investigations to employ methodologically efficient tools, to test new phenomena, 
before a wider range of approaches is used. The present investigation of emotional 
memory for discrete classes of emotions in amnesia relied on behavioural self-report 
measures and free recall of emotions. These were enough to confirm a poor episodic 
memory of patients, while the majority of patients showed an emotional response to the 
experimental stimuli similar with those of control patients (despite the significant 
episodic memory deficit). The behavioural reports of episodic memory and emotional 
re-experience were consistent with the clinical diagnosis, the treatment and the care 
received by all patients for Korsakoff’s syndrome. Furthermore, neuroimaging scans of 
Korsakoff’s syndrome patients are not always revealing, and are not routinely employed 
in diagnosis (NICE, 2014). 
 
5.3 Directions for future research 
 
The present thesis revealed fundamental aspects of the ability to re-experience 
emotions both in the presence and absence of episodic recall. The experience of 
affective valence was found to be more durable than that of discrete emotion classes, 
which showed that perhaps valence (a long-recognised dimension of affect) is a 
stronger, more fundamental form of affect than discrete emotion categories. However, 
both neurologically normal and amnesic (Korsakoff’s syndrome patients) were able to 
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re-experience discretely all four classes of emotions (anger, fear, sadness, and 
happiness, as executive function, and not episodic memory seemed to be related to the 
intensity of the affective re-experience. 
Importantly, further questions about emotional re-experience (emotional 
memory) remain unanswered. Firstly, the contribution of executive functions to 
emotional memory needs to be explored in more detail, potentially in more neurological 
studies with patients with different aetiologies of the amnesic syndrome. An immediate 
direction would be to replicate current findings regarding the ability to re-experience of 
discrete emotions, and the interference of positive and negative classes of emotions is 
replicated when episodic memory systems are permanently inaccessible. Moreover, a 
particularly intriguing extension of the present work would address the same question 
when episodic memory systems are only temporarily switched off, as it he case for 
patients diagnosed with Transient Global Amnesia (TGA). Certain obvious ethical 
issues would need to be addressed first, but logistical concerns regarding the speed of 
administration and the use of quick and reliable measures of emotions should be 
appeased by the success of the methodology and tools used in the present work. 
Secondly, future research would benefit from employing neuroimaging techniques to 
expose which brain areas are involved in the re-experience of emotions, and the extent 
to which they differ from the system already identified to be employed in the processing 
and experience of discrete emotions. Thirdly, as there is already considerable evidence 
that negative discrete emotions share substantial neuroanatomical pathways (Vytal & 
Hamman, 2010; Vytal & Hamann, 2012), the question remains if those areas and 
networks can describe negative and positive affect with subordinate and unique 
neuroanatomic structures corresponding to discrete negative and positive emotions. 
 A promising outcome of the thesis is the proposition of a new set of indices to 
describe the emotional experience: the intensity, specificity, and accuracy of affect. The 
use of these composite indices could replace entirely the classical ratings of discrete 
emotions from which they are calculated and can be used to investigate all forms of 
emotional experience. As a first step to establish the new indices as routine measures of 
emotional experience, they would need to be associated with a specific neuroanatomy. 
Indeed, the neuroscientific evidence provides the fundamental neuroanatomic correlates 
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of cognitive functions, processes, or constructs. If discrete emotion states indeed exist 
(and the neuroscience literature has provided substantial evidence that they do), then it 
makes sense to discuss about the overall intensity, specificity and accuracy of affect. 
However, empirical evidence should show that the overall intensity of affect 
corresponds to the maximum intensity of the four discrete emotions by identifying a 
corresponding pattern in the cortical and subcortical blood flow activity to known 
emotion processing structures. Similarly, after measuring individual discrete emotions 
when only one emotion is of interest, one would think that the specificity of the 
affective experience is indeed an essential construct. However, for specificity to be a 
potent tool for the investigation of affect, the index should correlate consistently with a 
selective neural pathway. The regions most probable to capture the construct of 
specificity could be the unique areas associated with each discrete emotion which 
should show a proportionately more intense hemodynamic response for emotional 
experiences with a higher specificity index. A curious alternative would be for a unique 
brain area or structure (“the specificity centre”) to activate proportionately with the 
specificity of the affective experience, regardless of dominant discrete emotion, while 
the known unique brain regions that correlate with that discrete emotion to indicate 
which emotion class it is. 
Further removed from the evidence presented in this thesis is the question 
regarding the organisation or the structure of affect. In this respect, one has to wonder 
whether the right questions have been asked. Specifically, is valence the only 
fundamental dimension of affect, or are any of the other dimensions relevant to the 
experience of emotions? If other such dimensions can be identified, then how do they 
relate (in a subordinate or superordinate fashion) with discrete emotions and valence. 
Convenient possibilities are offered by the literature on the dimensional theories of 
emotions. Perhaps the most intriguing hypothesis to be tested was proposed by Lövheim 
(2012), who suggested that the levels of monoamine neurotransmitters traditionally 
involved in emotion experience (dopamine, noradrenaline, serotonin) might represent 
underlying dimensions of the experience of discrete emotions. Conversely, a second line 
of enquiry can address the question if the study of discrete emotions can reliably extend 
to other classes of affect? Currently, the neuroscientific evidence suggest the strongest 
candidate might be the emotion of disgust (Hamman, 2012). 
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5.4 A final thought 
 
 Discrete emotions offer an unsurpassed means of understanding the uberty of the 
affective experience and should be used more widely. The present thesis has shown that 
amnesic (Korsakoff’s syndrome) patients are able to experience and reliably report at 
least four discrete emotions with a high level of specificity, similarly with 
neurologically normal controls. However, a wider range of clinical populations can 
potentially present unique insights about their own emotional experience, if specific 
emotions are targeted and elicited discretely, while, importantly, measuring the 
experience of all basic emotions. This can open the door to further understanding of 
discrete emotions, and their role in shaping the affective experience – which is arguably 
the next frontier in the field of affective neuroscience. 
As shown in the present work, the available instruments to measure discrete 
emotions can be used effectively, even for a high number of administrations in a single 
session. Other tools, especially assessing the brain activity and physiology associated 
with the specific re-experience of discrete emotions (the neuro-correlates of affective 
specificity) could greatly expand our current understanding of affect, and further inform 
the development of future investigations. Notably, this thesis has presented novel ways 
to analyse and interpret the ratings of individual discrete emotions, which look most 
likely to reveal new and far-reaching aspects of the affective experience.  
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Appendix D. Emotional Stories (Chapters 2 and 3) 
 
 
 
Session 1, Presentation. 
 
Instruction for participants listening to both the stem (i.e., the first paragraph of the 
story), and the emotional ending (i.e., the last paragraph). Both parts of the story are 
read out to them in a neutral prosody. 
Please listen to the following story and imagine that you are personally 
experiencing what is happening in the text. 
 
Session 1, Recall, and Session 2. 
 
Instructions for participants during the recall procedure, when they are presented with 
the original story stems, and are asked to recall the story ending. The story stems are 
read out to them in a neutral prosody. 
 Please listen to the following story and try to reproduce out loud the rest of the 
story, including as many details as you can remember.  
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Story Code Name: Workmate   Target emotion: Anger 
 
It was Friday night, after work, and a colleague invited me for a drink in a newly 
opened pub. The pub was relatively busy, as you would expect on an early Friday 
evening. A few lads were gathered around the pool table, while the shooter broke the 
balls. I sat down at one of the few available tables in the corner, and my colleague went 
to get the drinks. 
 
My colleague returned to our table and asked me to take the drinks from him. I got up 
and before I had a chance to take the drinks, my colleague let go of them. The glasses 
smashed against the corner of the table and splattered over him and few of the people 
around him, but surprisingly missed me completely. My colleague started shouting at 
me and accusing me of deliberating dropping the drinks, supposedly as a failed joke. I 
couldn’t believe how ridiculous his claims were, yet he seemed to be very serious. The 
scene quickly escalated, when the pool player, who was close behind my colleague, 
turned around and said that a chip of the glass cut his hand and that he was bleeding, but 
his hands seemed to be just fine. The couple by the slot machine intervened too by 
saying they saw the situation quite clearly and that I had deliberately dropped the 
drinks. Surprisingly, people became even more agitated and aggressive towards me, and 
while some seemed to treat the situation as a mockery at my expense, others made more 
serious threats. Accusations, threats and insults were thrown at him from all directions, 
as if everybody had been waiting for an excuse to lash out. 
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Story Name: Workmate     Target emotion: Fear 
 
It was Friday night, after work, and a colleague invited me for a drink in a newly 
opened pub. The pub was relatively busy, as you would expect on an early Friday 
evening. A few lads were gathered around the pool table, while the shooter broke the 
balls. I sat down at one of the few available tables in the corner, and my colleague went 
to get the drinks. 
 
 
A few moments later I heard a loud noise, and a lot of people bustling around the bar. 
Loud screams rose from the crowd as I saw my colleague set on fire, running towards 
our table. A giant flame expanded behind him and everybody started to panic, while 
trying to find the way out. The pool player with the cue stick still in his hand rushed to 
get out of the way, but caused my colleague to trip and fall right at my feet. I couldn’t 
believe how quickly the fire had spread. It was now spreading up my clothes. I could 
feel them getting stuck to my skin. I tried to rush to the door, but everything was in the 
way. I couldn’t touch anything; fire was everywhere. A young couple by the slot 
machine were trapped too and were trying to push the machine out of the way. When 
they succeeded, it fell onto a column, which collapsed, and a small part of the ceiling 
fell over me, completely blocking my exit. I was trapped and the smoke was getting so 
thick, that I couldn’t breathe anymore. 
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Story Code Name: Workmate   Target emotion: Sadness 
 
It was Friday night, after work, and a colleague invited me for a drink in a newly 
opened pub. The pub was relatively busy, as you would expect on an early Friday 
evening. A few lads were gathered around the pool table, while the shooter broke the 
balls. I sat down at one of the few available tables in the corner, and my colleague went 
to get the drinks. 
 
 
My colleague brought the drinks over and we started talking mostly about work. He was 
one of the friendliest and most helpful people at work. He had supported me through 
some of the hardest times and had proven to be the only one I could truly rely on at 
work. The pool player came to our table, and my colleague introduced him as a friend. 
Before he went back, the pool player whispered something in his friend’s ear. My 
colleague looked at me for a second and then burst into tears. He went on to say that he 
was seriously ill, and that the doctors said to him there was nothing they could do. He 
said his prospects of recovery were terribly slim, and that his life was just a matter of 
waiting for the inevitable to happen. He had never talked about his health before, and I 
was only then realising that I was about to lose one of the dearest and most important 
people to me. From across the room a couple by the slot machine were calling my name. 
As they came over to join us, I was trying to think of something to say to introduce my 
colleague, but I simply couldn’t move on from the terrible news I had just received. 
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Story Code Name: Workmate   Target emotion: Happiness 
 
It was Friday night, after work, and a colleague invited me for a drink in a newly 
opened pub. The pub was relatively busy, as you would expect on an early Friday 
evening. A few lads were gathered around the pool table, while the shooter broke the 
balls. I sat down at one of the few available tables in the corner, and my colleague went 
to get the drinks. 
 
 
My colleague came back with the drinks and said he had a pleasant surprise for me. He 
told me how one of the people at work, from a more distant department, heard about me 
joining the team and wanted to meet me. My colleague called the pool player over, and 
as he turned around I could hardly believe my eyes. It was one of my best childhood 
friends. We grew up together, but when his family moved to another town we lost track 
of each other. He looked very much as I had imagined him to be. The same smile, the 
same hair, the same look, only a special gleam in his eyes now that he saw me. He 
called, from the across the room, a couple that were standing by the slot machine: his 
younger brother with his lovely partner. They sat down at our table and I still could not 
believe we were all finally reunited. They were all doing well and as the younger 
brother was soon getting married, they invited me to the wedding. There was a lot of 
excitement about the big event, we shared memories from our school years, laughed, 
and had a lovely time. 
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Story Code Name: Child     Target emotion: Anger 
 
It was a regular Tuesday morning. I had plenty of time on my hands and I decided to 
leave the house early. I noticed the traffic was particularly busy. Out in the street, I saw 
my neighbour, who stopped only for a second to say hello. He had his little boy with 
him. They were going out for the day, and they were in a big rush. The man suddenly 
remembered that he had forgotten something important back at the house and asked me 
if I could look after the boy, just for a minute, while he went to fetch it. Another 
neighbour’s daughter was gliding along on her roller blades nearby. 
 
 
The boy noticed a little kitten behind us and approached it, looking like he wanted to 
play with it. Before I had a chance to react, he grabbed the kitten by the tail, lifted it up 
in the air and kicked it very hard towards the traffic. The kitten landed in front of a 
speeding car, but very nearly managed to avoid being run over. I quickly pulled the little 
boy away, and told him never to do that again. I couldn’t believe how such a nice little 
boy could be so cruel to an innocent being. The kitten was back on the pavement when I 
saw the roller-skater coming towards it and holding a water blaster. I thought to myself, 
“It’s too cold to be playing with such a toy”, but she stopped next to the trembling 
kitten, pointed the gun at it, started squirting, and chased it away. The kitten was 
running as fast as it could, crying desperately, but the roller-skater seemed to have no 
problem keeping close to it and aiming straight at it with the water gun. A few men 
working on a nearby scaffolding noticed the whole scene and started cheering, 
encouraging the roller-skater to keep chasing the kitten for their own entertainment. 
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Story Code Name: Child    Target emotion: Fear 
 
It was a regular Tuesday morning. I had plenty of time on my hands and I decided to 
leave the house early. I noticed the traffic was particularly busy. Out in the street, I saw 
my neighbour, who stopped only for a second to say hello. He had his little boy with 
him. They were going out for the day, and they were in a big rush. The man suddenly 
remembered that he had forgotten something important back at the house and asked me 
if I could look after the boy, just for a minute, while he went to fetch it. Another 
neighbour’s daughter was gliding along on her roller blades nearby. 
 
Once his father left, I noticed that the boy became a little fidgety. I tried to hold his 
hand, but he unexpectedly pulled away and started running across the busy street. I 
began to run after him as fast as I could, to catch him before anything happened. He 
went around a building and was out of my sight. As I turned the corner, I ran into the 
roller-skater, I knocked her over and she crashed into a scaffolding erected alongside the 
building, while I fell on the ground. I got up and realised I was seemingly alright, but I 
couldn’t see my neighbour’s little boy anywhere. The roller-skater was lying on her 
back, on the ground, in a small puddle of blood. She started screaming and looked like 
she couldn’t move. I then noticed several heavy objects hanging precariously right 
above her, high up on the scaffolding. I was thinking I had to go look for the boy, who 
was left in my care, but I also felt responsible for knocking the girl over. I didn’t want to 
move the girl, in case she had hit her back and moving her would risk further damaging 
her spine, but the heavy objects hanging right above her looked set to come crashing 
down at any moment. 
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Story Code Name: Child   Target emotion: Sadness 
 
It was a regular Tuesday morning. I had plenty of time on my hands and I decided to 
leave the house early. I noticed the traffic was particularly busy. Out in the street, I saw 
my neighbour, who stopped only for a second to say hello. He had his little boy with 
him. They were going out for the day, and they were in a big rush. The man suddenly 
remembered that he had forgotten something important back at the house and asked me 
if I could look after the boy, just for a minute, while he went to fetch it. Another 
neighbour’s daughter was gliding along on her roller blades nearby. 
 
Once his father left, I noticed that the little child was very quiet. I tried to talk to him, 
but he sat down on the ground and started to cry. I asked him what had happened but he 
wouldn’t stop crying – shaking, weeping, and holding a toy to his chest. Moments later, 
the boy looked up at me. His big eyes full of tears seemed to want to say something: 
“Mommy died…. She died last night.”, and he turned his face down again. He seemed 
completely overwhelmed with grief. Then, I heard a sharp scream behind me, turned 
around and saw the roller-skater going very fast. She couldn’t control her speed and 
crashed into the scaffolding erected alongside a building. A few heavy objects fell on 
top of her from high up on the scaffolding. She looked pretty badly hurt, and started 
crying profusely. Several other girls on roller skates soon gathered around her, all 
wearing the same outfit, for the annual inline hockey competition, which was going to 
start later that day. The girls were all looking very distressed at their friend’s suffering 
and the fact that they would not be able to take part in the competition. All I could hear 
were the little boy’s uncontrolled weeps, as he muttered to himself incoherently. 
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Story Code Name: Child    Target emotion: Happiness 
 
It was a regular Tuesday morning. I had plenty of time on my hands and I decided to 
leave the house early. I noticed the traffic was particularly busy. Out in the street, I saw 
my neighbour, who stopped only for a second to say hello. He had his little boy with 
him. They were going out for the day, and they were in a big rush. The man suddenly 
remembered that he had forgotten something important back at the house and asked me 
if I could look after the boy, just for a minute, while he went to fetch it. Another 
neighbour’s daughter was gliding along on her roller blades nearby. 
 
 
Once his father left, I became increasingly aware that the little child was totally 
adorable. He was singing a cute little song – clearly one of his favourites and was 
jumping around, holding my hand tightly. His joyous mood was completely contagious. 
The roller-skater came towards us holding a bunch of tiny dainty flowers in one hand. 
She stopped next to the little boy, took a few flowers and gave them to him. The boy 
stopped singing for a moment, accepted the gift delightedly and then gave her a big hug 
and a kiss. As she was getting ready to leave, the little boy stopped her, took her hand 
and said: “You are my best friend!” The roller-skater looked surprised and very 
impressed by the little boy’s affection. Good children are so wonderful. Behind me, a 
few men were taking down the scaffolding from a building. The construction work had 
caused inconvenience to everybody in the area, due to the noise and dust coming off 
from the site, but work was now finished and everybody could finally look forward to 
having some peace and quiet. 
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Story Code Name: Car     Target emotion: Anger 
 
One Saturday morning a friend asked me to go with him to a nearby town, where he had 
some business. He said he was driving us there and since I didn’t have any particular 
plans for that day I agreed to go with my friend. I was watching the traffic and 
meditating aimlessly, when I gradually noticed that another car kept overtaking us, 
getting in front of us out of sight, then dropping behind us, only to come back again and 
go past us, in the other lane. 
 
 
My friend turned the car stereo on and put the music up very loud. It wasn’t so much the 
volume, as the poor quality of the sound, which was absolutely horrible. If he had only 
turned the volume down a little, I was sure the speakers would have sounded better. I 
asked him repeatedly to do so, but he was too taken up with the song to even pay 
attention to me. I started thinking that I was coming with him as a favour, in the first 
place, so a little more consideration would not have been too much to expect. Then 
moments later he pulled   over at a small petrol station and quickly got out the car to go 
to the shop. Thankfully, the car stereo stopped, but then I noticed that we were parked 
too close to the entrance in the station blocking everybody else’s access. The other 
vehicle, that I had seen earlier on the road, was now behind us, wanting to enter the 
petrol station, sounding the horn and shouting at me to move the car. A truck stopped 
behind and joined him in aggressively sounding the horn and shouting at me to get out 
of the car and push it out of the way. I could not believe how unreasonable and rude 
they were all being. 
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Story Code Name: Car     Target emotion: Fear 
 
One Saturday morning a friend asked me to go with him to a nearby town, where he had 
some business. He said he was driving us there and since I didn’t have any particular 
plans for that day I agreed to go with my friend. I was watching the traffic and 
meditating aimlessly, when I gradually noticed that another car kept overtaking us, 
getting in front of us out of sight, then dropping behind us, only to come back again and 
go past us, in the other lane. 
 
 
Suddenly, I heard a bang coming from the front of the car, and I could tell that my 
friend had lost control of the vehicle. Seconds later our car abruptly swerved to the right 
and repeated attempts to stay in our lane made the car go left and right very forcefully. I 
didn’t know for how long was my friend going to avoid a collision as nothing he was 
doing seemed to stop or balance the car and I expected us to crash very soon. We were 
going from side to side and the next second my head hit against the door window, 
shattering the glass. My head started feeling weird from the blow and even if I didn’t 
know what had happened, I could sense it was something bad. I tried to move, but I 
couldn’t, and I kept thinking of the blow to the head that I had just taken. I then noticed 
the other car in front of us stopping very quickly and I started to prepare for a very 
violent impact, but only to realise there was not much I could do about it. I started 
thinking that a collision with the other car would project us into the opposite lane of 
traffic, where a truck was coming in at full speed. 
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Story Code Name: Car     Target emotion: Sadness 
 
One Saturday morning a friend asked me to go with him to a nearby town, where he had 
some business. He said he was driving us there and since I didn’t have any particular 
plans for that day I agreed to go with my friend. I was watching the traffic and 
meditating aimlessly, when I gradually noticed that another car kept overtaking us, 
getting in front of us out of sight, then dropping behind us, only to come back again and 
go past us, in the other lane. 
 
 
The car engine suddenly died and my friend’s repeated attempts to restart it failed, so 
we pulled safely off the road to have a look under the bonnet. The engine looked in a 
very bad state, and my friend said there was nothing we could do about it. He took his 
mobile phone out and tried to make a call, but the reception wasn’t good where we 
were, so he started walking on the side of the road to look for better signal. He stopped 
next to a parked truck and seemed like he managed to get through to someone on the 
phone. I then noticed the other car coming from behind him, at full speed, heading 
towards the truck and hitting my friend full on. I ran to him but by the time I arrived, 
there was nothing I could do; my friend lied lifeless on the tarmac. I couldn’t believe 
how a regular Saturday morning when I was supposed to help my friend on a short trip 
could have had such a tragic ending. I couldn’t bring myself to doing anything, and the 
desolate scene in front of me was stuck in my mind forever. 
  
Appendices 
415 
 
Story Code Name: Car    Target emotion: Happiness 
 
One Saturday morning a friend asked me to go with him to a nearby town, where he had 
some business. He said he was driving us there and since I didn’t have any particular 
plans for that day I agreed to go with my friend. I was watching the traffic and 
meditating aimlessly, when I gradually noticed that another car kept overtaking us, 
getting in front of us out of sight, then dropping behind us, only to come back again and 
go past us, in the other lane. 
 
 
My friend then told me that he had won a customer competition and the prize consisted 
in an all-expenses paid holiday abroad for him and three other friends, and that he 
wanted me to come along with him. I could not believe what I was hearing, but he 
continued saying that we were actually going to meet with two other friends to tell them 
the news and discuss the trip. We arrived into town and stopped near a pub, where my 
friend parked behind a large truck. The other vehicle that I had seen earlier on the road 
pulled over as well. A cheerful looking man came down from the truck and approached 
our car, and so did the other driver. I only then recognised them both; they were two of 
our mutual friends and I suspected we were all there for the same reason. My friend was 
very pleased to see them both and they seemed very excited too. We all went inside the 
pub impressed about my friend’s wonderful news, and determined to make the most of 
that great opportunity. We had never been on a holiday together, but it was something 
we had talked about many times, and we could finally do it without having to worry 
about costs. 
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Story Code Name: Dog     Target emotion: Anger 
 
I was walking back home through the central park, one late Monday afternoon. There 
were not many people out, but the weather was good. A dog was running around 
energetically, enjoying the fresh air. Overlooking the park were the university and two 
schools. Students could often be seen in the park, but not that day. I walked past a 
wandering undergraduate, who seemed to be the only other person out at the time. 
 
 
The dog came running from behind, went past me, and headed straight towards a frail 
old lady walking very slowly, holding a white cane in one hand and a small handbag in 
the other. It soon got to her and it grabbed her cane and pulled it away from her, then 
turned back again and started growling and barking loudly, in a very aggressive tone. 
The lady looked desperate and didn’t seem to know what to do, as she started crying 
and looking very hesitantly for someone to help her. The student I had seen earlier went 
over to her, but instead of lending her a hand, he started laughing at what was happening 
and inciting the dog further. He seemed to be enjoying the whole situation and 
demanded more entertainment. The horrible scene soon got worse when a young 
teenager saw what was happening and went over as well. He approached the old lady 
from behind, plucked her handbag away from her, and started going through her things, 
pocketing what he found interesting and throwing back at her everything else. The old 
lady was crying and begging to be left alone, but the two boys’ laughter and excitement 
was covering her feeble weeps completely. 
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Story Code Name: Dog     Target emotion: Fear 
 
I was walking back home through the central park, one late Monday afternoon. There 
were not many people out, but the weather was good. A dog was running around 
energetically, enjoying the fresh air. Overlooking the park were the university and two 
schools. Students could often be seen in the park, but not that day. I walked past a 
wandering undergraduate, who seemed to be the only other person out at the time. 
 
 
The dog quickly caught up with me and suddenly became very aggressive. I could hear 
it growling very tensely behind me and before I had a chance to turn and react, it 
seemed to attack me. Luckily, however, the student walking behind me came to the 
rescue and kicked the dog away before it could get to me. But the dog turned around 
and plunged at the student, planting his teeth deep into his calf. A teenager intervened to 
help the student, but he also got attacked by the dog, which eventually ran away, leaving 
the two lying on the ground, bleeding heavily. The teenager seemed to have fallen in an 
awkward position on the concrete path and was not moving much, despite looking like 
he was in an agonising pain. A man behind me was calling an ambulance, describing the 
wounds over the phone, and saying to everyone not to move the victims. I could see that 
the student and the teenager were losing a lot of blood quickly and all I could think 
about was that they could soon go into shock. There wasn’t anything I could have done, 
but something had to be done quickly. 
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Story Code Name: Dog     Target emotion: Sadness 
 
I was walking back home through the central park, one late Monday afternoon. There 
were not many people out, but the weather was good. A dog was running around 
energetically, enjoying the fresh air. Overlooking the park were the university and two 
schools. Students could often be seen in the park, but not that day. I walked past a 
wandering undergraduate, who seemed to be the only other person out at the time. 
 
 
The dog ran in front of me and couched at my legs, looking very poorly. I took a 
sandwich out of my bag and put it down next to it, but the dog refused to have it. Its 
eyes were running abundantly and its movements were uncoordinated. I tried to think 
what to do, but before I knew it, the dog fell inert. Its eyes were still open, but they had 
a blank stare. A young teenager came running and calling for his dog. When he saw us, 
he rushed to me, took his dog in his arms, and started crying. He said his dog had 
wondered off when he let it loose. It had not been looking well all day and he thought a 
walk in the park would do it good. The student I had passed by turned up behind us and 
saw the young boy in tears holding his dead dog. He went up to him and said he had lost 
a puppy too that same day. He had the puppy in a leash when he suddenly ran into the 
slow moving traffic and was caught under the wheels of a bus. The boys looked each 
other in the eyes and started weeping uncontrollably. 
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Story Code Name: Dog    Target emotion: Happiness 
 
I was walking back home through the central park, one late Monday afternoon. There 
were not many people out, but the weather was good. A dog was running around 
energetically, enjoying the fresh air. Overlooking the park were the university and two 
schools. Students could often be seen in the park, but not that day. I walked past a 
wandering undergraduate, who seemed to be the only other person out at the time. 
 
 
The dog started leaping around me in circles, waging its tail and looking very playful. I 
looked around for his owner, but I couldn’t see anyone. The dog kept following me, and 
I was enjoying his company, but I decided not to let it come with me for too long. The 
student I had seen earlier came up from behind me, stopped and took a sandwich out of 
his bag to feed the dog. I hadn’t realised how hungry it was, but I could tell by the 
sounds it was making how grateful it was for the free meal. The student said he had a 
dog too and he could tell this one was lost and missing its owner. We watched the 
hungry dog finish the sandwich, hoping that its owner will appear, and soon, a young 
teenager came running towards us, calling his dog. He picked the dog up, squeezed it 
affectively and started stroking it gently and talking to it. Then he turned to us and said 
he had been looking for his dog in and around the park for the last several hours and he 
thought he had lost it. The dog was wagging its tail ever stronger while the teenager 
attached its strap back on and started walking it home. 
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Appendix E. Emotional stories (Chapters 2 and 3) – recall scoring 
 
 
 
TO – Target Object (the main character of the story) 
PO – Primed Object (the second character in the story, mentioned/primed in the 
story stem) 
UO – Unprimed Object (the third character in the story, not mentioned in the 
story stem)  
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Story Code Name: Workmate   Target emotion: Anger 
 
  
TO 
Score 
Unit 
PO 
Score 
Unit 
UO 
Score 
Unit 
20 20 20 
My colleague asked me 3     
to take the drinks 2     
My colleague let go of the drinks 3     
to soon  1     
The glasses smashed against the 
corner of the table  
3     
My colleague started shouting at 
me 
3     
I tried to explain what had 
happened,  
3     
but he wouldn’t listen.  2     
The pool player was behind my 
colleague 
  3   
The pool player said that   3   
the drinks had spoilt his clothes too   3   
I couldn't believe his claim because   3   
he was standing too far from the 
table 
  3   
I tried to apologise,   2   
he wouldn’t listen to me either.   3   
A young couple were standing by 
the fruit machines 
    3 
The young couple came over     2 
The young couple said that     2 
The young couple saw how      2 
I had dropped the drinks     3 
deliberately     1 
The young couple offered a drink     3 
to my colleague     1 
The young couple left with my 
colleague 
    3 
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Story Name: Workmate     Target emotion: Fear 
 
  
TO 
Score 
Unit 
PO 
Score 
Unit 
UO 
Score 
Unit 
20 20 20 
My colleague was screaming 2     
I turned around 2     
My colleague was set on fire 
2     
My colleague was running towards 
our table 
3     
The fire was spreading to the 
people around him 
3     
The pool player rushed to get out 
of the pub 
  3   
The pool player pushed aside a 
table 
  3   
The table overturned   2   
The table knocked over a few 
chairs 
  3   
The drinks on the table spilt on the 
floor 
  4   
The drinks caught fire   2   
The chairs tripped up my colleague   3   
My colleague fell down next to my 
feet 
3     
My colleague caused 2     
the fire to climb up my clothes 3     
A young couple were trapped by 
the fruit machines 
    3 
The young couple were trying to 
push the machines 
    3 
out of the way      1 
The fruit machine fell onto a 
column 
    3 
The column collapsed in front of 
me 
    3 
The column trapped me      3 
The smoke was getting very thick     2 
I couldn't breathe anymore     2 
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Story Code Name: Workmate   Target emotion: Sadness 
 
  
TO 
Score 
Unit 
PO 
Score 
Unit 
UO 
Score 
Unit 
20 20 20 
My colleague said 2     
My colleague had a terminal illness 2     
My colleague had been to the 
hospital 
3     
that day 1     
The doctors told my colleague 3     
My colleague hadn't long to live 3     
My colleague was very nice 2     
My colleague had supported me 3     
through some of the hardest times 
in my life 
1     
The pool player came towards our 
table,  
  3   
The pool player walked past me   3   
The pool player looked similar to an 
old colleague of mine 
  3   
My old colleague had died when I 
was younger 
  3   
I remembered my old colleague's 
funeral 
  3   
I remembered the feeling   3   
of losing a colleague   2   
A young couple were standing by 
the fruit machines 
    3 
The young couple were calling my 
name 
    3 
The young couple were distant 
relatives 
    2 
I hadn't seen the couple     3 
in a long time     1 
The young couple were coming 
over 
    3 
I was preparing to introduce my 
colleague 
    3 
I couldn’t find the words.     2 
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Story Code Name: Workmate   Target emotion: Happiness 
 
  
TO 
Score 
Unit 
PO 
Score 
Unit 
UO 
Score 
Unit 
20 20 20 
My colleague had a pleasant 
surprise for me 
3     
My colleague had met through his 
work 
3     
somebody who used to know me,  3     
My colleague talked with this 
mysterious person 
3     
about me 1     
My colleague decided to get us 
together, 
3     
as soon as possible. 1     
My colleague called the pool player 
over. 
3     
The pool player was one of my 
closest childhood colleagues 
  2   
We used to live on the same street   3   
his family moved to another town    3   
we lost track of each other.    3   
The pool player was very excited to 
see me 
  3   
The pool player said   2   
The pool player had been hoping 
for this moment 
  3   
for a long time   1   
A young couple were standing by 
the fruit machines 
    3 
The young couple came over to our 
table 
    3 
The young couple were his younger 
brother and his partner 
    2 
The young couple were going to 
get married soon,  
    2 
The young couple were very 
excited about the wedding 
    3 
The young couple invited me     3 
to the wedding     1 
I accepted the invitation     3 
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Story Code Name: Child     Target emotion: Anger 
 
  
TO 
Score 
Unit 
PO 
Score 
Unit 
UO 
Score 
Unit 
20 20 20 
The boy noticed a little kitten 3     
The boy went up to the kitten 3     
I told the boy to be gentle with it, 3     
The kitten looked very feeble 2     
The boy grabbed the kitten 3     
by the tail 1     
The boy kicked the kitten 
3     
as hard as he could 2     
The roller-skater was coming 
towards us 
  3   
The roller-skater was holding a 
water pistol 
  3   
It was too cold   2   
to be playing with such a toy   2   
The roller-skater stopped next to 
the kitten 
  3   
The roller-skater sprayed the kitten   3   
with a powerful jet of cold water   1   
The roller-skater chased the kitten 
away 
  3   
A few men were working on a 
nearby scaffolding  
    3 
The men noticed the whole scene     3 
The men encouraged the roller-
skater 
    3 
to keep chasing the kitten     2 
for their own entertainment     1 
I tried to get     2 
the roller-skater to stop chasing the 
kitten, 
    3 
My voice could not be heard over 
the workmen's cheers 
    3 
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Story Code Name: Child    Target emotion: Fear 
 
  
TO 
Score 
Unit 
PO 
Score 
Unit 
UO 
Score 
Unit 
20 20 20 
The boy became fidgety 2     
The boy started running across the 
busy street 
3     
I chased after him, 3     
I was trying to catch him  3     
before anything happened 1     
The boy went around a building. 3     
I ran into the roller-skater,    3   
The roller-skater crashed into a 
scaffolding 
  3   
I couldn’t see the boy 3     
The roller-skater was lying on the 
ground,  
  3   
Heavy objects were hanging above 
her, 
    3 
high up on the scaffolding     1 
The impact had brought them      3 
even closer to the edge of the 
scaffolding board     1 
I didn’t want   2   
to move the girl,   2   
in case she had hit her back    3   
A few tools fell on the ground      3 
not far from the roller-skater     1 
The tools falling down made a 
horrible noise 
    3 
The heavy objects above her looked 
set to come crashing down  
    2 
as the scaffolding seemed to have 
lost one of its supporting sole 
boards 
    3 
The boy was gone 2     
and I also felt responsible for   2   
the girl being in danger.   2   
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Story Code Name: Child   Target emotion: Sadness 
 
  
TO 
Score 
Unit 
PO 
Score 
Unit 
UO 
Score 
Unit 
20 20 20 
The boy was very quiet 2     
The boy sat down on the ground  3     
The boy started to cry 2     
The boy looked up at me 3     
The boy's nana died last night 3     
The boy was holding a toy 3     
to his chest  1     
The toy was the last present from 
nana 
3     
The roller-skater was going very 
fast towards the end opf the 
pavement 
  3   
The roller-skater fell in an 
awkward position 
  3   
The roller-skater sprained her ankle   3   
The roller-skater outfit said   2   
The roller-skater was taking part in 
a hockey competition   3   
later that day   1   
The roller-skater was looking very 
distressed because 
  2   
she wouldn’t be able to take part 
in the competition. 
  3   
A few men were standing on a 
scaffolding 
    3 
The men were finishing the work      3 
on the front wall     1 
A few buckets of paint fell from 
high up on the scaffolding. 
    3 
The men looked dejected as     2 
the thick blue paint spilled down     2 
the paint was spreading along the 
entire front wall, 
    3 
Several week's work was ruined 
within minutes 
    3 
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Story Code Name: Child    Target emotion: Happiness 
 
  
TO 
Score 
Unit 
PO 
Score 
Unit 
UO 
Score 
Unit 
20 20 20 
The boywas singing one of his 
favourite songs 
3     
The boy was jumping around 2     
The boy was holding my hand 3     
The roller-skater came towards us   3   
The roller-skater was holding a 
bunch of flowers   3   
The roller-skater gave a few 
flowers  
  3   
to the boy   1   
The boy gave the roller-skater 3     
a hug 1     
The boy took the roller-skater's 
hand 
3     
The boy asked the roller-skater 3     
to be friends 2     
The roller-skater looked very 
impressed, 
  2   
The roller-skater played a game    3   
with the boy   1   
The roller-skater was teaching the 
boy 
  3   
a new song   1   
A few menwere taking down the 
scaffolding 
    3 
from a historic building     1 
The construction work  had caused 
inconvenience due to 
    3 
the noise and dust had been comin 
from the site, but 
    3 
People could look forward to 
having some peace and quiet 
    3 
Work was finished     2 
A few people were gathered in the 
street 
    3 
to watch the impressive building     2 
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Story Code Name: Car     Target emotion: Anger 
 
  
TO 
Score 
Unit 
PO 
Score 
Unit 
UO 
Score 
Unit 
20 20 20 
My cousin put the music up very 
loud 
2     
The speakers started sounding 
awful. 
2     
I asked him repeatedly 3     
to turn the music down a little,  2     
He didn’t pay attention to me at all 3     
My cousin pulled over at a small 
petrol station,  
3     
My cousin quickly got out of the 
car 
3     
to go to the shop.  2     
The other vehicle was now behind 
us 
  2   
The driver was beeping the horn    3   
We were parked too close to the 
entrance of the service station 
  3   
We were blocking everybody else’s 
access. 
  3   
The other driver was shouting at 
me 
  3   
to move the car   2   
I couldn't do anything anyway   2   
before my cousin returned   2   
A truck stopped behind the other 
car 
    3 
The lorry driver started honking the 
horn 
    3 
The lorry driver was shouting at me     3 
to push the car     2 
out of the way     1 
I tried to explain that      2 
my cousin will be back shortly      2 
with the keys     1 
The lorry driver kept on shouting at 
me 
    3 
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Story Code Name: Car     Target emotion: Fear 
 
  
TO 
Score 
Unit 
PO 
Score 
Unit 
UO 
Score 
Unit 
20 20 20 
A bang came from the front of the 
car 
3     
My cousin had lost control of the 
vehicle.  
3     
The car was swerving left and right 
very forcefully.  
2     
I expected 2     
we would leave the road very soon 3     
my head hit the side window 3     
in an awkward position 1     
My head/ The impact shattered the 
glass 
3     
The other car in front of us was 
stopping very quickly 
  2   
I tried to prepare for a very violent 
impact, 
  3   
I couldn’t move.    2   
The blow to the head could be 
made worse by another impact. 
  3   
The car in front had stopped 
completely. 
  2   
There was no way   2   
to go past it   2   
We had to stop   2   
but we couldn't   2   
A collision would project us into 
the opposite lane of traffic 
    3 
A lorry was coming towards usfast     3 
The lorry started breaking violently     2 
in order to avoid the same obstacle 
as the car in front of us 
    2 
The lorry started skidding     3 
The lorry turned sideways across 
the road,  
    1 
The lorry was sliding towards us     3 
The lorry was taking up both lanes 
of traffic 
    3 
 
  
Appendices 
431 
 
Story Code Name: Car     Target emotion: Sadness 
 
  
TO 
Score 
Unit 
PO 
Score 
Unit 
UO 
Score 
Unit 
20 20 20 
My cousin told me that 3     
we were going to my auntie's 3     
My auntie had asked 2     
to see me urgently. 2     
My auntiehad been very ill for a 
while now. 
3     
I hadn’t spoken to her recently 3     
We had been very close 2     
I was her favourite nephew 2     
The car I had seen earlier on the 
road was already there. 
  2   
The driver was standing by the 
door 
  3   
The driver came running towards 
us 
  3   
The driver said   2   
we had arrived too late.   2   
My auntie had died earlier that 
morning 
  3   
The ambulance was leaving   2   
 just as he got there.   3   
A lorry driver was parked across 
the road 
    3 
from my auntie's house     1 
The lorry driver came to us     3 
The lorry driver had been with my 
auntie 
    2 
in her last moments     1 
A few people were with her at her 
death bed, 
    3 
My auntie didn't want     2 
to see anybody else     2 
My auntie was calling for me     3 
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Story Code Name: Car    Target emotion: Happiness 
 
  
TO 
Score 
Unit 
PO 
Score 
Unit 
UO 
Score 
Unit 
20 20 20 
My cousin had won a newspaper 
competition  
3     
The prize was an all-expenses paid 
holiday, for him and three other 
friends 
3     
My cousin wanted me 3     
to come along with him 2     
We were going to meet with two 
other friends 
3     
 to tell them 2     
the news 1     
We stopped near a pub,  3     
The other vehicle pulled over too   2   
The driver was cheerful   2   
The driver was one of our mutual 
friends 
  2   
I was very pleased   2   
to see him   2   
We all went inside the pub.   3   
The friend was congratulating my 
cousin 
  3   
The friend gave both of us   3   
a small present   1   
A lorry was parking behind my 
cousin's car. 
    3 
The lorry driver was one of my 
cousin's friends 
    2 
The lorry driver joined us inside the 
pub 
    3 
The lorry driver said      2 
we had never been on a holiday 
together,  but 
    3 
we had talked about it many times.     3 
we could finally go, without     2 
worrying about the costs     2 
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Story Code Name: Dog     Target emotion: Anger 
 
  
TO 
Score 
Unit 
PO 
Score 
Unit 
UO 
Score 
Unit 
20 20 20 
on the other side of the channel 1     
The dog was headed towards a 
frail old lady 
3     
The dog grabbed the lady's 
walking stick 
3     
The dog pulled the lady's walking 
stick away from her 
3     
The dog started growling 
aggressively 
2     
The lady looked for 2     
someone to help her 3     
I tried to draw the student's 
attention 
3     
The student was very close to the 
old lady 
  3   
The student didn't lend the old 
lady a hand 
  3   
The student incited the dog   3   
The student picked up the stick   3   
The student pretended to give the 
stick back 
  3   
to the lady   1   
The student was holding the stick   3   
out of her reach   1   
The teenager approached the lady     3 
from behind     1 
The teenager snatched the lady's 
bag 
    3 
The teenager started going 
through the bag 
    3 
The teenager was pocketing     2 
what he found interesting     2 
The old lady was begging to be left 
alone, 
    3 
The lady's feeble cries could hardly 
be heard over the teenager's 
laughter 
    3 
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Story Code Name: Dog     Target emotion: Fear 
 
  
TO 
Score 
Unit 
PO 
Score 
Unit 
UO 
Score 
Unit 
20 20 20 
The dog caught up with me  3     
The dog started growling 2     
The dog tried to grab my leg 3     
The dog pulled back half way 
through the attack  
3     
The dog went around my back 3     
The dog began a new attack 3     
The dog's teeth were inches from 
my skin 
3     
The student walking kicked the dog 
away before 
  3   
the dog could get to me.   3   
The dog pounced at the student    3   
The dog bit the student    3   
from his calf   1   
The student was screaming   2   
The student was losing a lot of 
blood 
  3   
The student could soon go into 
shock 
  2   
A teenager came     2 
to help the student     2 
The teenager got attacked by the 
dog 
    3 
The teenager was lying on the 
concrete path 
    3 
A man behind me was calling an 
ambulance 
    3 
The man was describing the boy's 
wounds 
    3 
The man was advising everyone     2 
not to move him.      2 
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Story Code Name: Dog     Target emotion: Sadness 
 
  
TO 
Score 
Unit 
PO 
Score 
Unit 
UO 
Score 
Unit 
20 20 20 
The dog came up to me  3     
The dog crouched at my feet 3     
The dog was looking very ill 2     
I gave the dog 3     
a sandwich I had 2     
in my bag 1     
The dog laid his head 3     
on my feet 1     
The dog died 2     
The student turned up behind me   3   
The student said that   2   
The student had lost a puppy   3   
that same day   1   
The puppy was playing in the 
garden 
  3   
The puppy choked  on something   2   
The puppy died before   2   
the student could take him    3   
to the vet's   1   
A young teenager came running     2 
The teenager was calling his dog     3 
The teenager said     2 
The dog had not been looking well     2 
The teenager thought     2 
A walk in the park would do the 
dog good 
    3 
The teenager picked up the dead 
dog 
    3 
The teenager started crying 
uncontrollably 
    3 
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Story Code Name: Dog    Target emotion: Happiness 
 
  
TO 
Score 
Unit 
PO 
Score 
Unit 
UO 
Score 
Unit 
20 20 20 
The dog started leaping around me 3     
The dog was wagging its tail 2     
The dog was holding a stick 3     
in its mouth 1     
The dog dropped the stick 3     
at my feet 1     
I threw the stick 3     
The dog caught the stick 
acrobatically 
3     
in the air 1     
The student came up from behind 
me 
  3   
The student took a sandwich   3   
out of his bag   1   
to feed the dog   2   
The dog ate the sandwich   3   
The student said   2   
the student had a dog too   2   
The student said   2   
the dog looked lost   2   
A young teenager was running 
towards us 
    3 
The teenager was calling his dog     3 
The teenager picked up the dog     3 
The teenager said     2 
the teenager had been looking for 
the dog 
    3 
for the last several hours     1 
The teenager was very grateful to 
you  
    3 
for having looked after his dog     2 
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Appendix F. Emotional stories (Chapters 4 and 5) 
 
 
 
Phase 1, Iterations 1 to 3. 
 
Instruction for participants during the presentation procedure: 
Please listen to the following story and imagine that you are personally 
experiencing what is happening in the text. 
 
Instruction for participants during the recall procedure: 
Please try to reproduce out loud the previous story, including as many details 
as you can remember. 
 
Phase 1, Interference. 
 
Instruction for participants during the presentation procedure: 
Please listen to the following new story and imagine that you are personally 
experiencing what is happening in the text. 
 
Instruction for participants during the recall procedure: 
Please try to reproduce out loud the previous story, including as many details 
as you can remember. 
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Phase 2, Immediate Recall. 
 
Instructions for participants during the recall procedure: 
 Please try to reproduce out loud the earlier story that I read to you three times 
at the start of the session, including as many details as you can remember. 
 
Phase 3, Delayed Recall. 
 
Instructions for participants during the recall procedure: 
 Please try to reproduce out loud the earlier story that I read to you three times 
at the start of the session, including as many details as you can remember.  
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Target Story Name: WA     Target emotion: Anger 
 
You are meeting with a friend in a local pub, on a Saturday afternoon. The pub is busy. 
You sit down as a small table in the corner, while your friend goes to the bar and returns 
with the drinks. Your friend drops the drinks, while putting them on the table. The 
glasses smash and the drinks spill down your legs. Your friend is shouting at you, and 
blames you for dropping the drinks. A young woman was standing behind your friend. 
She was wearing a new blue dress, which was now stained. The woman accuses you of 
ruining her dress, even if you hadn't touched the drinks. You explain that you didn't do 
anything, but she throws her cocktail into your face. The woman leaves the pub quickly. 
Many people around you comment about the woman's dress. A young couple standing 
by the fruit machines come over and speak to your friend. The couple take your friend's 
side and shout insults at you for no reason. The pub's staff ask you to leave and ban you 
from the pub. 
 
 
Interference Story Name: FH   Target emotion: Happiness 
 
You are in your local shop. You start talking and as you go up to the till, you decide to 
let him/her go first. Your friend pays for his shopping and buys a scratch-card. As you 
are paying for your own shopping, your friend starts laughing loudly and tells you that 
he/she has won £250,000. He/she says that you must go for a meal to celebrate. On the 
way to the restaurants, your friend decides to spend some of the money to go on a 
holiday, and invites you to come along, for free. When you get to the restaurant, you 
begin making plans about where you want to go. 
  
Appendices 
440 
 
Target Story Name: LF     Target emotion: Fear 
 
Your friend is giving you a lift to a nearby town in a small car. You get on the main 
road, which is busy. A loud explosion is coming from below the engine. The car is 
swerving sideways forcefully, and the driver loses control of the car. Your head hits the 
side window and shatters the glass. The broken glass gets in your eyes, and it hurts 
badly. The blue car in front of you stops. The car has a pink Baby on Board sign. Two 
young girls are playing on the back seat and turn their heads towards you. The brakes on 
your car stop working. You hit the car in front, which is pushed off the road. Loud 
screams are coming from the car in front. Your car stops, and the engine shuts off. Your 
friend can't restart the car. A blue lorry is coming from the other direction. The lorry 
brakes violently, turns on its side and heads for your car. Your car door is jammed 
closed and you are trapped inside the car. 
 
 
Interference Story Name: HH   Target emotion: Happiness 
 
You are on an exotic holiday at the seaside. It is a hot sunny summer day and you sit in 
the shade, at a terrace by the sea, looking out into the horizon. A soft smile creeps 
across your face as you begin to eat your favourite flavour of ice cream. A soft wind is 
blowing from the sea, and you just make out the contour of a large white boat in the 
distance. Closer to shore, three yachts gracefully glide across the sea, while the sailors 
are waving at somebody on the shore. The waves are gently lapping on the pristine 
white beach in front of you. The sea is clear and calm. Your favourite music starts 
playing on the stereo in the background. 
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Target Story Name: DS     Target emotion: Sadness 
 
You are in a park. A white dog is running around. The dog is looking sick. The dog falls 
at your feet and dies. A teenager wearing a green top and grey trousers was running 
after the dog. He is the dog's owner. The teenager picks up the dead dog and strokes it. 
The teenager has been looking after the dog ever since his parents died, 9 years ago. The 
boy had no friends. His brother had died 4 years ago. The brother was a year older than 
him. His sister lives in a hospice, 360 miles away suffering from a terminal illness. She 
was admitted into hospital after his brother died. His sister was two years younger than 
the teenager. The boy was not able to see his sister since she fell ill. The boy shows you 
a picture with his dog and with his brother from when they were on a trip in the 
mountains. His brother fell off a cliff and could not be saved. 
 
Interference Story Name: PH   Target emotion: Happiness 
 
As you walk across the park, you catch the eye of an attractive man / woman. She / he 
smiles widely as he passes. He / she reminds you of the first boy/girl you liked, when 
you were in school. He / She was tall and slender and had a beautiful face. You 
wondered if he/she could be the same person. A couple of seconds later, he/she calls 
your name from behind. He/she recognises you, and is very happy to see you. You go to 
a pub, to catch up on old times. He/she tells you how you haven't changed at all. After a 
couple of drinks, you make plans to meet again in a couple of days. 
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Target Story Name: SH    Target emotion: Happiness 
 
You are walking back home on a Friday afternoon. The streets are busy as many people 
are walking home from work. A man/woman is crossing the street in a hurry and calls 
your name. The man/woman is one of your closest childhood friends. You used to live 
next door to him/her, but after you turned 14, his/her family moved to a far-away town. 
You haven't seen him/her since he/she left. He/she is very excited to see you and says 
he/she has been hoping for this moment for a long time. He/she has moved recently into 
town. He/she lives near you, and invites you to visit him/her one weekend. Your friend's 
younger brother and his lovely partner join you. They are getting married, and are 
excited about the wedding. The wedding will be on a cruise ship, in four weeks and they 
are paying for all their guests' tickets and expenses. They invite you to the wedding and 
you gladly accept the invitation. 
 
Interference Story Name: RS   Target emotion: Sadness 
 
It is Tuesday morning. You are free for a couple of hours, and so, you decide to go for a 
walk. While getting back, you see your neighbour’s young boy, who seems to be 
waiting for someone. The boy is quiet. He sits down on the ground and then starts to 
cry. Next, he looks up at you and says that his nana had died the previous night. You 
notice that the boy is holding a toy close to his chest. The boy tells you that his nana 
gave him that toy yesterday. Then, you hear something behind you. You turn around 
and see the roller-skater going fast towards the end of the pavement. She can’t control 
her speed, and falls in an awkward position, spraining her ankle badly. She was getting 
ready to take part in a competition later in the day. The roller-skater is looking very 
distressed because she wouldn’t be able to compete. 
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Appendix G. Emotional stories (Chapters 4 and 5) – recall scoring 
 
The propositional analysis followed the detailed guidelines published by Turner and 
Greene (1977).  
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Target Story Name: WA     Target emotion: Anger 
 
Story Sentence Proposition / Recall Unit Valence   
You are meeting with a friend 
in a local pub, on a Saturday 
afternoon. 
Meet, you friend N 1 
qualify, pub, local N 2 
Location: meet, pub N 3 
Qualify: Saturday, afternoon N 4 
Time: Meet, Saturday N 5 
The pub is busy. qualify, pub, busy N 6 
You sit down as a small table in 
the corner, 
Sit down, you, table N 7 
qualify table, small N 8 
location: table, corner N 9 
while your friend goes to the 
bar and returns with the drinks. 
quality friend, your N 10 
go, friend bar,  N 11 
return, friend, drinks N 12 
Your friend drops the drinks, 
while putting them on the 
table. 
quality friend, your E 13 
drop friend drinks E 14 
put friend drinks on table E 15 
Time: while, put, drop E 16 
The glasses smash and Smash, glasses E 17 
the drinks spill down your legs. quality of legs, your E 18 
Spill drinks down pants E 19 
Your friend is shouting at you, 
and blames you for dropping 
the drinks. 
Quality of friend, you E 20 
shout, friend at you E 21 
blame, friend, you E 22 
drop drinks, you E 23 
causality: because, drop, blame E 24 
A young woman was standing 
behind your friend 
qualify friend, your N 25 
qualify woman, young N 26 
stand, woman, behind friend N 27 
She was wearing a new blue 
dress, which was now stained. 
qualify, dress, new N 28 
qualify dress, blue N 29 
wear woman, dress N 30 
qualify dress, stained N 31 
The woman accuses you of 
ruining her dress, 
qualify dress, her E 32 
ruin, you dress E 33 
Accuse woman, ruin E 34 
even if you hadn't touched the 
drinks. 
touch drinks you E 35 
negate: touch E 36 
Despite: negate, acuse E 37 
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Target Story Name: WA     Target emotion: Anger 
Continued from previous page 
Story Sentence Proposition / Recall Unit Valence   
You explain that you didn't do 
anything, 
do you nothing E 38 
explain you, do you E 39 
but she throws her cocktail into 
your face. 
quality of, cocktail, her E 40 
quality of face, your E 41 
throw, she cocktail, face E 42 
The woman leaves the pub 
quickly. 
leave woman, pub N 43 
qualify, leave, quickly N 44 
Many people around you 
comment about the woman's 
dress. 
number of, people, many N 45 
qualify people, around you N 46 
quality of dress, woman's N 47 
Comment, people, dress N 48 
A young couple standing by the 
fruit machines come over  
quality of, couple, young N 49 
stand couple, fruit machines N 50 
come over, couple N 51 
and speak to your friend. Quality of, friend, your N 52 
Speak couple, friend N 53 
The couple take your friend's 
side and shout insults at you for 
no reason. 
Quality of friend, you E 54 
Take side, couple, friend E 55 
Shout, couple, insults, you, no reason E 56 
The pub's staff ask you to leave 
and ban you from the pub. 
quality of staff, pubs E 57 
leave you E 58 
ask, staff, you, leave you E 59 
ban, staff you, pub. E 60 
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Target Story Name: LF     Target emotion: Fear 
 
Sentence Proposition Valence   
Your friend is giving you a lift 
to a nearby town in a small 
car. 
Quality of, friend, your N 1 
Quality of, nearby, town N 2 
quality of car, small N 3 
Gives lift, your friend, you, small car N 4 
Location: nearby town N 5 
You get on the main road, 
which is busy. 
Quality of road, main N 6 
Get you, on the main road N 7 
Quality of, main road, busy N 8 
A loud explosion is coming 
from below the engine. 
quality of, explosion, loud E 9 
Come loud explosion from the engine E 10 
The car is swerving sideways 
forcefully, and  
Swerve sideways, car E 11 
Qualify swerve, forcefully E 12 
the driver loses control of 
the car. Lose control, driver, car E 13 
Your head hits the side 
window and shatters the 
glass. 
quality of, head, your E 14 
Hit, your head, side window E 15 
Shatter, the glass E 16 
The broken glass gets in your 
eyes, and it hurts badly. 
quality of eyes, your E 17 
Get broken glass, in your eyes E 18 
hurts, glass, you E 19 
Qualify, hurts glass you, badly E 20 
The blue car in front of you 
stops. 
quality of the car, blue N 21 
quality of the car, in front N 22 
Stop, car in front N 23 
The car has a pink Baby on 
Board sign. 
Quality of sign, Baby on Board N 24 
quality of sign, pink N 25 
quality of the car, in front N 26 
Two young girls are playing 
on the back seat  
quality of girls, young N 27 
number of, girls, 2 N 28 
play, girls N 29 
quality of, seat, back N 30 
Location: play girls, back seat N 31 
and turn their heads towards 
you. 
quality of heads, girls N 32 
turn, girls heads towards you N 33 
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Target Story Name: LF     Target emotion: Fear 
Continued from previous page 
Sentence Proposition Valence   
The brakes on your car stop 
working. 
Quality of car, your E 34 
quality of brakes, car E 35 
work, brakes E 36 
negate: work brakes E 37 
You hit the car in front, 
which is pushed off the road 
quality of the car, in front E 38 
hit, you, car in front E 39 
is pushed car in front, off the road E 40 
Loud screams are coming 
from the car in front. 
quality of screams, loud E 41 
quality of the car, in front E 42 
come screams from the car E 43 
Your car stops, and the 
engine shuts off. 
Quality of car, your N 44 
be stopped, your car N 45 
shut off, the engine N 46 
Your friend can't restart the 
car. 
quality of friend, your N 47 
restart, car, your friend N 48 
negate: restart car N 49 
A blue lorry is coming from 
the other direction. 
quality of lorry, blue N 50 
quality of direction, other N 51 
come lorry from the other direction N 52 
The lorry brakes violently, Brake lorry E 53 
Qualify brake lorry, violently E 54 
turns on its side and heads 
for your car 
turn on side, lorry E 55 
quality of car, your E 56 
head for your car, lorry E 57 
Your car door is jammed 
closed and you are trapped 
inside the car. 
quality of door, your E 58 
Is jammed closed, your door E 59 
are trapped inside the car you E 60 
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Target Story Name: DS     Target emotion: Sadness 
 
Sentence Proposition Valence   
You are in a park. you are N 1 
Location: Park N 2 
A white dog is running 
around. 
Quality of: dog, white N 3 
Run around, dog N 4 
The dog is looking sick Look, dog, sick E 5 
The dog falls at your feet Fall, dog E 6 
quality: feet, your E 7 
Location: at your feet E 8 
and dies die, dog E 9 
A teenager wearing a 
green top and gray 
trousers 
Quality of: top, green N 10 
Quality of: trousers, gray N 11 
Wear, teenager, top and trousers N 12 
was running after the dog Run, teenager, after dog N 13 
He is the dog's owner Quality: owner, dog N 14 
IS: Teenager, dog owner N 15 
The teenager picks up the 
dead dog Pick up: teenager, dog E 16 
and strokes it. Stroke: teenager, dog E 17 
The teenager has been 
looking after the dog 
Look after: teenager, dog E 18 
Quality of: parents, teenager's E 19 
Die: teenager's parents E 20 
ever since his parents 
died, 9 years ago. 
Time: Since, look after, Die E 21 
Number of: years, 9 N 22 
Time: 9 years ago N 23 
The boy had no friends. Have: boy, friends E 24 
Negate E 25 
His brother had died 4 
years ago. 
Quality of: brother, teenager's E 26 
Die: the brother E 27 
Number of: years, 4 N 28 
Time: 4 years ago N 29 
The brother was a year 
older than him. 
Quality older, than boy N 30 
Be brother, older than boy N 31 
Number of: years, 1 N 32 
Quality: older brother, 1 year N 33 
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Target Story Name: DS     Target emotion: Sadness 
Continued from previous page 
Sentence Proposition Valence   
His sister lives in a hospice, 
360 miles away 
Quality of: sister, teenager's E 34 
Location: sister, hospital E 35 
Number of: miles, 360 N 36 
Location: hospice, 360 miles N 37 
Live: sister, hospice E 38 
suffering from a terminal 
illness 
Quality: illness, terminal E 39 
Suffer, sister, terminal illness E 40 
She was admitted into 
hospital after his brother 
died. 
Be admitted: sister E 41 
Die, brother E 42 
Time: after died brother, admitted sister E 43 
His sister was two years 
younger than the 
teenager. 
Quality younger, than boy N 44 
Be sister, younger than boy N 45 
Number of: years, 2 N 46 
Quality: younger sister, 2 years N 47 
The boy was not able to 
see his sister since she fell 
ill. 
Fall ill, sister E 48 
See, boy sister E 49 
Time: since, fall ill sister, see boy sister E 50 
Negate: see boy sister E 51 
The boy shows you a 
picture with his dog and 
with his brother 
Quality of: picture, brother N 52 
Quality of: picture, dog N 53 
Show, boy, you, picture N 54 
from when they were on a 
trip in the mountains. 
Be on a trip, boys N 55 
Location: in the mountains, trip N 56 
Quality of: picture, trip N 57 
His brother fell off a cliff 
and could not be saved. 
Fall, brother, cliff E 58 
be saved, brother E 59 
negate E 60 
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Target Story Name: SH    Target emotion: Happiness 
 
Sentence Proposition Valence   
You are walking back 
home on a Friday 
afternoon. 
Quality of, Friday, afternoon N 1 
walk back you, home, N 2 
Time: Walk, afternoon/Friday N 3 
The streets are busy as 
many people are walking 
home from work. 
Qualify streets, busy N 4 
number of people, many N 5 
walk home people N 6 
location: walk people from work N 7 
Causality: because, people walk home, streets busy N 8 
A man/woman is 
crossing the street in a 
hurry 
Cross, woman, street N 9 
qualify, cross, hurry N 10 
qualify, name, your N 11 
and calls your name. call, woman your name N 12 
The man/woman is one 
of your closest childhood 
friends 
qualify friend, childhood E 13 
qualify friend, close E 14 
qualify friend, your E 15 
Is man/woman, friend E 16 
You used to live next 
door to him/her, 
qualify next door, man/woman N 17 
Live, you, next door N 18 
but after you turned 14, 
his/her family moved to 
a far away town. 
qualify, family his/her N 19 
qualify town, far away N 20 
move, family, town N 21 
turn you 14 N 22 
Time: after, turn 14, move family,  N 23 
You haven't seen 
him/her since he/she 
left. 
leave he/she N 24 
see you, him/her N 25 
Negate: See you friend N 26 
Time: since, she left, not see you her N 27 
He/she is very excited to 
see you  
qualify excited, very E 28 
He/she is excited E 29 
See, she you E 30 
Causality: He/She is excited, see you E 31 
and says he/she has 
been hoping for this 
moment for a long time. 
hope she for this moment E 32 
Time: for a long time, hope she, E 33 
Say she, hope she E 34 
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Target Story Name: SH    Target emotion: Happiness 
Continued from previous page 
Sentence Proposition Valence   
He/she has moved 
recently into town. 
He/she lives near you, 
Move into town friends N 35 
qualify, recently N 36 
live she N 37 
location: near you, live he/she N 38 
and invites you to visit 
him/her one weekend. 
visit you him/her N 39 
invite he/she to visit N 40 
time: at the weekend, visit N 41 
Your friend's younger 
brother and his lovely 
partner join you. 
qualify brother, younger E 42 
qualify, brother, friend's E 43 
qualify partner, lovely E 44 
qualify partner, brother's E 45 
brother, and partner E 46 
join you, brother and partner E 47 
They are getting married, 
and are excited about 
the wedding. 
Marry, they (brother and partner) E 48 
are excited, they E 49 
Causality: because, excited, wedding E 50 
The wedding will be on a 
cruise ship, in four weeks 
Location: wedding, cruise ship E 51 
number of weeks, 4 E 52 
time: wedding, four weeks E 53 
and they are paying for 
all their guests' tickets 
and expenses. 
quality of, ticket, guests E 54 
quality of, expenses, guests E 55 
pay they for tickets E 56 
pay they for expenses E 57 
They invite you to the 
wedding and you gladly 
accept the invitation. 
invite you, they E 58 
accept you invitation E 59 
qualify, accept, gladly E 60 
 
 
 
Appendices 
452 
 
Appendix H. Summary of neuropsychological assessments 
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Legend: 
MMSE Mini Mental State Examination 
HADS Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale 
WMS-
III 
Wechsler Memory Scale III 
HDS Hamilton Depression Scale 
BDI Becks Depression Inventory 
ERQ Emotion Regulation Questionnaire 
BADS Behavioural Assessment of Dysexecutive Syndrome 
WAIS Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale 
WASI Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence 
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Appendix – Summary of Neuropsychological Assessments (continued) 
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Legend: 
DKEFSTM Delis–Kaplan Executive Function System - Trail Making 
DKEFSVF Delis–Kaplan Executive Function System - Verbal Fluency 
DKEFSDF Delis–Kaplan Executive Function System - Design Fluency 
DKEFSCWI Delis–Kaplan Executive Function System - Colour-Word Interference 
DKEFSST Delis–Kaplan Executive Function System - Sorting Test 
DKEFSTQT Delis–Kaplan Executive Function System  - Twenty Questions Test 
DKEFSWCT Delis–Kaplan Executive Function System - Word Context Test 
DKEFSTT Delis–Kaplan Executive Function System - Tower Test 
DKEFSPT Delis–Kaplan Executive Function System - Proverb Test 
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Appendix I. Self-report measures of emotions – Visual Analogue Mood Scales 
(VAMS) 
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Appendix J. Sample of free recall transcripts – neurologically normal participant 
 
 
 
Control #01, Session: DS 
 
Iteration 1: 00:03:03 
I’m in a park, and there’s a white dog running around, and it falls down at my feet. A 
teenagers comes up. He’s got a green top and gray slacks. He picks up the dog and tells 
me that his parents are dead for 9 years. His brother died a year earlier, His sister is in a 
hospice with a terminal illness. His brother, a year before, had fallen off a cliff and 
could not be saved. He shows me a picture with him, his brother, and the dog, from 
before his brother died. 
 
Iteration 2: 00:08:22 
I’m in a park. There’s a white dog running around. It looks sick and it falls dead at my 
feet. The teenager is running after the dog. He picks it up and strokes it. He tells me that 
he’s got no friends. His parents are dead. He’s been looking after the dog since his 
parents died, 9 years previously. His brother died and his sister is 360 miles away, in a 
hospice with a terminal illness, that she was diagnosed the year after his brother died. 
He is unable to see her. He shows me a photo of his brother, himself and the dog, on a 
trip in the mountains, where his brother fell off a cliff and could not be saved. 
 
Iteration 3: 00:11:53 
I’m in a park. There’s a white dog running around. It looks sick and falls dead at my 
feet. The teenager was chasing the dog, wearing a green top and gray trousers. The dog 
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belonged to him. He picks up the dog, and strokes the dog, and tells me that he’s looked 
after the dog ever since his parents died, 9 years previous. He tells me that his brother’s 
died. His brother’s 4 years younger than him. His sister is in a hospice 360 miles away, 
and was diagnosed with a terminal illness a year after his brother died. He shows me a 
picture of his brother, himself and the dog when they were on a trip up in the mountains, 
when his brother fell off a mountain and could not be saved. 
 
Interference: 00:14:55 
I’m walking down the street and I catch the eye of an attractive man. He smiles. He’s 
tall, slim with a beautiful face, and he reminds me of someone I used to know when I 
went to school. And I wonder if he can be the same person. When he passes he calls my 
name, and I turn around. We go to a restaurant.  
 
Recall 1: 00:16:28 
I’m having a walk in the park, and there is a white dog running around. He looks sick 
and it falls dead at my feet. A teenager was chasing the dog, He was wearing a green top 
and gray slacks. He picks the dog up and strokes it. He tells me he’s been looking after 
the dog ever since his parents died, 9 years previous. His brother died, and his sister’s 
got a terminal illness and is in a hospice 360 miles away, and he’s not been able to see 
her ever since his brother died, two years previous. He shows me a photo of him, his 
brother and the dog from a trip in the mountains, when his brother fell off a cliff and 
could not be saved. 
 
Recall 2: 00:39:40 
I was walking in the park. There was a white dog running around. It looked sick, it fell 
dead at my feet. The teenager who had been chasing the dog was wearing a green top 
and gray slacks. He picked the dog up and stroked the dog, and tells me he had been 
looking after the dog ever since his parents died, 9 years previous. His brother had died 
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a year before. His sister had a terminal illness and was in a hospice 360 miles away, and 
he hadn’t been able to visit her ever since she’d gotten ill, a year before his brother died. 
He showed me a photo of himself, his brother and his dog, where his brother fell off a 
mountain and could not be saved. 
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Control #01, Session: LF 
 
Iteration 1: 00:00:00 
My friend is giving me a lift in a small car. It makes a terrible noise and it swerves, and 
there is a silver car in front with a pink baby sign in the back where two girls are 
playing. We hit the car. There is a blue lorry coming towards us. It puts on its brakes 
and it swerves and it hits our car into the side, and I am trapped inside. There is 
screaming coming from the car in front.  
 
Iteration 2: 00:03:12 
My friend is giving me a lift to a nearby town in a small car. We turn into a busy road. 
There is a noise, an explosion from underneath the car, and it swerves to the side. I bang 
my head, and it shatters the glass which gets in my eyes. There is a silver car in front 
that stops. It’s got a pink baby on board sticker, And there are two young girls playing 
on the back seat, who turn to look. The brakes don’t work on our car. It swerves to the 
side and hits the silver car, pushing it into a ditch. There is a blue lorry coming towards 
us, that brakes. It turns on its side, and turns towards us, hitting us in the side, and jams 
the door. And we are unable to get out. 
 
Iteration 3: 00:06:30 
My friend is giving me a lift into a nearby town in a small car. We turn into the main 
road, which is busy, there is a loud explosion from underneath the engine. It swerves 
violently, and my head hits the window to the side, breaking it. The glass gets into my 
eyes, and it hurts terribly. There is a small silver car in front. It’s got a pink baby on 
board sticker on the back, where there are two young girls playing, who turn to look. 
My driver loses control of the car. The brakes don’t work. It swerves and hits the car in 
front, pushing it off the road. The blue lorry coming from the opposite direction, and 
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slams on its brakes violently. It skids and hits us and the door is jammed and I can’t get 
out. 
 
Interference: 00:09:28 
I’m on an exotic holiday, on a terrace, looking out at the horizon. I’m eating my 
favourite flavour of ice-cream. There are three yachts, and the sailors are waving at 
somebody on the beach. The waves are lapping against the pristine white sand. 
 
Recall 1: 00:10:56 
My friend is giving me a lift in his small car. We turn onto the main road, which is very 
busy, there is a loud explosion from underneath the engine, and the car swerves. There 
is a silver car in front and it’s got a pink baby-on-board sign. There are two young girls 
playing on the back seat and they turn to look. My friend loses control of the car. He 
slams on the brake. They don’t work. He hits the car in front, knocking it off the road. 
There is loud screaming coming from the car. A blue lorry, in the opposite direction, 
coming towards us slams on its brakes violently. The lorry turns over and skids, and hits 
us, and we’re trapped inside. 
 
Recall 2: 00:53:30 
My friend is giving me a lift in a small car to a nearby town. We go onto the main road, 
which is very busy. There is a loud explosion underneath the engine. The car swerves 
and I hit my head in the window. It shatters and the glass goes in my eyes, which hurts 
terribly. There is a silver car in front with a pink baby-on-board sign, and two girls are 
playing on the back seat. They turn to look at us. My friend loses control of the car. He 
puts his foot down on the brakes, but they don’t work. We hit the car in front, and knock 
it to the side of the road. There’s loud screaming coming from the car. There is a blue 
lorry coming from the opposite direction. It slams on its brakes violently, and veers to 
the side. It hits us and we are trapped in the car, and we can’t open the door. 
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Control #01, Session: NH 
 
Iteration 1: 00:01:25 
It’s a Friday afternoon, and I am walking back home. The streets are busy with people. 
Someone calls my name and I look. She crossed the street to me. It’s a dear friend of 
mine from when I was younger. She’s moved away when I was 14. She now lives close 
to me and she invites me around to her house, where her son and fiancé are there. 
They’re getting married on a cruise ship, and they are paying for all their guests. They 
invite me to join them for the wedding and I accept. 
 
Iteration 2: 00:04:00 
I’m walking back home on a Friday afternoon. It’s busy and there are many people 
going home. A lady’s crossing the road and calls to me. It’s an old childhood friend who 
moved away when I was 14. I hadn’t seen her since then. She is excited to see me and 
says she has been waiting for this moment for a long time. She invites me to her house 
at the weekend, where her younger brother and his fiancé are there. They are getting 
married in 4 weeks’ time on a cruise ship and they are paying for all their guests. They 
invite me to the wedding and I gladly accept. 
 
Iteration 3: 00:06:31 
I am walking back home on a Friday afternoon, and it’s very busy. There are many 
people walking home too. A lady is crossing the street and calls my name. It’s a life’s 
childhood’s friend, who moved out of the area after I turned 14 with her parents, and I 
hadn’t seen her since then. She is very excited to see me and tells me has been waiting 
for this moment for a long time. She’s recently moved back into town and lives quite 
close to me, and invites me to her home on the weekend. Her younger brother is there 
with his lovely partner and are very excited as they are getting married in 4 weeks time 
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on a cruise ship. They are paying for all their guests expenses and invite me along, 
which I gladly accept. 
 
Interference: 00:09:13 
It’s a Tuesday afternoon and I’m not busy, so I decided to go for a walk. I see my 
neighbour’s son who is crying. I ask him what’s the matter and he tells me that his 
nana’s died the day before. He’s clutching something to his chest and he tells me that 
his nana gave it to him yesterday. A roller-skater is coming up behind me and falls and 
sprains her ankle. She’s quite distressed, because she tells me she was in a competition 
that afternoon, and she wouldn’t be able to compete. 
 
Recall 1: 00:10:48 
I’m coming back home on a Friday afternoon. It’s very busy and there many people 
walking back home. A lady is crossing the street and calls my name. It’s a close 
childhood friend whom I haven’t seen for a long time, since I was 14, when she moved 
out of the area with her mum. She is very excited and tells me she has been waiting for 
this moment for a long time. She has just moved back into town, close to me and invites 
me around for the weekend. Her younger brother is there with his beautiful partner, and 
they’re very excited as are getting married in 4 weeks’ time. They are paying for all 
their guests to come, their expenses, and they invite me to the wedding, which I gladly 
accept. 
 
Recall 2: 00:43:25 
It’s a Friday afternoon, and I am coming back from work. It’s very busy and there are 
many people walking back home. A lady is crossing the street and calls my name. It’s a 
very close childhood friend, whom I haven’t; seen for many years, since I was 14, when 
she moved far away with her parents. She’s just moved back into the area and lives 
close by me, and invites me around to her house at the weekend. Her younger brother is 
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there, with his beautiful partner, who is very excited and tells me they are getting 
married on a cruise ship in 4 weeks’ time. They are paying for all the expenses for their 
guests and they invite me to come to the wedding.  
 
  
Appendices 
473 
 
Control #01, Session: WA 
 
Iteration 1: 00:01:30 
I’m going out with my friend on a Saturday afternoon to the pub. I sit down at my table 
while my friend buys the drinks. He comes to the table, and before he can put them on 
the table, he spills them and the drinks go down my legs. A lady standing by, in a blue 
dress has the drinks spilt down her dress, and accuses me of doing it, I explained that it 
wasn’t me. My friend was shouting at me that it was my fault, and I said I hadn’t 
touched the glasses. There’s a lady standing by in a blue dress, and she accuses me of 
knocking the drink down her dress. I explained to her that it wasn’t me, and I hadn’t 
touched the drinks. A couple standing by a jukebox … A crowd of people are watching 
what is going on. A couple standing by a jukebox come and speak to my friend, and 
take my friend’s side, and accuse me of knocking the drinks over. 
 
Iteration 2: 00:05:28 
I meet my friend on a Saturday afternoon at my local pub. I go and seat at a small table 
in the corner while he goes to the bar to fetch the drinks. When he fetches the drinks 
back, he drops them on the table, smashing the glass and the drinks go down my legs. 
He shouts at me that it’s my fault, and I tell him that I didn’t even touch the drinks. 
There’s a young lady standing beside me in a new blue dress, and the dress is now 
stained. She shouts at me that it’s my fault, and I try to explain to her that I hadn’t even 
touched the glasses. She throws her cocktail in my face and leaves the pub. The pub is 
busy and many people comment about the lady’s dress. A couple standing by the fruit-
machines come over and speak to my friend, and they take his side and they shout 
insults at me. The bar staff ask me to leave and bar me from the pub. 
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Iteration 3: 00:08:25 
I meet my friend at the local pub on a Saturday afternoon. The pub is quite busy. I sit 
down at a small table in the corner, while he goes for the drinks. He fetches the drinks 
back and he drops them on the table, smashing the drink’s glass. The drinks pour down 
my legs, He shouts at me that it’s my fault. And a young lady standing besides me, her 
dress had gotten stained and she accuses me of staining her dress. And I explained to 
her that I never even touched the glasses. She throws her cocktail…. 
I meet my friend on a Saturday afternoon at the local pub. It’s quite busy. I sit at a small 
table in the corner of the room, while he goes to get the drinks. He brings the drinks 
back. He drops them before placing them on the table and they smash. The drinks pour 
down my legs. He shouts at me that it was my fault, even though I didn’t touch the 
drinks. There’s a young lady standing beside me in a new blue dress, which is now 
stained. She accuses me of staining the dress. I tried to explain to her that I didn’t even 
touch the glasses. She threw her cocktail in my face and quickly leaves the pub. Several 
people turn and comment about the stain on the lady’s dress. A couple standing by the 
fruit machine come over and speak to my friend, taking his side and hurling insults at 
me. The bar staff ask me to leave and bar me from the pub. 
 
Interference: 00:13:25 
I’m going shopping on a Saturday afternoon and I meet my friend. We stand chatting in 
the shop. She goes first to buy her shopping. And she asks me what lottery ticket to buy, 
and I tell her. While buying my shopping, she laughs loudly and tells me she’s won 
£250,000 and that must go for a meal to celebrate. When we get to the restaurant, she 
decides to book a holiday and invites me along, free. We then go to the restaurant to 
celebrate. 
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Recall 1: 00:14:49 
On a Saturday afternoon, I meet my friend in the local pub. He goes to the bar to buy 
the drinks, while I sit at a small table in the corner. He brings the drinks over and drops 
the drinks, smashing the glass, and the drink splashes, and goes down my leg. He shouts 
at me, accusing me of spilling the drinks, even though I hadn’t touched the glasses. A 
young lady is standing beside me, wearing a new blue dress. The drinks spill and stain 
her dress. She accuses me of staining her dress, even though I didn’t touch the glasses. I 
tell her, and she throws her cocktail in my face, and quickly leaves the pub. Several 
people standing around comment on the stain of the lady’s dress. A couple standing at 
the fruit machine come over and speak to my friend, and start hurling insults at me. The 
bar staff come over and ask me to leave and bar me from the pub. 
 
Recall 2: 00:52:10 
On a Saturday afternoon I meet my friend at the local pub. It’s very busy in the pub, and 
I sit at a small table in the corner, while he goes to the bar to get the drinks. He brings 
them back to the table and drops them smashing the glass. The drinks go down my legs. 
There’s a young lady standing beside me in a new blue dress and it stains her dress. She 
shouts at me even though it’s not my fault and I didn’t touch the glass, she throws her 
cocktail in my face and leaves the pub. Several people around comment on the state of 
the lady’s dress. A couple standing by the fruit machine come over and speak to my 
friend, and insult me. They take his side. The staff come over and ask me to leave and 
bar me from the pub. 
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Appendix K. Sample of free recall transcripts – Korsakoff’s syndrome patients 
 
 
Patient #04, Session 1: LF – WH 
 
Iteration 1: LF 
There’s a contact with the other car, like a little crash, like a little bump. They were 
arguing a little bit. Eventually they settled it out, in the end. (That was it, really.) 
 
Iteration 2: LF 
There was a bit of a crash. Then we panicked a bit. So we had to stop. And… 
 
Iteration 3: LF 
Panic, basically. And we were talking a lot about the opponent’s car. (That’s basically 
it.) 
 
Interference: WH 
We were very anxious, and that was it, really. 
 
Recall 1: LF 
We were just driving. And, then, we got into contact with the other car. We had a little 
bit of a crash. We were shocked and a little bit angry with the other car. 
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Recall 2: LF 
We had a bit of a crash, a car accident. We just got into the car, and this car came into 
us, and we had a bit of a crash, but we weren’t injured. We had our seat belts on. 
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Patient #04, Session 2: NS – DH 
 
Iteration 1: NS 
He (the neighbour’s little boy) was a bit frightened. And there was a little bit of an 
argument. 
 
Iteration 2: NS 
He was a little bit angry. There was a bit of an argument, because his parents were 
angry with him. 
 
Iteration 3: NS 
The boy was angry. He was creating a little bit of a scene. 
 
Interference: DH 
The girl was a bit in despair. She had the dog to comfort her. She just took it for a walk. 
The dog was a bit frightened, but she comforted it. But she was frightened as well. And 
she just took it for a walk and she tried to reassure it. (And that’s basically it.) 
 
 
Recall 1: NS 
He (the neighbour’s little boy) was alright, but a little frightened for the dog’s sake, 
because the dog was in a bit of distress in the beginning, and he was trying to reassure 
the dog, really. 
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Recall 2: NS 
He was a bit frightened, because there was a bit of a racket, so he clung to his mother, 
and his mother calmed him down. (And that’s all I can remember from this story.) 
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Patient #04, Session 3: WA – LH 
 
Iteration 1: WA 
She (the friend) had a bit of an argument. There was a bit of a showdown. She was sad 
as well. 
 
Iteration 2: WA 
There was a bit of an argument, but it did get resolved eventually.  
 
Iteration 3: WA 
She had a bit of an argument. And it did get resolved eventually… that I was with her. 
We were friends afterwards, but we’ve just had a bit of an argument. Too much drink. 
 
Interference: LH 
There was a bit of an argument, but it did get resolved eventually. 
 
Recall 1: WA 
I met a friend in a pub. 
 
Recall 2: WA 
I used to work with a friend and then we went to the pub. 
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Patient #04, Session 4: DH – NS 
 
Iteration 1: DH 
I went for a walk and I met up with this girl and she had this dog. She was very fond of 
this dog. And I stroked it and we just went for a walk in the park with the dog. (And 
that’s basically it, really.) 
 
Iteration 2: DH 
She was in the park and the dog was excited. But it was a little angry at first, because it 
wanted something to eat. And she gave it something to eat, and it was a little bit better 
after that. And I was with her and I stroked the dog, and… that was basically it, we just 
went for a walk with the dog. 
 
Iteration 3: DH 
She was angry in the beginning, but the dog played about a bit. And we were happy 
afterwards, that the dog was alright.  
 
Interference: NS 
We were walking the park and the dog got a bit excited. The owner was a bit panicky in 
the beginning. 
 
Recall 1: DH 
It was afraid in the beginning, but it was alright afterwards with his owner, and we 
assured the dog. 
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Recall 2: DH 
A girl was walking a dog in the park and I was with her.  
Appendices 
483 
 
Appendix L. Sample of neuropsychological assessments – neurologically normal 
control participant 
 
Appendices 
484 
 
Appendices 
485 
 
Appendices 
486 
 
Appendices 
487 
 
Appendices 
488 
 
Appendices 
489 
 
Appendices 
490 
 
Appendices 
491 
 
Appendices 
492 
 
Appendices 
493 
 
Appendices 
494 
 
Appendices 
495 
 
Appendices 
496 
 
Appendices 
497 
 
Appendices 
498 
 
Appendices 
499 
 
Appendices 
500 
 
Appendices 
501 
 
Appendices 
502 
 
Appendices 
503 
 
Appendices 
504 
 
Appendices 
505 
 
Appendices 
506 
 
Appendices 
507 
 
 
  
Appendices 
508 
 
Appendix M. Sample of neuropsychological assessments – Korsakoff’s syndrome 
patient 
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Appendix N. Matlab code for the figures illustrating the simulation of the indices 
of affective specificity and accuracy 
 
 
Specificity Within Discrete Negative Emotions 
 
 
clear all; 
  
n=0.1; 
while n<10; 
    x1=0:0.1:n; 
    y1=n:0.1:10; 
  
    [a1,b1]=meshgrid(x1,y1); 
    z1=((a1+0.125).*(b1+0.125)).^(1/2)-0.125; 
  
    mesh(x1,y1,z1,... 
        'FaceColor','cyan',... 
        'FaceAlpha',0.5,... 
        'EdgeColor','black') 
  
    set(gca,'XTick',0:2:10) 
    set(gca,'YTick',0:2:10) 
    set(gca,'ZTick',0:2:10) 
  
    view([-35 15]); % view 1 
% view([235 15]); % view 2 
% view([-10 10]); % view 3 
% view([275 10]); % view 4 
 
    hold on 
    n=n+0.1; 
end 
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Accuracy Within Discrete Negative Emotions 
 
 
clear all; 
  
[x,y]=meshgrid(linspace(-10,10,101)); 
z=((((10+x)./2).*((10+y)./2)).^(1./2)-5).*2; 
mesh(x,y,z,... 
    'FaceColor','cyan',... 
    'FaceAlpha',0.5,... 
    'EdgeColor','black') 
  
hold on 
  
t=linspace(-10,10,101); 
X1=0*t; 
Y1=t; 
Z1=((((10+t)./2).*((10)./2)).^(1./2)-5).*2; 
  
X2=t; 
Y2=0*t; 
Z2=((((10+t)./2).*((10)./2)).^(1./2)-5).*2; 
  
plot3(X1,Y1,Z1,'LineWidth',2) 
plot3(X2,Y2,Z2,'LineWidth',2) 
  
view([-35 15]); % view 1 
% view([235 15]); % view 2 
% view([-10 10]); % view 3 
% view([275 10]); % view 4 
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Specificity Between Discrete Positive and Negative Emotions 
 
 
clear all; 
  
% 1: Delta(b2) = 0.1 
 
x1=0:0.1:0.1; 
y1=0.1:0.1:10; 
  
[a1,b1]=meshgrid(x1,y1); 
z1=(((0.1+0.0102907187508).*(a1+0.0102907187508).*(b1+0.0102907187508)
).^(1/3))-0.0102907187508; 
  
mesh(x1,y1,z1,... 
   'FaceColor','red',... 
   'FaceAlpha',0.5,... 
   'EdgeColor','black') 
  
set(gca,'XTick',0:2:10) 
set(gca,'YTick',0:2:10) 
set(gca,'ZTick',0:2:10) 
  
view([-35 15]); % view 1 
% view([235 15]); % view 2 
% view([-10 10]); % view 3 
% view([275 10]); % view 4 
  
hold on 
  
% 2: Delta(b2) = 2.5 
 
x2=0:0.1:2.5; 
y2=2.5:0.1:10; 
  
[a2,b2]=meshgrid(x2,y2); 
z2=(((2.5+0.0102907187508).*(a2+0.0102907187508).*(b2+0.0102907187508)
).^(1/3))-0.0102907187508; 
  
mesh(x2,y2,z2,... 
   'FaceColor','green',... 
   'FaceAlpha',0.5,... 
   'EdgeColor','black') 
  
hold on 
  
% 3: Delta(b2) = 5 
 
x3=0:0.1:5; 
y3=5:0.1:10; 
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[a3,b3]=meshgrid(x3,y3); 
z3=(((5+0.0102907187508).*(a3+0.0102907187508).*(b3+0.0102907187508)).
^(1/3))-0.0102907187508; 
  
mesh(x3,y3,z3,... 
   'FaceColor','yellow',... 
   'FaceAlpha',0.5,... 
   'EdgeColor','black') 
  
hold on 
  
% 4: Delta(b2) = 7.5 
 
x4=0:0.1:7.5; 
y4=7.5:0.1:10; 
  
[a4,b4]=meshgrid(x4,y4); 
z4=(((7.5+0.0102907187508).*(a4+0.0102907187508).*(b4+0.0102907187508)
).^(1/3))-0.0102907187508; 
  
mesh(x4,y4,z4,... 
   'FaceColor','cyan',... 
   'FaceAlpha',0.5,... 
   'EdgeColor','black') 
  
hold on 
  
% 5: Delta(b2) = 9.9 
 
x5=0:0.1:9.9; 
y5=9.9:0.1:10; 
  
[a5,b5]=meshgrid(x5,y5); 
z5=(((9.9+0.0102907187508).*(a5+0.0102907187508).*(b5+0.0102907187508)
).^(1/3))-0.0102907187508; 
  
mesh(x5,y5,z5,... 
   'FaceColor','blue',... 
   'FaceAlpha',0.5,... 
   'EdgeColor','black') 
  
hold on 
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Accuracy Between Discrete Positive and Negative Emotions 
 
 
clear all; 
  
% 1: Delta(b2) = -9.9 
  
x1=-10:0.5:10; 
y1=-10:0.5:10; 
  
[a1,b1]=meshgrid(x1,y1); 
z1=((((((10-9.9)/2)*((a1+10)/2).*((b1+10)/2)).^(1/3))-5)*2); 
  
mesh(x1,y1,z1,... 
   'FaceColor','red',... 
   'FaceAlpha',1,... 
   'EdgeColor','black') 
  
set(gca,'XTick',-10:5:10) 
set(gca,'YTick',-10:5:10) 
set(gca,'ZTick',-10:5:10) 
  
view([235 15]); % view 1 
% view([145 15]); % view 2 
% view([55 15]); % view 3 
% view([-35 15]); % view 4 
  
hold on 
  
% 2: Delta(b2) = -5 
  
x2=-10:0.5:10; 
y2=-10:0.5:10; 
  
[a2,b2]=meshgrid(x2,y2); 
z2=((((((10-5)/2)*((a1+10)./2).*((b1+10)./2)).^(1/3))-5).*2); 
  
mesh(x2,y2,z2,... 
   'FaceColor','green',... 
   'FaceAlpha',0.8,... 
   'EdgeColor','black') 
  
hold on 
  
% 3: Delta(b2) = 0 
  
x3=-10:0.5:10; 
y3=-10:0.5:10; 
  
[a3,b3]=meshgrid(x3,y3); 
z3=((((5*((a1+10)./2).*((b1+10)./2)).^(1/3))-5).*2); 
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mesh(x3,y3,z3,... 
   'FaceColor','yellow',... 
   'FaceAlpha',0.4,... 
   'EdgeColor','black') 
  
hold on 
  
% 4: Delta(b2) = 5 
  
x4=-10:0.5:10; 
y4=-10:0.5:10; 
  
[a4,b4]=meshgrid(x4,y4); 
z4=((((((10+5)/2)*((a1+10)./2).*((b1+10)./2)).^(1/3))-5).*2); 
  
mesh(x4,y4,z4,... 
   'FaceColor','cyan',... 
   'FaceAlpha',0.2,... 
   'EdgeColor','black') 
  
hold on 
  
% 5: Delta(b2) = 9.9 
  
x5=-10:0.5:10; 
y5=-10:0.5:10; 
  
[a5,b5]=meshgrid(x5,y5); 
z5=((((((10+9.9)/2)*((a1+10)./2).*((b1+10)./2)).^(1/3))-5).*2); 
  
mesh(x5,y5,z5,... 
   'FaceColor','blue',... 
   'FaceAlpha',0.1,... 
   'EdgeColor','black') 
  
hold on 
 
 
 
